Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions

In this paper we consider sequential auctions where an individual’s value for a bundle of objects is either greater than the sum of the values for the objects separately (positive synergy) or less than the sum (negative synergy). We show that the existence of positive synergies implies declining expected prices. When synergies are negative, expected prices are increasing. There are several corollaries. First, the seller is indi¤erent between selling the objects simultaneously as a bundle or sequentially when synergies are positive. Second, when synergies are negative, the expected revenue generated by the simultaneous auction can be larger or smaller than the expected revenue generated by the sequential auction. In addition, in the presence of positive synergies, an option to buy the additional object at the price of the …rst object is never exercised in the symmetric equilibrium and the seller’s revenue is unchanged. Under negative synergies, in contrast, if there is an equilibrium where the option is never exercised, then equilibrium prices may either increase or decrease and, therefore, the net e¤ect on the seller’s revenue of the introduction of an option is ambiguous. Finally, we examine two special cases with asymmetric players. In the …rst case, players have distinct synergies. In this example, even if one player has positive synergies and the other has negative synergies, it is still possible for expected prices to decline. In the second case, one player wants two objects and the remaining players want one object each. For this example, we show that expected prices may not necessarily decrease as predicted by Branco (1997). The reason is that players with singleunit demand will generally bid less than their true valuations in the …rst period. Therefore, there are two opposing forces; the reduction in the bid of the player with multiple-demand in the last auction and less aggressive bidding in the …rst auction by the players with single-unit demand.

Sequential auctions with continuation costs

In actual sequential auctions, 1) bidders typically incur a cost in continuing from one sale to the next, and 2) bidders decide whether or not to continue. To investigate the question "when do bidders drop out," we define a sequential auction model with continuation costs and an endogenously determined number of bidders at each sale, and we characterize the equilibria in this modele Simple examples illustrate the effect of several possible changes to this modele

Sequential asymmetric auctions with endogenous participation

In this paper we suggest a model of sequential auctions with endogenous participation where each bidder conjectures about the number of participants at each round. Then, after learning his value, each bidder decides whether or not to participate in the auction. In the calculation of his expected value, each bidder uses his conjectures about the number of participants for each possible subgroup. In equilibrium, the conjectured probability is compatible with the probability of staying in the auction. In our model, players face participation costs, bidders may buy as many objects as they wish and they are allowed to drop out at any round. Bidders can drop out at any time, but they cannot come back to the auction. In particular we can determine the number of participants and expected prices in equilibrium. We show that for any bidding strategy, there exists such a probability of staying in the auction. For the case of stochastically independent objects, we show that in equilibrium every bidder who decides to continue submits a bid that is equal to his value at each round. When objects are stochastically identical, we are able to show that expected prices are decreasing.

Simultaneous pooled auctions

Suppose a seller wants to sell k similar or identical objects and there are n > k potential buyers. Suppose that each buyer wants only one object. In this case, we suggest the use of a simultaneous auction that would work as follows. Players are asked to submit sealed bids for one object. The individual with the highest bid chooses an object first; the individual with the second-highest bid chooses the next object; and this process continues until the individual with the kth highest bid receives the last object. Each individual pays the equivalent to his or her bid. When objects are identical, we show that the proposed auction generates the same revenue as a first-price sealed-bid sequential auction. When objects are perfectly correlated, there is no known solution for sequential auctions, whereas we can characterize bidding strategies in the proposed auction. Moreover, the proposed auction is optimal (given an appropriately chosen reserve price), and it may be easier and cheaper to run than a sequential auction.

Auction price anomalies: Evidence from wool auctions in Australia

Using detailed Australian wool auction data we test for further evidence of pricing anomalies at sequential auctions. We find that an anomaly frequently exists and order is frequently endogenously determined. Moreover, prices increase through some sales and decrease through others. We examine whether it is possible to explain the variation in the anomaly across sales and conclude that there is no systematic relationship between the direction of the price anomaly and the characteristics of the wool or the auction. We do, however, find evidence that an anomaly, is more likely in longer sales.

Auctions with synergies and asymmetric buyers

In this paper we consider sequential auctions with synergies where one player wants two objects and the remaining players want one object each. We show that expected prices may not necessarily decrease as predicted by Branco [Econ. Lett. 54 (1997) 159]. Indeed we show that expected prices can actually increase. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved.

Auctions of licences and market structure

This paper studies sequential auctions of licences to operate in amarket where those firms that obtain at least one licence then engage ina symmetric market game. I employ a new refinement of Nash equilibrium,the concept of {\sl Markovian recursively undominated equilibrium}.The unique solution satisfies the following properties: (i) when severalfirms own licences before the auction (incumbents), new entrants buylicences in each stage, and (ii) when there is no more than one incumbent,either the single firm preempts entry altogether or entry occurs inevery stage, depending on the parameter configuration.

Why do bidders drop out from a sequential auction

In actual sequential auctions, 1) bidders typically incur a cost in continuing from one sale to the next, and 2) bidders decide whether or not to continue. To investigate the question "why do bidders drop out," we define a sequential auction model with continuation costs and an endogenously determined number of bidders at each sale, and we characterize the equilibria in this model. Simple examples illustrate the effect of several possible changes to this model.

Bidding at sequential first-price auctions with(out) supply uncertainty: a laboratory analysis

We report on a series of experiments that test the effects of an uncertain supply on the formation of bids and prices in sequential first-price auctions with private-independent values and unit-demands. Supply is assumed uncertain when buyers do not know the exact number of units to be sold (i.e., the length of the sequence). Although we observe a non-monotone behavior when supply is certain and an important overbidding, the data qualitatively support our price trend predictions and the risk neutral Nash equilibrium model of bidding for the last stage of a sequence, whether supply is certain or not. Our study shows that behavior in these markets changes significantly with the presence of an uncertain supply, and that it can be explained by assuming that bidders formulate pessimistic beliefs about the occurrence of another stage.

Biased Random-key Genetic Algorithms For The Winner Determination Problem In Combinatorial Auctions.

Abstract In this paper, we address the problem of picking a subset of bids in a general combinatorial auction so as to maximize the overall profit using the first-price model. This winner determination problem assumes that a single bidding round is held to determine both the winners and prices to be paid. We introduce six variants of biased random-key genetic algorithms for this problem. Three of them use a novel initialization technique that makes use of solutions of intermediate linear programming relaxations of an exact mixed integer-linear programming model as initial chromosomes of the population. An experimental evaluation compares the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms with the standard mixed linear integer programming formulation, a specialized exact algorithm, and the best-performing heuristics proposed for this problem. The proposed algorithms are competitive and offer strong results, mainly for large-scale auctions.

Analyzing the n→π* Electronic Transition of Formaldehyde in Water. A Sequential Monte Carlo/Time-Dependent Density Functional Theory

The n→π* absorption transition of formaldehyde in water is analyzed using combined and sequential classical Monte Carlo (MC) simulations and quantum mechanics (QM) calculations. MC simulations generate the liquid solute-solvent structures for subsequent QM calculations. Using time-dependent density functional theory in a localized set of gaussian basis functions (TD-DFT/6-311++G(d,p)) calculations are made on statistically relevant configurations to obtain the average solvatochromic shift. All results presented here use the electrostatic embedding of the solvent. The statistically converged average result obtained of 2300 cm-1 is compared to previous theoretical results available. Analysis is made of the effective dipole moment of the hydrogen-bonded shell and how it could be held responsible for the polarization of the solvent molecules in the outer solvation shells.

Determination of picloram in waters by sequential injection chromatography with UV detection

This paper describes a sequential injection chromatography procedure for determination of picloram in waters exploring the low backpressure of a 2.5 cm long monolithic C18 column. Separation of the analyte from the matrix was achieved in less than 60 s using a mobile phase composed by 20:80 (v v-1) acetonitrile:5.0 mmol L-1 H3PO4 and flow rate of 30 μL s-1. Detection was made at 223 nm with a 40 mm optical path length cell. The limits of detection and quantification were 33 and 137 μg L-1, respectively. The proposed method is sensitive enough to monitor the maximum concentration level for picloram in drinking water (500 μg L-1). The sampling frequency is 60 analyses per hour, consuming only 300 μL of acetonitrile per analysis. The proposed methodology was applied to spiked river water samples and no statistically significant differences were observed in comparison to a conventional HPLC-UV method.

Development of a flow through photo-reactor to study degradation of organic compounds by Sequential Injection Analysis (SIA)

This work describes a photo-reactor to perform in line degradation of organic compounds by photo-Fenton reaction using Sequential Injection Analysis (SIA) system. A copper phthalocyanine-3,4',4²,4²¢-tetrasulfonic acid tetrasodium salt dye solution was used as a model compound for the phthalocyanine family, whose pigments have a large use in automotive coatings industry. Based on preliminary tests, 97% of color removal was obtained from a solution containing 20 µmol L-1 of this dye.

Sequential hygienic behavior in Carniolan honey bees (Apis mellifera carnica)

We examined the sequence, order or steps of hygienic behavior (HB) from pin-killed pupae until the removal of them by the bees. We conducted our study with four colonies of Apis mellifera carnica in Germany and made four repetitions. The pin-killing method was used for evaluation of the HB of bees. The data were collected every 2 h after perforation, totaling 13 observations. Additionally, for one hygienic colony and another non-hygienic colony, individual analyses of each dead pupa were made at every observation, including all details, steps or sequences of HB. The bees recognize the cells containing dead pupae within 2 h after perforation, initially making a hole in the capping, which is the beginning of HB. Uncapping of the dead brood cell reached maximum values from 4 to 6 h after perforation; after 24 h, practically all cells were already uncapped. Another variable, called brood partially removed, was analyzed 4 h after perforation, after the cells had been perforated, which involved uncapping, followed by partial or total removal of the brood. Maximum values of brood partially removed were found 10 h after perforation, though such cells could be found up to 48 h after perforation. The most frequent sequence of events in both colonies was: capped cell -> punctured cell. brood partially removed -> empty cell. A new model of three pairs of recessive genes (uncapping u1, u2 and remover r) was proposed in order to explain the genetic control of the HB in Apis mellifera. We recommend evaluating HB 24 h after perforation and using a correction factor to compensate for control removal levels. We found a series of details of HB, which allow a study of how various factors may affect the sequence of the activities involved in HB and investigation of the genetics that controls this process.

Sequential analysis of global gene expression profiles in immature and in vitro matured bovine oocytes: potential molecular markers of oocyte maturation

Background: Without intensive selection, the majority of bovine oocytes submitted to in vitro embryo production (IVP) fail to develop to the blastocyst stage. This is attributed partly to their maturation status and competences. Using the Affymetrix GeneChip Bovine Genome Array, global mRNA expression analysis of immature (GV) and in vitro matured (IVM) bovine oocytes was carried out to characterize the transcriptome of bovine oocytes and then use a variety of approaches to determine whether the observed transcriptional changes during IVM was real or an artifact of the techniques used during analysis. Results: 8489 transcripts were detected across the two oocyte groups, of which similar to 25.0% (2117 transcripts) were differentially expressed (p < 0.001); corresponding to 589 over-expressed and 1528 under-expressed transcripts in the IVM oocytes compared to their immature counterparts. Over expression of transcripts by IVM oocytes is particularly interesting, therefore, a variety of approaches were employed to determine whether the observed transcriptional changes during IVM were real or an artifact of the techniques used during analysis, including the analysis of transcript abundance in oocytes in vitro matured in the presence of a-amanitin. Subsets of the differentially expressed genes were also validated by quantitative real-time PCR (qPCR) and the gene expression data was classified according to gene ontology and pathway enrichment. Numerous cell cycle linked (CDC2, CDK5, CDK8, HSPA2, MAPK14, TXNL4B), molecular transport (STX5, STX17, SEC22A, SEC22B), and differentiation (NACA) related genes were found to be among the several over-expressed transcripts in GV oocytes compared to the matured counterparts, while ANXA1, PLAU, STC1and LUM were among the over-expressed genes after oocyte maturation. Conclusion: Using sequential experiments, we have shown and confirmed transcriptional changes during oocyte maturation. This dataset provides a unique reference resource for studies concerned with the molecular mechanisms controlling oocyte meiotic maturation in cattle, addresses the existing conflicting issue of transcription during meiotic maturation and contributes to the global goal of improving assisted reproductive technology.