Institutional change and the evolution of the regulatory state: evidence from the Swiss case

This article examines institutional change in a case that was expected to be particularly resilient but showed considerable structural transformation: the institutionalization of the regulatory state in Switzerland. This process is illustrated through the establishment of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) in four areas: banking and finance; telecommunications; electricity; and competition. The theoretical framework developed by Streeck, Thelen and Mahoney is used to explore hypotheses about the modes of institutional change, with the methodology of diachronic within-case study. Results confirm only partially the expectations, pointing to layering and displacement as the prevalent modes of change. The concluding part discusses the type and the direction of change as additional explanatory factors.

Policy Credibility and Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Comparative Empirical Analysis

Independent regulatory agencies are one of the main institutional features of the 'rising regulatory state' in Western Europe. Governments are increasingly willing to abandon their regulatory competencies and to delegate them to specialized institutions that are at least partially beyond their control. This article examines the empirical consistency of one particular explanation of this phenomenon, namely the credibility hypothesis, claiming that governments delegate powers so as to enhance the credibility of their policies. Three observable implications are derived from the general hypothesis, linking credibility and delegation to veto players, complexity and interdependence. An independence index is developed to measure agency independence, which is then used in a multivariate analysis where the impact of credibility concerns on delegation is tested. The analysis relies on an original data set comprising independence scores for thirty-three regulators. Results show that the credibility hypothesis can explain a good deal of the variation in delegation. The economic nature of regulation is a strong determinant of agency independence, but is mediated by national institutions in the form of veto players.

Having Your Cake and Eating It, Too: Can Regulatory Agencies Be Both Independent and Accountable?

Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) were created in various sectors and on different governmental levels to implement liberalization policies. This paper investigates the link between IRAs' independence, which is said to promote regulatory credibility and the use of technical expertise, and their accountability, which is related to the need for controlling and legitimizing independent regulators. The literature on the regulatory state anticipates a positive relation between the independence and accountability of IRAs, but systematic empirical evidence is still lacking. To tackle this question, this paper measures and compares the independence and the accountability of IRAs in three differentially liberalized sectors in Switzerland (telecommunications, electricity and railways). With the application of Social Network Analysis, this piece of research shows that IRAs can be de facto independent and accountable at the same time, but the two features do not necessarily co-evolve in the same direction.

Legitimacy and Accountability of Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Critical Review

This article reviews the literature that deals with the problem of legitimizing regulatory governance, with a special attention to the question of the accountability of independent regulatory agencies. The discussion begins with the presentation of the traditional arguments concerning the democratic deficit of the regulatory state. The positive evaluation of regulatory performance by citizens is presented as an alternative source of legitimacy. It follows the discussion of the existing approaches to make agencies accountable, so as to ensure the procedural legitimacy of regulatory governance. Some insights concerning new forms of accountability are offered in the last section, namely with reference to the establishment and ongoing consolidation of formal and informal networks of regulators.

The media accountability of independent regulatory agencies

Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) are increasingly attracting academic and societal attention, as they represent the institutional cornerstone of the regulatory state and play a key role in policy-making. Besides the expected benefits in terms of credibility and efficiency, these regulators are said to bring about a 'democratic deficit', following their statutory separation from democratic institutions. Consequently, a 'multi-pronged system of control' is required. This article focuses on a specific component of this system, that is, the media. The goal is to determine whether media coverage of IRAs meets the necessary prerequisites to be considered a potential 'accountability forum' for regulators. The results of a comparison of two contrasted cases - the British and Swiss competition commissions - mostly support the expectations, because they show that media coverage of IRAs corresponds to that of the most relevant policy issues and follows the regulatory cycle. Furthermore, a systematic bias in media coverage can be excluded.

The Same, but Different: Central Banks, Regulatory Agencies, and the Politics of Delegation to Independent Authorities

Independent regulatory agencies are the institutional foundations of the regulatory state that, during the past 15 years, has gained prominence throughout Europe. This article studies the rise of independent authorities in European countries by comparing regulatory agencies and central banks. Delegation to independent central banks and to independent regulatory agencies is similar in many respects. In both cases, agents are deliberately made independent from political principals through a specific institutional design. Moreover, it has been argued that delegation to both central banks and regulatory agencies is linked to the need for policy-makers to improve the credibility of policy commitments, to the wish of incumbent politicians to tie the hands of future majorities, and to the extent to which the institutional contexts safeguard policy stability. Through an analysis of the formal independence of central banks and regulatory agencies in Western Europe, this article identifies an empirical puzzle that casts doubts on the accuracy of current explanations. Veto players and the uncertainty of incumbent policy-makers in respect to their re-election prospects matter for delegation to both central banks and regulatory agencies, but in opposite ways. Making sense of these anomalies is necessary to achieve a better understanding of delegation to independent authorities.

The dangers of hanging baskets: 'Regulatory myths' and media representations of health and safety regulation

The successful enforcement of health and safety regulation is reliant upon the ability of regulatory agencies to demonstrate the legitimacy of the system of regulatory controls. While 'big cases' are central to this process, there are also significant legitimatory implications associated with 'minor' cases, including media-reported tales of pettiness and heavy-handedness in the interpretation and enforcement of the law. The popular media regularly report stories of 'regulatory unreasonableness', and they can pass quickly into mainstream public knowledge. A story's appeal becomes more important than its factual veracity; they are a form of 'regulatory myth'. This paper discusses the implications of regulatory myths for health and safety regulators, and analyses their challenges for regulators, paying particular attention to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) which has made concerted efforts to address regulatory myths attaching to its activities. It will be shown that such stories constitute sustained normative challenges to the legitimacy of the regulator, and political challenges to the burgeoning regulatory state, because they reflect some of the key concerns of late-modern society.

A social network-based approach to assess de facto independence of regulatory agencies

This article uses a policy network perspective to assess the independence of regulatory agencies (RAs) in liberalized public utility sectors. We focus on the de facto independence of RAs from elected politicians, regulatees and other co-regulators. We go further than previous studies, which only undertook a general analysis of the de jure independence of RAs from political authorities. Specifically, we apply a social network analysis (SNA), which concentrates on the attributes and relational profiles of all actors involved in new regulatory arrangements. The concept of de facto independence is applied to the Swiss telecommunications sector in order to provide initial empirical insights. Results clearly show that SNA indicators are an appropriate tool to identify the de facto independence of RAs and can improve knowledge about the issues arising from the emergence of the ‘regulatory State’.

Having your cake and eating it too: Can regulatory agencies be both independent and accountable?

Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) were created in various sectors and on different governmental levels to implement liberalization policies. This paper investigates the link between IRAs' independence, which is said to promote regulatory credibility and the use of technical expertise, and their accountability, which is related to the need for controlling and legitimizing independent regulators. The literature on the regulatory state anticipates a positive relation between the independence and accountability of IRAs, but systematic empirical evidence is still lacking. To tackle this question, this paper measures and compares the independence and the accountability of IRAs in three differentially liberalized sectors in Switzerland (telecommunications, electricity and railways). With the application of Social Network Analysis, this piece of research shows that IRAs can be de facto independent and accountable at the same time, but the two features do not necessarily co-evolve in the same direction.

Accountability e controlo social

Comunicação apresentada no 8º Congresso Nacional de Administração Pública – Desafios e Soluções, em Carcavelos de 21 a 22 de Novembro de 2011.

A (in)segurança privada em Portugal

Along with the food and the comfort, safety has always been one of the human priorities. In pursuit of this objective, man developed self-preservation mechanisms, went to live in society and created rules to control the community life. In the West and in the late eighteenth century, with the creation of states as we know them today, the monopoly of security, among other powers, has been preserved untouched until the last quarter of this century. With the bankruptcy of the welfare state and the rise of the regulatory state, many of the essential tasks for the community have also been carried out by private companies or institutions, including education, health care and security. Although not easy, education and health care have been more opened to be managed by the private sector. Instead, the privatization of the security sector has seen much more resistance. Still, especially in the West, the states have delegated some of the security competences to private companies. Portugal is no exception to the rule and, after a few years of unregulated activity, in 1982 was published the first law regulating the private security. After the initial stages of development (evolution and maturation), which lasted until the early years of the 2000‘s, the private security now seems to have reached maturity. Today, now with a new legal system, composed by Law no. 34/2013, of 16 may, its regulations and complementary legislation, now private security encompasses other activities and competences - becoming, an increasingly complement to public safety. It has also increased the pre-requisites and control mechanisms for private security companies, and strengthened the rules that limit their scope of activity.

La participation des consommateurs à la construction de l'autorité des normes internationales : vers une économie politique internationale de la traduction

Cette thèse explore les implications politiques de la montée en puissance des normes internationales sur nos sociétés contemporaines et pose la problématique des dynamiques participatives des représentants des consommateurs au sein des formes de pouvoir non étatique à l'aide du cas de l'Organisation internationale de normalisation (ISO). Le renforcement du pouvoir des normes internationales et autres spécifications techniques soulève d'importants enjeux démocratiques qui portent aussi bien sur la représentativité des acteurs qui les élaborent, sur l'articulation des prérogatives publiques et privées dans la gouvernance de la mondialisation, que sur le rôle de l'expertise dans la reconnaissance de ces nouvelles formes de pouvoir. La participation du monde associatif intervient sur ces différents enjeux de manière complexe. Cette recherche s'inscrit à la suite des études en relations internationales/économie politique internationale sur les formes d'autorité non étatique et s'inspire du concept de traduction issu de la sociologie des sciences et techniques pour mettre en lumière le rôle des spécifications techniques dans la construction d'une société de consommation centrée sur la liberté de choix et la façon dont les associations de consommateurs se saisissent des arènes de normalisation pour y faire valoir des préoccupations collectives, leur expertise et leur identité. Cette thèse défend l'idée que les consommateurs participent à la construction de l'autorité des normes internationales par leur rôle dans la traduction qui permet de relier les spécifications techniques au fonctionnement des marchés, au cadre réglementaire de la loi et aux préoccupations sociétales. L'analyse repose sur une observation ethnographique des délibérations d'un comité technique de l'ISO, une recherche-­‐action, la réalisation d'entretiens et la consultation de documents d'archives de l'ISO. -- This thesis explores the political significance of the rise of international standards on contemporary societies and questions the participatory dynamics of consumers' representatives within nonstate forms of power, using the case of the International organization for standardization (ISO). The power granted to international standards and other technical specifications raises important democratic issues regarding the representativity of standard-­‐ writers, the public-­‐private relationships involved in this form of governance or the expertise sustaining the recognition of such new forms of power. The participation of civil society associations affect such issues in complex ways. This research relies on international relations/international political economy approaches of nonstate authority and takes inspiration from the concept of translation developed by science and technology studies to highlight the crucial role played by technical specifications in building a consumer society based on the freedom of choice as well as how consumers' associations take stock of standardization arenas to promote collective issues and claim their expertise and identity. This thesis argues that consumers contribute to the construction of the authority of international standards through their role in the translation that links international standards to the market society, the regulatory state as well as to societal preoccupation. The analysis is based on an ethnographic observation of deliberations within an ISO technical committee, a research-­‐action, interviews as well as on the consultation of ISO archives.

Estado del arte acerca de las discusiones teóricas sobre soberanía del estado y la unión monetaria europea entre 2002 - 2010. Caso: El Reino Unido

El siguiente trabajo tiene como objetivo el Estado del arte acerca de la discusión teórica de la repercusión de la unión monetaria en el principio de soberanía nacional, específicamente el caso de Gran Bretaña, ya que éste es el único país que expresa abiertamente su incertidumbre referente a algún tipo de amenaza a su soberanía. Se pretende precisar si existen criterios concluyentes, o por el contrario determinar si no hay claridad con respecto al futuro de Gran Bretaña como miembro de la unión monetaria.A partir de lo anterior, se plantean como sus propósitos particulares construir un marco conceptual acerca de la soberanía. Este estado del arte se inicia con citas de los principales autores de finales de siglo XVII y XVIII y finaliza con las posiciones conceptuales aportadas por los teóricos modernos motivados por el nacimiento de la Unión Europea como un nuevo orden político. Entre las que se citan: modelo centrico o intergubernamentalista, modelo de gobernabilidad multi-nivel, modelo neo-funcionalista y modelo federalista. Igualmente, el trabajo, busca desarrollar un marco conceptual sobre Unión Monetaria y su evolución hasta el logro de una unión fiscal europea en el periodo de 1950-2010, establecer las relaciones teóricas entre Soberanía del Estado y Unión Monetaria y por último realizar un análisis histórico hermenéutico de la Unión Europea y el caso del Reino Unido de acuerdo a las relaciones evidenciadas en los apartados teóricos entre soberanía del Estado y Unión Monetaria.