Educational Expansion and Persistent Inequalities of Education: Utilizing the Subjective Expected Utility Theory to Explain the Increasing Participation Rates in Upper Secondary School in the Federal Republic Of Germany

This investigation attempts to answer the question why more and more parents have chosen the Gymnasium for their children's secondary school education in post‐war West Germany. Based on the theory of subjective expected utility, the crucial mechanisms of parental educational decisions have been emphasized. From this perspective it is assumed that increasing educational motivation coupled with changes in the subjective evaluation of the cost–benefit of education were important conditions for an increasing participation in upper secondary schools. These were, however, in turn, the result of educational expansion. The empirical analyses for three time‐periods in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s confirm these assumptions to a large degree. Additionally, empirical evidence was found to suggest that in addition to the intentions of parents and the educational career of their children, structural moments of educational expansion and their own inertia played an important role in the pupils' transition from one educational level to the next. Finally, evidence was found that persistent class‐specific educational inequality stems from a constant balance in the relative cost–benefit advantages between social classes as well as from an increasing difference of primary origin effect between social classes in the realization of their educational choice.

Conditional Expected Utility

Let 'epsilon' be a class of event. Conditionally Expected Utility decision makers are decision makers whose conditional preferences ≿E, E є 'epsilon', satisfy the axioms of Subjective Expected Utility theory (SEU). We extend the notion of unconditional preference that is conditionally EU to unconditional preferences that are not necessarily SEU. We give a representation theorem for a class of such preferences, and show that they are Invariant Bi-separable in the sense of Ghirardato et al.[7]. Then, we consider the special case where the unconditional preference is itself SEU, and compare our results with those of Fishburn [6].

Expected utility without full transitivity

We generalize the classical expected-utility criterion by weakening transitivity to Suzumura consistency. In the absence of full transitivity, reflexivity and completeness no longer follow as a consequence of the system of axioms employed and a richer class of rankings of probability distributions results. This class is characterized by means of standard expected-utility axioms in addition to Suzumura consistency. An important feature of some members of our new class is that they allow us to soften the negative impact of wellknown paradoxes without abandoning the expected-utility framework altogether.

Essays in Behavioral Decision Theory

This thesis studies decision making under uncertainty and how economic agents respond to information. The classic model of subjective expected utility and Bayesian updating is often at odds with empirical and experimental results; people exhibit systematic biases in information processing and often exhibit aversion to ambiguity. The aim of this work is to develop simple models that capture observed biases and study their economic implications.

In the first chapter I present an axiomatic model of cognitive dissonance, in which an agent's response to information explicitly depends upon past actions. I introduce novel behavioral axioms and derive a representation in which beliefs are directionally updated. The agent twists the information and overweights states in which his past actions provide a higher payoff. I then characterize two special cases of the representation. In the first case, the agent distorts the likelihood ratio of two states by a function of the utility values of the previous action in those states. In the second case, the agent's posterior beliefs are a convex combination of the Bayesian belief and the one which maximizes the conditional value of the previous action. Within the second case a unique parameter captures the agent's sensitivity to dissonance, and I characterize a way to compare sensitivity to dissonance between individuals. Lastly, I develop several simple applications and show that cognitive dissonance contributes to the equity premium and price volatility, asymmetric reaction to news, and belief polarization.

The second chapter characterizes a decision maker with sticky beliefs. That is, a decision maker who does not update enough in response to information, where enough means as a Bayesian decision maker would. This chapter provides axiomatic foundations for sticky beliefs by weakening the standard axioms of dynamic consistency and consequentialism. I derive a representation in which updated beliefs are a convex combination of the prior and the Bayesian posterior. A unique parameter captures the weight on the prior and is interpreted as the agent's measure of belief stickiness or conservatism bias. This parameter is endogenously identified from preferences and is easily elicited from experimental data.

The third chapter deals with updating in the face of ambiguity, using the framework of Gilboa and Schmeidler. There is no consensus on the correct way way to update a set of priors. Current methods either do not allow a decision maker to make an inference about her priors or require an extreme level of inference. In this chapter I propose and axiomatize a general model of updating a set of priors. A decision maker who updates her beliefs in accordance with the model can be thought of as one that chooses a threshold that is used to determine whether a prior is plausible, given some observation. She retains the plausible priors and applies Bayes' rule. This model includes generalized Bayesian updating and maximum likelihood updating as special cases.

Toward a rational-choice foundation of non-additive theories

A classical argument of de Finetti holds that Rationality implies Subjective Expected Utility (SEU). In contrast, the Knightian distinction between Risk and Ambiguity suggests that a rational decision maker would obey the SEU paradigm when the information available is in some sense good, and would depart from it when the information available is not good. Unlike de Finetti's, however, this view does not rely on a formal argument. In this paper, we study the set of all information structures that might be availabe to a decision maker, and show that they are of two types: those compatible with SEU theory and those for which SEU theory must fail. We also show that the former correspond to "good" information, while the latter correspond to information that is not good. Thus, our results provide a formalization of the distinction between Risk and Ambiguity. As a consequence of our main theorem (Theorem 2, Section 8), behavior not-conforming to SEU theory is bound to emerge in the presence of Ambiguity. We give two examples of situations of Ambiguity. One concerns the uncertainty on the class of measure zero events, the other is a variation on Ellberg's three-color urn experiment. We also briefly link our results to two other strands of literature: the study of ambiguous events and the problem of unforeseen contingencies. We conclude the paper by re-considering de Finetti's argument in light of our findings.

What is ambiguity?

The concept of Ambiguity designates those situations where the information available to the decision maker is insufficient to form a probabilistic view of the world. Thus, it has provided the motivation for departing from the Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) paradigm. Yet, the formalization of the concept is missing. This is a grave omission as it leaves non-expected utility models hanging on a shaky ground. In particular, it leaves unanswered basic questions such as: (1) Does Ambiguity exist?; (2) If so, which situations should be labeled as "ambiguous"?; (3) Why should one depart from Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) in the presence of Ambiguity?; and (4) If so, what kind of behavior should emerge in the presence of Ambiguity? The present paper fills these gaps. Specifically, it identifies those information structures that are incompatible with SEU theory, and shows that their mathematical properties are the formal counterpart of the intuitive idea of insufficient information. These are used to give a formal definition of Ambiguity and, consequently, to distinguish between ambiguous and unambiguous situations. Finally, the paper shows that behavior not conforming to SEU theory must emerge in correspondence of insufficient information and identifies the class of non-EU models that emerge in the face of Ambiguity. The paper also proposes a new comparative definition of Ambiguity, and discusses its relation with some of the existing literature.

Does uncertainty cause inertia in decision making? An experimental study of the role of regret aversion and indecisiveness

Previous research has shown that often there is clear inertia in individual decision making---that is, a tendency for decision makers to choose a status quo option. I conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate two potential determinants of inertia in uncertain environments: (i) regret aversion and (ii) ambiguity-driven indecisiveness. I use a between-subjects design with varying conditions to identify the effects of these two mechanisms on choice behavior. In each condition, participants choose between two simple real gambles, one of which is the status quo option. I find that inertia is quite large and that both mechanisms are equally important.

Risk, ambiguity, and diversification

Attitudes toward risk influence the decision to diversify among uncertain options. Yet, because in most situations the options are ambiguous, attitudes toward ambiguity may also play an important role. I conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the effect of ambiguity on the decision to diversify. I find that diversification is more prevalent and more persistent under ambiguity than under risk. Moreover, excess diversification under ambiguity is driven by participants who stick with a status quo gamble when diversification among gambles is not feasible. This behavioral pattern cannot be accommodated by major theories of choice under ambiguity.

Ensaio sobre o agente racional: esparadrapos para um paciente terminal?

The Rational Agent model have been a foundational basis for theoretical models such as Economics, Management Science, Artificial Intelligence and Game Theory, mainly by the ¿maximization under constraints¿ principle, e.g. the ¿Expected Utility Models¿, among them, the Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) Theory, from Savage, placed as most influence player over theoretical models we¿ve seen nowadays, even though many other developments have been done, indeed also in non-expected utility theories field. Having the ¿full rationality¿ assumption, going for a less idealistic sight ¿bounded rationality¿ of Simon, or for classical anomalies studies, such as the ¿heuristics and bias¿ analysis by Kahneman e Tversky, ¿Prospect Theory¿ also by Kahneman & Tversky, or Thaler¿s Anomalies, and many others, what we can see now is that Rational Agent Model is a ¿Management by Exceptions¿ example, as for each new anomalies¿s presentation, in sequence, a ¿problem solving¿ development is needed. This work is a theoretical essay, which tries to understand: 1) The rational model as a ¿set of exceptions¿; 2) The actual situation unfeasibility, since once an anomalie is identified, we need it¿s specific solution developed, and since the number of anomalies increases every year, making strongly difficult to manage rational model; 3) That behaviors judged as ¿irrationals¿ or deviated, by the Rational Model, are truly not; 4) That¿s the right moment to emerge a Theory including mental processes used in decision making; and 5) The presentation of an alternative model, based on some cognitive and experimental psychology analysis, such as conscious and uncounscious processes, cognition, intuition, analogy-making, abstract roles, and others. Finally, we present conclusions and future research, that claims for deeper studies in this work¿s themes, for mathematical modelling, and studies about a rational analysis and cognitive models possible integration. .

Voter Participation in the 1998 Bundestag Elections: A Theoretical Modification and Empirical Application of Downs’ Theory of Voter Participation

This article seeks to contribute to the illumination of the so-called 'paradox of voting' using the German Bundestag elections of 1998 as an empirical case. Downs' model of voter participation will be extended to include elements of the theory of subjective expected utility (SEU). This will allow a theoretical and empirical exploration of the crucial mechanisms of individual voters' decisions to participate, or abstain from voting, in the German general election of 1998. It will be argued that the infinitely low probability of an individual citizen's vote to decide the election outcome will not necessarily reduce the probability of electoral participation. The empirical analysis is largely based on data from the ALLBUS 1998. It confirms the predictions derived from SEU theory. The voters' expected benefits and their subjective expectation to be able to influence government policy by voting are the crucial mechanisms to explain participation. By contrast, the explanatory contribution of perceived information and opportunity costs is low.

Bildungsexpansion und Bildungsbeteiligung. Oder: warum immer mehr Schulpflichtige das Gymnasium besuchen

Die vorliegende Untersuchung ist ein Beitrag, die Frage zu klären, warum in der westdeutschen Nachkriegszeit immer mehr Schulpflichtige nach Abschluss der Grundschule das Gymnasium besuchen. Ausgehend von einem entscheidungstheoretischen Modell der subjektiven Werterwartung werden Mechanismen der elterlichen Bildungsentscheidung aufgezeigt. Dabei wird davon ausgegangen, dass sowohl zunehmende Bildungsmotivationen als auch Veränderungen in der subjektiven Bewertung von Kosten und Nutzen für eine höhere Bildung wichtige Voraussetzungen für die zunehmende Bildungsbeteiligung, aber auch Folgen der Bildungsexpansion waren. Die empirischen Analysen für drei Zeitpunkte in den 60er, 70er und 80er Jahren bestätigen diese Annahmen weitgehend. Ebenso wurde empirisch belegt, welch wichtige Rolle neben den Bildungsintentionen von Eltern und dem vorhergehenden Bildungsverlauf ihrer Kinder auch strukturelle Momente der Bildungsexpansion und ihre Eigendynamik beim tatsächlichen Bildungsübergang spielen. Schließlich gibt es Hinweise dafür, dass die Persistenz klassenspezifischer Bildungsungleichheiten auf einer konstanten Balance von Nutzen und Kosten zwischen den sozialen Klassen basiert.

Strategy-proof choice of acts : a preliminary study

We model social choices as acts mapping states of the world to (social) outcomes. A (social choice) rule assigns an act to every profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. A rule is strategy-proof if no agent ever has an incentive to misrepresent her beliefs about the world or her valuation of the outcomes; it is ex-post efficient if the act selected at any given preference profile picks a Pareto-efficient outcome in every state of the world. We show that every two-agent ex-post efficient and strategy-proof rule is a top selection: the chosen act picks the most preferred outcome of some (possibly different) agent in every state of the world. The states in which an agent’s top outcome is selected cannot vary with the reported valuations of the outcomes but may change with the reported beliefs. We give a complete characterization of the ex-post efficient and strategy-proof rules in the two-agent, two-state case, and we identify a rich class of such rules in the two-agent case.

Strategy-proof choice of acts : a preliminary study

We model social choices as acts mapping states of the world to (social) outcomes. A (social choice) rule assigns an act to every profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. A rule is strategy-proof if no agent ever has an incentive to misrepresent her beliefs about the world or her valuation of the outcomes; it is ex-post efficient if the act selected at any given preference profile picks a Pareto-efficient outcome in every state of the world. We show that every two-agent ex-post efficient and strategy-proof rule is a top selection: the chosen act picks the most preferred outcome of some (possibly different) agent in every state of the world. The states in which an agent’s top outcome is selected cannot vary with the reported valuations of the outcomes but may change with the reported beliefs. We give a complete characterization of the ex-post efficient and strategy-proof rules in the two-agent, two-state case, and we identify a rich class of such rules in the two-agent case.

Décisions et perspectives : de la théorie de l'utilité à la philosophie de la volonté.

Les implications philosophiques de la Théorie de la Perspective de 1979, notamment celles qui concernent l’introduction d’une fonction de valeur sur les résultats et d’un coefficient de pondération sur les probabilités, n’ont à ce jour jamais été explorées. Le but de ce travail est de construire une théorie philosophique de la volonté à partir des résultats de la Théorie de la Perspective. Afin de comprendre comment cette théorie a pu être élaborée il faut étudier la Théorie de l’Utilité Attendue dont elle est l’aboutissement critique majeur, c’est-à-dire les axiomatisations de la décision de Ramsey (1926), von Neumann et Morgenstern (1947), et enfin Savage (1954), qui constituent les fondements de la théorie classique de la décision. C’est entre autres la critique – par l’économie et la psychologie cognitive – du principe d’indépendance, des axiomes d’ordonnancement et de transitivité qui a permis de faire émerger les éléments représentationnels subjectifs à partir desquels la Théorie de la Perspective a pu être élaborée. Ces critiques ont été menées par Allais (1953), Edwards (1954), Ellsberg (1961), et enfin Slovic et Lichtenstein (1968), l’étude de ces articles permet de comprendre comment s’est opéré le passage de la Théorie de l’Utilité Attendue, à la Théorie de la Perspective. À l’issue de ces analyses et de celle de la Théorie de la Perspective est introduite la notion de Système de Référence Décisionnel, qui est la généralisation naturelle des concepts de fonction de valeur et de coefficient de pondération issus de la Théorie de la Perspective. Ce système, dont le fonctionnement est parfois heuristique, sert à modéliser la prise de décision dans l’élément de la représentation, il s’articule autour de trois phases : la visée, l’édition et l’évaluation. À partir de cette structure est proposée une nouvelle typologie des décisions et une explication inédite des phénomènes d’akrasie et de procrastination fondée sur les concepts d’aversion au risque et de surévaluation du présent, tous deux issus de la Théorie de la Perspective.