Income tax progressivity, growth, income inequality and welfare

This paper analyzes the effects of personal income tax progressivity on long-run economic growth, income inequality and social welfare. The quantitative implications of income tax progressivity increments are illustrated for the US economy under three main headings: individual effects (reduced labor supply and savings, and increased dispersion of tax rates); aggregate effects (lower GDP growth and lower income inequality); and welfare effects (lower dispersion of consumption across individuals and higher leisure levels, but also lower growth of future consumption). The social discount factor proves to be crucial for this third effect: a higher valuation of future generations' well-being requires a lower level of progressivity. Additionally, if tax revenues are used to provide a public good rather than just being discarded, a higher private valuation of such public goods will also call for a lower level of progressivity.

Progressivity in the Portuguese personal income tax system

This Work Project analyzes the evolution of the Portuguese personal income tax system’s progressivity over the period of 2005 through 2013. It presents the first computation of cardinal progressivity measures using administrative tax data for Portugal. We compute several progressivity indices and find that progressivity has had very modest variations from 2005 to 2012, whilst from 2012 to 2013 there has been a relatively stronger decrease, excluding the impact of the income tax surcharge of the years 2012 and 2013. When this latter is included, progressivity of 2012 and 2013 decreases considerably. Analyzing the effective average tax rates of the top income percentiles in the income scale, we find that these rates have increased over the period 2010–2013, suggesting that an analysis of effective tax rates is insufficient to assess progressivity in the whole tax scheme.

The Progressivity of Equalization Payments in Federations

We investigate the conditions under which an inequality averse and additively separable welfarist constitution maker would always choose to set up a progressive equalization payments scheme in a federation with local public goods. A progressive equalization payments scheme is defined as a list of per capita net (possibly negative) subsidies - one such net subsidy for every jurisdiction - that are decreasing with respect to jurisdictions per capita wealth. We examine these questions in a setting in which the case for progressivity is a priori the strongest, namely, all citizens have the same utility function for the private and the public goods, inhabitants of a given jurisdiction are all identical, and they are not able to move across jurisdictions. We show that the constitution maker favors a progressive equalization payments scheme for all distributions of wealth and all population sizes if and only if its objective function is additively separable between each jurisdiction’s per capita wealth and number of inhabitants. When interpreted as a mean of order r social welfare function, this condition is shown to be equivalent to additive separability of the individual’s indirect utility function with respect to wealth and the price of the public good. Some implications of this restriction to the case where the individual’s direct utility function is additively separable are also derived.

The paradox of progressivity in low-tax countries: income tax in Guatemala

Includes bibliography

The Determinants of Personal Income Tax Progressivity Around the Globe

This paper utilizes a novel database collected by the authors to document features of the progressivity of personal income tax systems across 209 countries for the years 1980-2009. We measure progressivity in several ways. First, we associate it with the increase in effective average (marginal) tax rates between a wage of zero and ten times the average wage in a country. Second, we consider the curvature of the tax schedule expressed as the difference between the effective average (marginal) tax schedule from a wage of zero to ten times the average wage and a linear average tax schedule and, alternatively, the diference between the effective average (marginal) tax schedule from the minimum positive taxable income, to ten times the average wage as opposed to a linear average tax schedule. Moreover, the paper assesses patterns regarding the conditional correlation of country-specifc tax progressivity measures with a host of economic and political country-specific characteristics and find the labor supply elasticity and the income replacement rates for the unemployed to be key determinants of progressivity around the globe, in line with economic theory.

Tax evasion, inequality, and progressive taxes : a political economy perspective

The standard approach to tax compliance applies the economics-of-crime methodology pioneered by Becker (1968): in its first application, due to Allingham and Sandmo (1972) it models the behaviour of agents as a decision involving a choice of the extent of their income to report to tax authorities, given a certain institutional environment, represented by parameters such as the probability of detection and penalties in the event the agent is caught. While this basic framework yields important insights on tax compliance behavior, it has some critical limitations. Specifically, it indicates a level of compliance that is significantly below what is observed in the data. This thesis revisits the original framework with a view towards addressing this issue, and examining the political economy implications of tax evasion for progressivity in the tax structure. The approach followed involves building a macroeconomic, dynamic equilibrium model for the purpose of examining these issues, by using a step-wise model building procedure starting with some very simple variations of the basic Allingham and Sandmo construct, which are eventually integrated to a dynamic general equilibrium overlapping generations framework with heterogeneous agents. One of the variations involves incorporating the Allingham and Sandmo construct into a two-period model of a small open economy of the type originally attributed to Fisher (1930). A further variation of this simple construct involves allowing agents to initially decide whether to evade taxes or not. In the event they decide to evade, the agents then have to decide the extent of income or wealth they wish to under-report. We find that the ‘evade or not’ assumption has strikingly different and more realistic implications for the extent of evasion, and demonstrate that it is a more appropriate modeling strategy in the context of macroeconomic models, which are essentially dynamic in nature, and involve consumption smoothing across time and across various states of nature. Specifically, since deciding to undertake tax evasion impacts on the consumption smoothing ability of the agent by creating two states of nature in which the agent is ‘caught’ or ‘not caught’, there is a possibility that their utility under certainty, when they choose not to evade, is higher than the expected utility obtained when they choose to evade. Furthermore, the simple two-period model incorporating an ‘evade or not’ choice can be used to demonstrate some strikingly different political economy implications relative to its Allingham and Sandmo counterpart. In variations of the two models that allow for voting on the tax parameter, we find that agents typically choose to vote for a high degree of progressivity by choosing the highest available tax rate from the menu of choices available to them. There is, however, a small range of inequality levels for which agents in the ‘evade or not’ model vote for a relatively low value of the tax rate. The final steps in the model building procedure involve grafting the two-period models with a political economy choice into a dynamic overlapping generations setting with more general, non-linear tax schedules and a ‘cost-of evasion’ function that is increasing in the extent of evasion. Results based on numerical simulations of these models show further improvement in the model’s ability to match empirically plausible levels of tax evasion. In addition, the differences between the political economy implications of the ‘evade or not’ version of the model and its Allingham and Sandmo counterpart are now very striking; there is now a large range of values of the inequality parameter for which agents in the ‘evade or not’ model vote for a low degree of progressivity. This is because, in the ‘evade or not’ version of the model, low values of the tax rate encourages a large number of agents to choose the ‘not-evade’ option, so that the redistributive mechanism is more ‘efficient’ relative to the situations in which tax rates are high. Some further implications of the models of this thesis relate to whether variations in the level of inequality, and parameters such as the probability of detection and penalties for tax evasion matter for the political economy results. We find that (i) the political economy outcomes for the tax rate are quite insensitive to changes in inequality, and (ii) the voting outcomes change in non-monotonic ways in response to changes in the probability of detection and penalty rates. Specifically, the model suggests that changes in inequality should not matter, although the political outcome for the tax rate for a given level of inequality is conditional on whether there is a large or small or large extent of evasion in the economy. We conclude that further theoretical research into macroeconomic models of tax evasion is required to identify the structural relationships underpinning the link between inequality and redistribution in the presence of tax evasion. The models of this thesis provide a necessary first step in that direction.

Diseño de un sistema de suspensión progresiva Full-Floater

[ES]El objetivo del trabajo consiste en diseñar y dimensionar un sistema de suspensión progresiva tipo Full-Floater para una moto de competición. Se debe hacer un diseño que se adapte a unas condiciones de progresividad y rigidez para un bloque amortiguador dado. Para el desarrollo del trabajo se suministran datos reales tomados de la competición Motostudent. El desarrollo se realiza mediante el software PTC Creo 2.0.

Diseño de sistema de suspensión progresiva Pro-Link

[ES]Mediante este trabajo se va a diseñar un mecanismo para crear un sistema de suspensión progresiva para la suspensión trasera de una motocicleta a partir de un muelle lineal. El muelle introducido en la suspensión será lineal, por lo tanto, tendrá una sola rigidez, constante y la cual delimita el muelle, pero gracias a un mecanismo diseñado especialmente para la suspensión trasera de una moto, se va conseguir que la rigidez varíe. El mecanismo utilizado para este trabajo se llama Pro-Link y la empresa que lo emplea es Honda. Para ello, se creará un esquema del mecanismo en sí y tras un análisis cinemático mediante el programa Creo Parametric, y haciendo varios cambios en el sistema para ajustarlo a la mejor progresividad posible, se obtendrá la gráfica en la que se observará la curva que marca la rigidez progresiva. Esto es, se verá la evolución de la nueva rigidez dependiendo de la oscilación vertical de la rueda. Por otra parte, gracias a un análisis dinámico del mismo programa se conseguirán las reacciones del sistema y se calcularán los elementos auxiliares de éste para el buen funcionamiento del mismo. Finalmente, se creará el diseño del triángulo y un diseño preliminar del basculante mediante el método de elementos finitos del programa.

Efectos macroeconómicos de la progresividad en los sistemas de seguridad social: una aplicación al caso de los Estados Unidos

[ES] Este trabajo estudia los potenciales efectos macroeconómicos de una reforma que aumente la progresividad del sistema de Seguridad Social de los Estados Unidos de América. Condicionados por los supuestos del modelo, los resultados abogan por un aumento en el bienestar social con un determinado aumento de la progresividad. Esto es debido a que la redistribución total de la renta de los más pudientes a los que cuentan con menos recursos origina un contexto de menor bienestar social. Además, los resultados respaldan la validez del tipo de cotización como herramienta para ajustar el nivel de progresividad del sistema y rechazan la tasa de reemplazo de la pensión como mecanismo para conseguir dicho fin.

Igualdad de sacrificio: una aplicación para el IRPF en Bizkaia

En el presente trabajo pretendemos analizar la reforma fiscal llevada a cabo en el territorio histórico de Bizkaia en el ejercicio 2.006, y que entró en vigor el 1 de enero de 2.007. En concreto, se pretende analizar el efecto que tuvo sobre los contribuyentes, desglosándolo por niveles de renta. Con este objeto, planteamos la hipótesis de igualdad de sacrificio, y contrastamos su cumplimiento en los años 2.006 y 2.007, esto es, el último año previo a la entrada en vigor de la reforma y el primero en el que se aplico la nueva normativa. Los resultados muestran que, si bien en el año 2.006 no se cumplía el principio de igualdad de sacrificio, en el año 2.007 hay evidencia a favor de que sí se estuviese cumpliendo. Finalmente, se proponen formas funcionales impositivas alternativas a la empleada en la hipótesis de igualdad de sacrificio, observándose unos resultados similares a los obtenidos mediante la hipótesis de igualdad de sacrificio.

Igualdad de sacrificio: una aplicación para el IRPF español

Es bien sabido que el Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas (IRPF) es un impuesto progresivo (aumenta la proporción a pagar cuando aumenta la renta). Aun así es importante saber si el esfuerzo o la pérdida de utilidad que asume cada individuo en el pago del impuesto es el mismo, es decir, si se cumple el principio de igualdad de sacrificio. En este trabajo se plantea si el impuesto sobre la renta en España cumplió este principio en los años 2006 y 2007, y si la reforma fiscal que hubo en estos años nos acercó o alejó de su cumplimiento. La respuesta es que, en líneas generales, sí se cumple, suponiendo esta reforma una mejora relevante para la consecución de este objetivo.

Incidencia redistributiva de la política fiscal en la República Dominicana, 2000-2014

[ES]El trabajo es un análisis de la incidencia de la política fiscal llevada a cabo en la República Dominicana a lo largo del periodo 2000-2014, orientado a evaluar la progresividad o regresividad del sistema tributario y el gasto público así como sus efectos en la distribución del ingreso de la población dominicana. Con objeto de evaluar la acción fiscal se compara la distribución del ingreso antes y después del pago de impuestos y de las actuaciones de gasto, utilizando los indicadores de medidas de desigualdad y concentración tales como el índice de Gini, Kakwani, Concentración y Reybolds-Smolensky. El estudio considera algunas propuestas de política fiscal para lograr una mejora en la distribución del ingreso disponible a partir de las actuaciones de gasto público y un sistema tributario más progresivo.

Bureaucratic Corruption As a Constraint on Voter Choice

It Has Often Been Assumed That a Country's Tax Level, Tax Structure Progressivity and After-Tax Income Distribution Are Chosen by Voters Subject Only to Their Budget Constraints. This Paper Argues That At Certain Income Levels Voters' Decisions May Be Constrained by Bureaucratic Corruption. the Theoretical Arguments Are Developed in Asymmetry Limits the Capacity of the Fiscal System to Generate Revenues by Means of Direct Taxes. This Hypothesis Is Tested Witha Sample of International Data by Means of a Simultaneous Equation Model. the Distortions Resulting From Corruption Ar Captured Through Their Effects on a Latent Variable Defined As the Overall Fiscal Structure. Evidence Is Found of Causality Running From This Latent Variable to the Level of Taxes and the Degree of After Tax Inequality.

Relación entre el impuesto de renta y la generación de empleo en Colombia - Externalidades generadas en las empresas y en los inversionistas

El artículo analiza la relación que ha existido en Colombia a partir de la década de los años 90 s- entre el impuesto de renta y la generación de empleo. En el estudio se identificaron los principales obstáculos que enfrenta la política tributaria colombiana; entre ellos los altos costos laborales salariales y no salariales (impuestos a la nómina), la acción de los grupos de presión, el desempleo, excesos en la formulación de exenciones y descuentos tributarios injustificados al igual que la necesidad de formular políticas tributarias y laborales viables a mediano y largo plazo. Como puede verse a lo largo de la investigación, estos elementos han impedido la consecución de una política tributaria óptima que contemple los principios de equidad, progresividad, eficiencia y flexibilidad.

Análisis de los beneficios tributarios y el impuesto al patrimonio en la ley 1111 de 2006, frente a los principios de equidad, progresividad y eficiencia.

La historia de la tributación en Colombia en los últimos años se ha caracterizado por un sistema tributario ineficiente y poco equitativo. La reforma tributaria del año 2006, continua con la misma tendencia tributaria de años anteriores y además, crea una serie de beneficios y exenciones tributarias que están en contra de los principios constitucionales de Equidad, Progresividad y Eficiencia. Respecto al impuesto de renta, crea nuevas tarifas, descuentos y beneficios tributarios que generan un impuesto ineficiente en términos de control y de recaudo. Por otro lado, los beneficios dirigidos a sectores económicos en específico y a los contribuyentes más ricos del país, están en contra de un sistema tributario equitativo y progresivo. Finalmente, la extensión del impuesto al patrimonio, se considera como un impuesto ineficiente ya que es un impuesto transitorio que se ha vuelto permanente y costoso para el país. Se observa entonces, un carácter inequitativo, regresivo e ineficiente de la ley 1111 de 2006, soportado en la evidencia de los beneficios y descuentos tributarios otorgados a grandes capitales y la extensión del Impuesto al Patrimonio.