Investigation of un-American propaganda activities in the United States : Hearings before a Special Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, Seventy-fifth Congress, third session-Seventy-eighth Congress, second session, on H. Res. 282, to investigate (1) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.

Martin Dies, chairman.

Communist outlets for the distribution of Soviet propaganda in the United States. Hearings before the Committee on Un-American activities, House of Representatives, Eigh;ty-seventh Congress, second session.

Hearings held May 9-July 12, 1962.

Soviet influence activities : a report on active measures and propaganda, 1986-87.

Item 876

The Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 1945-1957: Unconquerable Minds

Vaughan, J. (2005). The Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 1945-1957: Unconquerable Minds. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. RAE2008

Justifying jihad: US politics, propaganda and the Afghan mujahedeen

Hard-line anti-communists in the United States recognised the potential for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 to embroil their super-power rival in a ‘Vietnam-like quagmire.’ Their covert operation to arm the mujahedeen is well documented. This dissertation argues that propaganda and public diplomacy were powerful and essential instruments of this campaign. It examines the protagonists of this strategy, their policies, initiatives and programmes offering a comprehensive analysis heretofore absent. It stretches from the dying days of the Carter administration when Zbigniew Brzezinski saw the ‘opportunity’ presented by the invasion to the Soviet���s withdrawal in 1989. The aim of these information strategies was to damage Soviet credibility and enhance that of the US, considered under threat from growing ‘moral equivalence’ amongst international publics. The conflict could help the US regain strategic advantage in South Asia undermined by the ‘loss’ of Iran. The Reagan administration used it to justify the projection of US military might that it believed was eviscerated under Carter and emasculated by the lingering legacy of Vietnam. The research engages with source material from the Reagan Presidential Library, the United States Information Agency archives and the Library of Congress as well as a number of online archives. The material is multi-archival and multi-media including documentaries, booklets, press conferences, summit programmes and news-clips as well as national security policy documents and contemporaneous media commentary. It concludes that propaganda and public diplomacy were integral to the Reagan administration and other mujahedeen supporters’ determination to challenge the USSR. It finds that the conflict was used to justify military rearmament, further strategic aims and reassert US power. These Cold War machinations had a considerable impact on the course of the conflict and undermined efforts at resolution and reconciliation with profound implications for the future stability of Afghanistan and the world.

«The Soviet cannot be trusted» : les relations diplomatiques entre l’URSS et la Grande-Bretagne dans les années 1920.

Ce mémoire tente de présenter l’état des relations diplomatiques entre la Russie soviétique, puis l’Union des républiques socialistes soviétiques (URSS) à partir de 1922, et la Grande-Bretagne entre 1920 et 1927, à travers les documents du Foreign Office britannique. Pour cela, il présente le retour progressif des relations officielles entre les deux pays sous la gouverne du premier ministre britannique Lloyd George, de 1916 à 1922, et la mise en place d’une politique britannique à l’égard du gouvernement soviétique. Il tente ensuite d’établir les politiques des différents gouvernements qui suivent celui de Lloyd George, et de voir si ces politiques marquent une rupture avec la politique du gouvernement de Lloyd George ou si, au contraire, il existe une continuité dans ces politiques, malgré le changement de gouvernement. L’hypothèse principale que nous soutenons est que malgré les changements de gouvernements entre 1920 et 1927, la politique de la Grande-Bretagne restera identique durant toute la période, et ce malgré les différents gouvernements britanniques qui vont se succéder : un gouvernement d’union, deux gouvernements conservateurs et le premier gouvernement travailliste. Nous croyons que la prétendue « propagande soviétique » sera l’une des lignes directrices des relations entre les deux pays pendant la période étudiée, lignes établies par Lloyd George et son gouvernement au début de 1920. Nous soutenons également que cette « propagande » sera le pivot des relations entre les deux pays, et qu’elle sera un frein constant dans l’établissement de relations normalisées avec l’Union soviétique. Nous croyons que cette propagande entraînera une « paranoïa » de la part du gouvernement britannique qui, pendant toute la période que nous étudions, passera tout son temps à se plaindre au gouvernement soviétique de « sa » propagande, entraînant finalement la rupture des relations en 1927.

Forgery, disinformation, political operations : Soviet active measures.

Mode of access: Internet.

The committee on public information : a transmedia war propaganda campaign

This thesis develops an understanding of how propaganda entered the realm of journalism and popular culture in the United States during World War I through an examination of materials created by the Committee on Public Information (CPI). The CPI was a US governmental propaganda organisation created during World War I to persuade the nation to mobilise for war. Three of its divisions were chosen for this study: the Division of News (DoN), the Division of Four Minute Men (FMM) and the Division of Pictorial Publicity (DPP). Chapter 1 provides a general context for the thesis, outlines the research questions and details previous research on the CPI. Chapter 2 outlines the methods of analysis for interpreting the case study chapters and provides contextual information. The case studies are presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. These chapters are structured in the order of context, medium and content, and contain historical contextual information about each particular division, medialogical aspects of its propagated form and thematic groupings created from close reading of CPI materials. A semiotic analysis in the Peircian tradition is also performed on visual forms of propaganda in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 discusses how the expectations of persuasion, truth and amusement relate to each other when mediated in culture, using Lotman’s concept of the semiosphere. This further develops an understanding of propaganda as a cultural system in relation to other cultural systems – in this case, journalism and popular culture. Chapter 7 provides conclusions about the study, outlines relative strengths and weaknesses regarding the selection and deployment of methods, makes recommendations for future research, and summarises the key contributions of the thesis.

The Committee on Public Information : a transmedia war propaganda campaign

This article summarises a PhD dissertation of the same name. It develops an understanding of how propaganda entered journalism and popular culture in the United States during World War I through an examination of materials created by the Committee on Public Information (CPI). Three CPI divisions were studied: The Division of News, the Four Minute Men, and the Division of Pictorial Publicity. The methodology of archival contextualisation was created, bringing together the methods of close reading, discourse-historical contextualisation, and Piercian semiotics. A summary of relevant literature is interspersed with thematic historical developments that impacted the relationship between propaganda, journalism and popular culture. This review outlines a gap in knowledge about the archival materials as well as the relationship between propaganda, journalism and popular culture from this period. A discussion about how the expectations of persuasion, truth and amusement relate to each other when mediated in culture, using Lotman’s concept of the semiosphere further develops an understanding of propaganda as a cultural system in relation to other cultural systems – in this case, journalism and popular culture. Findings from the study include that the CPI created a transmedia war propaganda campaign, which enabled propaganda to successfully draw entertainment value from popular culture and credibility from journalism in order to influence public opinion.

Ranskan rooli ja asema läntisessä liittoutumassa neljännen ja viidennen tasavallan vaihtumakohdassa 1956-1958

The study discusses the position of France as the United States’ ally in NATO in 1956-1958. The concrete position of France and the role that it was envisioned to have are being treated from the point of view of three participants of the Cold War: France, the United States and the Soviet Union. How did these different parties perceive the question and did these views change when the French Fourth Republic turned into the Fifth in 1958? The study is based on published French and American documents of Foreign Affairs. Because of problems with accessibility to the Soviet archival sources, the study uses reports on France-NATO relations of Pravda newspaper, the official organ of the Communist Party of the USSR, to provide information about how the Soviet side saw the question. Due to the nature and use of source material, and the chronological structure of the work, the study belongs methodologically to the research field of History of International Relations. As distinct from political scientists’ field of research, more prone to theorize, the study is characteristically a historical research, a work based on qualitative method and original sources that aims at creating a coherent narrative of the views expressed during the period covered by the study. France’s road to a full membership of NATO is being treated on the basis of research literature, after which discussions about France’s position in the Western Alliance are being chronologically traced for the period of last years of the Fourth Republic and the immediate months of coming back to power of Charles de Gaulle. Right from the spring of 1956 there can be seen aspirations of France, on one hand, to maintain her freedom of action inside the Western Alliance and, on the other, to widen the dialogue between the allies. The decision on France’s own nuclear deterrent was made already during the Fourth Republic, when it was thought to become part of NATO’s common defence. This was to change with de Gaulle. The USA felt that France still fancied herself as a great power and that she could not participate in full in NATO’s common defence because of her colonies. The Soviet Union saw the concrete position of France in the Alliance as in complete dependence on the USA, but her desired role was expressed largely in “Gaullist” terms. The expressions used by the General and the Soviet propaganda were close to each other, but the Soviet Union could not support de Gaulle without endangering the position of the French Communist Party. Between the Fourth and Fifth Republics no great rupture in content took place concerning the views of France’s role and position in the Western Alliance. The questions posed by de Gaulle had been expressed during the whole period of Fourth Republic’s existence. Instead, along with the General the weight and rhetoric of these questions saw a great change. Already in the early phase the Americans saw it possible that with de Gaulle, France would try to change her role. The rupture took place in the form of expression, rather than in its content.

The Soviet Union, Finland and the Cold War : The Finnish Card in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1956-1959

From the Soviet point of view the actual substance of Soviet-Finnish relations in the second half of 1950s clearly differed from the contemporary and later public image, based on friendship and confidence rhetoric. As the polarization between the right and the left became more underlined in Finland in the latter half of the 1950s, the criticism towards the Soviet Union became stronger, and the USSR feared that this development would have influence on Finnish foreign policy. From the Soviet point of view, the security commitments of FCMA-treaty needed additional guarantees through control of Finnish domestic politics and economic relations, especially during international crises. In relation to Scandinavia, Finland was, from the Soviet point of view, the model country of friendship or neutrality policy. The influence of the Second Berlin Crisis or the Soviet-Finnish Night Frost Crisis in 1958-1959 to Soviet policy towards Scandinavia needs to be observed from this point of view. The Soviet Union used Finland as a tool, in agreement with Finnish highest political leadership, for weakening of the NATO membership of Norway and Denmark, and for maintaining Swedish non-alliance. The Finnish interest to EFTA membership in the summer of 1959, at the same time with the Scandinavian countries, seems to have caused a panic reaction in the USSR, as the Soviets feared that these economic arrangements would reverse the political advantages the country had received in Finland after the Night Frost Crisis. Together with history of events, this study observes the interaction of practical interests and ideologies, both in individuals and in decision-making organizations. The necessary social and ideological reforms in the Soviet Union after 1956 had influence both on the legitimacy of the regime, and led to contradictions in the argumentation of Soviet foreign policy. This was observed both in the own camp as well as in the West. Also, in Finland a breakthrough took place in the late 1950's: as the so-called counter reaction lost to the K-line, "a special relationship" developed with the Soviet Union. As a consequence of the Night Frost Crisis the Soviet relationship became a factor decisively defining the limits of domestic politics in Finland, a part of Finnish domestic political argumentation. Understood from this basis, finlandization is not, even from the viewpoint of international relations, a special case, but a domestic political culture formed by the relationship between a dominant state, a superpower, and a subordinate state, Finland.