Quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly

In this paper, we consider a Stackelberg duopoly competition with differentiated goods, linear and symmetric demand and with unknown costs. In our model, the two firms play a non-cooperative game with two stages: in a first stage, firm F 1 chooses the quantity, q 1, that is going to produce; in the second stage, firm F 2 observes the quantity q 1 produced by firm F 1 and chooses its own quantity q 2. Firms choose their output levels in order to maximise their profits. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them following a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that there is exactly one perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this game. We analyse the variations of the expected profits with the parameters of the model, namely with the parameters of the probability distributions, and with the parameters of the demand and differentiation.

Bilateral oligopoly and quantity competition

Bilateral oligopoly is a strategic market game with two commodities, allowing strategic behavior on both sides of the market. When the number of buyers is large, such a game approximates a game of quantity competition played by sellers. We present examples which show that this is not typically a Cournot game. Rather, we introduce an alternative game of quantity competition (the market share game) and, appealing to results in the literature on contests, show that this yields the same equilibria as the many-buyer limit of bilateral oligopoly, under standard assumptions on costs and preferences. We also show that the market share and Cournot games have the same equilibria if and only if the price elasticity of the latter is one. These results lead to necessary and sufficient conditions for the Cournot game to be a good approximation to bilateral oligopoly with many buyers and to an ordering of total output when they are not satisfied.

Efecto de la competencia en la escogencia de estándares educativos

En la literatura económica no se ha estudiado como la competencia entre las instituciones educativas afecta específicamente la escogencia de estándares educativos y el valor de matrícula. Usando un modelo teórico analizo como la competencia entre las instituciones educativas afectan la escogencia de estándares académicos, comparando la solución en competencia con la solución eficiente y la solución de monopolio. Los individuos son heterogéneos y se diferencian en su habilidad, las instituciones educativas compiten estableciendo en una primera etapa el estándar educativo, y en una segunda etapa el valor de matrícula. Una vez definidos los estándares y los valores de matrícula, estos son información pública, permitiendo a los individuos escoger entre ingresar o no a una institución educativa o a que institución educativa ingresar de acuerdo a la habilidad innata y al costo asociado al esfuerzo. En los resultados se muestra que el bienestar social aumenta cuando en la economía existe más de una institución educativa con estándares diferentes, y la solución de mercado, en monopolio o en competencia, obliga a los estudiantes a ejercer un mayor esfuerzo para alcanzar el título. Independiente a la relación de costos, el valor de matrícula es siempre mayor para la institución con estándar educativo más alto, y mayor en la solución de mercado. Cuando el costo unitario de la institución con estándar más alto es mayor o igual al costo de la institución con menor estándar, los estándares educativos escogidos por el planificador son mayores y el esfuerzo requerido por los individuos es menor respecto a la solución de mercado.

Non-Linear Pricing in Imperfectly Competitive Markets

This thesis is dedicated to the analysis of non-linear pricing in oligopoly. Non-linear pricing is a fairly predominant practice in most real markets, mostly characterized by some amount of competition. The sophistication of pricing practices has increased in the latest decades due to the technological advances that have allowed companies to gather more and more data on consumers preferences. The first essay of the thesis highlights the main characteristics of oligopolistic non-linear pricing. Non-linear pricing is a special case of price discrimination. The theory of price discrimination has to be modified in presence of oligopoly: in particular, a crucial role is played by the competitive externality that implies that product differentiation is closely related to the possibility of discriminating. The essay reviews the theory of competitive non-linear pricing by starting from its foundations, mechanism design under common agency. The different approaches to model non-linear pricing are then reviewed. In particular, the difference between price and quantity competition is highlighted. Finally, the close link between non-linear pricing and the recent developments in the theory of vertical differentiation is explored. The second essay shows how the effects of non-linear pricing are determined by the relationship between the demand and the technological structure of the market. The chapter focuses on a model in which firms supply a homogeneous product in two different sizes. Information about consumers' reservation prices is incomplete and the production technology is characterized by size economies. The model provides insights on the size of the products that one finds in the market. Four equilibrium regions are identified depending on the relative intensity of size economies with respect to consumers' evaluation of the good. Regions for which the product is supplied in a single unit or in several different sizes or in only a very large one. Both the private and social desirability of non-linear pricing varies across different equilibrium regions. The third essay considers the broadband internet market. Non discriminatory issues seem the core of the recent debate on the opportunity or not of regulating the internet. One of the main questions posed is whether the telecom companies, owning the networks constituting the internet, should be allowed to offer quality-contingent contracts to content providers. The aim of this essay is to analyze the issue through a stylized two-sided market model of the web that highlights the effects of such a discrimination over quality, prices and participation to the internet of providers and final users. An overall welfare comparison is proposed, concluding that the final effects of regulation crucially depend on both the technology and preferences of agents.

Quantity-setting competition with differentiated goods under uncertain demand

We consider a quantity-setting duopoly model, and we study the decision to move first or second, by assuming that the firms produce differentiated goods and that there is some demand uncertainty. The competitive phase consists of two periods, and in either period, the firms can make a production decision that is irreversible. As far as the firms are allowed to choose (non-cooperatively) the period they make the decision, we study the circumstances that favour sequential rather than simultaneous decisions.

Quantity-setting competition under uncertain demand

We consider a quantity-setting duopoly model, and we study the decision to move first or second, by assuming that. the firms produce homogeneous goods and that. there is some demand uncertainty. The competitive phase consists of two periods, and in either period, the firms can make a production decision that is irreversible. As far as the firms are allowed to choose (non-cooperatively) the period they make the decision, we study the circumstances that favour sequential rather than simultaneous decisions.

Does egg competition occur in marine broadcast-spawners?

When the availability of sperm limits female reproductive success, competition for sperm, may be an important broker of sexual selection. This is because sperm limitation can increase the variance in female reproductive success, resulting in strong selection on females to compete for limited fertilization opportunities. Sperm limitation is probably common in broadcast-spawning marine invertebrates, making these excellent candidates for investigating scramble competition between broods of eggs and its consequences for female reproductive success. Here, we report our findings from a series of experiments that investigate egg competition in the sessile, broadcast-spawning polychaete Galeolaria caespitosa. We initially tested whether the order in which eggs encounter sperm affects their fertilization success at two ecologically relevant current regimes. We used a split-clutch-split-ejaculate technique to compare the fertilization success of eggs from individual females that had either first access (competition-free treatment) or second access (egg competition treatment) to a batch of sperm. We found that fertilization success depended on the order in which eggs accessed sperm; eggs that were assigned to the competition-free treatment exhibited significantly higher fertilization rates than those assigned to the egg competition treatment at both current speeds. In subsequent experiments we found that prior exposure of sperm to eggs significantly reduced both the quantity and quality of sperm available to fertilize a second clutch of eggs, resulting in reductions in fertilization success at high and low sperm concentrations. These findings suggest that female traits that increase the likelihood of sperm-egg interactions (e.g. egg size) will respond to selection imposed by egg competition.

Equilibria of quantity setting differentiated duopoly with uncertainty

In this paper, we consider a Stackelberg duopoly competition with differentiated goods and with unknown costs. The firms' aim is to choose the output levels of their products according to the well-known concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. There is a firm ( F1 ) that chooses first the quantity 1 q of its good; the other firm ( F2 ) observes 1 q and then chooses the quantity 2 q of its good. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them following a probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that there is exactly one perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this game. We analyse the advantages, for firms and for consumers, of using the technology with the highest production cost versus the one with the cheapest cost.

Antibodies in falciparum malaria: what matters most, quantity or quality?

In view of the recent demonstration that antibodies that are protective agains Plasmodium falciparum malaria may act in collaboration with blood monocytes, we have investigated the isotype content of sera from individuals with defined clinical states of resistance or susceptibility to malaria. Profound differences in the distribution of each Ig subclass and particulary in the ratio of cytophilic versus noncytophilic antibodies were found. In protected subjects, two cytophilic isotypes, IgG1 and IgG3 were found to predominate. In non-protected subjects, i.e. children and primary attack adults, three different situations were encountered: a) an imbalance in which IgG2, a non-cytophilic class, predominated (mostly seen in primary attacks); b) imbalance in which mostly IgM antibodies predominated (a frequent event in children) or c) less frequently, an overall low level of antimalarial antibodies. Of 33 non immune subjects studied all, except one, had one of the above defects. The function of total Ig presenting such an isotype imbalance was studied in vitro in Antibody-Dependent -Cellular-Inhibition assays. Not only did IgG from protected subjects cooperate efficiently with blood monocytes, whilst IgG from non-protected groups did not, but moreover the latter inhibit the in vitro effect of the former: in competition assays whole IgG from primary attack cases with increased IgG2 content, competed with IgG from immune adults, thus suggesting that non-protected subjects had antibodies to epitopes critical for protection, but that these antibodies are non functional.

Trade, firm selection, and innovation: the competition channel

The availability of rich firm-level data sets has recently led researchers to uncover new evidence on the effects of trade liberalization. First, trade openness forces the least productive firms to exit the market. Secondly, it induces surviving firms to increase their innovation efforts and thirdly, it increases the degree of product market competition. In this paper we propose a model aimed at providing a coherent interpretation of these findings. We introducing firm heterogeneity into an innovation-driven growth model, where incumbent firms operating in oligopolistic industries perform cost-reducing innovations. In this framework, trade liberalization leads to higher product market competition, lower markups and higher quantity produced. These changes in markups and quantities, in turn, promote innovation and productivity growth through a direct competition effect, based on the increase in the size of the market, and a selection effect, produced by the reallocation of resources towards more productive firms. Calibrated to match US aggregate and firm-level statistics, the model predicts that a 10 percent reduction in variable trade costs reduces markups by 1:15 percent, firm surviving probabilities by 1 percent, and induces an increase in productivity growth of about 13 percent. More than 90 percent of the trade-induced growth increase can be attributed to the selection effect.

Dynamic price competition with fixed capacities

Many revenue management (RM) industries are characterized by (a) fixed capacities in theshort term (e.g., hotel rooms, seats on an airline flight), (b) homogeneous products (e.g., twoairline flights between the same cities at similar times), and (c) customer purchasing decisionslargely influenced by price. Competition in these industries is also very high even with just twoor three direct competitors in a market. However, RM competition is not well understood andpractically all known implementations of RM software and most published models of RM donot explicitly model competition. For this reason, there has been considerable recent interestand research activity to understand RM competition. In this paper we study price competitionfor an oligopoly in a dynamic setting, where each of the sellers has a fixed number of unitsavailable for sale over a fixed number of periods. Demand is stochastic, and depending on howit evolves, sellers may change their prices at any time. This reflects the fact that firms constantly,and almost costlessly, change their prices (alternately, allocations at a price in quantity-basedRM), reacting either to updates in their estimates of market demand, competitor prices, orinventory levels. We first prove existence of a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium for a duopoly.In equilibrium, in each state sellers engage in Bertrand competition, so that the seller withthe lowest reservation value ends up selling a unit at a price that is equal to the equilibriumreservation value of the competitor. This structure hence extends the marginal-value conceptof bid-price control, used in many RM implementations, to a competitive model. In addition,we show that the seller with the lowest capacity sells all its units first. Furthermore, we extendthe results transparently to n firms and perform a number of numerical comparative staticsexploiting the uniqueness of the subgame-perfect equilibrium.

The analysis of the basketball coach speech during the moments of game and pause in relation to the performance in competition

In the area of the professional competition, the coach is a fundamental part in the management of a team and more concretely in the game planning. During the competition, the management of the times of pause and times out as well as the conduct of the coach during the same ones is an aspect to analyze in the sports performance. It is for this that it becomes necessary to know some of the behaviors that turn out to be more frequent by the coach and that are more related to a positive performance of his players. For it there has been realized a study of 7 cases of expert coaches in those that his verbal behavior has observed during 4 games. It has focused on the content of the information only to verbal level, on his meaning. The information that have been obtained in the study shows a major quantity of information elaborated during the pauses of the games and a major tactical content with regard to the moments of game. On the other hand, a relation exists between a major number of questions and a minor number of psychological instructions when the score is adverse, whereas in case of victory, a direct relation does not exist with any category. The rest of categories of the speech do not meet influenced directly for the result, for what it is not possible to consider a direct and immediate relation between the coach verbal behavior during the pauses and the result of the game, except in punctual moments.

Testes de desempenho aeróbio relacionados a intensidades de corrida em treinamento e competição para fundistas de alto rendimento = : Aerobic performance tests related to training and competition running intensities for high performance distance runners

Universidade Estadual de Campinas . Faculdade de Educação Física

Energy absorbed by electronic body protectors from kicks in a taekwondo competition

Objective: Although some scientific information on electronic body protectors in taekwondo is available, no research has been done to assess the impact of kicks in a competitive situation. The purpose of this study, then, was to assess the energy absorbed by these protectors from kicks performed in an actual taekwondo competition. Methods: Subjects consisted of junior (14-17 years) and senior (>= 18 years) male taekwondo-in, who participated in an open tournament. Data on the energy imparted by valid kicks in Joules (1) were collected from a public visual electronic monitor. Results: Energy was higher for the seniors: 264.31 +/- 56.63 J versus 224.38 +/- 48.23 J for the juniors (eta(2) = 0.121). The seniors scored lower in percent impact but the effect was trivial: 123.46 +/- 24.77% versus 136.70 +/- 26.33% (eta(2) = 0.087). Conclusions: The difference between senior and junior taekwondo-in in absolute energy generated was small, while the difference in relative energy impact was trivial in favour of the junior taekwondo athletes.

Particle competition for complex network community detection

In many real situations, randomness is considered to be uncertainty or even confusion which impedes human beings from making a correct decision. Here we study the combined role of randomness and determinism in particle dynamics for complex network community detection. In the proposed model, particles walk in the network and compete with each other in such a way that each of them tries to possess as many nodes as possible. Moreover, we introduce a rule to adjust the level of randomness of particle walking in the network, and we have found that a portion of randomness can largely improve the community detection rate. Computer simulations show that the model has good community detection performance and at the same time presents low computational complexity. (C) 2008 American Institute of Physics.