Public and private learning from prices, strategic substitutability and complementarity, and equilibrium multiplicity

We study a general static noisy rational expectations model where investors have private information about asset payoffs, with common and private components, and about their own exposure to an aggregate risk factor, and derive conditions for existence and uniqueness (or multiplicity) of equilibria. We find that a main driver of the characterization of equilibria is whether the actions of investors are strategic substitutes or complements. This latter property in turn is driven by the strength of a private learning channel from prices, arising from the multidimensional sources of asymmetric information, in relation to the usual public learning channel. When the private learning channel is strong (weak) in relation to the public we have strong (weak) strategic complementarity in actions and potentially multiple (unique) equilibria. The results enable a precise characterization of whether information acquisition decisions are strategic substitutes or complements. We find that the strategic substitutability in information acquisition result obtained in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) is robust. JEL Classification: D82, D83, G14 Keywords: Rational expectations equilibrium, asymmetric information, risk exposure, hedging, supply information, information acquisition.

Experimental Cournot oligopoly and inequity aversion

This paper explores the role of inequity aversion as an explanation for observed behavior in experimental Cournot oligopolies. We show that inequity aversion can change the nature of the strategic interaction: quantities are strategic substitutes for sufficiently asymmetric output levels but strategic complements otherwise. We find that inequity aversion can explain why: (i) some experiments result in higher than Cournot-Nash production levels while others result in lower, (ii) collusion often occurs with only two players whereas with three or more players market outcomes are very close to Cournot-Nash, and (iii) players often achieve equal profits in asymmetric Cournot oligopoly.

Structure of international cooperation in trade, investment and environment

This dissertation analyzes the obstacles against further cooperation in international economic relations. The first essay explains the gradual nature of trade liberalization. I show that existence of asymmetric information between governments provides a sufficient reason for gradualism to exist. Governments prefer starting small to reduce the cost of partner’s betrayal when there is sufficient degree of information asymmetry regarding the partner’s type. Learning about partner’s incentive structure enhances expectations, encouraging governments to increase their current level of cooperation. Specifically, the uninformed government’s subjective belief for the trading partner being good is improved as the partner acts cooperatively. This updated belief, in turn, lowers the subjective probability of future betrayal, enabling further progress in cooperation. The second essay analyzes the relationship between two countries facing two policy dilemmas in an environment with two way goods and capital flows. When issues are independent and countries are symmetric, signing separate agreements for tariffs (Free Trade Agreements-FTA) and for taxes (Tax Treaties-TT) provides the identical level of enforcement as signing a linked agreement. However, linkage can still improve the joint welfare by transferring the slack enforcement power in a case of asymmetric issues or countries. I report non-results in two cases where the policy issues are interconnected due to technological spillover effect of FDI. Moreover, I show that linking the agreements actually reduces enforcement when agreements are linked under a limited punishment rule and policy variables are strategic substitutes. The third essay investigates the welfare/enforcement consequences of linking trade and environmental agreements. In the standard literature, linking the agreements generate non-trivial results only when there is structural relation between the issues. I focus on institutional design of the linkage and show that even if environmental aspects of international trade are negligible linking the agreements might still have some interesting welfare implications under current GATT Rules. Specifically, when traded goods are substitutes in consumption, linking the environmental agreement with trade agreement under the Withdrawal of Equivalent Concession Rule (Article XXVIII) will reduce the enforcement. However, enforcement in environmental issue increases when the same rule is implemented in the absence of linkage.

Incomplete information games of conflict and collective action

My thesis consists of three essays that investigate strategic interactions between individuals engaging in risky collective action in uncertain environments. The first essay analyzes a broad class of incomplete information coordination games with a wide range of applications in economics and politics. The second essay draws from the general model developed in the first essay to study decisions by individuals of whether to engage in protest/revolution/coup/strike. The final essay explicitly integrates state response to the analysis. The first essay, Coordination Games with Strategic Delegation of Pivotality, exhaustively analyzes a class of binary action, two-player coordination games in which players receive stochastic payoffs only if both players take a ``stochastic-coordination action''. Players receive conditionally-independent noisy private signals about the normally distributed stochastic payoffs. With this structure, each player can exploit the information contained in the other player's action only when he takes the “pivotalizing action”. This feature has two consequences: (1) When the fear of miscoordination is not too large, in order to utilize the other player's information, each player takes the “pivotalizing action” more often than he would based solely on his private information, and (2) best responses feature both strategic complementarities and strategic substitutes, implying that the game is not supermodular nor a typical global game. This class of games has applications in a wide range of economic and political phenomena, including war and peace, protest/revolution/coup/ strike, interest groups lobbying, international trade, and adoption of a new technology. My second essay, Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs, studies the decision problem of citizens who must decide whether to submit to the status quo or mount a revolution. If they coordinate, they can overthrow the status quo. Otherwise, the status quo is preserved and participants in a failed revolution are punished. Citizens face two types of uncertainty. (a) non-strategic: they are uncertain about the relative payoffs of the status quo and revolution, (b) strategic: they are uncertain about each other's assessments of the relative payoff. I draw on the existing literature and historical evidence to argue that the uncertainty in the payoffs of status quo and revolution is intrinsic in politics. Several counter-intuitive findings emerge: (1) Better communication between citizens can lower the likelihood of revolution. In fact, when the punishment for failed protest is not too harsh and citizens' private knowledge is accurate, then further communication reduces incentives to revolt. (2) Increasing strategic uncertainty can increase the likelihood of revolution attempts, and even the likelihood of successful revolution. In particular, revolt may be more likely when citizens privately obtain information than when they receive information from a common media source. (3) Two dilemmas arise concerning the intensity and frequency of punishment (repression), and the frequency of protest. Punishment Dilemma 1: harsher punishments may increase the probability that punishment is materialized. That is, as the state increases the punishment for dissent, it might also have to punish more dissidents. It is only when the punishment is sufficiently harsh, that harsher punishment reduces the frequency of its application. Punishment Dilemma 1 leads to Punishment Dilemma 2: the frequencies of repression and protest can be positively or negatively correlated depending on the intensity of repression. My third essay, The Repression Puzzle, investigates the relationship between the intensity of grievances and the likelihood of repression. First, I make the observation that the occurrence of state repression is a puzzle. If repression is to succeed, dissidents should not rebel. If it is to fail, the state should concede in order to save the costs of unsuccessful repression. I then propose an explanation for the “repression puzzle” that hinges on information asymmetries between the state and dissidents about the costs of repression to the state, and hence the likelihood of its application by the state. I present a formal model that combines the insights of grievance-based and political process theories to investigate the consequences of this information asymmetry for the dissidents' contentious actions and for the relationship between the magnitude of grievances (formulated here as the extent of inequality) and the likelihood of repression. The main contribution of the paper is to show that this relationship is non-monotone. That is, as the magnitude of grievances increases, the likelihood of repression might decrease. I investigate the relationship between inequality and the likelihood of repression in all country-years from 1981 to 1999. To mitigate specification problem, I estimate the probability of repression using a generalized additive model with thin-plate splines (GAM-TPS). This technique allows for flexible relationship between inequality, the proxy for the costs of repression and revolutions (income per capita), and the likelihood of repression. The empirical evidence support my prediction that the relationship between the magnitude of grievances and the likelihood of repression is non-monotone.

Strategic mass killings

Since World War II there have been about fifty episodes of large-scale mass killings of civilians and massive forced displacements. They were usually meticulously planned and independent of military goals. We provide a model where conflict onset, conflict intensity and the decision to commit mass killings are all endogenous, with two main goals: (1) to identify the key variables and situations that make mass killings more likely to occur; and (2) to distinguish conditions under which mass killings and military conflict intensity reinforce each other from situations where they are substitute modes of strategic violence. We predict that mass killings are most likely in societies with large natural resources, significant proportionality constraints for rent sharing, low productivity and low state capacity. Further, massacres are more likely in a civil than in an interstate war, as in the latter group sizes matter less for future rents. In non polarized societies there are asymmetric equilibria with only the larger group wanting to engage in massacres. In such settings the smaller group compensates for this by fighting harder in the first place. In this case we can talk of mass killings and fighting efforts to be substitutes. In contrast, in polarized societies either both or none of the groups can be ready to do mass killings in case of victory. Under the "shadow of mass killings" groups fight harder. Hence, in this case massacres and fighting are complements. We also present novel empirical results on the role of natural resources in mass killings and on what kinds of ethnic groups are most likely to be victimized in massacres and forced resettlements, using group level panel data.

Fat Substitutes In Processing Of Sausages Using Piramutaba Waste.

The aim of this study was to evaluate fat substitute in processing of sausages prepared with surimi of waste from piramutaba filleting. The formulation ingredients were mixed with the fat substitutes added according to a fractional planning 2(4-1), where the independent variables, manioc starch (Ms), hydrogenated soy fat (F), texturized soybean protein (Tsp) and carrageenan (Cg) were evaluated on the responses of pH, texture (Tx), raw batter stability (RBS) and water holding capacity (WHC) of the sausage. Fat substitutes were evaluated in 11 formulations and the results showed that the greatest effects on the responses were found to Ms, F and Cg, being eliminated from the formulation Tsp. To find the best formulation for processing piramutaba sausage was made a complete factorial planning of 2(3) to evaluate the concentrations of fat substitutes in an enlarged range. The optimum condition found for fat substitutes in the sausages formulation were carrageenan (0.51%), manioc starch (1.45%) and fat (1.2%).

Tiering strategic environmental assessment and project environmental impact assessment in highway planning in Sao Paulo, Brazil

Constructing highways in dense urban areas is always a challenge. In Sao Paulo Metropolitan Region, heavy truck traffic contributes to clog streets and expressways alike. As part of the traffic neither originates nor head to the region, a peripheral highway has been proposed to reduce traffic problems. This project called Rodoanel, is an expressway approximately 175 km long. The fact that the projected south and north sections would cross catchments that supply most of the metropolis water demand was strongly disputed and made the environmental permitting process particularly difficult. The agency in charge commissioned a strategic environmental assessment (SEA) of a revamped project, and called it the Rodoanel Programme. However, the SEA report failed to satisfactorily take account of significant strategic issues. Among these, the highway potential effect of inducing urban sprawl over water protection zones is the most critical issue, as it emerged later as a hurdle to project licensing. Conclusion is that, particularly where no agreed-upon framework for SEA exists, when vertical tiering with downstream project EIA is sought, then a careful scoping of strategic issues is more than necessary. If an agreement on `what is strategic` is not reached and not recognized by influential stakeholders, then the unsettled conflicts will be transferred to project EIA. In such a context, SEA will have added another loop to the usually long road to project approval. (c) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Strategic alignment and performance: Brazilian companies in the medical diagnostics sector

A gap has been identified in the literature on the diagnosis and monitoring of the degree of strategic alignment. The main objective of this article is to diagnose and analyze the strategic alignment profile using the alignment diagnostic profile (ADP) tool, which enables organizations to show visually their degree of strategic alignment. The methodological approach adopted is multiple-case studies, which were conducted at five organizations in the medical diagnostics sector. The results indicate that the ADP enables organizations to understand the steps required to improve their level of alignment and to identify and locate gaps and conflicts.

Mapping the Contemporary Studies on Alliances and Strategic Networks

The competition among the companies depends on the velocity and efficience they can create and commercialize knowledge in a timely and cost-efficient manner. In this context, collaboration emerges as a reaction to the environmental changes. Although strategic alliances and networks have been exploited in the strategic literature for decades, the complexity and continuous usage of these cooperation structures, in a world of growing competition, justify the continuous interest in both themes. This article presents a scanning of the contemporary academic production in strategic alliances and networks, covering the period from January 1997 to august 2007, based on the top five journals accordingly to the journal of Citation Report 2006 in the business and management categories simultaneously. The results point to a retraction in publications about strategic alliances and a significant growth in the area of strategic. networks. The joint view of strategic alliances and networks, cited by some authors a the evolutionary path of study, still did not appear salient. The most cited topics found in the alliance literature are the governance structure, cooperation, knowledge transfer, culture, control, trust, alliance formation,,previous experience, resources, competition and partner selection. The theme network focuses mainly on structure, knowledge transfer and social network, while the joint vision is highly concentrated in: the subjects of alliance formation and the governance choice.

Cattle Grazing Distribution and Efficacy of Strategic Mineral Mix Placement in Tropical Brazilian Pastures

A study was conducted in Brazil to identify factors affecting grazing distribution of yearling Nelore cross heifers and to evaluate the efficacy of placement of a salt-mineral mix away from water to improve uniformity of grazing. Two pastures (25 ha and 42 ha) were evaluated for four 15-d sessions. Mineral mix was placed 590 m to 780 m from water during two sessions and at water for two sessions. Stubble heights were measured at the beginning and end of each session in 1-ha subunits of each pasture. Cattle locations were recorded oil clay 13 and 14 of each session by horseback observers. Heifers avoided areas with a preponderance of forbs and taller grass (P < 0.001). For the first 15 days of the study cattle avoided subunits farther from water. Thereafter, horizontal distance from water had no affect on grazing use (P > 0.10). Stubble height reduction was more uniform (P < 0.05) when the mineral mix was Lit water compared to away from water. In contrast, heifers spent less time farther from water when Mineral mix was placed at water (P = 0.02) based Oil Visual observations. Strategic placement of a salt-mineral mix away from water does not appear to be a reliable tool to improve cattle grazing distribution in humid tropical pastures from 25 ha to 45 ha in size.

Strategic argumentation: A game theoretical investigation

Argumentation is modelled as a game where the payoffs are measured in terms of the probability that the claimed conclusion is, or is not, defeasibly provable, given a history of arguments that have actually been exchanged, and given the probability of the factual premises. The probability of a conclusion is calculated using a standard variant of Defeasible Logic, in combination with standard probability calculus. It is a new element of the present approach that the exchange of arguments is analysed with game theoretical tools, yielding a prescriptive and to some extent even predictive account of the actual course of play. A brief comparison with existing argument-based dialogue approaches confirms that such a prescriptive account of the actual argumentation has been almost lacking in the approaches proposed so far.

Strategic research partnerships: Empirical evidence from Asia

This paper evaluates the role Strategic Research Partnerships (SRPs) play in Asia. Specific Asian institutional settings influence the roles of SRPs. Japan is regarded as a forerunner in the practice of SRPs. In Japan, lack of spillover channels, limited opportunities for mergers and acquisitions, weak university research and pressure for internal diversification motivate firms to form SRPs. In Korea, SRPs are regarded as a means to promote large-scale research projects. In Taiwan, SRPs are formed to facilitate technological diffusion. Empirical findings on SRPs, focusing on government-sponsored R&D consortia in Japan, are summarized. Issues regarding SRP formation, their effect on R&D spending of participating firms, and productivity, are examined. Reference is made to alternative forms of measurement of SRPs and their potential application to Asian countries is assessed. Enhancing the capacity of policy-makers to assess the extent and contribution of SRPs is considered to be a priority.