The Supreme Court Confirmation Process and Its Implications

In recent history, there has been a trend of increasing partisan polarization throughout most of the American political system. Some of the impacts of this polarization are obvious; however, there is reason to believe that we miss some of the indirect effects of polarization. Accompanying the trend of increased polarization has been an increase in the contentiousness of the Supreme Court confirmation process. I believe that these two trends are related. Furthermore, I argue that these trends have an impact on judicial behavior. This is an issue worth exploring, since the Supreme Court is the most isolated branch of the federal government. The Constitution structured the Supreme Court to ensure that it was as isolated as possible from short-term political pressures and interests. This study attempts to show how it may be possible that those goals are no longer being fully achieved. My first hypothesis in this study is that increases in partisan polarization are a direct cause of the increase in the level of contention during the confirmation process. I then hypothesize that the more contention a justice faces during his or her confirmation process, the more ideologically extreme that justice will then vote on the bench. This means that a nominee appointed by a Republican president will tend to vote even more conservatively than was anticipated following a contentious confirmation process, and vice versa for Democratic appointees. In order to test these hypotheses, I developed a data set for every Supreme Court nominee dating back to President Franklin D. Roosevelt¿s appointments (1937). With this data set, I ran a series of regression models to analyze these relationships. Statistically speaking, the results support my first hypothesis in a fairly robust manner. My regression results for my second hypothesis indicate that the trend I am looking for is present for Republican nominees. For Democratic nominees, the impacts are less robust. Nonetheless, as the results will show, contention during the confirmation process does seem to have some impact on judicial behavior. Following my quantitative analysis, I analyze a series of case studies. These case studies serve to provide tangible examples of these statistical trends as well as to explore what else may be going on during the confirmation process and subsequent judicial decision-making. I use Justices Stevens, Rehnquist, and Alito as the subjects for these case studies. These cases will show that the trends described above do seem to be identifiable at the level of an individual case. These studies further help to indicate other potential impacts on judicial behavior. For example, following Justice Rehnquist¿s move from Associate to Chief Justice, we see a marked change in his behavior. Overall, this study serves as a means of analyzing some of the more indirect impacts of partisan polarization in modern politics. Further, the study offers a means of exploring some of the possible constraints (both conscious and subconscious) that Supreme Court justices may feel while they decide how to cast a vote in a particular case. Given the wide-reaching implications of Supreme Court decisions, it is important to try to grasp a full view of how these decisions are made.

The inherent equitable jurisdiction and the plenary power of the Supreme Court of New South Wales to order the winding up of companies

Not all companies in Australia are amenable to a winding up order pursuant to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The Supreme Court of New South Wales has previously dealt with such winding up applications by apparently focusing on the inherent jurisdiction of the court to consider whether the court has jurisdiction to firstly consider the winding up application. This article proposes an original alternative paradigm: the plenary power provided to the court by s 23 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) can be utilised to initially attract the jurisdiction of the court and subsequently the inherent jurisdiction specifically utilising the equitable “just and equitable” ground is available to the court to consider and make such a winding up order if appropriate. Variation of such a paradigm may also be available to the court when considering the inherent jurisdiction in relation to corporation matters more generally.

Bilski v Kappos : The United States Supreme Court delivers mixed views on patenting non-physical inventions and business methods

The United States Supreme Court has handed down a once in a generation patent law decision that will have important ramifications for the patentability of non-physical methods, both internationally and in Australia. In Bilski v Kappos, the Supreme Court considered whether an invention must either be tied to a machine or apparatus, or transform an article into a different state or thing to be patentable. It also considered for the first time whether business methods are patentable subject matter. The decision will be of particular interest to practitioners who followed the litigation in Grant v Commissioner of Patents, a Federal Court decision in which a Brisbane-based inventor was denied a patent over a method of protecting an asset from the claims of creditors.

Caveat today gone tomorrow : Applying to the Supreme Court to Remove a Caveat

While there are many reasons why a client may seek removal of a caveat (which retains an interest in land or water allocation), the procedures involved require careful adherence.

Supreme Court Decision Results in a Change to Standard Contracts

The decision of Dalton J in Lai v Soineva [2011] QSC 247 has resulted in a change in the latest versions of the Real Estate Institute of Queensland (REIQ) contracts.

Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) s 253 – whether refusal to stay execution of costs is an order “as to costs only”

In Virgtel Ltd v Zabusky [2009] QCA 92 the Queensland Court of Appeal considered the scope of an order “as to costs only” within the meaning of s 253 of the Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) (‘the Act”). The Court also declined to accept submissions from one of the parties after oral hearing, and made some useful comments which serve as a reminder to practitioners of their obligations in that regard.

Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) s 253 - leave to appeal costs orders - appeal against substantive judgment insufficient - must be arguable case that discretion will be overturned on appeal

The recent decision of the Court of Appeal in AGL Sales (Qld) Pty Ltd v Dawson Sales Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 262 provides clear direction on the Court’s expectations of a party seeking leave to appeal a costs order.This decision is likely to impact upon common practice in relation to appeals against costs orders. It sends a clear message to trial judges that they should not give leave as of course when giving a judgment in relation to costs, and that parties seeking leave under s 253 of the Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) should make a separate application. The application should be supported by material presenting an arguable case that the trial judge made an error in the exercise of the discretion of the kind described in House v King (1936) 55 CLR 499. A different, and interesting, aspect of this appeal is that it was the first wholly electronic civil appeal. The court-provided technology had been adopted at trial, and the Court of Appeal dispensed with any requirement for hard copy appeal record books.

Supreme Court Act 1995 s48 - Interest on judgment for damages for personal injuries

The case of Flynn v The Maryborough Sugar Factory Limited [2003] QDC 446 the plaintiff had been awarded damages for personal injuries and there was a charge on those damages under a Commonwealth statute, with a provision in the statute that damages could not be satisfied until the Commonwealth had been paid. The Court considered the point of considerable practical significance of whether interest accrued on the judgment under s48 of the Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) before the defendant had obtained clearances under the Commonwealth legislation.

Absent Witnesses and the U.K. Supreme Court: Judicial Deference as Judicial Dialogue?

This article analyses the position of absent witness evidence under the UK Criminal Justice Act 2003 after significant European and domestic case law on the topic. It argues that flexibility in the hearsay regime under the 2003 Act and a permissive approach by appellate courts has increased the potential for fair trial violations in recent years. Moreover, the UK Supreme Court decision in R v Horncastle preserves domestic courts’ authority to determine the meaning of European rights and selectively defer to Parliament. This area of the law demonstrates the scope that the domestic system retains for divergence from European standards.

The First Year of the UK's Supreme Court

This article reviews the judgments issued by the UK Supreme Court during the first year of its existence (October 2009 - September 2010) and assesses how the modus operandi of the new court differs from that of its predecessor, the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords.

A Human Rights Triumph? Dictatorship-Era Crimes and the Chilean Supreme Court

This article assesses the dramatic shift in Chilean Supreme Court jurisprudence toward accountability for crimes committed during the dictatorship and sets it within the context of judicial reform and political change. Chile's experience has been identified as emblematic of delayed justice, but an examination of key case law identifies the narrow scope and instability of Supreme Court decision-making. The Court has been uncharacteristically assertive in its application of human rights norms yet vulnerable to external influences. The Chilean example underscores the need for political leadership to address past violations in post-conflict societies. Political inertia impeded justice claims and, as a result, change required significant judicial innovation.

Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court

After setting the scene by explaining the constraints which are placed on the Justices of the UK Supreme Court, this book considers how human rights are conceptualized by the Court in general and how in particular the procedural questions thrown up by the Human Rights Act have been dealt with so far. It then examines on a right-by-right basis the Justices' position on all the European Convention rights and some additional international human rights standards incorporated into UK law.