Pagamento em função do desempenho nos cuidados de saúde primários : três serviços nacionais de saúde, três experiências

RESUMO – A atribuição de incentivos financeiros em função do desempenho e do alcance de metas de qualidade, aos prestadores e especificamente aos médicos constitui um dos principais paradigmas das reformas dos Cuidados de Saúde Primários (CSP) que ocorrem em diversos países. O pay for performance (P4P) - pagamento em função do desempenho tem sido considerado, a nível internacional, como uma estratégia capaz de imputar mais qualidade, eficiência, acessibilidade e equidade aos CSP, pilares fundamentais na prossecução dos objectivos dos sistemas de saúde. Recompensar financeiramente os prestadores de cuidados pelos resultados em saúde e pela concretização de metas específicas, que reflectem prioridades assistenciais é uma forma de promover a satisfação profissional e estimular o envolvimento no processo de cuidados e nas novas formas de governação clínica. O interesse em desenvolver uma comparação internacional e em particular, através de três sistemas de saúde com serviço nacional de saúde (SNS) no âmbito da caracterização do impacto da implementação do P4P nos CSP prende-se com a importância atribuída aos contributos das experiências do P4P decorridas em diferentes países, onde os mesmos objectivos foram procurados de formas diferentes e obtiveram resultados diferentes. A implementação de programas de P4P no Reino Unido, na Nova Zelândia e em Portugal é geradora de melhorias na qualidade assistencial e nos resultados em saúde, determinantemente influenciados pelos contextos e processos de implementação dos programas de P4P, bem como, pela magnitude dos incentivos financeiros.

Budgeting and resource allocation in universities, a public choice approach

The calls urging colleges and universities to improve their productivity are coming thick and fast in Brazil. Many studies are suggesting evaluation systems and external criteria to control universities production in qualitative terms. Since universities and colleges are not profit-oriented organizations (considering just the fair and serious researching and teaching organizations, of course) the traditional microeconomics and administrative variables used to measure efficiency do not have any direct function. In this sense, It could be created a as if market control system to evaluate universities and colleges production. The budget and the allocation resources mechanism inside it can be used as an incentive instrument to improve quality and productivity. It will be the main issue of this paper.

Avaliação do desempenho segundo a metodologia do balanced scorecard: aplicação à gestão hospitalar no Algarve

Dissertação de mest. em Gestão Empresarial, Faculdade de Economia, Univ. do Algarve, 2004

The brazilian education quality index (Ideb): measurement and incentives upgrades

The increasing availability of social statistics in Latin America opens new possibilities in terms of accountability and incentive mechanisms for policy makers. This paper addresses these issues within the institutional context of the Brazilian educational system. We build a theoretical model based on the theory of incentives to analyze the role of the recently launched Basic Education Development Index (Ideb) in the provision of incentives at the sub-national level. The first result is to demonstrate that an education target system has the potential to improve the allocation of resources to education through conditional transfers to municipalities and schools. Second, we analyze the local government’s decision about how to allocate its education budget when seeking to accomplish the different objectives contemplated by the index, which involves the interaction between its two components, average proficiency and the passing rate. We discuss as well policy issues concerning the implementation of the synthetic education index in the light of this model arguing that there is room for improving the Ideb’s methodology itself. In addition, we analyze the desirable properties of an ideal education index and we argue in favor of an ex-post relative learning evaluation system for different municipalities (schools) based on the value added across different grades

Management practices on public lands: hearings, Ninety-second Congress, first [and second] session[s], on S. 350, a bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture to Institute Programs designed to reforest and restore the quality of public and private forest lands; to enhance and expand recreational opportunity on such lands; to provide financial incentives to improve management of state and private forest lands; to establish a federal forest lands management fund; to facilitate public participation in Federal Resource Management; and to enhance the quality of the environment ad the resources of the public lands; [and] S. 1734, a bill to provide for comprehensive management of the nation's forest lands through the application of sound forest practices, and for other purposes.

Frank Church, subcommittee chairman.

The Complementarity between segment disclosure and earnings quality, and its effect on cost of capital

We investigate the role of earnings quality in determining the levels of segment disclosure, and whether and how better quality earnings and segment disclosure influences cost of capital. Using a large US sample for the period 2001-2006, we find a positive relation between earnings quality and levels of segment disclosures. We also find that firms providing better quality segment information, contingent upon good earnings quality, enjoy lower cost of capital. We base our empirical tests on a self created index of segment disclosure. Our results contribute to a better understanding of (1) the incentives for providing segment disclosures, and (2) how accounting quality (quality of segment information and earnings quality) is related to the cost of capital.

Market Transparency, Market Quality and Sunshine Trading

This paper analyzes the implications of pre-trade transpareny on market performance. We find that transparency increases the precision held by agents, however we show that this increase in precision may not be due to prices themselves. In competitive markets, transparency increases market liquidity and reduces price volatility, whereas these results may not hold under imperfect competition. More importantly, market depth and volatility might be positively related with proper priors. Moreover, we study the incentives for liquidity traders to engage in sunshine trading. We obtain that the choice of sunshine/dark trading for a noise trader is independent of his order size, being the traders with higher liquidity needs more interested in sunshine trading, as long as this practice is desirable. Key words: Market Microstructure, Transparency, Prior Information, Market Quality, Sunshine Trading

Labeling Regulations and Segregation of First- and, Second-Generation Genetically Modified Products: Innovation Incentives and Welfare Effects, April 2005

We review some of the most significant issues and results on the economic effects of genetically modified (GM) product innovation, with emphasis on the question of GM labeling and the need for costly segregation and identity preservation activities. The analysis is organized around an explicit model that can accommodate the features of both first-generation and second-generation GM products. The model accounts for the proprietary nature of GM innovations and for the critical role of consumer preferences vis-à-vis GM products, as well as for the impacts of segregation and identity preservation and the effects of a mandatory GM labeling regulation. We also investigate briefly a novel question in this setting, the choice of “research direction”when both cost-reducing and quality-enhancing GM innovations are feasible.

Quality assurance mechanisms in agrifood: The case of the Spanish fresh meat sector

The largest fresh meat brand names in Spain are analyzed here to studyhow quality is signaled in agribusiness and how the underlying quality-assurance organizations work. Results show, first, that organizationalform varies according to the specialization of the brand name.Publicly-controlled brand names are grounded on market contracting withindividual producers, providing stronger incentives. In contrast,private brands rely more on hierarchy, taking advantage of itssuperiority in solving specific coordination problems. Second, theseemingly redundant coexistence of several quality indicators for agiven product is explained in efficiency terms. Multiple brands areshown to be complementary, given their specialization in guaranteeingdifferent attributes of the product.

Audit quality: Attributes, private safeguards and the role of regulation

This article examines the private mechanisms used to safeguard quality in auditing, with a view to defining rules capable of facilitating the performance of market forces. An outline is given of a general theory of private quality assurance in auditing, based on the use of quasi-rents to self-enforce quality dimensions. Particular attention is paid to the role of fee income diversification as the key ingredient of private incentives for audit quality. The role of public regulation is then situated in the context defined by the presence of these safeguard mechanisms. This helps in defining the content of rules and the function of regulatory bodies in facilitating and strengthening the protective operation of the market. By making sense of the interaction between regulation, quality attributes and private safeguards, the analysis helps to evaluate the relative merits of different regulatory options.

Outpatient prescription writing quality in a paediatric general hospital

Introduction The writing of prescriptions is an important aspect of medical practice. Since 2006, the Swiss authorities have decided to impose incentives to prescribe generic drugs. The objectives of this study were 1) to determine the evolution of the outpatient prescription practice in our paediatric university hospital during 2 periods separated by 5 years; 2) to assess the writing quality of outpatient prescriptions during the same period.Materials & Methods Design: Copies of prescriptions written by physicians were collected twice from community pharmacies in the region of our hospital for a 2-month period in 2005 and 2010. They were analysed according to standard criteria regarding both formal and pharmaceutical aspects. Drug prescriptions were classified as a) complete when all criteria for safety were fulfilled, b) ambiguous when there was a danger of a dispensing error because of one or more missing criteria, or c) containing an error.Setting: Paediatric university hospital.Main outcome measures: Proportion of generic drugs; outpatient prescription writing quality.Results: A total of 651 handwritten prescriptions were reviewed in 2005 and 693 in 2010. They contained 1570 drug prescriptions in 2005 (2.4 ± 1.2 drugs per patient) and 1462 in 2010 (2.1 ± 1.1). The most common drugs were paracetamol, ibuprofen, and sodium chloride. A higher proportion of drugs were prescribed as generic names or generics in 2010. Formal data regarding the physicians and the patients were almost complete, except for the patients' weight. Of the drug prescriptions, 48.5% were incomplete, 11.3% were ambiguous, and 3.0% contained an error in 2005. These proportions rose to 64.2%, 15.5% and 7.4% in 2010, respectively.Discussions, Conclusion This study showed that physicians' prescriptions comprised numerous omissions and errors with minimal potential for harm. Computerized prescription coupled with advanced decision support is eagerly awaited.Disclosure of Interest None Declared

Qualité et économies: vont-elles de pair [Quality and saving: do they run together?]

In the healthcare debate, it is often stated that better quality leads to savings. Quality systems lead to additional costs for setting up, running and external evaluations. In addition, suppression of implicit rationing leads to additional costs. On the other hand, they lead to savings by procedures simplification, improvement of patients' health state and quicker integration of new collaborators. It is then logical to imagine that financial incentives could improve quality. First evidences of pay for performances initiatives show a positive impact but also some limitations. Quality and savings are linked together and require all our attention.

Chronic disease management: a qualitative study investigating the barriers, facilitators and incentives perceived by Swiss healthcare stakeholders.

BACKGROUND: Chronic disease management has been implemented for some time in several countries to tackle the increasing burden of chronic diseases. While Switzerland faces the same challenge, such initiatives have only emerged recently in this country. The aim of this study is to assess their feasibility, in terms of barriers, facilitators and incentives to participation. METHODS: To meet our aim, we used qualitative methods involving the collection of opinions of various healthcare stakeholders, by means of 5 focus groups and 33 individual interviews. All the data were recorded and transcribed verbatim. Thematic analysis was then performed and five levels were determined to categorize the data: political, financial, organisational/ structural, professionals and patients. RESULTS: Our results show that, at each level, stakeholders share common opinions towards the feasibility of chronic disease management in Switzerland. They mainly mention barriers linked to the federalist political organization as well as to financing such programs. They also envision difficulties to motivate both patients and healthcare professionals to participate. Nevertheless, their favourable attitudes towards chronic disease management as well as the fact that they are convinced that Switzerland possesses all the resources (financial, structural and human) to develop such programs constitute important facilitators. The implementation of quality and financial incentives could also foster the participation of the actors. CONCLUSIONS: Even if healthcare stakeholders do not have the same role and interest regarding chronic diseases, they express similar opinions on the development of chronic disease management in Switzerland. Their overall positive attitude shows that it could be further implemented if political, financial and organisational barriers are overcome and if incentives are found to face the scepticism and non-motivation of some stakeholders.

Clinically relevant quality measures for risk factor control in primary care: a retrospective cohort study.

BACKGROUND: Assessment of the proportion of patients with well controlled cardiovascular risk factors underestimates the proportion of patients receiving high quality of care. Evaluating whether physicians respond appropriately to poor risk factor control gives a different picture of quality of care. We assessed physician response to control cardiovascular risk factors, as well as markers of potential overtreatment in Switzerland, a country with universal healthcare coverage but without systematic quality monitoring, annual report cards on quality of care or financial incentives to improve quality. METHODS: We performed a retrospective cohort study of 1002 randomly selected patients aged 50-80 years from four university primary care settings in Switzerland. For hypertension, dyslipidemia and diabetes mellitus, we first measured proportions in control, then assessed therapy modifications among those in poor control. "Appropriate clinical action" was defined as a therapy modification or return to control without therapy modification within 12 months among patients with baseline poor control. Potential overtreatment of these conditions was defined as intensive treatment among low-risk patients with optimal target values. RESULTS: 20% of patients with hypertension, 41% with dyslipidemia and 36% with diabetes mellitus were in control at baseline. When appropriate clinical action in response to poor control was integrated into measuring quality of care, 52 to 55% had appropriate quality of care. Over 12 months, therapy of 61% of patients with baseline poor control was modified for hypertension, 33% for dyslipidemia, and 85% for diabetes mellitus. Increases in number of drug classes (28-51%) and in drug doses (10-61%) were the most common therapy modifications. Patients with target organ damage and higher baseline values were more likely to have appropriate clinical action. We found low rates of potential overtreatment with 2% for hypertension, 3% for diabetes mellitus and 3-6% for dyslipidemia. CONCLUSIONS: In primary care, evaluating whether physicians respond appropriately to poor risk factor control, in addition to assessing proportions in control, provide a broader view of the quality of care than relying solely on measures of proportions in control. Such measures could be more clinically relevant and acceptable to physicians than simply reporting levels of control.

Ownership, Incentives and Hospitals

This article analyzes hospital privatization by comparing costs and quality between different ownership forms. We put the attention on the distinction between public hospitals and private hospitals with public funding. Using information about Spanish hospitals, we have found that private hospitals provide services at a lower cost at expenses of lower quality. We observe that property rights theory is fulfilled at least for the Spanish hospital market. The way that Heath Authorities finance publicly funded hospitals may be responsible for the differences in incentives between public and private centers. We argue that the trade-off between costs and quality could be minimized by designing financing contracts with fixed and variable components.