992 resultados para Real variables
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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The inference and optimization in sparse graphs with real variables is studied using methods of statistical mechanics. Efficient distributed algorithms for the resource allocation problem are devised. Numerical simulations show excellent performance and full agreement with the theoretical results. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006.
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Les restriccions reals quantificades (QRC) formen un formalisme matemàtic utilitzat per modelar un gran nombre de problemes físics dins els quals intervenen sistemes d'equacions no-lineals sobre variables reals, algunes de les quals podent ésser quantificades. Els QRCs apareixen en nombrosos contextos, com l'Enginyeria de Control o la Biologia. La resolució de QRCs és un domini de recerca molt actiu dins el qual es proposen dos enfocaments diferents: l'eliminació simbòlica de quantificadors i els mètodes aproximatius. Tot i això, la resolució de problemes de grans dimensions i del cas general, resten encara problemes oberts. Aquesta tesi proposa una nova metodologia aproximativa basada en l'Anàlisi Intervalar Modal, una teoria matemàtica que permet resoldre problemes en els quals intervenen quantificadors lògics sobre variables reals. Finalment, dues aplicacions a l'Enginyeria de Control són presentades. La primera fa referència al problema de detecció de fallades i la segona consisteix en un controlador per a un vaixell a vela.
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The present paper concerns on the estimative of the pressure loss and entropy variation in an isothermal fluid flow, considering real gas effects. The 1D formulation is based on the isothermal compressibility module and on the thermal expansion coefficient in order to be applicable for both gas and liquid as pure substances. It is emphasized on the simple methodology description, which establishes a relationship between the formulation adopted for ideal gas and another considering real gas effects. A computational procedure has been developed, which can be used to determine the flow properties in duct with a variable area, where real gas behavior is significant. In order to obtain quantitative results, three virial coefficients for Helium equation of state are employed to determine the percentage difference in pressure and entropy obtained from different formulations. Results are presented graphically in the form of real gas correction factors, which can be applied to perfect gas calculations.
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This work aims to demonstrate an application of telemetry for monitoring process variables. The authors developed the prototype of a dedicated device capable of multiplexing, encoding and transmitting real-time data signals via amplitude-shift keying modulation to remotely located device(s). The prototype development is described in details, enabling the reproduction of the proposed telemetry system for a three-phase motor as well as for other devices. Furthermore, the proposed device has an easy implementation by using of accessible components and low cost, also presenting a tutorial and educational purpose. © 2011 IEEE.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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In the recent past one of the main concern of research in the field of Hypercomplex Function Theory in Clifford Algebras was the development of a variety of new tools for a deeper understanding about its true elementary roots in the Function Theory of one Complex Variable. Therefore the study of the space of monogenic (Clifford holomorphic) functions by its stratification via homogeneous monogenic polynomials is a useful tool. In this paper we consider the structure of those polynomials of four real variables with binomial expansion. This allows a complete characterization of sequences of 4D generalized monogenic Appell polynomials by three different types of polynomials. A particularly important case is that of monogenic polynomials which are simply isomorphic to the integer powers of one complex variable and therefore also called pseudo-complex powers.
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Un juego de asignación se define por una matriz A; donde cada fila representa un comprador y cada columna un vendedor. Si el comprador i se empareja a un vendedor j; el mercado produce aij unidades de utilidad. Estudiamos los juegos de asignación de Monge, es decir, aquellos juegos bilaterales de asignación en los cuales la matriz satisface la propiedad de Monge. Estas matrices pueden caracterizarse por el hecho de que en cualquier submatriz 2x2 un emparejamiento óptimo está situado en la diagonal principal. Para mercados cuadrados, describimos sus núcleos utilizando sólo la parte central tridiagonal de elementos de la matriz. Obtenemos una fórmula cerrada para el reparto óptimo de los compradores dentro del núcleo y para el reparto óptimo de los vendedores dentro del núcleo. Analizamos también los mercados no cuadrados reduciéndolos a matrices cuadradas apropiadas.
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[eng] In the context of cooperative TU-games, and given an order of players, we consider the problem of distributing the worth of the grand coalition as a sequentia decision problem. In each step of process, upper and lower bounds for the payoff of the players are required related to successive reduced games. Sequentially compatible payoffs are defined as those allocation vectors that meet these recursive bounds. The core of the game is reinterpreted as a set of sequentally compatible payoffs when the Davis-Maschler reduced game is considered (Th.1). Independently of the reduction, the core turns out to be the intersections of the family of the sets of sequentially compatible payoffs corresponding to the different possible orderings (Th.2), so it is in some sense order-independent. Finally, we analyze advantagenous properties for the first player
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[eng] In the context of cooperative TU-games, and given an order of players, we consider the problem of distributing the worth of the grand coalition as a sequentia decision problem. In each step of process, upper and lower bounds for the payoff of the players are required related to successive reduced games. Sequentially compatible payoffs are defined as those allocation vectors that meet these recursive bounds. The core of the game is reinterpreted as a set of sequentally compatible payoffs when the Davis-Maschler reduced game is considered (Th.1). Independently of the reduction, the core turns out to be the intersections of the family of the sets of sequentially compatible payoffs corresponding to the different possible orderings (Th.2), so it is in some sense order-independent. Finally, we analyze advantagenous properties for the first player
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Un juego de asignación se define por una matriz A; donde cada fila representa un comprador y cada columna un vendedor. Si el comprador i se empareja a un vendedor j; el mercado produce aij unidades de utilidad. Estudiamos los juegos de asignación de Monge, es decir, aquellos juegos bilaterales de asignación en los cuales la matriz satisface la propiedad de Monge. Estas matrices pueden caracterizarse por el hecho de que en cualquier submatriz 2x2 un emparejamiento óptimo está situado en la diagonal principal. Para mercados cuadrados, describimos sus núcleos utilizando sólo la parte central tridiagonal de elementos de la matriz. Obtenemos una fórmula cerrada para el reparto óptimo de los compradores dentro del núcleo y para el reparto óptimo de los vendedores dentro del núcleo. Analizamos también los mercados no cuadrados reduciéndolos a matrices cuadradas apropiadas.
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[cat] El concepte de joc cooperatiu amb large core és introduït per Sharkey (1982) i el de Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme és definit per Sprumont (1990). Inspirat en aquests conceptes, Moulin (1990) introdueix la noció de large monotonic core donant una caracterització per a jocs de tres jugadors. En aquest document provem que tots els jocs amb large monotonic core són convexes. A més, donem un criteri efectiu per determinar si un joc té large monotonic core o no, i daquí obtenim una caracterització pel cas de quatre jugadors.
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[cat] El concepte de joc cooperatiu amb large core és introduït per Sharkey (1982) i el de Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme és definit per Sprumont (1990). Inspirat en aquests conceptes, Moulin (1990) introdueix la noció de large monotonic core donant una caracterització per a jocs de tres jugadors. En aquest document provem que tots els jocs amb large monotonic core són convexes. A més, donem un criteri efectiu per determinar si un joc té large monotonic core o no, i daquí obtenim una caracterització pel cas de quatre jugadors.