Les relations mères-enfants lorsqu'un enfant enfreint une règle : étude de l'impact des stratégies visant à renforcer les règles et du climat interpersonnel

La documentation sur les pratiques parentales suggère qu’afin de favoriser le développement optimal des enfants, les parents devraient utiliser des pratiques qui sont structurantes et qui soutiennent leur autonomie (Grolnick & Pomerantz, 2009). Dans certaines situations, par exemple lorsqu’un enfant enfreint une règle, il peut toutefois sembler difficile pour les parents d’adopter des stratégies parentales qui allient ces deux dimensions. Qui plus est, peu d’études se sont penchées sur la façon dont les parents peuvent renforcer la structure tout en tenant simultanément compte des besoins et de l’individualité des enfants. L’objectif de cette thèse est d’évaluer l’impact de trois stratégies visant à renforcer les règles (répéter la règle, donner une punition ou avoir recours à une conséquence logique) variant quant à leurs niveaux de structure et de soutien à l’autonomie, et de vérifier leurs effets lorsqu’elles sont employées au sein d’un climat interpersonnel soutenant l’autonomie ou d’un climat interpersonnel contrôlant. Le premier article s’intéresse à l’impact conjoint des stratégies visant à renforcer les règles et du climat interpersonnel sur des indicateurs de conformité et d’intériorisation rapportés par 221 enfants et leurs mères. Les résultats montrent que les mères considèrent les conséquences logiques utilisées dans un climat qui soutient l’autonomie comme étant les pratiques les plus efficaces et les plus acceptables (effet interactif). Les enfants pensent aussi qu’un climat interpersonnel qui soutient l’autonomie est plus efficace et plus acceptable qu’un climat interpersonnel contrôlant. De plus, les résultats suggèrent que les enfants considèrent les conséquences logiques comme des pratiques aussi efficaces, mais plus acceptables que les punitions. Le fait de répéter la règle est jugé comme étant acceptable, mais peu efficace comparativement aux autres stratégies. Pour les enfants, les résultats montrent qu’il n’y a pas d’interaction entre les stratégies visant à renforcer les règles et le climat interpersonnel. Le second article vise à documenter les réactions émotionnelles potentielles des mêmes enfants (N = 221) face aux trois stratégies visant à renforcer les règles et aux climats interpersonnels. Quatre émotions déterminantes dans le processus d’intériorisation sont étudiées, soit la colère, la tristesse, la culpabilité et la honte. Les résultats montrent d’abord qu’un climat interpersonnel contrôlant amènerait les enfants à vivre plus de colère, de tristesse et de honte qu’un climat soutenant l’autonomie. Par contre, les enfants rapportent autant de culpabilité au sein des deux climats interpersonnels. Les résultats suggèrent également que les punitions susciteraient plus de tristesse, de culpabilité et de colère que les conséquences logiques, que les conséquences logiques feraient vivre aux enfants plus de tristesse et de culpabilité que répéter la règle et que les punitions amèneraient les enfants à vivre davantage de honte que répéter la règle. Finalement, les résultats suggèrent que les effets des stratégies visant à renforcer les règles et du climat interpersonnel sont additifs; il n’y a pas d’interaction entre ces deux facteurs. Les contributions théoriques de cette thèse à la documentation sur les pratiques parentales et le développement des enfants, de même que ses implications pratiques pour les parents dans la socialisation des enfants sont discutées.

Access to Electronic Data by Third-Country Law Enforcement Authorities, Challenges to EU Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights. Center for European Policy Studies, 2015

This study examines the challenges posed to European law by third country access to data held by private companies for the purposes of law enforcement. It pays particular attention to the implications for rule of law and fundamental rights of foreign authorities’ direct access to electronic information falling outside pre-established channels of supranational cooperation. A special focus is given to EU-US relations and the practical issues emerging in transatlantic relations covering mutual legal assistance and evidence gathering for law enforcement purposes in criminal proceedings.

Federal Trade Commission : enforcement of the franchise rule : report to Congressional requesters /

"GAO-01-776."

Digital constitutionalism and the role of the rule of law in the governance of virtual communities

This project proposes a new conceptual framework for the regulation of social networks and virtual communities. By applying a model based upon the rule of law, this thesis addresses the growing tensions that revolve around the public use of private networks. This research examines the shortcomings of traditional contractual governance models and cyberlaw theory and provides a reconstituted approach that will allow public constitutional-type interests to be recognised in the interpretation and enforcement of contractual doctrine.

The diversity of interests in environmental governance : a challenge for the rule of law

The function of environmental governance and the principle of the rule of law are both controversial and challenging. To apply the principle of the rule of law to the function of environmental governance is perhaps even more controversial and challenging. A system of environmental governance seeks to bring together the range of competitive and potentially conflicting interests in how the environment and its resources are managed. Increasingly it is the need for economic, social and ecological sustainability that brings these interests – both public and private – together. Then there is the relevance of the principle of the rule of law. Economic, social and ecological sustainability will be achieved – if at all – by a complex series of rules of law that are capable of enforcement so as to ensure compliance with them. To what extent do these rules of law reflect the principle of the rule of law? Is the principle of the rule of law the formally unstated value that is expected to underpin the legal system or is it the normative predicate that directs the legal system both vertically and horizontally? Is sustainability an aspirational value or a normative predicate according to which the environment and its resources are managed? Let us deal sequentially with these issues by reviewing a number of examples that demonstrate the relationship between environmental governance and the rule of law.

Young driver perceptions of police traffic enforcement and self reported driving offences

Purpose Road policing is a key method used to improve driver compliance with road laws. However, we have a very limited understanding of the perceptions of young drivers regarding police enforcement of road laws. This paper addresses this gap. Design/Methodology/Approach Within this study 238 young drivers from Queensland, Australia, aged 17-24 years (M = 18, SD = 1.54), with a provisional (intermediate) driver’s licence completed an online survey regarding their perceptions of police enforcement and their driver thrill seeking tendencies. This study considered whether these factors influenced self-reported transient (e.g., travelling speed) and fixed (e.g., blood alcohol concentration) road violations by the young drivers. Findings The results indicate that being detected by police for a traffic offence, and the frequency with which they display P-plates on their vehicle to indicate their licence status, are associated with both self-reported transient and fixed rule violations. Licence type, police avoidance behaviours and driver thrill seeking affected transient rule violations only, while perceptions of police enforcement affected fixed rule violations only. Practical implications This study suggests that police enforcement of young driver violations of traffic laws may not be as effective as expected and that we need to improve the way in which police enforce road laws for young novice drivers. Originality/value: This paper identifies that perceptions of police enforcement by young drivers does not influence all types of road offences.

Enforcement of associated protected measures in particularly sensitive sea areas

The distinguished character of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSAs) is that every application for PSSAs must be accompanied by Associated Protected Measures (APMs) which can make PSSAs efficient in practice.1 That is why APMs are regarded as the core feature of every PSSA.2 APM is “an international rule or standard that falls within the purview of an international maritime organization (IMO) and regulates international maritime activities for the protection of the area at risk.” So far, APMs have been approved by IMO as following: -Compulsory or recommended pilotage -Mandatory ship reporting -An area to be avoided -Traffic separation schemes -Discharge prohibition or regulations -Mandatory no anchoring areas -Deep water routes -Emission control areas (PDF contains 5 pages)

Leniency programs, antitrust enforcement and multimarket contact : three essays in industrial organization

The Layout of My Thesis This thesis contains three chapters in Industrial Organization that build on the work outlined above. The first two chapters combine leniency programs with multimarket contact and provide a thorough analysis of the potential effects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus. The third chapter puts the whole discussion on leniency programs into perspective by examining other enforcement tools available to an antitrust authority. The main argument in that last chapter is that a specific instrument can only be as effective as the policy in which it is embedded. It is therefore important for an antitrust authority to know how it best accompanies the introduction or modification of a policy instrument that helps deterrence. INTRODUCTION Chapter 1 examines the efféct of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on the incentives of firms to report cartel activities. The main question is whether the inclusion of these policies in a leniency program undermine the effectiveness of the latter by discouraging the firms to apply for amnesty. The model is static and focus on the ex post incentives of firms to desist from collusion. The results suggest that, because Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus encourage the reporting of a second cartel after a first detection, a firm, anticipating this, may be reluctant to seek leniency and to report in the first place. However, the effect may also go in the opposite direction, and Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may encourage the simultaneous reporting of two cartels. Chapter 2 takes this idea further to the stage of cartel formation. This chapter provides a complete characterization of the potential anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of Amnesty Plus in a infinitely repeated game framework when the firms use their multimarket contact to harshen punishment. I suggest a clear-cut policy rule that prevents potential adverse effects and thereby show that, if policy makers follow this rule, a leniency program with Amnesty Plus performs better than one without. Chapter 3 characterizes the socially optimal enforcement effort of an antitrust authority and shows how this effort changes with the introduction or modification of specific policy instruments. The intuition is that the policy instrument may increase the marginal benefit of conducting investigations. If this effect is strong enough, a more rigorous detection policy becomes socially desirable.

Real-time context-aware network security policy enforcement system (RC-NSPES)

The major technical objectives of the RC-NSPES are to provide a framework for the concurrent operation of reactive and pro-active security functions to deliver efficient and optimised intrusion detection schemes as well as enhanced and highly correlated rule sets for more effective alerts management and root-cause analysis. The design and implementation of the RC-NSPES solution includes a number of innovative features in terms of real-time programmable embedded hardware (FPGA) deployment as well as in the integrated management station. These have been devised so as to deliver enhanced detection of attacks and contextualised alerts against threats that can arise from both the network layer and the application layer protocols. The resulting architecture represents an efficient and effective framework for the future deployment of network security systems.

Regulatory and enabling approaches to corporate law enforcement : patterns of litigation 1986-2002 and the effect of recent reforms in New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom

Enforcement of corporate rights and duties may follow either a ‘regulatory’ or ‘enabling’ model. If a regulatory approach is taken, enforcement action will generally be undertaken by regulatory agencies such as, in New Zealand, the Registrar of Companies and Securities Commission, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) or the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in the United Kingdom. If an enabling approach is chosen, enforcement action will more often be by private parties such as company shareholders, directors or creditors. When New Zealand's company law was reformed in 1993, a primarily private enforcement regime was adopted, consisting of a list of statutory directors' duties and an enhanced collection of shareholder remedies, based in part upon North American models and including a statutory derivative action. Public enforcement was largely confined to administrative matters and the enforcement of the disclosure requirements of New Zealand's securities law. While the previous enforcement regime was similarly reliant on private action, the law on directors' duties was less accessible, and shareholder action was hindered by the majority rule principle and the rule in Foss v Harbottle. This approach is in contrast with that used in Australia and the United Kingdom, where public agencies have a much more prominent enforcement role despite recent and proposed reforms to directors' duties and shareholder remedies. These reforms are designed to improve the ability of private parties to enforce corporate rights and duties. A survey of enforcement litigation in New Zealand since 1986 indicates that the object of a primarily enabling enforcement regime seems to have been achieved, and may well have been achieved even without the 1993 reform package. Private enforcement has, in fact, been much more prevalent than public enforcement since well before the enactment of the new legislation. Most enforcement action both before and after the reform was commenced by shareholders and shareholder/directors, and most involved closely held companies. Public enforcement was largely undertaken in areas such as securities law, where the wider public interest was affected. Similar surveys of Australian and United Kingdom enforcement litigation reveal a proportionally much greater reliance on public bodies to enforce corporate rights and duties, indicating a more regulatory approach. The ASIC and DTI enforced a wider range of provisions, affecting both closely and widely held companies, than those subject to public enforcement in New Zealand. Publicly enforced provisions in Australia and the United Kingdom include directors' duties and provisions dealing with disqualification from managing companies, as well as securities law requirements.

Decentralisation of EC Competition Law Enforcement and General Principles of Community Law. Research Papers in Law, 4/2004

From the Introduction. By virtue of Council Regulation No. 1/2003, as of 1st May 2004 the full application of EC competition law will be entrusted to national competition authorities (hereinafter NCAs) and national courts. The bold reform of EC competition law enforcement adheres to the system of executive federalism1 which characterises the EC legal system. The repartition of competences within the Community allocates implementation of Community law mainly at Member States level. Pursuant to Article 10 EC, they are responsible for the implementation of the measures which have been adopted at Community level for the achievement of the objectives specified in the EC Treaty. Consequently, the attainment of the Community objectives depends very much upon the cooperation of national authorities, which act in accordance with their own national procedural rules.2 The various national procedural rules present themselves as conduits through which Community law is implemented and enforced. While as a rule Community law is not designed to alter national procedural rules, the Community legal order cannot afford to leave national procedural rules untouched when they are liable to hamper the effective application of Community law....For reason of space, this contribution intends only to highlight some aspects of Regulation No. 1/2003 with regard to which general principles of Community law are able to condition national procedural rules.

Democratic governance and the rule of law : lessons from Colombia /

"Colombia has experienced conflict for decades. In the 1990s it was a paradigm of the failing state, beset with all manner of troubles: terrorism, kidnapping, murder, drug trafficking, corruption, an economic downturn of major scope, general lawlessness, and brain drain. Today the country is much safer, and the agents of violence are clearly on the defensive. Nonetheless, much work lies ahead to secure the democratic system. Security and the rule of law are fundamental to the task. As the monopoly over the legitimate use of force is established, democratic governance also needs the architecture of law: ministry of justice, courts, legislative scrutiny, law enforcement agencies, regulatory bodies, public defenders, police, correctional system, legal statutes, contracts, university level academic education to train lawyers, judges, and investigators, along with engagement with civil society to promote a culture of lawfulness. Security without the rule of law puts a society at risk of falling into a Hobbesian hell."--P. v.

Law Enforcement Actions in Urban Spaces Governed by Violent Non-State Entities: Lessons from Latin America

In response to a crime epidemic afflicting Latin America since the early 1990s, several countries in the region have resorted to using heavy-force police or military units to physically retake territories de facto controlled by non-State criminal or insurgent groups. After a period of territory control, the heavy forces hand law enforcement functions in the retaken territories to regular police officers, with the hope that the territories and their populations will remain under the control of the state. To a varying degree, intensity, and consistency, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica have adopted such policies since the mid-1990s. During such operations, governments need to pursue two interrelated objectives: to better establish the state’s physical presence and to realign the allegiance of the population in those areas toward the state and away from the non-State criminal entities. From the perspective of law enforcement, such operations entail several critical decisions and junctions, such as: Whether or not to announce the force insertion in advance. The decision trades off the element of surprise and the ability to capture key leaders of the criminal organizations against the ability to minimize civilian casualties and force levels. The latter, however, may allow criminals to go to ground and escape capture. Governments thus must decide whether they merely seek to displace criminal groups to other areas or maximize their decapitation capacity. Intelligence flows rarely come from the population. Often, rival criminal groups are the best source of intelligence. However, cooperation between the State and such groups that goes beyond using vetted intelligence provided by the groups, such as a State tolerance for militias, compromises the rule-of-law integrity of the State and ultimately can eviscerate even public safety gains. Sustaining security after initial clearing operations is at times even more challenging than conducting the initial operations. Although unlike the heavy forces, traditional police forces, especially if designed as community police, have the capacity to develop trust of the community and ultimately focus on crime prevention, developing such trust often takes a long time. To develop the community’s trust, regular police forces need to conduct frequent on-foot patrols with intensive nonthreatening interactions with the population and minimize the use of force. Moreover, sufficiently robust patrol units need to be placed in designated beats for substantial amount of time, often at least over a year. Establishing oversight mechanisms, including joint police-citizens’ boards, further facilities building trust in the police among the community. After disruption of the established criminal order, street crime often significantly rises and both the heavy-force and community-police units often struggle to contain it. The increase in street crime alienates the population of the retaken territory from the State. Thus developing a capacity to address street crime is critical. Moreover, the community police units tend to be vulnerable (especially initially) to efforts by displaced criminals to reoccupy the cleared territories. Losing a cleared territory back to criminal groups is extremely costly in terms of losing any established trust and being able to recover it. Rather than operating on a priori determined handover schedule, a careful assessment of the relative strength of regular police and criminal groups post-clearing operations is likely to be a better guide for timing the handover from heavy forces to regular police units. Cleared territories often experience not only a peace dividend, but also a peace deficit – in the rise new serious crime (in addition to street crime). Newly – valuable land and other previously-inaccessible resources can lead to land speculation and forced displacement; various other forms of new crime can also significantly rise. Community police forces often struggle to cope with such crime, especially as it is frequently linked to legal business. Such new crime often receives little to no attention in the design of the operations to retake territories from criminal groups. But without developing an effective response to such new crime, the public safety gains of the clearing operations can be altogether lost.