Risk dominance selects the leader. An experimental analysis

Coordination games arise very often in studies of industrial organization and international trade. This type of games has multiple strict equilibria, and therefore the identification of testable predictions isvery difficult. We study a vertical product differentiation model with two asymmetric players choosing first qualities and then prices. This game has two equilibria for some parameter values. However, we apply the risk dominance criterion suggested by Harsanyi and Selten and show that it always selects the equilibrium where the leader is the firm having some initial advantage. We then perform an experimental analysis totest whether the risk dominance prediction is supported by the behaviour oflaboratory agents. We show that the probability that the risk dominance prediction is right depends crucially on the degree of asymmetry of the game. The stronger the asymmetries the higher the predictive power of the risk dominance criterion.

Stochastic stability and the evolution of coordination in spatially structured populations.

Animals can often coordinate their actions to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes. However, this can result in a social dilemma when uncertainty about the behavior of partners creates multiple fitness peaks. Strategies that minimize risk ("risk dominant") instead of maximizing reward ("payoff dominant") are favored in economic models when individuals learn behaviors that increase their payoffs. Specifically, such strategies are shown to be "stochastically stable" (a refinement of evolutionary stability). Here, we extend the notion of stochastic stability to biological models of continuous phenotypes at a mutation-selection-drift balance. This allows us to make a unique prediction for long-term evolution in games with multiple equilibria. We show how genetic relatedness due to limited dispersal and scaled to account for local competition can crucially affect the stochastically-stable outcome of coordination games. We find that positive relatedness (weak local competition) increases the chance the payoff dominant strategy is stochastically stable, even when it is not risk dominant. Conversely, negative relatedness (strong local competition) increases the chance that strategies evolve that are neither payoff nor risk dominant. Extending our results to large multiplayer coordination games we find that negative relatedness can create competition so extreme that the game effectively changes to a hawk-dove game and a stochastically stable polymorphism between the alternative strategies evolves. These results demonstrate the usefulness of stochastic stability in characterizing long-term evolution of continuous phenotypes: the outcomes of multiplayer games can be reduced to the generic equilibria of two-player games and the effect of spatial structure can be analyzed readily.

Pre-play communication and credibility: A test of Aumann's conjecture

The effectiveness of pre-play communication in achieving efficientoutcomes has long been a subject of controversy. In some environments,cheap talk may help to achieve coordination. However, Aumannconjectures that, in a variant of the Stag Hunt game, a signal forefficient play is not self-enforcing and concludes that an "agreementto play [the efficient outcome] conveys no information about what theplayers will do." Harsanyi and Selten (1988) cite this example as anillustration of risk-dominance vs. payoff-dominance. Farrell and Rabin(1996) agree with the logic, but suspect that cheap talk willnonetheless achieve efficiency. The conjecture is tested with one-waycommunication. When the sender first chooses a signal and then anaction, there is impressive coordination: a 94% probability for thepotentially efficient (but risky) play, given a signal for efficientplay. Without communication, efforts to achieve efficiency wereunsuccessful, as the proportion of B moves is only 35%. I also test ahypothesis that the order of the action and the signal affects theresults, finding that the decision order is indeed important. WhileAumann s conjecture is behaviorally disconfirmed when the signal isdetermined initially, the signal s credibility seems to be much moresuspect when the sender is known to have first chosen an action, andthe results are not statistically distinguishable from those whenthere is no signal. Some applications and issues in communication andcoordination are discussed.

Endogenous price leadership

We consider a linear price setting duopoly game with di®erentiatedproducts and determine endogenously which of the players will lead andwhich will follow. While the follower role is most attractive for each firm, we show that waiting is more risky for the low cost firm so that,consequently, risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten(1988), allow the conclusion that only the high cost firm will choose towait. Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous price leader.

On some geometry and equivalence classes of normal form games

Equivalence classes of normal form games are defined using the geometryof correspondences of standard equilibiurm concepts like correlated, Nash,and robust equilibrium or risk dominance and rationalizability. Resultingequivalence classes are fully characterized and compared across differentequilibrium concepts for 2 x 2 games. It is argued that the procedure canlead to broad and game-theoretically meaningful distinctions of games aswell as to alternative ways of viewing and testing equilibrium concepts.Larger games are also briefly considered.

Endogenous price leadership

We consider a linear price setting duopoly game with differentiated products and determine endogenously which of the players will lead and which will follow. While the follower role is most attractive for each firm, we show that waiting is more risky for the low cost firm so that, consequently, risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten (1988), allow the conclusion that only the highcost firm will choose to wait. Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous price leader.

Endogenous Stackelberg leadership

We consider a linear quantity setting duopoly game and analyzewhich of the players will commit when both players have the possibility todo so. To that end, we study a 2-stage game in which each player caneither commit to a quantity in stage 1 or wait till stage 2. We show thatcommitting is more risky for the high cost firm and that, consequently,risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten (1988), allowthe conclusion that only the low cost firm will choose to commit.Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous Stackelberg leader.

Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).

Stochastic dominance and absolute risk aversion

In this paper we propose the infimum of the Arrow-Pratt index of absolute risk aversion as a measure of global risk aversion of a utility function. We then show that, for any given arbitrary pair of distributions, there exists a threshold level of global risk aversion such that all increasing concave utility functions with at least as much global risk aversion would rank the two distributions in the same way. Furthermore, this threshold level is sharp in the sense that, for any lower level of global risk aversion, we can find two utility functions in this class yielding opposite preference relations for the two distributions.

Stochastic dominance and absolute risk aversion

In this paper we proose the infimum of the Arrow-Pratt index of absoluterisk aversion as a measure of global risk aversion of a utility function.We then show that, for any given arbitrary pair of distributions, thereexists a threshold level of global risk aversion such that all increasingconcave utility functions with at least as much global risk aversion wouldrank the two distributions in the same way. Furthermore, this thresholdlevel is sharp in the sense that, for any lower level of global riskaversion, we can find two utility functions in this class yielding oppositepreference relations for the two distributions.

Reward-risk efficiency in proportional reinsurance with different risk measures

We have studied, in particular under normality of the implied random variables, the connections between different measures of risk such as the standard deviation, the W-ruin probability and the p-V@R. We discuss conditions granting the equivalence of these measures with respect to risk preference relations and the equivalence of dominance and efficiency of risk-reward criteria involving these measures. Then more specifically we applied these concepts to rigorously face the problem of finding the efficient set of de Finetti’s variable quota share proportional reinsurance.

Emotion and reason in everyday risk perception

Although research has documented the importance of emotion in risk perception, little is knownabout its prevalence in everyday life. Using the Experience Sampling Method, 94 part-timestudents were prompted at random via cellular telephones to report on mood state and threeemotions and to assess risk on thirty occasions during their working hours. The emotions valence, arousal, and dominance were measured using self-assessment manikins (Bradley &Lang, 1994). Hierarchical linear models (HLM) revealed that mood state and emotions explainedsignificant variance in risk perception. In addition, valence and arousal accounted for varianceover and above reason (measured by severity and possibility of risks). Six risks were reassessedin a post-experimental session and found to be lower than their real-time counterparts.The study demonstrates the feasibility and value of collecting representative samples of data withsimple technology. Evidence for the statistical consistency of the HLM estimates is provided inan Appendix.

Directional dominance on stature and cognition in diverse human populations.

Homozygosity has long been associated with rare, often devastating, Mendelian disorders, and Darwin was one of the first to recognize that inbreeding reduces evolutionary fitness. However, the effect of the more distant parental relatedness that is common in modern human populations is less well understood. Genomic data now allow us to investigate the effects of homozygosity on traits of public health importance by observing contiguous homozygous segments (runs of homozygosity), which are inferred to be homozygous along their complete length. Given the low levels of genome-wide homozygosity prevalent in most human populations, information is required on very large numbers of people to provide sufficient power. Here we use runs of homozygosity to study 16 health-related quantitative traits in 354,224 individuals from 102 cohorts, and find statistically significant associations between summed runs of homozygosity and four complex traits: height, forced expiratory lung volume in one second, general cognitive ability and educational attainment (P < 1 × 10(-300), 2.1 × 10(-6), 2.5 × 10(-10) and 1.8 × 10(-10), respectively). In each case, increased homozygosity was associated with decreased trait value, equivalent to the offspring of first cousins being 1.2 cm shorter and having 10 months' less education. Similar effect sizes were found across four continental groups and populations with different degrees of genome-wide homozygosity, providing evidence that homozygosity, rather than confounding, directly contributes to phenotypic variance. Contrary to earlier reports in substantially smaller samples, no evidence was seen of an influence of genome-wide homozygosity on blood pressure and low density lipoprotein cholesterol, or ten other cardio-metabolic traits. Since directional dominance is predicted for traits under directional evolutionary selection, this study provides evidence that increased stature and cognitive function have been positively selected in human evolution, whereas many important risk factors for late-onset complex diseases may not have been.

Same- and Other-Sex Victimization : Risk Factors, Consequences, and Protection by Peers

Bullying can be viewed as goal-oriented behavior in the strive for dominance and prestige in the peer group (Salmivalli, 2010). To ensure the effectiveness of their power demonstrations, bullies often choose targets from among their vulnerable peers (Salmivalli, 2010; Veenstra et al., 2007). A large number of studies have also shown that victimization has severe consequences for the victims’ psychosocial adjustment (Reijntjes, Kamphuis, Prinzie, & Telch, 2010; Ttofi, Farrington, Lösel, & Loeber, 2011). In this thesis I investigate – based on three empirical studies – whether similar dynamics on the risk factors and consequences apply to same- and other-sex victimization. In the empirical studies, we used the data from the randomized control trial of the KiVa antibullying program for the elementary school grades 4–6 (2007–2008), and for the middle school grades 7–9 (2008–2009). We measured same- and other-sex victimization, and victims’ defending relationships by dyadic questions: “By which classmates are you victimized?” and “By which classmates are you supported, comforted, or defended?” In addition, we used self-reports and peer reports to measure adjustment and social status. The findings imply that other-sex victimization may be challenging for antibullying work. First, although targets of bullying seemed to be selected from among vulnerable peers for the most part, perceived popularity increased the risks of other-sex victimization. Popularity of these victims may falsely lead to an impression that the victims are doing well. Second, the consequences considering victims’ later psychosocial adjustment were alarming concerning girls bullied by boys. Thus, despite the fact that the targets may be perceived as popular, other-sex victimization can have even more severe consequences than same-sex victimization. Third, we found that defending relationships were mostly same-sex relationships, and consequently, we may ask whether defending is effective against other-sex bullies. Finally, the KiVa antibullying program was less effective against other-sex victimization in the adolescent sample. The findings altogether emphasize the importance of taking into account the sex composition of the bully-victim dyad, both considering future research on bullying and in the antibullying work with children and adolescents.

Output risk aspects of genetically modified crop technology in South Africa

Technology involving genetic modification of crops has the potential to make a contribution to rural poverty reduction in many developing countries. Thus far, insecticide-producing 'Bt' varieties of cotton have been the main GM crops under cultivation in developing nations. Several studies have evaluated the farm-level performance of Bt varieties in comparison to conventional ones by estimating production technology, and have mostly found Bt technology to be very successful in raising output and/or reducing insecticide input. However, the production risk properties of this technology have not been studied, although they are likely to be important to risk-averse smallholders. This study investigates the output risk aspects of Bt technology using a three-year farm-level dataset on smallholder cotton production in Makhathini flats, Kwa-Zulu Natal, South Africa. Stochastic dominance and stochastic production function estimation methods are used to examine the risk properties of the two technologies. Results indicate that Bt technology increases output risk by being most effective when crop growth conditions are good, but being less effective when conditions are less favourable. However, in spite of its risk increasing effect, the mean output performance of Bt cotton is good enough to make it preferable to conventional technology even for risk-averse smallholders.