Supreme Court Act 1995 s48 - Interest on judgment for damages for personal injuries

The case of Flynn v The Maryborough Sugar Factory Limited [2003] QDC 446 the plaintiff had been awarded damages for personal injuries and there was a charge on those damages under a Commonwealth statute, with a provision in the statute that damages could not be satisfied until the Commonwealth had been paid. The Court considered the point of considerable practical significance of whether interest accrued on the judgment under s48 of the Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) before the defendant had obtained clearances under the Commonwealth legislation.

Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) s 253 – whether refusal to stay execution of costs is an order “as to costs only”

In Virgtel Ltd v Zabusky [2009] QCA 92 the Queensland Court of Appeal considered the scope of an order “as to costs only” within the meaning of s 253 of the Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) (‘the Act”). The Court also declined to accept submissions from one of the parties after oral hearing, and made some useful comments which serve as a reminder to practitioners of their obligations in that regard.

Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) s 253 - leave to appeal costs orders - appeal against substantive judgment insufficient - must be arguable case that discretion will be overturned on appeal

The recent decision of the Court of Appeal in AGL Sales (Qld) Pty Ltd v Dawson Sales Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 262 provides clear direction on the Court’s expectations of a party seeking leave to appeal a costs order.This decision is likely to impact upon common practice in relation to appeals against costs orders. It sends a clear message to trial judges that they should not give leave as of course when giving a judgment in relation to costs, and that parties seeking leave under s 253 of the Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) should make a separate application. The application should be supported by material presenting an arguable case that the trial judge made an error in the exercise of the discretion of the kind described in House v King (1936) 55 CLR 499. A different, and interesting, aspect of this appeal is that it was the first wholly electronic civil appeal. The court-provided technology had been adopted at trial, and the Court of Appeal dispensed with any requirement for hard copy appeal record books.

The Supreme court act R.S., c. 139 (1906) and rules : with references to all the decisions of the court dealing with its practice and jurisprudence /

Mode of access: Internet.

The inherent equitable jurisdiction and the plenary power of the Supreme Court of New South Wales to order the winding up of companies

Not all companies in Australia are amenable to a winding up order pursuant to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The Supreme Court of New South Wales has previously dealt with such winding up applications by apparently focusing on the inherent jurisdiction of the court to consider whether the court has jurisdiction to firstly consider the winding up application. This article proposes an original alternative paradigm: the plenary power provided to the court by s 23 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) can be utilised to initially attract the jurisdiction of the court and subsequently the inherent jurisdiction specifically utilising the equitable “just and equitable” ground is available to the court to consider and make such a winding up order if appropriate. Variation of such a paradigm may also be available to the court when considering the inherent jurisdiction in relation to corporation matters more generally.

A general charter for trade associations. Correspondence between the attorney general and the secretary of commerce. Permissible activities of trade associations. Text of Supreme court decision condemning certain practices. Text of act legalizing agricultural cooperative marketing associations, together with a treatise on the application of these pronouncements.

Mode of access: Internet.

[Documents bearing on the suit brought by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in the Supreme Court of the U.S. to test the constitutionality of the Sheppard-Towner Act involving the principle of federal aid legislation.]

Mode of access: Internet.

Abstracts of Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Interstate commerce act.

Mode of access: Internet.

Civil Practice Act and Rules of Supreme Court.

Title varies; Vol. for 1934 does not include rules of the Supreme Court; vols. for 1949-1975 include Administrative Review Act.

The Youth Commission act and related materials classified to Illinois revised statutes, 1957, Illinois Attorney General's Opinions, 1953- 1957, and Illinois Supreme Court Reports.

Mode of access: Internet.

Small business problems. The Supreme Court in relation to small business and the Sherman act.

At head of title: 77th Congress, 1st session. Senate Committee print no. 2.

Absent Witnesses and the U.K. Supreme Court: Judicial Deference as Judicial Dialogue?

This article analyses the position of absent witness evidence under the UK Criminal Justice Act 2003 after significant European and domestic case law on the topic. It argues that flexibility in the hearsay regime under the 2003 Act and a permissive approach by appellate courts has increased the potential for fair trial violations in recent years. Moreover, the UK Supreme Court decision in R v Horncastle preserves domestic courts’ authority to determine the meaning of European rights and selectively defer to Parliament. This area of the law demonstrates the scope that the domestic system retains for divergence from European standards.

Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court

After setting the scene by explaining the constraints which are placed on the Justices of the UK Supreme Court, this book considers how human rights are conceptualized by the Court in general and how in particular the procedural questions thrown up by the Human Rights Act have been dealt with so far. It then examines on a right-by-right basis the Justices' position on all the European Convention rights and some additional international human rights standards incorporated into UK law.

Spanish Supreme Court Rules in Favour of Google Search Engine... and a Flexible Reading of Copyright Statutes?

On 3 April 2012, the Spanish Supreme Court issued a major ruling in favour of the Google search engine, including its ‘cache copy’ service: Sentencia n.172/2012, of 3 April 2012, Supreme Court, Civil Chamber.* The importance of this ruling lies not so much in the circumstances of the case (the Supreme Court was clearly disgusted by the claimant’s ‘maximalist’ petitum to shut down the whole operation of the search engine), but rather on the court going beyond the text of the Copyright Act into the general principles of the law and case law, and especially on the reading of the three-step test (in Art. 40bis TRLPI) in a positive sense so as to include all these principles. After accepting that none of the limitations listed in the Spanish Copyright statute (TRLPI) exempted the unauthorized use of fragments of the contents of a personal website through the Google search engine and cache copy service, the Supreme Court concluded against infringement, based on the grounds that the three-step test (in Art. 40bis TRLPI) is to be read not only in a negative manner but also in a positive sense so as to take into account that intellectual property – as any other kind of property – is limited in nature and must endure any ius usus inocui (harmless uses by third parties) and must abide to the general principles of the law, such as good faith and prohibition of an abusive exercise of rights (Art. 7 Spanish Civil Code).The ruling is a major success in favour of a flexible interpretation and application of the copyright statutes, especially in the scenarios raised by new technologies and market agents, and in favour of using the three-step test as a key tool to allow for it.

Revised rules of the Supreme court of the United States : Adopted June 5, 1928. Effective July 1, 1928. Amended June 1, 1931, and May 31, 1932. (The Acts of February 13, 1925, c.229, 43 Stat. 936, January 31, 1928, c. 14, 45 Stat. 54, and April 26, 1928, c. 440, 45 Stat. 466, are printed in an appendix.).

Act of February 13, 1925: An act to amend the Judicial code, and to further define the jurisdiction of the Circuit courts of appeals and of the Supreme court, and for other purposes; Act of January 31, 1928: An act in reference to writs of error; Act of April 26, 1928: An act to amend section 2 of an act entitled "An act in reference to writs of error" (12 pages at end) Eighty pages: "Amendments effective Sept. 1, 1932" inserted. (c.1).