Теглови апроксимации с оператори от тип на Гудман–Шарма

P. E. Parvanov - The uniform weighted approximation errors of the Goodman–Sharma operators are characterized for functions.

Direct and Converse Theorems for Generalized Bernstein-Type Operators

2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: 41A25, 41A27, 41A36.

Some Results in Stability Analysis of Hybrid Dynamical Systems

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

First steps towards probabilistic justification logic

In this article, we introduce the probabilistic justification logic PJ, a logic in which we can reason about the probability of justification statements. We present its syntax and semantics, and establish a strong completeness theorem. Moreover, we investigate the relationship between PJ and the logic of uncertain justifications.

Algebraic duality theorems for infinite LP problems

In this paper we consider a primal-dual infinite linear programming problem-pair, i.e. LPs on infinite dimensional spaces with infinitely many constraints. We present two duality theorems for the problem-pair: a weak and a strong duality theorem. We do not assume any topology on the vector spaces, therefore our results are algebraic duality theorems. As an application, we consider transferable utility cooperative games with arbitrarily many players.

On lattices from combinatorial game theory modularity and a representation theorem: finite case

We show that a self-generated set of combinatorial games, S. may not be hereditarily closed but, strong self-generation and hereditary closure are equivalent in the universe of short games. In [13], the question "Is there a set which will give a non-distributive but modular lattice?" appears. A useful necessary condition for the existence of a finite non-distributive modular L(S) is proved. We show the existence of S such that L(S) is modular and not distributive, exhibiting the first known example. More, we prove a Representation Theorem with Games that allows the generation of all finite lattices in game context. Finally, a computational tool for drawing lattices of games is presented. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

A Folk Theorem for Games when Frequent Monitoring Decreases Noise

This paper studies frequent monitoring in an infinitely repeated game with imperfect public information and discounting, where players observe the state of a continuous time Brownian process at moments in time of length _. It shows that a limit folk theorem can be achieved with imperfect public monitoring when players monitor each other at the highest frequency, i.e., _. The approach assumes that the expected joint output depends exclusively on the action profile simultaneously and privately decided by the players at the beginning of each period of the game, but not on _. The strong decreasing effect on the expected immediate gains from deviation when the interval between actions shrinks, and the associated increase precision of the public signals, make the result possible in the limit. JEL: C72/73, D82, L20. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Public Monitoring, Brownian Motion.

An axiomatic characterization of the strong constrained egalitarian solution

In this paper we axiomatize the strong constrained egalitarian solution (Dutta and Ray, 1991) over the class of weak superadditive games using constrained egalitarianism, order-consistency, and converse order-consistency. JEL classification: C71, C78. Keywords: Cooperative TU-game, strong constrained egalitarian solution, axiomatization.

Strong structural controllability and the multi-link inverted pendulum

This technical note investigates the controllability of the linearized dynamics of the multilink inverted pendulum as the number of links and the number and location of actuators changes. It is demonstrated that, in some instances, there exist sets of parameter values that render the system uncontrollable and so usual methods for assessing controllability are difficult to employ. To assess the controllability, a theorem on strong structural controllability for single-input systems is extended to the multiinput case.

Strong structural controllability and the multilink inverted pendulum

This technical note investigates the controllability of the linearized dynamics of the multilink inverted pendulum as the number of links and the number and location of actuators changes. It is demonstrated that, in some instances, there exist sets of parameter values that render the system uncontrollable and so usual methods for assessing controllability are difficult to employ. To assess the controllability, a theorem on strong structural controllability for single-input systems is extended to the multiinput case.

On the interpretation of Andrews’ theorem

Andrews (1984) has shown that any flow satisfying Arnol'd's (1965, 1966) sufficient conditions for stability must be zonally-symmetric if the boundary conditions on the flow are zonally-symmetric. This result appears to place very strong restrictions on the kinds of flows that can be proved to be stable by Arnol'd's theorems. In this paper, Andrews’ theorem is re-examined, paying special attention to the case of an unbounded domain. It is shown that, in that case, Andrews’ theorem generally fails to apply, and Arnol'd-stable flows do exist that are not zonally-symmetric. The example of a circular vortex with a monotonic vorticity profile is a case in point. A proof of the finite-amplitude version of the Rayleigh stability theorem for circular vortices is also established; despite its similarity to the Arnol'd theorems it seems not to have been put on record before.

Invex nonsmooth alternative theorem and applications

An invex constrained nonsmooth optimization problem is considered, in which the presence of an abstract constraint set is possibly allowed. Necessary and sufficient conditions of optimality are provided and weak and strong duality results established. Following Geoffrion's approach an invex nonsmooth alternative theorem of Gordan type is then derived. Subsequently, some applications on multiobjective programming are then pursued. © 2000 OPA (Overseas Publishers Association) N.V. Published by license under the Gordon and Breach Science Publishers imprint.

Interactive theorem provers: issues faced as a user and tackled as a developer

Interactive theorem provers (ITP for short) are tools whose final aim is to certify proofs written by human beings. To reach that objective they have to fill the gap between the high level language used by humans for communicating and reasoning about mathematics and the lower level language that a machine is able to “understand” and process. The user perceives this gap in terms of missing features or inefficiencies. The developer tries to accommodate the user requests without increasing the already high complexity of these applications. We believe that satisfactory solutions can only come from a strong synergy between users and developers. We devoted most part of our PHD designing and developing the Matita interactive theorem prover. The software was born in the computer science department of the University of Bologna as the result of composing together all the technologies developed by the HELM team (to which we belong) for the MoWGLI project. The MoWGLI project aimed at giving accessibility through the web to the libraries of formalised mathematics of various interactive theorem provers, taking Coq as the main test case. The motivations for giving life to a new ITP are: • study the architecture of these tools, with the aim of understanding the source of their complexity • exploit such a knowledge to experiment new solutions that, for backward compatibility reasons, would be hard (if not impossible) to test on a widely used system like Coq. Matita is based on the Curry-Howard isomorphism, adopting the Calculus of Inductive Constructions (CIC) as its logical foundation. Proof objects are thus, at some extent, compatible with the ones produced with the Coq ITP, that is itself able to import and process the ones generated using Matita. Although the systems have a lot in common, they share no code at all, and even most of the algorithmic solutions are different. The thesis is composed of two parts where we respectively describe our experience as a user and a developer of interactive provers. In particular, the first part is based on two different formalisation experiences: • our internship in the Mathematical Components team (INRIA), that is formalising the finite group theory required to attack the Feit Thompson Theorem. To tackle this result, giving an effective classification of finite groups of odd order, the team adopts the SSReflect Coq extension, developed by Georges Gonthier for the proof of the four colours theorem. • our collaboration at the D.A.M.A. Project, whose goal is the formalisation of abstract measure theory in Matita leading to a constructive proof of Lebesgue’s Dominated Convergence Theorem. The most notable issues we faced, analysed in this part of the thesis, are the following: the difficulties arising when using “black box” automation in large formalisations; the impossibility for a user (especially a newcomer) to master the context of a library of already formalised results; the uncomfortable big step execution of proof commands historically adopted in ITPs; the difficult encoding of mathematical structures with a notion of inheritance in a type theory without subtyping like CIC. In the second part of the manuscript many of these issues will be analysed with the looking glasses of an ITP developer, describing the solutions we adopted in the implementation of Matita to solve these problems: integrated searching facilities to assist the user in handling large libraries of formalised results; a small step execution semantic for proof commands; a flexible implementation of coercive subtyping allowing multiple inheritance with shared substructures; automatic tactics, integrated with the searching facilities, that generates proof commands (and not only proof objects, usually kept hidden to the user) one of which specifically designed to be user driven.

A Median Voter Theorem for Postelection Politics

We analyze a model of 'postelection politics', in which (unlike in the more common Downsian models of 'preelection politics') politicians cannot make binding commitments prior to elections. The game begins with an incumbent politician in office, and voters adopt reelection strategies that are contingent on the policies implemented by the incumbent. We generalize previous models of this type by introducing heterogeneity in voters' ideological preferences, and analyze how voters' reelection strategies constrain the policies chosen by a rent-maximizing incumbent. We first show that virtually any policy (and any feasible level of rent for the incumbent) can be sustained in a Nash equilibrium. Then, we derive a 'median voter theorem': the ideal point of the median voter, and the minimum feasible level of rent, are the unique outcomes in any strong Nash equilibrium. We then introduce alternative refinements that are less restrictive. In particular, Ideologically Loyal Coalition-proof equilibrium also leads uniquely to the median outcome.