Why do bidders drop out from a sequential auction


Autoria(s): Menezes, Flavio Marques; Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard
Data(s)

13/05/2008

23/09/2010

13/05/2008

23/09/2010

26/01/2000

Resumo

In actual sequential auctions, 1) bidders typically incur a cost in continuing from one sale to the next, and 2) bidders decide whether or not to continue. To investigate the question "why do bidders drop out," we define a sequential auction model with continuation costs and an endogenously determined number of bidders at each sale, and we characterize the equilibria in this model. Simple examples illustrate the effect of several possible changes to this model.

Identificador

0104-8910

http://hdl.handle.net/10438/377

Idioma(s)

en_US

Publicador

Fundação Getulio Vargas. Escola de Pós-graduação em Economia

Relação

Ensaios Econômicos;364

Palavras-Chave #Sequential auctions #Endogenous participation #Economia #Leilões
Tipo

Working Paper