Fitness to stand trial : how discourses of rationality, reasonableness and culpability inform the law and psychiatry to create standards of normal

The objective of this thesis is to demonstrate the importance of the concepts of rationality, reasonableness, culpability and autonomy that inform and support our conception of both the person and the punishable subject. A critical discourse analysis tracing these concepts through both the law and psychological tools used to evaluate the fitness of a person reveals that these concepts and their implied values are inconsistently applied to the mentally disordered who come into conflict with the law. I argue that the result of this inconsistency compromises a person's autonomy which is a contradiction to this concept as a foundational principle of the law. Ultimately, this thesis does not provide a solution to be employed in policy making, but its analysis leaves open possibilities for further exploration into the ways legal and social justice can be reconciled.

Equality, reasonableness and gender in the process of constitutionalization and internationalization of law

The themes of this paper are equality, reasonableness and gender rights in the dynamics of two sequential and convergent processes: the constitutionalization of judicial law, and the internationalization of constitutional law. The thesis of this paper is that in the face of non-compliance of the obligation to regulate, guarantee and protect gender rights, the best option has been to strengthen judicial law, which has enabled the development of rules for protection, the adoption of contemporary methods of interpretation and adjudication of the law, as well as the resolution of shortfalls in protection based on said processes of the constitutionalization and internationalization of local law.

Double Reasonableness and the Fourth Amendment

Recently the Supreme Court has placed new limits on both the substance of the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary that serves as the principal remedy for Fourth Amendment violations. In this Article we briefly summarize these limitations and then argue that the curtailment of the exclusionary rule has the potential to ameliorate substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine. The limited reach of the modern exclusionary rule provides the Court with license to develop an expansive new substantive framework free of the specter of a correspondingly expansive remedial framework. One point on which nearly all jurists and commentators agree is that current Fourth Amendment doctrine is a mess. We argue that the Court’s exclusionary rule cases, while frustrating and ill-conceived if viewed in isolation, provide the Court with an opportunity to revisit problematic Fourth Amendment doctrine that was born under a very different remedial regime. Such an approach would allow the Court to adhere to its current view of the exclusionary rule as a remedy of last resort while creating a Fourth Amendment with teeth. The goal is a Fourth Amendment right that is more substantial and clearly defined, but a remedy that remains limited to egregious violations of clear substantive rules. The time is now to lift the Fourth Amendment fog.

Sermons, on a number of connected subjects; in which an attempt is made to explain the leading principles of revealed religion; to show their consistency, reasonableness and importance; and to guard them against dangerous misconstructions and false inferences, and against the specious objections of unbelievers.

Mode of access: Internet.

Six sermons on the study of the Holy Scriptures : their nature, interpretation, and some of their most important doctrines ; preached before the University of Cambridge, in the years 1827-8. To which are annexed two dissertations: the first on the reasonableness of the Orthodox views of Christianity, as opposed to the rationalism of Germany; the second on the interpretation of prophecy generally, with an original exposition of the Book of Revelation; shewing that the whole of that remarkable prophecy has long ago been fulfilled /

Mode of access: Internet.

A Query submitted to the consideration of the people called Quakers, respecting the reasonableness of their disapprobation of music.

Mode of access: Internet.

Factual brief, submitted on behalf of the Industrial Commissioner, in the matter of the petitions of certain affected persons, firms, and corporations, for a review of the validity or reasonableness of Directory order number 7, governing minimum wage standards in the retail trade industry, promulgated under Article 19 of the Labor law. Case no. 2828-45, et al.

Cover title.

Democratic Stability through the Concept of Reasonableness in John Rawls

The paper addresses the question of the stability of a democratic state and shows the shortcomings of the political and institutional structure for this purpose. It argues for the need of an additional factor of reasonableness as defined by John Rawls. We reflect on its articulation with rationality, its role regarding laws and the areas where its presence is crucial to the health and maintenance of a democratic political society. The analysis concludes by justifying the instrumental need of such faculty in the political arena as well as vindicating it as a mandatory civic duty.

The failure of Australian legislation on indirect discrimination to detect the systemic racism which prevents Aboriginal people from fully participating in the workforce

Government figures put the current indigenous unemployment rate at around 23%, 3 times the unemployment rate for other Australians. This thesis aims to assess whether Australian indirect discrimination legislation can provide a remedy for one of the causes of indigenous unemployment - the systemic discrimination which can result from the mere operation of established procedures of recruitment and hiring. The impact of those practices on indigenous people is examined in the context of an analysis of anti-discrimination legislation and cases from all Australian jurisdictions from the time of the passing of the Racial Discrimination Act by the Commonwealth in 1975 to the present. The thesis finds a number of reasons why the legislation fails to provide equality of opportunity for indigenous people seeking to enter the workforce. In nearly all jurisdictions it is obscurely drafted, used mainly by educated middle class white women, and provides remedies which tend to be compensatory damages rather than change to recruitment policy. White dominance of the legal process has produced legislative and judicial definitions of "race" and "Aboriginality" which focus on biology rather than cultural difference. In the commissions and tribunals complaints of racial discrimination are often rejected on the grounds of being "vexatious" or "frivolous", not reaching the required standard of proof, or not showing a causal connection between race and the conduct complained of. In all jurisdictions the cornerstone of liability is whether a particular employment term, condition or practice is reasonable. The thesis evaluates the approaches taken by appellate courts, including the High Court, and concludes that there is a trend towards an interpretation of reasonableness which favours employer arguments such as economic rationalism, the maintenance of good industrial relations, managerial prerogative to hire and fire, and the protection of majority rights. The thesis recommends that separate, clearly drafted legislation should be passed to address indigenous disadvantage and that indigenous people should be involved in all stages of the process.

The Foot Heath Status Questionnaire : correct scale score calculation

This letter is in response to the recently published article “Evaluation of two self-referent foot health instruments” by Robert Trevethan (RT) and is in regard to the scale scores he derived when using the quality of life measure, the Foot Health Status Questionnaire [1]. Unfortunately, the journal reviewers and editor did not identify, or address, a fundamental flaw in the methodology of this paper. Subsequently, the inference drawn from this paper could, in all reasonableness, mislead the reader

Reasonable adjustments in assessment : putting law and policy into practice in Australia

The Australian Disability Standards for Education 2005 (Cth) require education providers to make reasonable adjustments in educational assessment so that students with disability can participate on the same basis as other students and be able to demonstrate what they know and can do. Reasonableness is governed by a determination of the balance of interests, benefits and detriment to the parties involved. The Standards require providers to consult with students and associates on adjustments, although guidance on how consultation should occur and how the views of students and associates are to be taken into account is vague. In this article, we identify three principles to be considered in order to put appropriate and effective reasonable adjustments in assessment into practice. While Australian law and assessment contexts are used to examine intentions, expectations and practices in educational assessment for students with disability, we argue that these three principles must be considered in any national education system to ensure equitable assessment practices and achieve equitable educational inclusion for students with disability.

Court overrides costs assessment limits

This article considers the implications for Queensland practitioners of the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Branson v Tucker [2012] NSWCA 310. That decision involved the question whether the court retained a jurisdiction to examine the reasonableness of costs charged by a barrister, who had entered a costs agreement with solicitors, in circumstances where where had been no application under the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) for an assessment of the costs the subject of the bill and it was no longer possible for such an application to be made.

Conrad Summenhart's theory of individual rights and its medieval background

This study focuses on the theory of individual rights that the German theologian Conrad Summenhart (1455-1502) explicated in his massive work Opus septipartitum de contractibus pro foro conscientiae et theologico. The central question to be studied is: How does Summenhart understand the concept of an individual right and its immediate implications? The basic premiss of this study is that in Opus septipartitum Summenhart composed a comprehensive theory of individual rights as a contribution to the on-going medieval discourse on rights. With this rationale, the first part of the study concentrates on earlier discussions on rights as the background for Summenhart s theory. Special attention is paid to language in which right was defined in terms of power . In the fourteenth century writers like Hervaeus Natalis and William Ockham maintained that right signifies power by which the right-holder can to use material things licitly. It will also be shown how the attempts to describe what is meant by the term right became more specified and cultivated. Gerson followed the implications that the term power had in natural philosophy and attributed rights to animals and other creatures. To secure right as a normative concept, Gerson utilized the ancient ius suum cuique-principle of justice and introduced a definition in which right was seen as derived from justice. The latter part of this study makes effort to reconstructing Summenhart s theory of individual rights in three sections. The first section clarifies Summenhart s discussion of the right of the individual or the concept of an individual right. Summenhart specified Gerson s description of right as power, taking further use of the language of natural philosophy. In this respect, Summenhart s theory managed to bring an end to a particular continuity of thought that was centered upon a view in which right was understood to signify power to licit action. Perhaps the most significant feature of Summenhart s discussion was the way he explicated the implication of liberty that was present in Gerson s language of rights. Summenhart assimilated libertas with the self-mastery or dominion that in the economic context of discussion took the form of (a moderate) self-ownership. Summenhart discussion also introduced two apparent extensions to Gerson s terminology. First, Summenhart classified right as relation, and second, he equated right with dominion. It is distinctive of Summenhart s view that he took action as the primary determinant of right: Everyone has as much rights or dominion in regard to a thing, as much actions it is licit for him to exercise in regard to the thing. The second section elaborates Summenhart s discussion of the species dominion, which delivered an answer to the question of what kind of rights exist, and clarified thereby the implications of the concept of an individual right. The central feature in Summenhart s discussion was his conscious effort to systematize Gerson s language by combining classifications of dominion into a coherent whole. In this respect, his treatement of the natural dominion is emblematic. Summenhart constructed the concept of natural dominion by making use of the concepts of foundation (founded on a natural gift) and law (according to the natural law). In defining natural dominion as dominion founded on a natural gift, Summenhart attributed natural dominion to animals and even to heavenly bodies. In discussing man s natural dominion, Summenhart pointed out that the natural dominion is not sufficiently identified by its foundation, but requires further specification, which Summenhart finds in the idea that natural dominion is appropriate to the subject according to the natural law. This characterization lead him to treat God s dominion as natural dominion. Partly, this was due to Summenhart s specific understanding of the natural law, which made reasonableness as the primary criterion for the natural dominion at the expense of any metaphysical considerations. The third section clarifies Summenhart s discussion of the property rights defined by the positive human law. By delivering an account on juridical property rights Summenhart connected his philosophical and theological theory on rights to the juridical language of his times, and demonstrated that his own language of rights was compatible with current juridical terminology. Summenhart prepared his discussion of property rights with an account of the justification for private property, which gave private property a direct and strong natural law-based justification. Summenhart s discussion of the four property rights usus, usufructus, proprietas, and possession aimed at delivering a detailed report of the usage of these concepts in juridical discourse. His discussion was characterized by extensive use of the juridical source texts, which was more direct and verbal the more his discussion became entangled with the details of juridical doctrine. At the same time he promoted his own language on rights, especially by applying the idea of right as relation. He also showed recognizable effort towards systematizing juridical language related to property rights.

Legal Reasoning in Context

This study in EU law analyses the reasoning of the Court of Justice (the Court of Justice of the European Union) in a set of its preliminary rulings. Preliminary rulings are answers to national courts questions on the interpretation (and validity) of EU law called preliminary references. These questions concern specific legal issues that have arisen in legal disputes before the national courts. The Court of Justice alone has the ultimate authority to interpret EU law. The preliminary rulings bind the national courts in the cases giving rise to the preliminary reference, and the interpretations of EU law offered in the preliminary rulings are considered generally binding on all instances applying EU law. EU law is often described as a dynamic legal order and the Court of Justice as at the vanguard of developing it. It is generally assumed that the Court of Justice is striving to realise the EU s meta-level purpose (telos): integration. Against this backdrop one can understand the criticism the Court of Justice is often faced with in certain fields of EU law that can be described as developing. This criticism concerns the Court s (negatively) activist way of not just stating the law but developing or even making law. It is difficult to analyse or prove wrong this accusation as it is not in methodological terms clearly established what constitutes judicial activism, or more exactly where the threshold of negative activism lies. Moreover, one popular approach to assessing the role of the Court of Justice described as integration through law has become fairly political, neglecting to take into consideration the special nature of law as both facilitating and constraining action, not merely a medium for furthering integration. This study offers a legal reasoning approach of a more legalist nature, in order to balance the existing mix of approaches to explaining what the Court of Justice does and how. Reliance on legal reasoning is found to offer a working framework for analysis, whereas the tools for an analysis based on activism are found lacking. The legal reasoning approach enables one to assess whether or not the Court of Justice is pertaining to its own established criteria of interpretation of EU law, and if it is not, one should look more in detail at how the interpretation fits with earlier case-law and doctrines of EU law. This study examines the reasoning of the Court of Justice in a set of objectively chosen cases. The emphasis of the study is on analysing how the Court of Justice applies the established criteria of interpretation it has assumed for itself. Moreover, the judgments are assessed not only in terms of reasoning but also for meaningful silences they contain. The analysis is furthermore contextualised by taking into consideration how the cases were commented by legal scholars, their substantive EU law context, and also their larger politico-historical context. In this study, the analysis largely shows that the Court of Justice is interpreting EU law in accordance with its previous practice. Its reasoning retains connection with the linguistic or semiotic criteria of interpretation, while emphasis lies on systemic reasoning. Moreover, although there are a few judgments where the Court of Justice offers clearly dynamic reasoning or what can be considered as substantive reasoning stemming from, for example, common sense or reasonableness, such reasons are most often given in addition to systemic ones. In this sense and even when considered in its broader context, the case-law analysed in this study does not portray a specifically activist image of the Court of Justice. The legal reasoning approach is a valid alternative for explaining how and why the Court of Justice interprets EU law as it does.

A Linear S-N Curve with Load Dependent Variance and Explicit Failure Probability

We reconsider standard uniaxial fatigue test data obtained from handbooks. Many S-N curve fits to such data represent the median life and exclude load-dependent variance in life. Presently available approaches for incorporating probabilistic aspects explicitly within the S-N curves have some shortcomings, which we discuss. We propose a new linear S-N fit with a prespecified failure probability, load-dependent variance, and reasonable behavior at extreme loads. We fit our parameters using maximum likelihood, show the reasonableness of the fit using Q-Q plots, and obtain standard error estimates via Monte Carlo simulations. The proposed fitting method may be used for obtaining S-N curves from the same data as already available, with the same mathematical form, but in cases in which the failure probability is smaller, say, 10 % instead of 50 %, and in which the fitted line is not parallel to the 50 % (median) line.