Tax transparency can work for companies if they do it right

The Tax Transparency Package released by the European Commission last week comes amid global moves by the G20 and others to make it more difficult for companies to avoid paying their fair share of tax. But as serious information sharing plans are hammered out between nations around the world, the Australian government is considering protecting the privacy of some of Australia’s richest people, diluting transparency measures aimed at private companies.

Not all corporate tax avoiders will be snared by new rules

Hockey’s budget announcement of two major tax integrity measures was flagged before the budget was handed down, but even that came as no surprise. Integrity, or lack thereof, in our tax system is a hot topic and an easy target for a Treasurer looking to sell a federal budget. The first of the proposed changes is to our GST regime. No-one likes hearing that they will be paying more tax. But, the charging of GST on supplies of digital products and services in Australia by an off-shore supplier will at least make sense to the general public. With the inherent unfairness in the current system and a revenue raising prediction of A$350 million over the next four years, most are likely to accept the logic of such a measure. The second of the proposed changes are new laws to be included in Australia’s general anti-avoidance provision. New laws, which will apply from 1 January 2016, are aimed at multinational companies engaged in aggressive tax practices. The proposed anti-avoidance law is designed to stop multinationals that artificially avoid a taxable presence in Australia. It is difficult to see how this strategy of addressing specific behaviour through what is considered a general provision will work. And, it is these changes that are already causing confusion.

More than naming and shaming needed to stop corporate tax avoidance

The report of the Senate Economics References Committee inquiry into corporate tax avoidance comes with the subtitle – “You cannot tax what you cannot see”, with a strong focus on increased transparency. The majority of the 17 recommendations in the interim report relate to improved transparency of the tax affairs of corporate taxpayers. This is a significant step in the right direction. Recent experiences in the war on corporate tax avoidance both in Australia and overseas confirm that “information is power”. Most notably, we have seen increased transparency changing the behaviour of multinational enterprises as well as inducing governments to act.

Government cracks down on tax avoidance through foreign investment rules

The Turnbull Government announced yet another measure aimed at addressing tax base erosion and profit shifting, placing additional requirements on new foreign investment under the existing national interest test. In the last 12 months Australia has seen various reforms within the tax system. However, this latest initiative is a shift as it links Australia’s tax regime with its foreign investment regime. It sends a broader signal to the market that Australia will look beyond the collection of tax revenues to a consideration of national interest.

Ao Ministério Público da união e à Receita Federal brasileira, tudo? uma análise crítica à lei complementar 105 de 2001 como possível meio de coibir o crime de Sonegação Fiscal

O trabalho de conclusão de curso tem como objetivo central a análise crítica da Lei Complementar nº 105 de 2001- que autoriza a Receita Federal do Brasil a quebrar diretamente o sigilo bancário dos contribuintes, com base em possíveis indícios de omissões, fraudes e simulações- como meio hábil para coibir o crime de sonegação fiscal. A partir dessa análise, vamos testar a hipótese de que nenhum agente público pode determinar a quebra das informações bancárias de um contribuinte, sem a prévia autorização do Poder Judiciário. O artigo tem três partes. Na primeira, os principais conceitos que envolvem o sigilo bancário e as possíveis exceções à quebra do sigilo bancário são descritas e discutidas. A partir do exame conceitual, vamos estudar a correlação desse assunto com o combate à sonegação fiscal e a afirmação do princípio da transparência fiscal na comunidade internacional. Na última parte, somos chamados a estudar a opinião da Suprema Corte quanto ao objeto do presente trabalho. A conclusão a que se chega é a de que os agentes públicos não podem obter as referidas informações sem prévia autorização de um juiz. Contudo, a matéria apesar de muito antiga, ainda é polêmica para a doutrina e a jurisprudência. Além disso, a alteração na composição do Supremo Tribunal Federal, de 2010 para 2015, pode indicar uma mudança também no entendimento dos magistrados quanto ao assunto.

ORÇAMENTO DOS MUNICÍPIOS DO ABC PAULISTA: uma avaliação da conformidade dos portais da transparência com as normas fiscais

As normas da transparência fiscal (LC 101/00, LC131/09, Decreto 7185/10) determinam que todos os entes da federação das três esferas de poder disponibilizem na internet, em tempo real, informações pormenorizadas sobre a execução orçamentária e financeira. O ente federativo mais próximo do cidadão é o município, onde o seu espaço de vida é constituído. A transparência das informações municipais possibilita um melhor acompanhamento das contas públicas. Dessa forma, o cidadão poderá exercer de forma mais eficaz o seu direito de accountability. O objetivo da pesquisa é avaliar o nível de transparência do orçamento público dos municípios do ABC Paulista, com base na conformidade com as normas legais da transparência fiscal. A pesquisa é exploratória e de natureza descritiva, com abordagem quantitativa. Foram construídos escores de conformidade para os municípios, permitindo classificá-los em quatro categorias de transparência: transparente, translúcido, diáfano e opaco. A coleta de dados foi realizada no período de fevereiro a junho de 2013 por meio da observação nos portais eletrônicos da transparência de cada município. As evidências empíricas apontam que os portais não estão em total conformidade com as exigências legais. No que tange a accountability os avanços ainda são modestos, a assimetria informacional ainda persiste e o conteúdo divulgado é muito técnico.

How do inequality affect tax morale in Latin America and Caribbean?

Latin America is well known as an inequitable region. As it is recognized, inequality and corruption perception weaken the way that political institutions works and the democratic system. Focusing on Latin American and Caribbean countries, this paper analyzes what are the elements shaping tax morale. In particular, how the context influences ethical grounds decisions such as the predisposition to pay taxes is analyzed, using the survey carried out in 2005 by Latinobarometro. The objective is to analyze how country performance determines tax morale. To do so, four probitmodels are estimated using Gini index, Transparency International Corruption Perception Index and Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPpc) as explanatory variables. As expected we found that some socio-demographic variables play a relevant role. Interestingly, we also found that, in this attitude, LAC countries do not register a gender bias. However, those are not our main contributions to the literature on the field. The most important results are linked to: 1) the levelmatters, GDPpc increases the probability of people having tax morale, 2) moreover, income distributionalso influence on tax morale but in opposite direction and 3) corruption perception also reduces tax morale. Those results show that the quality of institutions matters and therefore, the way that democracy works play a relevant role.

Tax incentives for foreign direct investment part I : Recent trends and countertrends

According to the conventional wisdom, tax incentives for investment - in particular for foreign direct investment (FDI) - are not recommended. That is the view held almost universally by theorists and by the international bodies that advise on tax matters.' Tax incentives are bad in theory and bad in practice. They are bad in theory principally because they cause distortions: investment decisions are made that would not have been made without the inducement of special tax concessions. They are bad in practice, being both ineffective and inefficient. They are ineffective in that tax considerations are only rarely a major determinant in FDI decisions; they are inefficient because their cost, in terms of tax revenue foregone, often far exceeds any benefits they may produce. Other criticisms are also frequently levelled against tax incentives for FDI - they are inequitable (since they benefit some investors but not others), they are difficult to administer and open to abuse, and they lack transparency. Thus, it is not surprising that ''the standard advice given by institutions like the World Bank and the lMF to developing countries is to refrain from offering tax incentives to foreign investors".2 The purpose of this article is not to question that advice or to challenge the conventional wisdom - except in one respect. Recent evidence does suggest that tax considerations are an increasingly important factor in investment decisions and that special tax incentives have become substantially more effective as instruments for attracting FDI than they were 10 or 20 years ago.3 The first part of this article, published here, examines some of that evidence, reviews some recent trends in national policies towards FDI, attempts to suggest why investment incentives have become more important and more effective, and looks at the pressures that are exerted on governments, especially in developing countries, to compete for FDI by offering special incentives. The second part of the article, to be published in the Bulletin next month, assumes that many countries will continue to offer tax incentives to investors regardless of the best advice, and considers how incentives might be designed in order to increase their effectiveness and efficiency.

Health spending, illicit financial flows and tax incentives in Malawi

This analysis examines the gaps in health care financing in Malawi and how foregone taxes could fill these gaps. It begins with an assessment of the disease burden and government health expenditure. Then it analyses the tax revenues foregone by the government of Malawi by two main routes • Illicit financial flows (IFF) from the country • Tax incentives. We find that there are significant financing gaps in the health sector; for example, government expenditure is United States Dollars (USD) 177 million for 2013/2014 while projected donor contribution in 2013/2014 is USD 207 million and the total cost for the minimal health package is USD 535 million. Thus the funding gap between the government budget for health and the required spending to provide the minimal package for 2013/2014 is USD 358 million. On the other hand we estimate that almost USD 400million is lost through IFF and corporate utilization of tax incentives each year. The revenues foregone plus the current government health spending would be sufficient to cover the minimal public health package for all Malawians and would help tackle Malawi’s disease burden. Every effort must be made, including improving transparency and revising laws, to curtail IFF and moderate tax incentives.