Resistência II: Direito Fundamental Constitucional

Invocava então o art. 21º da CRP. “Todos têm o direito de resistir a qualquer ordem que ofenda os seus direitos, liberdades e garantias e de repelir pela força qualquer agressão, quando não seja possível recorrer à autoridade pública”: art. 21º da Constituição. § Then invoked the art. 21 of the CRP. "Everyone has the right to resist any order that offends the rights, freedoms and guarantees and to resist by force any aggression when it is not possible to use public authority" means art. 21 of the Constitution.

Resistência: Direito Fundamental Constitucional

“Todos têm o direito de resistir a qualquer ordem que ofenda os seus direitos, liberdades e garantias e de repelir pela força qualquer agressão, quando não seja possível recorrer à autoridade pública”. É o que consagra o art. 21º da Constituição da República Portuguesa. Trata-se não apenas dum direito fundamental, mas também dum dever fundamental. § "Everyone has the right to resist any order that offends the rights, freedoms and guarantees and to resist by force any aggression when it is not possible recourse to a public authority." It is what establishes the art. 21 of the Portuguese Constitution. It is not just of a fundamental right, but also as a fundamental duty.

Part I. A closing roll from Holy and Eternal Wisdom, Mother Ann, Father William and Father James, to the children of Zion : Part II. A sacred covenant of our heavenly parents, sent forth upon earth to their children, at the close of their late manifestation, (on the holy mount of God,) for the purification of Zion and the inhabitants thereof /

Text printed in two columns.

An inquiry into the right to change the ecclesiastical constitution of the Congregational churches of Massachusetts : with a preface addressed to the Rev. Joseph Lyman, D. D. under the sanction of whose name such a change has been proposed to the people of this state : to which is prefixed Dr. Morse's Report to the General Association of Massachusetts, from the Panoplist of August, 1815 /

Signed: A layman.

EU cohesion aid to Spain: a data set. Part II: 1994-99 planning period

In this paper we construct a data set on EU cohesion aid to Spain during the planning period 1994-99. The data are disaggregated by region, year and function and attempt to approximate the timing of actual executed expenditure on assisted projects.

The human right to water - normative foundations and ethical implications

La présente contribution examine les fondements normatifs ainsi que les implications éthiques du droit à l’eau, tel qu’il fut reconnu en 2002 par le comité onusien des droits économiques, sociaux et culturels. Il sera défendu que le droit à l’eau potable peut être justifié en tant que droit moral fondamental, de par son caractère indispensable en vue de la garantie des conditions basiques de survie. Cet état de fait, cependant, s’avère moins évident au vue d’un droit à l’eau d’usage non-domestique. Ici, la discussion se rapproche des débats accompagnant le concept beaucoup plus complexe des droits sociaux et économiques. Par rapport à ce groupe de droits, la question de l’allocation est des plus controversées: à qui incombe-t-il de garantir leur respect? Dans le but d’éviter cette problématique d’allocation, le présent essai soulèvera la question de savoir, si la limitation de l’accès à l’eau peut être conçue comme une violation d’autres droits moraux: bien qu’il y ait des cas où des entreprises transnationales déploient des activités nuisibles à l’égard des populations pauvres en polluant sciemment leurs ressources en eau ou en initiant et en exécutant des stratégies de privatisation les privant de leurs droits, la crise globale de l’eau ne saura être rattachée uniquement aux effets de la mondialisation. Plutôt, l’on reconnaîtra la nécessité d’efforts positifs et soutenus de la part des pays développés en vue de la réalisation d’un approvisionnement suffisant en eau pour tous.

Anotação, numa perspectiva de Direito Penal Constitucional, de Criminologia e de Política Criminal, de alguns dos aspectos do Acórdão do Tribunal Constitucional (português) n.º 353/2012, de 5 de Julho de 2012 - o problema da legítima defesa de bens jurídicos individuais e bens jurídicos colectivos, bens jurídicos supra-individuais e/ou bens jurídicos comunitários no meio do Estado de Direito e do Estado Social

o Acórdão do Tribunal Constitucional português n.º 353/2012, de 5 de Julho de 2012, ao declarar a respectiva inconstitucionalidade com força obrigatória geral, colocou em evidência a existência de bens jurídicos individuais e bens jurídicos colectivos, bens jurídicos supra-individuais, bens jurídicos comunitários. Bens jurídicos estes que devem e têm que ser tutelados e protegidos. A legítima defesa pode existir quer em relação à agressão actual e ilícita de bens jurídicos individuais, quer em relação à agressão actual e ilícita de bens jurídicos colectivos, bens jurídicos supra-individuais e/ou bens jurídicos comunitários? Parte muito substancial e importante da Doutrina indica que sim. Mas, então, como reagir, no contexto da hipotética legítima defesa, face à eventual agressão actual e ilícita dos bens jurídicos tutelados, agora com valor reforçado, pelo próprio Tribunal Constitucional? E qual o papel do direito constitucional de resistência? Este artigo pretende fornecer um muito breve contributo para a solução das correspondentes questões. A questão dos Direitos Fundamentais, o Desenvolvimento e a modernidade. § the Sentence of the (Portuguese) Constitutional Court n. 353/2012 of July 5, 2012, declaring its generally binding unconstitutionality, has highlighted the existence of individual legal goods and collective legal goods, supra-individual legal goods, community legal goods. These legal goods, that should and must be defended and protected. Legitimate defense can be either relative to the current and illicit aggression to individual legal goods, whether in relation to the current and illicit aggression to collective legal goods, supra-individual legal goods or community legal goods? Very substantial and important part of the Doctrine would appear so. But then how to respond, in the context of hypothetical self-defense, in the face of possible current and illicit aggression of the protected legal goods, now with enhanced value, by the Constitutional Court? And what is the role of the constitutional right of resistance? This article is intended to provide a very brief contribution to the solution of the corresponding questions. The question of Fundamental Rights, Development and modernity.

Fundamental rights in the EU: three years after Lisbon, the Luxembourg perspective. Research Paper in Law (Cooperative Research Paper) 02/2013

For more than 10 years after the signature of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the question of the protection of human rights had never been in issue. The emphasis was on the creation and consolidation of the common market establishing the free movement of persons, of services, of goods and of capital. Neither the initial Treaties nor the jurisprudence of the Court made any reference to the protection of human rights in the process of the creation of the common market. It all started in 1969 in the Stauder case with this very short sentence: “Interpreted in this way the provision at issue contains nothing capable of prejudicing the fundamental human rights enshrined in the general principles of Community law and protected by the Court”. Forty years later, with the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force on 1 December 2009, fundamental rights are part of primary law. The achievement has been remarkable if we consider the very beginning of the process. It is not an exaggeration to say that the Court with its jurisprudence has been the driving force and the source of inspiration for this achievement.

The clergy-Man's vade mecum : part II : containing the canonical codes of the primitive, universal, Eastern, and Western Church, Down to the Year of our Lord, DCCLXXXVII, done from the original Greek and Latin, omitting no Canon, Decree, or any part of them that is curious or instructive ; with explanatory notes, a large index, and a preface shewing the usefulness of the work; with some reflections on moderate-non-conformity, and the rights of the church

Mode of access: Internet.

A ‘right to have rights’ in the EU public sphere? An Arendtian justification for the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

This paper discusses the Court’s reasoning in interpreting the EU Charter, using recent case law on horizontal effect as a case study. It identifies two possible means of interpreting the provisions of the Charter: firstly, an approach based on common values (e.g. equality or solidarity) and, secondly, an approach based on access to the public sphere. It argues in favour of the latter. Whereas an approach based on common values is more consonant with the development of the case law so far, it is conceptually problematic: it involves subjective assessments of the importance and degree of ‘sharedness’ of the value in question, which can undermine the equal constitutional status of different Charter provisions. Furthermore, it marginalises the Charter’s overall politically constructional character, which distinguishes it from other sources of rights protection listed in Art 6 TEU. The paper argues that, as the Charter’s provisions concretise the notion of political status in the EU, they have a primarily constitutional, rather than ethical, basis. Interpreting the Charter based on the very commitment to a process of sharing, drawing on Hannah Arendt’s idea of the ‘right to have rights’ (a right to access a political community on equal terms), is therefore preferable. This approach retains the pluralistic, post-national fabric of the EU polity, as it accommodates multiple narratives about its underlying values, while also having an inclusionary impact on previously underrepresented groups (e.g. non-market-active citizens or the sans-papiers) by recognising their equal political disposition.

Wall material properties of yeast cells. Part II. Analysis

In the preceding paper (Part I) force-deformation data were measured with the compression experiment in conjunction with the initial radial stretch ratio and the initial wall-thickness to cell-radius ratio for baker's yeast (Saccharomyces cerevisiae). In this paper, these data have been analysed with the mechanical model of Smith et al. (Smith, Moxham & Middelberg (1998) Chemical Engineering Science, 53, 3913-3922) with the wall constitutive behaviour defined a priori as incompressible and linear-elastic. This analysis determined the mean Young's modulus ((E) over bar), mean maximum von Mises stress-at-failure (<(sigma)over bar>(VM,f)) and mean maximum von Mises strain-at failure (<(epsilon)over bar>(VM,f)) to be (E) over bar = 150 +/- 15 MPa, <(sigma)over bar>(VM,f) = 70 +/- 4 MPa and <(epsilon)over bar>(VM,f) = 0.75 +/- 0.08, respectively. The mean Young's modulus was not dependent (P greater than or equal to 0.05) on external osmotic pressure (0-0.8 MPa) nor compression rate (1.03-7.68 mu m/s) suggesting the incompressible linear-elastic relationship is representative of the actual cell-wall constitutive behaviour. Hydraulic conductivities were also determined and were comparable to other similar cell types (0-2.5 mu m/MPa s). The hydraulic conductivity distribution was not dependent on external osmotic pressure (0-0.8 MPa) nor compression rate (1.03-7.68 mu m/s) suggesting inclusion of cell-wall permeability in the mechanical model is justified. <(epsilon)over bar>(VM,f) was independent of cell diameter and to a first-approximation unaffected (P greater than or equal to 0.01) by external osmotic pressure and compression rate, thus providing a reasonable failure criterion. This criterion states that the cell-wall material will break when the strain exceeds <(epsilon)over bar>(VM,f) = 0.75 +/- 0.08. Variability in overall cell strength during compression was shown to be primarily due to biological variability in the maximum von Mises strain-at-failure. These data represent the first estimates of cell-wall material properties for yeast and the first fundamental analysis of cell-compression data. They are essential for describing cell-disruption at the fundamental level of fluid-cell interactions in general bioprocesses. They also provide valuable new measurements for yeast-cell physiologists. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

MR image-based measurement of rates of change in volumes of brain structures. Part II: Application to a study of Alzheimer's disease and normal aging

We present global and regional rates of brain atrophy measured on serially acquired T1-weighted brain MR images for a group of Alzheimer's disease (AD) patients and age-matched normal control (NC) subjects using the analysis procedure described in Part I. Three rates of brain atrophy: the rate of atrophy in the cerebrum, the rate of lateral ventricular enlargement and the rate of atrophy in the region of temporal lobes, were evaluated for 14 AD patients and 14 age-matched NC subjects. All three rates showed significant differences between the two groups, However, the greatest separation of the two groups was obtained when the regional rates were combined. This application has demonstrated that rates of brain atrophy, especially in specific regions of the brain, based on MR images can provide sensitive measures for evaluating the progression of AD. These measures will be useful for the evaluation of therapeutic effects of novel therapies for AD. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.