A Statutory interpretation EXperience : putting the SEX into statutory interpretation

With the growing proliferation of statute laws, the skill of statutory interpretation is an increasingly important aspect of legal practice. Despite the importance, statutory interpretation can be a challenging area of law to teach to undergraduate law students, who may find the topic dry and disengaging when taught through traditional methods. Such disengagement may adversely affect knowledge retention, particularly if the material is taught in the first or second year of study and not explicitly reinforced in subsequent years. Concern over the present standard of statutory interpretation skills being exhibited by practitioners, has prompted the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Queensland to contact law schools, enquiring how and to what extent statutory interpretation is being taught...

Engaging sex: Promoting the statutory interpretation experience in legal education

Given the ever increasing importance of legislation to the resolution of legal disputes, there is a concomitant need for law students to be well trained in the anatomy, identification, interpretation and application of laws made by or under parliament. This article discusses a blended learning project called Indigo’s Folly, implemented at the Queensland University of Technology Law School in 2014. Indigo’s Folly was created to increase law student competency with respect to statutory interpretation. Just as importantly, it was designed to make the teaching of statutory interpretation more interesting – to “bring the sexy” to the student statutory interpretation experience. Quantitative and qualitative empirical data will be presented as evidence to show that statutory interpretation can be taught in a way that law students find engaging.

What is Statutory Interpretation? A Primer QUT law students

In this Primer, our aims are to explain what statutory interpretation is and why it is important. We also aim to note some of the more difficult concepts and ideas you will need to understand when reading a statute, when deciding if it is relevant to a legal problem, and, if so, how it applies to that problem. We do not aim to provide an overview of the rules of Statutory Interpretation, but only to focus on areas that have created well-known difficulties for students and practitioners alike, such as the concept of the intentions of Parliament and the correct use of intrinsic materials.

Statutory licences and third party dealings: Property analysis v statutory interpretation

Statutory licensing schemes are proliferating as a means of regulating commercial activity, resource exploitation and activities harmful to the environment. Statutes often declare that entitlements are non-transferable or are transferable only with approval or subject to conditions. Some entitlements, such as resource consents issued under the Resource Management Act 1991 (NZ), are declared not to be property. Despite these statutory declarations, entitlements are often held to be transferable in equity or to be property for the purposes of resolving private disputes. Recently, in Greenshell New Zealand Ltd v Tikapa Moana Enterprises Ltd, the High Court of New Zealand indicated that a resource consent was property that could support a claim for relief against forfeiture, continuing the trend in earlier cases that appear to depart from the statute. In this article we examine the juridical treatment of entitlements in private law. We identify factors influencing the courts’ enforcement of private arrangements which may circumvent the statutory intent. Our analysis will guide legislators in the design of provisions to implement new schemes.

Parliamentary Debates in Statutory Interpretation: A Question of Admissibility or of Weight?

The article was first published in the McGill Law Journal. Un résumé en français est disponible.

National Application of International Law: The Statutory Interpretation Perspective

Reprinted with permission of the Publisher from The Canadian Yearbook of Internation Law, 41 by Don McRae © University of British Columbia Press 2003. All rights reserved.

Legislation and statutory interpretation

A clear and accessible guide to one of the most important skills all students of law must master: the skill of understanding legislation. The authors provide an engaging overview of important aspects of the legislative process, its application and interpretation, together with examples questions and excerpts of relevant legislation. This book is specifically designed for students studying the statutory process and statutory interpretation or anyone interested in knowing more about this subject.

The application of the statutory derivative action in Pt 2F.1A of the Corporations Act to companies in liquidation under Ch 5 : Well oiled machine or is Pt 2F.1A in need of a tune up?

The statutory derivative action was introduced in Australia in 2000. This right of action has been debated in the literature and introduced in a number of other jurisdictions as well. However, it is by no means clear that all issues have been resolved despite its operation in Australia for over 10 years. This article considers the application of Pt 2F.1A of the Corporations Act to companies in liquidation under Ch 5. It demonstrates that the application involves consideration of not only proper statutory interpretation but also policy matters around the role and the supervision by the court of a liquidator once a company has entered liquidation.

Driedger's 'Modern Principle' at the Supreme Court of Canada: Interpretation, Justification, Legitimization

Un résumé en français est également disponible

Preventative detention in Australian law : issues of interpretation

This article examines the statutory interpretation of terms in Div 105 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) . This division is the regime for preventative detention orders (PDOs), an Executive order permitting a person to be taken into custody and deprived of his/her personal liberty for the purpose of either preventing an imminent terrorist act or preserving evidence of a past terrorist act. The organisation of this article corresponds with three key features of a PDO from this description: "detention"; "Executive"; and "preventative purpose". To consider the interpretation of Div 105 , this article relies on statutory principles of interpretation, and most notably, the recent authority of Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 81 ALJR 1414 [PDF] ; [2007] HCA 33.

Statutory verification of water rights: the 'insuperable' difficulties of propertising water entitlements

The abolition of riparian entitlements in the early stages of colonial Australia and the vesting of these rights in the Crown represented a turning point for the evolution of private water rights. The extinguishment of common law rights connected to vested land interests and the introduction of new, unaligned statutory entitlements provided a new and fundamentally different system for the creation and regulation of private water entitlements. Unlike riparian entitlements, in the absence of express definition, statutory water entitlements may only be verified as property where such a construction is consistent with the nature and scope of the entitlement. In this respect, the statutory framework has disaggregated the propertisation of water rights from land ownership and linked the process to broader statutory interpretation principles. The shift away from institutional property has generated concerns about the interpretive approaches appropriate for the verification of legislative water entitlements. This article examines the existing interpretive approaches and argues that the blurring of the propertisation process with the separate issue of whether any change or modification of such water rights attracts s 51(xxxi) of the Commonwealth Constitution has produced a situation where core property indicia is increasingly overshadowed by legislative defeasibility. In the recent High Court decision of ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v Commonwealth, the focus of the majority judgements upon the inherent susceptibility of legislative entitlements to variation or extinguishment acted as a catalyst for the non-propertisation of statutory bore water licences in New South Wales. The emphasis the majority judgements gave to legislative defeasibility precluded a full and balanced assessment of other highly relevant property indicia, in particular the expectation interests of the holders. Conflating property and constitutional evaluation in this way is inappropriate in an era where entitlements to natural resource interests are increasingly statute based and the verification process has significant social and economic repercussions. Determining whether a statutory entitlement constitutes property requires a careful balancing of legislative intent, social and environmental context and individual expectation and the vicissitudes of a regulatory context should not eclipse this process.

Country of Origin and Internet Publication : Applying the Berne Convention in the Digital Age

Historically, determining the country of origin of a published work presented few challenges, because works were generally published physically – whether in print or otherwise – in a distinct location or few locations. However, publishing opportunities presented by new technologies mean that we now live in a world of simultaneous publication – works that are first published online are published simultaneously to every country in world in which there is Internet connectivity. While this is certainly advantageous for the dissemination and impact of information and creative works, it creates potential complications under the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“Berne Convention”), an international intellectual property agreement to which most countries in the world now subscribe. Under the Berne Convention’s national treatment provisions, rights accorded to foreign copyright works may not be subject to any formality, such as registration requirements (although member countries are free to impose formalities in relation to domestic copyright works). In Kernel Records Oy v. Timothy Mosley p/k/a Timbaland, et al. however, the Florida Southern District Court of the United States ruled that first publication of a work on the Internet via an Australian website constituted “simultaneous publication all over the world,” and therefore rendered the work a “United States work” under the definition in section 101 of the U.S. Copyright Act, subjecting the work to registration formality under section 411. This ruling is in sharp contrast with an earlier decision delivered by the Delaware District Court in Håkan Moberg v. 33T LLC, et al. which arrived at an opposite conclusion. The conflicting rulings of the U.S. courts reveal the problems posed by new forms of publishing online and demonstrate a compelling need for further harmonization between the Berne Convention, domestic laws and the practical realities of digital publishing. In this article, we argue that even if a work first published online can be considered to be simultaneously published all over the world it does not follow that any country can assert itself as the “country of origin” of the work for the purpose of imposing domestic copyright formalities. More specifically, we argue that the meaning of “United States work” under the U.S. Copyright Act should be interpreted in line with the presumption against extraterritorial application of domestic law to limit its application to only those works with a real and substantial connection to the United States. There are gaps in the Berne Convention’s articulation of “country of origin” which provide scope for judicial interpretation, at a national level, of the most pragmatic way forward in reconciling the goals of the Berne Convention with the practical requirements of domestic law. We believe that the uncertainties arising under the Berne Convention created by new forms of online publishing can be resolved at a national level by the sensible application of principles of statutory interpretation by the courts. While at the international level we may need a clearer consensus on what amounts to “simultaneous publication” in the digital age, state practice may mean that we do not yet need to explore textual changes to the Berne Convention.