Resource Curse or Destructive Creation: A Tale of Crony Capitalism in Transition

This paper explores the “resource curse” problem as a counter-example of creative performance and innovation by examining reliance on capital and physical resources, showing the gap between expectations and ex-post actual performance became clearer under conditions of economic turmoil. The analysis employs logistic regressions with dichotomous response and predictor variables, showing significant results.Several findings that have use for economic and business practice follow. First, in a transition period, a typical characteristic of successful firms was their reliance on either capital resources or physical asset endowments, whereas the innovation factor was not significant.Second, poor-performing enterprises exhibited evidence of over reliance on both capital and physical assets. Third, firms that relied on both types of resources tended to downplay creative performance. Fourth, reliance on capital/physical resources and adoption of “creative discipline/innovations” tend to be mutually exclusive. In fact, some evidence suggests that firms face more acute problem caused by the law of diminishing returns in troubled times. The Vietnamese corporate sector’s addiction to resources may contribute to economic deterioration, through a downward spiral of lower efficiency leading to consumption of more resources. The “innovation factor” has not been tapped as a source of economic growth. The absence of innovations and creativity has made the notion of “resource curse” become identical to “destructive creation” implemented by ex-ante resource-rich firms, and worsened the problem of resource misallocation in transition turmoil.

The Economic Effects of Improving Investor Rights in Portugal

The Portuguese economy has performed remarkably well since joining the EU in 1986. Output per worker grew at an annual rate of 2.25%. The relative price of investment has declined. Real investment has increased compared to output, in part fuelled by an increase in capital inflows. At the same time, resource allocation seems to have improved as well: firm-level data shows a significant decline in the dispersion of labor productivity and size across firms. This paper argues that improvements in outside investor rights that have taken place since Portugal joined the EU is a prime candidate to explain this set of facts.

Congestion models with consistent conjectures

This paper demonstrates that, in situations in which a cumulative externality exists, the basic nature and extent of resource misallocation may be substantially less than we imagine. This conclusion stems from deriving consistent conjectures in a unified framework in which congestion is present. Experiments support the conclusion that, when numbers of agents are small, when there is little heterogeneity among them, and when they have the opportunity to observe each other during repeated experiment, the market allocation may be efficient

Essays on economic growth

A fundamental question in development economics is why some economies are rich and others poor. To illustrate the income per capita gap across economies consider that the average gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of the richest 10 percent of economies in the year 2010 was a factor of 40-fold that of the poorest 10 percent of economies. In other words, the average person in a rich economy produces in just over 9 days what the average person in a poor economy produces in an entire year. What are the factors that can explain this difference in standard of living across the world today? With this in view, this dissertation is a conjunction of three essays on the economic growth field which we seek a possible responses to this question. The first essay investigates the existence of resource misallocation in the Brazilian manufacturing sector and measures possible distortions in it. Using a similar method of measurement to the one developed by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and firm-level data for 1996-2011 we find evidence of misallocation in the manufacturing sector during the observed period. Moreover, our results show that misallocation has been growing since 2005, and it presents a non-smooth dynamic. Significantly, we find that the Brazilian manufacturing sector operates at about 50% of its efficient product. With this, if capital and labor were optimally reallocated between firms and sectors we would obtain an aggregate output growth of approximately 110-180% depending on the mode in which the capital share is measured. We also find that the economic crisis did not have a substantial effect on the total productivity factor or on the sector's misallocation. However, small firms in particular seem to be strongly affected in a global crisis. Furthermore, the effects described would be attenuated if we consider linkages and complementarity effects among sectors. Despite Brazil's well-known high tax burden, there is not evidence that this is the main source of resource misallocation. Moreover, there is a distinct pattern of structural change between the manufacturing sectors in industrialized countries and those in developing countries. Therefore, the second essay demonstrate that this pattern differs because there are some factors that distort the relative prices and also affect the output productivity. For this, we present a multi-sector model of economic growth, where distortions affect the relative prices and the allocation of inputs. This phenomenon imply that change of the production structure or perpetuation of the harmful structures to the growth rate of aggregate output. We also demonstrate that in an environment with majority decision, this distortion can be enhanced and depends on the initial distribution of firms. Furthermore, distortions in relative prices would lead to increases in the degree of misallocation of resources, and that imply that there are distinct patterns of structural changes between economies. Finally, the calibrated results of the framework developed here converge with the structural change observed in the firm-level data of the Brazilian manufacturing sector. Thereafter, using a cross-industry cross-country approach, the third essay investigates the existence of an optimal level of competition to enhance economic growth. With that in mind, we try to show that this optimal level is different from industrialized and under development economies due to the technology frontier distance, the terms of trade, and each economy's idiosyncratic characteristics. Therefore, the difference in competition industry-country level is a channel to explain the output for worker gap between countries. The theoretical and empirical results imply the existence of an inverted-U relationship between competition and growth: starting for an initially low level of competition, higher competition stimulates innovation and output growth; starting from a high initial level of competition, higher competition has a negative effect on innovation and output growth. Given on average industries in industrialized economies present higher competition level. With that if we control for the terms of trade and the industry-country fixed effect, if the industries of the developing economy operated under the same competition levels as of the industrialized ones, there is a potential increase of output of 0.2-1.0% per year. This effect on the output growth rate depends on the competition measurement used.

The BRICS: some historical experiences, growth challenges and opportunities

The acronym BRICS was a fad among the media and global investors. Now, the acronym sounds passé. However, the group of countries remains important, from both political and economic reasons. They have a large aggregate size, 28% of the global GDP and 42% of the world’s population, high growth potential due to the current significant misallocation of resources and relatively low stock of human capital, structural transformation is in progress and one of them, China, is taking steps to become a global power and a challenger to the US dominance. This paper provides a brief overview of the five economies, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. We focus on some aspects of their history, the Chinese initiatives in international finance and geopolitical strategic moves, their growth experience and structural transformation over the last 35 years, trade and investment integration into the global economy and among themselves, the growth challenges faced by their economies and the potential gains to the Brazilian economy from a stronger integration with the other BRICS. In association with its efforts to be a global power, China aims to become a major player in global finance and to achieve the status of global currency for the renminbi, which would be the first currency of an emerging economy to attain such position. Despite the similarities, the BRICS encompass very diverse economies. In the recent decades, China and India showed stellar growth rates. On the other hand, Brazil, Russia and South Africa have expanded just in line with global output growth with the Russian economy exhibiting high volatility. China is by far the largest economy, and South Africa the smallest, the only BRICS economy with a GDP lower than US$ 1 trillion. Russia abandoned communism almost 25 years ago, but reversed many of the privatizations of 90’s. China is still ruled by communism, but has a vibrant private sector and recently has officially declared market forces to play a dominant role in its economy. Brazil, Russia and South Africa are global natural resources powerhouses and commodity exporters while China and India are large commodity importers. Brazil is relatively closed to international trade of goods and services, in marked contrast to the other four economies. Brazil, India and South Africa are dependent on external capital flows whereas China and Russia are capital exporters. India and South Africa have younger populations and a large portion living below the poverty line. Despite its extraordinary growth experience that lifted many millions from poverty, China still has 28% of its population classified as poor. Russia and China have much older populations and one of their challenges is to deal with the effects of a declining labor force in the near future. India, China and South Africa face a long way to urbanization, while Brazil and Russia are already urbanized countries. China is an industrial economy but its primary sector still absorbs a large pool of workers. India is not, but the primary sector employs also a large share of the labor force. China’s aggregate demand structure is biased towards investment that has been driving its expansion. Brazil and South Africa have an aggregate demand structure similar to the developed economies, with private consumption accounting for approximately 70%. The same similarity applies to the supply side, as in both economies the share of services nears 70%. The development problem is a productivity problem, so microeconomic reforms are badly needed to foster long-term growth of the BRICS economies since they have lost steam due a variety of factors, but fundamentally due to slower total factor productivity growth. China and India are implementing ambitious reform programs, while Brazil is dealing with macroeconomic disequilibria. Russia and South Africa remain mute about structural reforms. There are some potential benefits to Brazil to be extracted from a greater economic integration with the BRICS, particularly in natural resources intensive industries and services. Necessary conditions to the materialization of those gains are the removal of the several sources of resource misallocation and strong investment in human capital.

State advances and private retreats? Evidence from the decomposition of the Chinese manufacturing aggregate productivity decomposition in China

This paper is motivated by the recent debate on the existence and scale of China's 'Guo Jin Min Tui' phenomenon, which is often translated as 'the state sector advances and the private sector retreats'. We argue that the profound implication of an advancing state sector is not the size expansion of the state ownership in the economy per se, but the likely retardation of the development of the already financially constrained private sector and the issues around the sustainability of the already weakening Chinese economy growth. Drawing on recent methodological advances, we provide a critical analysis of the contributions of the state and non-state sectors in the aggregate Total Factor Productivity and its growth over the period of 1998-2007 to verify the existence of GJMT and its possible impacts on Chinese economic growth. Overall, we find strong and consistent evidence of a systematic and worsening resource misallocation within the state sector and/or between the state sectors and private sectors over time. This suggests that non-market forces allow resources to be driven away from their competitive market allocation and towards the inefficient state sector. Crown Copyright © 2014.

International human resource management in the introductory HRM course

This paper explores the extent to which students in the introductory HRM course in US institutions are likely to be exposed to information on international and cross-cultural aspects of HRM. Two methods are used: (1) an analysis of international content in fifteen popular introductory HRM textbooks and (2) a survey of professors teaching introductory HRM. The vast majority of responding instructors said their classes got some exposure to international issues in HRM, and most introductory texts included some relevant content. Critiques of international boxed features and dedicated IHRM chapters are provided, and suggestions for improving the quality and depth of IHRM content in introductory textbooks are made.