Securities investor protection act amendments : hearing before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, Ninety-fifth Congress, second session, on H.R. 8331 ... April 25, 1978.

Mode of access: Internet.

Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970.

Shipping list no.: 88-329-P.

Accounting reform and investor protection : hearings before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Seventh Congress, second session, on the legislative history of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, accounting reform and investor protection issues raised by Enron and other public companies.

Shipping list number: 2003-0249-P (volumes 1-2, 4), 2003-0247-P (volume 3).

A Life Cycle Approach to Investor Protection. ECMI Working Paper No. 1/September 2014

The market for investment products, including both securities and investment funds, is fraught with difficulties for consumers in terms of the ease of comparing products, trust in suppliers and consumer satisfaction. A comprehensive approach to investor protection, developed around the lifecycle of a financial product, may offer the investor greater protection during an investment’s life span. This paper proposes a new approach to investor protection, building on a review of major market failures affecting the origination, distribution and sale of financial products and based on a review of the relevant scientific literature and country experiences. The application of a ‘know-your-product’ principle at origination, a narrower ‘default rule’ for best execution and an ex-ante distinction between advice and ‘information-only’ services are among the options discussed in this paper to enhance the investor protection framework over the lifecycle of a financial product.

Investor protection, firm informational problems, big N auditors, and cost of debt around the world

This paper examines the effects of investor protection, firm informational problems (proxied by firm size, firm age, and the number of analysts following), and Big N auditors on firms' cost of debt around the world. Using data from 1994 to 2006 and over 90,000 firm-year observations, we find that the cost of debt is lower when firms are audited by Big N auditors, especially in countries with strong investor protection. Second, we find that firms with more informational problems (i.e., higher information asymmetry problems) benefit more from Big N auditors in terms of lower cost of debt only in countries with stronger investor protection.

Has investor protection been rendered obsolete by the Argentine crisis?

Includes bibliography

Contribuições do direito norte-americano ao sistema de proteção do investidor no mercado de capitais brasileiro

O atual arcabouço normativo de proteção do investidor no mercado de capitais brasileiro teve suas linhas mestras cravadas pela reforma bancária introduzida pelas Leis 4.595, de 31 de dezembro de 1964, e 4.728, de 14 de julho de 1965, pela criação de um regulador especializado em mercado de capitais pela Lei 6.385, de 07 de dezembro de 1976, e pela reforma da legislação das sociedades anônimas introduzida pela Lei 6.404, de 15 de dezembro de 1976. Desde 1976, o arcabouço normativo de proteção do investidor no mercado de capitais brasileiro vem sendo desenvolvido a partir dessas linhas mestras iniciais, incorporando as lições aprendidas com as turbulências e euforias vividas pela economia nacional. Esse arcabouço normativo que aí está desde 1976 foi inspirado por contribuições do direito federal norte-americano, as quais foram conscientemente captadas no Brasil pelo legislador e pela comunidade jurídica nacional. Difundiram-se internacionalmente dos EUA para o Brasil os preceitos da proteção do investidor no mercado de capitais calcados na existência de um órgão regulador do mercado de capitais, na divulgação de informações relevantes para decisões de investimento (disclosure), na regulação funcional dos agentes do mercado de capitais e na vedação de fraudes com valores mobiliários.

Investor legal protection and earnings management : a study of Chinese H-shares and Hong Kong shares

Under the unique "one country, two systems" arrangement, the more stringent investor protection rules in Hong Kong are not enforceable in firms that are incorporated in China but listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange (H-shares). As such, H-shares and other local Hong Kong firms are subject to different investor protection regimes in the same stock market. We find that H-shares are associated with higher earnings management than local Hong Kong firms after controlling for disparity in economic development, types of controlling shareholders and other factors. More importantly, this relationship is weaker after China implemented the Securities Law in 1999. The results are robust after considering the dual-listing status of H-shares and board characteristics. These results provide direct evidence showing the effect of investor legal protection on financial reporting quality.

O direito de exoneração do acionista minoritário

This study specifically addresses the situation of minority shareholders after the transfer of control in an listed company. The various underlying interests and reasons that shareholders have for investing in a company can demonstrate shareholders’ reasoning for taking radically different positions on issues relating to the transfer of control of the referred company. This study analyses the current legal system in Portugal and in the European Union in order to assess whether, in the event of a takeover bid of a listed company where there is a transfer of control, minority shareholders have the same appraisal rights as other shareholders to sell their shares and leave the company. The study then examines the European Court of Justice decision on whether a general principle of equal treatment of minority shareholders exists upon a transfer of control (Audiolux) and the Portuguese Securities Market Commission decision regarding the delisting of Brisa - Autoestradas de Portugal, S.A. based on the principle of investor protection. The study concludes that although the principle of equality amongst shareholders has made progress in the European legal system e.g. it is laid down in Directive 2004/25/EC of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids and the Portuguese Securities Market Code, there is also a need for further improvement, which can be accomplished by allowing minority shareholders to exercise an appraisal right in similar unregulated situations.

La prise de contrôle inversée en droit canadien

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de LLM en droit"

The Economic Effects of Improving Investor Rights in Portugal

The Portuguese economy has performed remarkably well since joining the EU in 1986. Output per worker grew at an annual rate of 2.25%. The relative price of investment has declined. Real investment has increased compared to output, in part fuelled by an increase in capital inflows. At the same time, resource allocation seems to have improved as well: firm-level data shows a significant decline in the dispersion of labor productivity and size across firms. This paper argues that improvements in outside investor rights that have taken place since Portugal joined the EU is a prime candidate to explain this set of facts.

The role of board independence in mitigating agency problem II in Australian family firms

We investigate the impact of board independence on earnings management on a sample of family controlled firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). Using panel data over the period 2000–2004, we find evidence of earnings management among family controlled firms in Australia, an environment of high investor protection and private benefits of control. Findings show that a higher proportion of independent directors on boards is effective in reducing earnings management, thereby mitigating agency problems associated with entrenchment and expropriation in family firms. We also find that managers of family firms are less aggressive in managing earnings via discretionary long-term accruals compared to non-family firms.

Sanctions and public enforcement of insider trading laws in Europe

The recent financial crisis triggered an increasing demand for financial regulation to counteract the potential negative economic effects of the evermore complex operations and instruments available on financial markets. As a result, insider trading regulation counts amongst the relatively recent but particularly active regulation battles in Europe and overseas. Claims for more transparency and equitable securities markets proliferate, ranging from concerns about investor protection to global market stability. The internationalization of the world’s securities market has challenged traditional notions of regulation and enforcement. Considering that insider trading is currently forbidden all over Europe, this study follows a law and economics approach in identifying how this prohibition should be enforced. More precisely, the study investigates first whether criminal law is necessary under all circumstances to enforce insider trading; second, if it should be introduced at EU level. This study provides evidence of law and economics theoretical logic underlying the legal mechanisms that guide sanctioning and public enforcement of the insider trading prohibition by identifying optimal forms, natures and types of sanctions that effectively induce insider trading deterrence. The analysis further aims to reveal the economic rationality that drives the potential need for harmonization of criminal enforcement of insider trading laws within the European environment by proceeding to a comparative analysis of the current legislations of height selected Member States. This work also assesses the European Union’s most recent initiative through a critical analysis of the proposal for a Directive on criminal sanctions for Market Abuse. Based on the conclusions drawn from its close analysis, the study takes on the challenge of analyzing whether or not the actual European public enforcement of the laws prohibiting insider trading is coherent with the theoretical law and economics recommendations, and how these enforcement practices could be improved.

ANÁLISE DAS MUDANÇAS DOS FATORES DETERMINANTES DA ESTRUTURA DE CAPITAL EM FUNÇÃO DO CICLO DE VIDA DAS EMPRESAS BRASILEIRAS

As várias teorias acerca da estrutura de capital despertam interesse motivando diversos estudos sobre o assunto sem, no entanto, ter um consenso. Outro tema aparentemente pouco explorado refere-se ao ciclo de vida das empresas e como ele pode influenciar a estrutura de capital. Este estudo teve como objetivo verificar quais determinantes possuem maior relevância no endividamento das empresas e se estes determinantes alteram-se dependendo do ciclo de vida da empresa apoiada pelas teorias Trade Off, Pecking Order e Teoria da Agência. Para alcançar o objetivo deste trabalho foi utilizado análise em painel de efeito fixo sendo a amostra composta por empresas brasileiras de capital aberto, com dados secundários disponíveis na Economática® no período de 2005 a 2013, utilizando-se os setores da BM&FBOVESPA. Como resultado principal destaca-se o mesmo comportamento entre a amostra geral, alto e baixo crescimento pelo endividamento contábil para o determinante Lucratividade apresentando uma relação negativa, e para os determinantes Oportunidade de Crescimento e Tamanho, estes com uma relação positiva. Para os grupos de alto e baixo crescimento alguns determinantes apresentaram resultados diferentes, como a singularidade que resultou significância nestes dois grupos, sendo positiva no baixo crescimento e negativa no alto crescimento, para o valor colateral dos ativos e benefício fiscal não dívida apresentaram significância apenas no grupo de baixo crescimento. Para o endividamento a valor de mercado foi observado significância para o Benefício fiscal não dívida e Singularidade. Este resultado reforça o argumento de que o ciclo de vida influência a estrutura de capital.