Principal-agent issues in asset acquisition: UK institutions and their investment agents

This paper explores principal‐agent issues in the stock selection processes of institutional property investors. Drawing upon an interview survey of fund managers and acquisition professionals, it focuses on the relationships between principals and external agents as they engage in property transactions. The research investigated the extent to which the presence of outcome‐based remuneration structures could lead to biased advice, overbidding and/or poor asset selection. It is concluded that institutional property buyers are aware of incentives for opportunistic behaviour by external agents, often have sufficient expertise to robustly evaluate agents’ advice and that these incentives are counter‐balanced by a number of important controls on potential opportunistic behaviour. There are strong counter‐incentives in the need for the agents to establish personal relationships and trust between themselves and institutional buyers, to generate repeat and related business and to preserve or generate a good reputation in the market.

Principal-Agent Theory and the World Trade Organization: Complex Agency and ‘Missing Delegation’

This paper analyses the World Trade Organization within a principal-agent framework. The concept of complex agency is introduced to focus on the variety of actors that comprise an international organization. Special attention is paid to the relationship between contracting parties’ representatives and the Secretariat. In the empirical part, the paper analyses the role of the Secretariat in assisting negotiations and presents evidence of declining influence. It is shown how principal-agent theory can contribute to addressing this ‘puzzle of missing delegation’. The paper concludes with a cautionary note as to the ‘location’ of international organizations’ emerging pathologies and calls for additional research to address the relationship between material and social sources to explain behaviour of the key actors within the complex agency.

A Principal-Agent Model of Contracting in Major League Baseball

Traditional economic analyses of the reserve clause in major league baseball view it as having arisen from the superior bargaining of owners compared to players. This article interprets it instead as promoting efficient investment by teams in player development, given the transferability of player skills to other teams. Using a principal-agent framework, the article shows that limited player mobility emerges as part of the optimal contract between players (principals) and teams (agents).

The European Commission and International Trade Negotiations: A Principal-Agent Approach. IES WORKING PAPER 2/2011

Starting from the concept of delegation of power in external trade policy, this paper aims to investigate the dynamics surrounding the European Union’s position in international trade negotiations. The analysis centres on the role of the European Commission (the agent), which by means of Treaty-based delegation and as mandated by the Council (the principal) acts as the sole trade negotiator in the international sphere on behalf of the European Union (EU). The broader negotiating process is thus conceptualised as a threelevel game, where the Commission holds an intermediary position between the European and international levels and also interacts with the Member States in the Council. After an insight into the European decision-making process for external trade, the paper further analyses the Commission’s role during the multilateral trade negotiations of the Doha Development Round. By applying the principal-agent theory to international trade negotiations in general, and subsequently to the controversial agricultural negotiations, this paper seeks to investigate some of the potential sources of autonomy that the Commission can draw upon while upholding an EU position at the international level, in addition to the “hardball” job of balancing the interests of the Member States with those of World Trade Organisation (WTO) partners. Along these lines, the paper finally aims to contribute to the literature concerning agency autonomy in EU external trade relations but also to provide a better understanding of inter-institutional relations within the EU as they may unfold in practice.

Memoirs of Vidocq, principal agent of the French police until 1827 [and now proprietor of the paper manufactory at St. Mandé]

Originally published in four volumes.

Memoir of the life and character of the Rev. Samuel Bacon, A.M., late : an officer of marines in the United States' service, afterwards, attorney at law in the state of Pennsylvania, and subsequently, a minister of the Episcopal Church, and principal agent of the American government for persons liberated from slave-ships, on the coast of Africa, where he terminated his life in the month of May, 1820 /

Goldsmiths'-Kress no. 23652.

Memoirs of Vidocq, principal agent of the French police until 1827 /

Tr. of: Les Memoires.

Principal agent problems evident in Chinese PPP infrastructure projects

The demand for infrastructure remains high in China. In order to meet this demand under conditions of limited government funding availability, local governments have increasingly sought private participation through ‘public, private partnerships’ (PPPs). While PPPs are recognised as a reliable mode for delivering infrastructure projects, agency problems are also known to interfere with their success. The nature of these agency problems, along with the types of partnership arrangements under which they occur, is the subject of this research. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with PPP consultants working on infrastructure projects in China. Results suggest that opportunistic behaviour is to be found both within the private sector and within the government sector. While the private sector is shown to take advantage of ‘information asymmetries,’ the government sector is shown to allocate project risks and responsibilities disproportionately in their favour. Results also indicate that PPP arrangements between local government and ‘state owned enterprises’ (SOEs) were less prone to agency abuse, while agency problems in PPP arrangements between local government and private firms were relatively greater.

Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology

We analyze a principal-agent model with moral hazard in which the principal has private information about the technology. We characterize Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the contracting game that possess the following properties: (i) a principal with a more informative technology ends up earning less profits than a principal with a less informative one does; (ii) compared to the complete information case, the actions implemented by the privately informed principal can be distorted; (iii) the agent can end up being better off when the principal has private information.

Federalismo: uma abordagem do problema do principal e do agente

The government has two objectives in this economy: make the states invest in thepriority sector and equalize wealth among states. Applying the model of the Principal-Agent Problem, we obtain that the federal system may not increase society 's wellfare when the states not necessarily invest in its respective thepriority sector. We also obtain that it is possible to implement an optimal mechanism where government equalize wealth among states without cost and can make states invest in thepriority sector.

Uusmaalaisten viljelijöiden arviot uudesta ympäristötuesta

The agro-environmental subsidy scheme is the most important agricultural environmental policy instrument used in Finland. The principal aim of the agro-environmental subsidy is to reimburse farmer the costs of using environmentally sounder farming practices and the measures that aim for preserving the environment. It also serves as an economic incentive for ensuring the large enough participation. The agro-environmental subsidy scheme is to be reformed in 2007. The main question answered in thesis was that whether farmers in Uusimaa region are ready to participate in the environmental subsidy scheme on the basis of the economical reasons or not. The focus is on farmers' opinions about how difficult it is to carry out measures of new environmental subsidy and do these measures change their ways of farming. The analysis is based on an empirical study of the farmers attitudes towards the new environmental subsidy scheme. The theoretical framework of this thesis is based on principal-agent theory and on the theory of the firm. In principal-agent theory environmental subsidy is interpreted as a deal in which farmers function as agents and government as a principal. Theory of the firm provides a theoretical framework for the analysis, through which we aim to analyse how rationally behaving farmer makes decisions by economical reasons to participate in the environment subsidy scheme. The thesis points out that presumably the participation percentage will stay high during the period of the new environmental subsidy scheme.