On inequality tax evasion and progressive taxes

This paper proposes a simple variation of the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) construct and integrates it to a dynamic general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous agents. We study an overlapping generations framework i n which agents must initially decide whether to evade taxes or not. In the event they decide to evade, they then have to decide the extent of income or wealth they wish to under-report. We find that in comparison with the basic approach, the ‘evade or not’ choice drastically reduced the extent of evasion in the economy. This outcome is the result of an anomaly intrinsic to the basic Allingham and Sandmo version of the model, which makes the evade-or-not extension a more suitable approach to modelling the issue. We also find that the basic model, and the model with and ‘evade-or-not’ choice have strikingly different political economy implications, , which suggest fruitful avenues of empirical research.

Asymmetric Information, Tax Evasion and Alternative Instruments of Government Revenue

Using a pure-exchange overlapping generations model, characterized with tax evasion and information asymmetry between the government (the social planner) and the financial intermediaries, we try and seek for the optimal tax and seigniorage plans, derived from the welfare maximizing objective of the social planner. We show that irrespective of whether the economy is characterized by tax evasion, or asymmetric information, a benevolent social planner, maximizing welfare and simultaneously financing the budget constraint, should optimally rely on explicit rather than implicit taxation.

The Proposed Financial Transaction Tax – Extraterritorial Effect, Tax Evasion and Other Legal Problems Facing the Proposal

The main topic of this master’s thesis is the proposed EU directive on a financial transaction tax. Ten Member States which want to enact the directive by using enhanced cooperation are currently negotiating the contents of the proposal. This tax would be levied on specific products which are traded on the financial markets. As an example the transaction of stocks would be taxed at a percentage of 0.1 percent, and the transaction of derivatives at a percentage of 0.01 percent. The proposed financial transaction tax would enter into force in said ten countries but it would still have effects on those countries, which are not planning on participating in this taxation system. This is one of the main reasons why this tax has faced a lot of opposition in several European Union countries. The main legal problems the tax is predicted to have are tax evasion, double taxation, and extraterritorial effect. The Commission has stated that it is aiming to reach certain objectives with the financial transaction tax. These objectives are for example to stabilise the financial markets following the financial crisis, and to deter tax evasion. Commission has defended the planning of the financial transaction tax by stating that the tax is likely to reach its objectives. The planning of the financial transaction tax began already in 2011 when the Commission published the first draft of the proposal. Following this the proposal was last amended in 2013, but the participating Member States are currently still negotiating the contents of the proposal. The participating Member States published a statement in December 2015 in which they promised that there will be a decision made about the financial transaction tax by the end of June 2016.

Tax morale and conditional cooperation

Why so many people pay their taxes, even though fines and audit probability are low, is a central question in the tax compliance literature. Positing a homo oeconomicus having a refined motivation structure sheds light on this puzzle. This paper provides empirical evidence for the relevance of conditional cooperation, using survey data from 30 West and East European countries. We find a high correlation between perceived tax evasion and tax morale. The results remain robust after exploiting endogeneity and conducting several robustness tests. We also observe a strong positive correlation between institutional quality and tax mmorale. Keywords: Tax morale; Tax compliance; Tax evasion; Pro-social behavior; Institutions

Planeamento fiscal abusivo: exemplificação de alguns esquemas

Dissertação de Mestrado apresentada ao Instituto de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Contabilidade e Finanças sobre a orientação do Doutor José Campos Amorim.

O sigilo bancário e a fraude fiscal

Tax evasion and fraud threaten the economic and social objectives of modern tax systems, precluding the state funding for the satisfaction of collective needs and the fair distribution of wealth, being a violation of basic principles and values of our society. In tax law, to give tax administration the necessary powers to supervise and control the information provided by taxpayers and combat tax evasion and fraud, over the last years the grounds for a derogation of bank secrecy without judicial authorization have been extended, which raises some constitutional compatibility issues. Similarly, this tendency of making this legal regime more flexible and increasing automatic exchange of information has been followed by the European Union and the international community. Banking secrecy, as a professional secrecy, is an instrument to protect the right to privacy but also appears as an anti-abuse and repressive mechanism of evasive and fraudulent behaviors. Because of the conflict of interests will always be necessary to make a practical agreement between them, ensuring the legality and the due guarantees of the taxpayers but also an effective way to combat tax evasion and fraud. Bank secrecy cannot be one method to, behind the right to privacy, taxpayers practice illegal activities. But the practice of these irregular conducts also does not justify a total annihilation of the right to banking secrecy, uncovering all documents and bank information’s. Although considering the legislative changes, the administrative derogation of bank secrecy will always be what the tax administration does of it.

Gender and public attitude toward corruption and tax evasion

The topics of corruption and tax evasion have attracted significant attention in the literature in recent years. We build on that literature by investigating empirically: (1) whether attitudes toward corruption and tax evasion vary systematically with gender and (2) whether gender differences decline as men and women face similar opportunities for illicit behavior. We use data on eight Western European countries from the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey. The results reveal significantly greater aversion to corruption and tax evasion among women. This holds across countries and time, and across numerous empirical specifications. (JEL H260, D730, J160, Z130)

Serious tax non compliance : motivation and guardianship

This article reviews what international evidence exists on the impact of civil and criminal sanctions upon serious tax noncompliance by individuals. This construct lacks sharp definitional boundaries but includes large tax fraud and large-scale evasion that are not dealt with as fraud. Although substantial research and theory have been developed on general tax evasion and compliance, their conclusions might not apply to large-scale intentional fraudsters. No scientifically defensible studies directly compared civil and criminal sanctions for tax fraud, although one U.S. study reported that significantly enhanced criminal sanctions have more effects than enhanced audit levels. Prosecution is public, whereas administrative penalties are confidential, and this fact encourages those caught to pay heavy penalties to avoid publicity, a criminal record, and imprisonment.

Tax evasion, inequality, and progressive taxes : a political economy perspective

The standard approach to tax compliance applies the economics-of-crime methodology pioneered by Becker (1968): in its first application, due to Allingham and Sandmo (1972) it models the behaviour of agents as a decision involving a choice of the extent of their income to report to tax authorities, given a certain institutional environment, represented by parameters such as the probability of detection and penalties in the event the agent is caught. While this basic framework yields important insights on tax compliance behavior, it has some critical limitations. Specifically, it indicates a level of compliance that is significantly below what is observed in the data. This thesis revisits the original framework with a view towards addressing this issue, and examining the political economy implications of tax evasion for progressivity in the tax structure. The approach followed involves building a macroeconomic, dynamic equilibrium model for the purpose of examining these issues, by using a step-wise model building procedure starting with some very simple variations of the basic Allingham and Sandmo construct, which are eventually integrated to a dynamic general equilibrium overlapping generations framework with heterogeneous agents. One of the variations involves incorporating the Allingham and Sandmo construct into a two-period model of a small open economy of the type originally attributed to Fisher (1930). A further variation of this simple construct involves allowing agents to initially decide whether to evade taxes or not. In the event they decide to evade, the agents then have to decide the extent of income or wealth they wish to under-report. We find that the ‘evade or not’ assumption has strikingly different and more realistic implications for the extent of evasion, and demonstrate that it is a more appropriate modeling strategy in the context of macroeconomic models, which are essentially dynamic in nature, and involve consumption smoothing across time and across various states of nature. Specifically, since deciding to undertake tax evasion impacts on the consumption smoothing ability of the agent by creating two states of nature in which the agent is ‘caught’ or ‘not caught’, there is a possibility that their utility under certainty, when they choose not to evade, is higher than the expected utility obtained when they choose to evade. Furthermore, the simple two-period model incorporating an ‘evade or not’ choice can be used to demonstrate some strikingly different political economy implications relative to its Allingham and Sandmo counterpart. In variations of the two models that allow for voting on the tax parameter, we find that agents typically choose to vote for a high degree of progressivity by choosing the highest available tax rate from the menu of choices available to them. There is, however, a small range of inequality levels for which agents in the ‘evade or not’ model vote for a relatively low value of the tax rate. The final steps in the model building procedure involve grafting the two-period models with a political economy choice into a dynamic overlapping generations setting with more general, non-linear tax schedules and a ‘cost-of evasion’ function that is increasing in the extent of evasion. Results based on numerical simulations of these models show further improvement in the model’s ability to match empirically plausible levels of tax evasion. In addition, the differences between the political economy implications of the ‘evade or not’ version of the model and its Allingham and Sandmo counterpart are now very striking; there is now a large range of values of the inequality parameter for which agents in the ‘evade or not’ model vote for a low degree of progressivity. This is because, in the ‘evade or not’ version of the model, low values of the tax rate encourages a large number of agents to choose the ‘not-evade’ option, so that the redistributive mechanism is more ‘efficient’ relative to the situations in which tax rates are high. Some further implications of the models of this thesis relate to whether variations in the level of inequality, and parameters such as the probability of detection and penalties for tax evasion matter for the political economy results. We find that (i) the political economy outcomes for the tax rate are quite insensitive to changes in inequality, and (ii) the voting outcomes change in non-monotonic ways in response to changes in the probability of detection and penalty rates. Specifically, the model suggests that changes in inequality should not matter, although the political outcome for the tax rate for a given level of inequality is conditional on whether there is a large or small or large extent of evasion in the economy. We conclude that further theoretical research into macroeconomic models of tax evasion is required to identify the structural relationships underpinning the link between inequality and redistribution in the presence of tax evasion. The models of this thesis provide a necessary first step in that direction.

Tax structure and tax evasion in Latin America

Incluye bibliografia

Tax evasion: causes, estimation methods, and penalties: a focus on Latin America

Includes bibliography

Tax morale and tax evasion: Social preferences and bounded rationality

We study a family of models of tax evasion, where a flat-rate tax finances only the provision of public goods, neglecting audits and wage differences. We focus on the comparison of two modeling approaches. The first is based on optimizing agents, who are endowed with social preferences, their utility being the sum of private consumption and moral utility. The second approach involves agents acting according to simple heuristics. We find that while we encounter the traditionally shaped Laffer-curve in the optimizing model, the heuristics models exhibit (linearly) increasing Laffercurves. This difference is related to a peculiar type of behavior emerging within the heuristics based approach: a number of agents lurk in a moral state of limbo, alternating between altruism and selfishness.

Sales tax enforcement: An empirical analysis of compliance enforcement methodologies and pathologies

Most research on tax evasion has focused on the income tax. Sales tax evasion has been largely ignored and dismissed as immaterial. This paper explored the differences between income tax and sales tax evasion and demonstrated that sales tax enforcement is deserving of and requires the use of different tools to achieve compliance. Specifically, the major enforcement problem with sales tax is not evasion: it is theft perpetrated by companies that act as collection agents for the state. Companies engage in a principal-agent relationship with the state and many retain funds collected as an agent of the state for private use. As such, the act of sales tax theft bears more resemblance to embezzlement than to income tax evasion. It has long been assumed that the sales tax is nearly evasion free, and state revenue departments report voluntary compliance in a manner that perpetuates this myth. Current sales tax compliance enforcement methodologies are similar in form to income tax compliance enforcement methodologies and are based largely on trust. The primary focus is on delinquent filers with a very small percentage of businesses subject to audit. As a result, there is a very large group of noncompliant businesses who file on time and fly below the radar while stealing millions of taxpayer dollars. ^ The author utilized a variety of statistical methods with actual field data derived from operations of the Southern Region Criminal Investigations Unit of the Florida Department of Revenue to evaluate current and proposed sales tax compliance enforcement methodologies in a quasi-experimental, time series research design and to set forth a typology of sales tax evaders. This study showed that current estimates of voluntary compliance in sales tax systems are seriously and significantly overstated and that current enforcement methodologies are inadequate to identify the majority of violators and enforce compliance. Sales tax evasion is modeled using the theory of planned behavior and Cressey’s fraud triangle and it is demonstrated that proactive enforcement activities, characterized by substantial contact with non-delinquent taxpayers, results in superior ability to identify noncompliance and provides a structure through which noncompliant businesses can be rehabilitated.^