Prosecutorial discretion in assisted dying in Canada : a proposal for charging guidelines

An Expert Panel of the Royal Society of Canada and a Select Committee of the Québec National Assembly both recently recommended the issuance of permissive guidelines for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion on voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide and “medical aid in dying” respectively. It seems timely, therefore, to propose a set of offence-specific guidelines for how prosecutorial discretion should be exercised in cases of voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide in Canadian provinces and territories. We take as our starting point the only existing guidelines of this sort currently in force in the world (i.e. the British Columbia Guidelines, and the England and Wales Guidelines). In light of certain concerns we have with these guidelines, we outline an approach to constructing guidelines for Canadian jurisdictions that begins with identifying three guiding principles we argue are appropriate for this purpose (respect for autonomy, the need for high-quality prosecutorial decision making, and the importance of public confidence in that decision making), and ends with a concrete and detailed set of proposed guidelines. The paper is consistent with, but also extends, the work of the Royal Society of Canada Expert Panel on End of Life Decision Making. Un panel d’expert de la Société Royale du Canada et une Commission spéciale de l’Assemblée nationale du Québec ont tous les deux récemment recommandé que soit émises des directives permettant exercice d’un pouvoir de poursuite discrétionnaire concernant l’euthanasie et le suicide assisté et « l’assistance médicale pour mourir », respectivement. Il semble donc à propos de proposer une série de directives spécifiques aux offenses sur la façon dont le pouvoir de poursuite discrétionnaire dans les territoires et provinces canadiennes serait appliqué dans les cas d’euthanasie et de suicide assisté. Nous avons pris comme point de départ les seules directives de la sorte existant déjà (c’est-à-dire celle de la Colombie-Britannique et de l’Angleterre et du Pays de Galles). Par contre, compte tenu de certaines de nos réserves concernant ces directives, nous avons ensuite établi les grandes lignes d’une approche permettant de mettre sur pied des directives pour les juridictions canadiennes, qui débute par l’identification de trois principes de base qui sont selon nous appropriées à cette fin (respect de l’autonomie, besoin pour une grande qualité de prise de prise de décision du poursuivant et la confiance du public envers cette prise de décision) pour se terminer par une série de directives concrètes et détaillées. Le présent document est compatible avec le travail de la Société royale du Canada tout en en augmentant la portée.

Prosecutorial guidelines for voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide : autonomy, public confidence and high quality decision-making

This article proposes offence-specific guidelines for how prosecutorial discretion should be exercised in cases of voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide. Similar guidelines have been produced in England and Wales but we consider them to be deficient in a number of respects, including that they lack a set of coherent guiding principles. In light of these concerns, we outline an approach to constructing alternative guidelines that begins with identifying three guiding principles that we argue are appropriate for this purpose: respect for autonomy, the need for high quality prosecutorial decision-making and the importance of public confidence in that decision-making.

Un nouvel acteur dans la résolution des conflits : le Procureur de la Cour pénale internationale

Le mémoire vise à déterminer quelle contribution la justice internationale peut apporter à la résolution des conflits et au maintien de la paix et plus précisément si les pouvoirs octroyés au Procureur de la Cour pénale internationale, dans le cadre du Statut de Rome, lui donnent la capacité d’influencer les conflits en cours. Le premier chapitre décrit l’historique des événements ayant mené à l’adoption du Statut de Rome en 1998 et permet d’expliquer l’évolution de la notion d’une justice post-conflictuelle à une justice pouvant favoriser la paix. Le débat théorique paix-justice est ensuite analysé afin de démontrer que le Procureur de la Cour pénale internationale peut exercer une certaine influence sur les conflits lorsqu’il possède un pouvoir discrétionnaire important. Le second chapitre examine les prérogatives octroyées au Procureur dans le cadre du statut de Rome et comment elles s’appliquent durant les différentes étapes de procédure menant à la délivrance d’un mandat d’arrêt. Il est démontré que le pouvoir discrétionnaire du Procureur est limité par le régime de complémentarité et par des enjeux de coopération avec les États Parties. Par conséquent, cela nuit à sa capacité d’influencer la résolution des conflits. Le troisième chapitre analyse deux situations en cours à la Cour pénale internationale, soit celle de l’Ouganda et celle du Darfour, afin de vérifier si le Procureur a réellement un impact sur les conflits en cours. Il est avancé que dans le cadre actuel du Statut de Rome, le Procureur est dépendant de la coopération des États Parties pour influencer la résolution des conflits.

Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002, s 32 - Duty to Disclose - consequences of non-disclosure - discretion to excuse non-compliance

In Newson v Aust Scan Pty Ltd t/a Ikea Springwood [2010] QSC 223 the Supreme Court examined the discretion under s 32(2) of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld), to permit a document which has not been disclosed as required by the pre-court procedures under the PIPA to be used in a subsequent court proceeding. This appears to be the first time that the nature and parameters of the discretion have been judicially considered.

UCPR rule 687 - exercise of discretion to fix costs - applicable principles

Although the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR) have always included a power for the court to order a party to pay an amount for costs to be fixed by the court, until recently the power was rarely used in the higher courts. In light of recent practice directions, and the changes to the procedures for assessment of costs contained in the new Chapter 17A of the UCPR, this is no longer the case. The judgment of Mullins J in ASIC v Atlantic 3 Financial (Aust) Pty Ltd [2008] QSC 9 provides some helpful guidance for practitioners about the principles which might be applied.

Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) s 253 - leave to appeal costs orders - appeal against substantive judgment insufficient - must be arguable case that discretion will be overturned on appeal

The recent decision of the Court of Appeal in AGL Sales (Qld) Pty Ltd v Dawson Sales Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 262 provides clear direction on the Court’s expectations of a party seeking leave to appeal a costs order.This decision is likely to impact upon common practice in relation to appeals against costs orders. It sends a clear message to trial judges that they should not give leave as of course when giving a judgment in relation to costs, and that parties seeking leave under s 253 of the Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) should make a separate application. The application should be supported by material presenting an arguable case that the trial judge made an error in the exercise of the discretion of the kind described in House v King (1936) 55 CLR 499. A different, and interesting, aspect of this appeal is that it was the first wholly electronic civil appeal. The court-provided technology had been adopted at trial, and the Court of Appeal dispensed with any requirement for hard copy appeal record books.

Default judgment - whether irregular - whether court has residual discretion not to set aside default judgment irregularly entered

In CB Richard Ellis (C) Pty Ltd v Wingate Properties Pty Ltd [2005] QDC 399 McGill DCJ examined whether the court now has a discretion to set aside an irregularly entered default judgment.

‘Structuring’ judicial sentencing discretion : consistency, guidance or pandering to the punitive?

Until quite recently, most Australian jurisdictions gave statutory force to the principle of imprisonment as a sanction of last resort, reflecting its status as the most punitive sentencing option open to the court.1 That principle gave primary discretion as to whether incarceration was the most appropriate means of achieving the purpose of a sentence to the sentencing court, which received all of the information relevant to the offence, the offender and any victim(s). The disestablishment of this principle is symptomatic of an increasing erosion of judicial discretion with respect to sentencing, which appears to be resulting in some extremely punitive consequences.

A Want of Order and Good Discipline: Rules, Discretion and the Victorian Prison

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