Economics teaching in Australian universities: Rewards and outcomes

This paper presents evidence from two survey's to help explain the poor ratings consistently given to the teaching of economics at Australian universities. The evidence suggests that the Poor ratings of economics teaching can be attributed to two related factors: inappropriate pedagogical practices and lack of rewards for allocating additional time to teaching. The survey data oil pedagogy, in economics consist of 205 responses from graduates from two Queensland universities. The time elapsed since graduation ranges from 1 to 10 years. The survey data on academics' time allocation consist of 290 responses from academic economists across a wide range of Australian universities.

An explaratory study on the relationship between Employee innovation and the rewards systems supporting innovation ; a case study of Medtronic Galway

The aim of this thesis is to explore the relationship between innovation and reward system supporting innovation. The empirical evidence came from a case study in Medtronic, Galway, a medical device company. This study incorporates the literature surrounding innovation and rewards and will attempt to identify a link both theoretically and practically between both.

Which Inequality? The Inequality of Endowments Versus the Inequality of Rewards

Society often allocates valuable resources - such as prestigious positions, salaries, or marriage partners - via tournament-like institutions. In such situations, inequality affects incentives to compete and hence has a direct effect on equilibrium choices and hence material outcomes. We introduce a new distinction between inequality in initial endowments (e.g. ability, inherited wealth) and inequality of what one can obtain as rewards (e.g. prestigious positions, money). We show that these two types of inequality have opposing effects on equilibrium behavior and wellbeing. Greater inequality of rewards tends to hurt most people — both the middle class and the poor, — who are forced into greater effort. In contrast, greater inequality of endowments tends to benefit the middle class. Thus, which type of inequality is considered hugely affects the correctness of our intuitions about the implications of inequality.

The Design and efficiency of loyalty rewards

The goal of this paper is to reexamine the optimal design and efficiency of loyalty rewards in markets for final consumption goods. While the literature has emphasized the role of loyalty rewards as endogenous switching costs (which distort the efficient allocation of consumers), in this paper I analyze the ability of alternative designs to foster consumer participation and increase total surplus. First, the efficiency of loyalty rewards depend on their specific design. A commitment to the price of repeat purchases can involve substantial efficiency gains by reducing price-cost margins. However, discount policies imply higher future regular prices and are likely to reduce total surplus. Second, firms may prefer to set up inefficient rewards (discounts), especially in those circumstances where a commitment to the price of repeat purchases triggers Coasian dynamics.

Market rewards to patterns on increasing earnings: do cash flow patterns, accruals manipulation and real activities manipulation matter?

This study explores whether firms have differential price-earnings multiples associated with their means of achieving a sequential pattern of increasing positive earnings. Our main findings show that market participants assign higher price-earnings multiples to firms when their pattern of increasing earnings is supported by the same pattern of increasing cash flows. Market participants assign lower price-earnings multiples to firms suspect of having engaged in accrual-based earnings management, sales manipulation, and overproduction to achieve the earnings pattern. We find, however, that market participants do not penalize firms suspect of having achieved the earnings pattern through the opportunistic reduction of discretionary expenses.

The rewards of cooperation: The effects of membership in European regulatory networks

Networks famously epitomize the shift from 'government' to 'governance' as governing structures for exercising control and coordination besides hierarchies and markets. Their distinctive features are their horizontality, the interdependence among member actors and an interactive decision-making style. Networks are expected to increase the problem-solving capacity of political systems in a context of growing social complexity, where political authority is increasingly fragmented across territorial and functional levels. However, very little attention has been given so far to another crucial implication of network governance - that is, the effects of networks on their members. To explore this important question, this article examines the effects of membership in European regulatory networks on two crucial attributes of member agencies, which are in charge of regulating finance, energy, telecommunications and competition: organisational growth and their regulatory powers. Panel analysis applied to data on 118 agencies during a ten-year period and semi-structured interviews provide mixed support regarding the expectation of organisational growth while strongly confirming the positive effect of networks on the increase of the regulatory powers attributed to member agencies.

Rewards for Motivating Employees

When considering ways to motivate employees, one must keep in mind that each individual is different and therefore everyone is motivated in different way. Employees can have quite different motivators, for example, more money, more recognition, flexible working hours, promotions, opportunities for learning, or discounts for employee and his/her family. Therefore, when attempting to help motivate people, it is important to discover what the individual motivation factors are for each one personally. Another key factor is the variation over time. Nobody experiences a constant set of needs over time, it will change slowly. One of the most fundamental concerns of reward management is how it can help to motivate people so that they achieve their full potential. The development of a performance culture is a typical aim of reward strategy. It is therefore necessary to understand the factors that motivate people and how, in the light of these factors, rewarding process and practices that will enhance motivation, commitment, job engagement and positive discretionary behavior, can be developed. The purpose of this research is to examine more in detail of the total reward systems which are used in two public sectors and their cultural differences and/or similarities. The study is focused on two different public sectors; Vantaa City Authority (Finland) and Hertfordshire County Authority (the United Kingdom). The research questions are: How do public sector employers attempt to reward their employees with a total reward system? • What are the different ways to motivate employees? • What is the reward system in the public sector based on? • What characteristics are included in the total reward system? • How does the culture affect the ways of motivation and rewarding? The benefits of a total reward approach are, for example, the greater impact which means that the combined effect of the different types of rewards will make a deeper and longer-lasting impact on the motivation and commitment of people. It also enhances the employment relationship, meaning that the employment relationship created by a total rewards approach makes the maximum use of relational as well as transactional rewards and will therefore appeal more to individuals. The research findings point out that in Finland rewards are based on just for the employees, recognition of individuals is high, in several cases they reward teams, and organisation climate is important issue for them. In the United Kingdom, the reward system is based on rewarding employees and their families, employer offer several discounts for employees and families, and flexible working hours are favourable.

Making the least active pay: a simulation of rewards and penalties under Demand Side Participation programs

The orthodox approach for incentivising Demand Side Participation (DSP) programs is that utility losses from capital, installation and planning costs should be recovered under financial incentive mechanisms which aim to ensure that utilities have the right incentives to implement DSP activities. The recent national smart metering roll-out in the UK implies that this approach needs to be reassessed since utilities will recover the capital costs associated with DSP technology through bills. This paper introduces a reward and penalty mechanism focusing on residential users. DSP planning costs are recovered through payments from those consumers who do not react to peak signals. Those consumers who do react are rewarded by paying lower bills. Because real-time incentives to residential consumers tend to fail due to the negligible amounts associated with net gains (and losses) or individual users, in the proposed mechanism the regulator determines benchmarks which are matched against responses to signals and caps the level of rewards/penalties to avoid market distortions. The paper presents an overview of existing financial incentive mechanisms for DSP; introduces the reward/penalty mechanism aimed at fostering DSP under the hypothesis of smart metering roll-out; considers the costs faced by utilities for DSP programs; assesses linear rate effects and value changes; introduces compensatory weights for those consumers who have physical or financial impediments; and shows findings based on simulation runs on three discrete levels of elasticity.