878 resultados para Price-cap
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In this study we apply an index number approach to allow for cross sectional comparisons of relative profitability, productivity and price performance of the regulated Water and Sewerage companies (WaSCs) in England and Wales during the years 1991-2008. In order to better analyse the impact of regulation on WaSC performance, we decompose actual economic profits into spatial multilateral Fisher productivity (TFP) index, the inverse of which is demonstrated to be a regulatory excess cost index that measures the deviation of a firm’s actual costs from benchmark costs, and a newly developed regulatory total price performance (TPP) index, which measures the excess of regulated revenues relative to benchmark costs. Increases (decreases) in regulatory price performance are indicative of the loosening (tightening) of price cap regulation. Moreover, we also show that the relationship between actual economic profitability, regulatory excess costs and regulatory price performance indices can be used to categorize regulatory price caps as “weak”, “powerful” or “catch-up promoting”. The results indicated that throughout the entire 1991-2008 period, price caps were never “powerful”, in the sense that they required less productive firms to immediately and fully catch-up to the most productive firm to regain economic profitability. More specifically, during the years 1991-2000 price caps were “weak” as prices were high enough for the firms to achieve economic profits despite their low productivity levels. However, after 2001 prices became “catch up promoting” as they required less productive companies to eliminate at least some excess costs in order to eliminate economic losses. Finally, we emphasize that as our results also clearly demonstrated a much closer alignment between allowed revenues and benchmark costs after 2001, Ofwat’s approach during this period was not only appropriate, but should also be continued in the 2009 price review.
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Privately owned water utilities typically operate under a regulated monopoly regime. Price-cap regulation has been introduced as a means to enhance efficiency and innovation. The main objective of this paper is to propose a methodology for measuring productivity change across companies and over time when the sample size is limited. An empirical application is developed for the UK water and sewerage companies (WaSCs) for the period 1991-2008. A panel index approach is applied to decompose and derive unit-specific productivity growth as a function of the productivity growth achieved by benchmark firms, and the catch-up to the benchmark firm achieved by less productive firms. The results indicated that significant gains in productivity occurred after 2000, when the regulator set tighter reviews. However, the average WaSC still must improve towards the benchmarking firm by 2.69% over a period of five years to achieve comparable performance. This study is relevant to regulators who are interested in developing comparative performance measurement when the number of water companies that can be evaluated is limited. Moreover, setting an appropriate X factor is essential to improve the efficiency of water companies and this study helps to achieve this challenge.
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Published as an article in: Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2010, vol. 37, issue 1, pages 42-69.
Productivity growth in electric energy retail in Colombia. A bootstrapped malmquist indices approach
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This paper offers a productivity growth estimate for electric energy commercialization firms in Colombia, using a non-parametric Malmquist bootstrap methodology. The estimation and methodology serve two main purposes. First, in Colombia Commercialization firms are subject to a price-cap regulation scheme, a non-common arrangement in the international experience for this part of the industry. Therefore the paper’s result suggest an estimate of the productivity factor to be used by the regulator, not only in Colombia but in other countries where commercialization is a growing part of the industry (renewable energy, for instance). Second, because of poor data collection from regulators and firms themselves, regulation based on a single estimation of productivity seems inappropriate and error-prone. The nonparametric Malmquist bootstrap estimation allows an assessment of the result in contrast to a single one estimation. This would open an opportunity for the regulator to adopt a narrower and more accurate productivity estimation or override an implausible result and impose a productivity factor in the price-cap to foster the development of the industry.
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This work verifies the impact caused by the Emergencial Program of Reduction of Consumption of Electric Energy (energy-rationing program) in the results of the concessionary private companies of the public service of electric energy distribution localized in the Northeast Area. As the rationing invigorated from June 2001 to February 2002, its effects are diluted in the results presented by these companies in the second semester of 2001 and first quarter of 2002, with prominence for the last quarter of 2001, when the revenue of extraordinary tariff restore was instituted by the National Agency of Electric Energy (ANEEL), consequence of the so-called General Agreement of the Electric Sector made between the federal government and the companies of the electric sector. The structure of a generic electric sector and a historical review of the Brazilian electric sector from the time it was controlled by the private enterprises, including the State control period, about 1960, and returning to the control of the private enterprises in 1990, under a new regulation structure are presented. An explanation of the models of economic regulation that Brazil used for the electric sector is made, with prominence for the price cap that is the actual effective model. The process of tariff revision foreseen in the concession contracts signed by the federal government and the concessionary companies is presented, highlighting its two stages: the tariff rebalancing that defines the new price cap and the calculation of the factor X that establishes the efficiency goals for the companies. There is made a presentation of the Emergencial Program of Reduction of Consumption of Electric Energy and of the consequent General Agreement of the Electric Sector, which created the revenue of extraordinary tariff restore. A conceptual revision on reviews is presented, regarding to concepts, accomplishment and recognition. A brief review of the six companies that made part of the worked sample is also presented. Analyzing the quarters historical review and of amount of sold energy, it was possible to conclude that the energy-rationing altered the results of the studied companies significantly and that alteration was masked by the accounting process of the revenue of extraordinary tariff restore
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This note explores the regulatory process of UK privatised utilities through the periodic review of prices. It provides a brief history of the privatisation programme in the UK and the theoretical arguments for the price-cap regulation that has been used. It argues that regulatory process appears to involve a covert dialogue and exchange of information between the regulator and regulated and also a second separate review process that consists of an overt dialogue. Using a semiotic analysis the authors suggest that the unfolding of each of these overt reviews follows a very similar pattern that is constantly being re-enacted. It is concluded that further research is required into the relative importance of the two separate review processes in the setting of the price-cap.
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The water and sewerage industry of England and Wales was privatized in 1989 and subjected to a new regime of environmental, water quality and RPI+K price cap regulation. This paper estimates a quality-adjusted input distance function, with stochastic frontier techniques in order to estimate productivity growth rates for the period 1985-2000. Productivity is decomposed so as to account for the impact of technical change, efficiency change, and scale change. Compared with earlier studies by Saal and Parker [(2000) Managerial Decision Econ 21(6):253-268, (2001) J Regul Econ 20(1): 61-90], these estimates allow a more careful consideration of how and whether privatization and the new regulatory regime affected productivity growth in the industry. Strikingly, they suggest that while technical change improved after privatization, productivity growth did not improve, and this was attributable to efficiency losses as firms appear to have struggled to keep up with technical advances after privatization. Moreover, the results also suggest that the excessive scale of the WaSCs contributed negatively to productivity growth. © 2007 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.
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A tanulmány a PPP különböző strukturális modelljeinek csoportosítását mutatja be, az egyes típusok rövid rendszerező áttekintésével. A tipológiák vizsgálata hasznos ahhoz, hogy a PPP projektek struktúrájának kialakításakor a különböző lehetőségeket mérlegelni tudjuk. Többféle megközelítésben lehet a modelleket tipizálni. Az együttműködés célja alapján a hatékonyság-, a minőség- és a finanszírozás-orientált modellek a legelterjedtebbek, a kockázatmegosztás módja alapján BOT, DBFO és koncessziós változatok, a haszonmegosztás szabályozása alapján árplafon-szabályozású, közvetlen haszonszabályozású, fixdíjas és árnyékáras megoldások a leginkább bevettek. A tanulmány ezek elemző bemutatása alapján arra a következtetésre jut, hogy a gyakorlati megoldások a legtöbb esetben az elméleti típusok valamilyen kombinációját tartalmazzák, a konkrét eset feltételeinek megfelelően. Így a gyakorlatban a fix tipológiák helyett alkalmasabb úgy megközelítenünk a PPP-t, mint egy folyamatosan változó, a helyi igényekhez idomuló jelenséget. A haszonszabályozó tipológia kapcsán a tanulmány melléklete rövid áttekintést nyújt a PPP esetében kritikus méltányos haszon becslésének lehetséges megoldásairól is. = This study shows a categorization of the different structural models of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects. The typologies are useful to assess the available options when decisions on PPP project structures are made. There are different categorizing aspects. Based ont he key purpose of the partnership there are efficiency, quality and financing focused models. From a risk sharing point of view, BOT, DBFO and concession models are most typical. Regarding the regulation of returns price-cap models, ’open book’ models, fixed price and shadow pricing models are most common. Based on the analytical assessment of these, they study concludes that actual projects are mostly a combination of theoretical types, as required by the given case. Therefore in practice, it is more appropriate to approach PPP projects as a constantly shaping concept, adjustable to particular conditions. Supporting the approaches to the regulation of returns, an appendix of the study summarizes the different methods to estimate fair returns, a critical issue in PPP projects.
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Après une période où la valeur des quotas laitiers a été en forte croissance au Québec, un plafond à cette valeur a été fixé à compter de 2007. Ce plafond a eu pour effet de limiter l’offre de quota sur le marché et la croissance de la taille des entreprises laitières québécoises. Cette situation soulève un questionnement sur l’efficience économique, le blocage de la croissance des entreprises les empêchant de bénéficier d’économies de taille, si bien entendu il en existe. En conséquence, cette étude s’intéresse aux économies de taille en production laitière en Amérique du Nord. Les économies de taille des entreprises ont été mesurées à l’aide d’une régression linéaire multiple à partir de certains indicateurs de coût monétaire et non monétaire. Cette analyse comprend quatre strates de taille formées à partir d’un échantillon non aléatoire de 847 entreprises du Québec, de l’État de New York et de la Californie, ainsi qu’à partir d’un groupe d’entreprises efficientes (groupe de tête). Les résultats démontrent l’existence d’économies de taille principalement au niveau des coûts fixes et plus particulièrement des coûts fixes non monétaires. Ils révèlent aussi que les deux indicateurs où l’effet des économies de taille est le plus important sont le coût du travail non rémunéré et l’amortissement. Par ailleurs, lorsque la taille d’une entreprise augmente, les économies de taille supplémentaires réalisées deviennent de moins en moins importantes. Enfin, les résultats indiquent qu’il existe des déséconomies de taille au niveau des coûts d’alimentation. Les résultats obtenus au niveau du groupe de tête vont dans le même sens. Ils confirment également qu’il est possible pour les grandes entreprises efficientes de réaliser des économies de taille pour la plupart des indicateurs de coût. Toutefois, les économies additionnelles que ces entreprises peuvent réaliser sont moins importantes que celles obtenues par les petites entreprises efficientes. Mots clés : Agriculture, production laitière, Amérique du Nord, économies de taille, efficience économique, régression linéaire.
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The concept of SG (Smart Grids) encompasses a set of technologies that raise the intelligence of the electrical networks, such as smart meters or instruments of communication, sensing and auto-correction of networks. Nevertheless, the cost is still an important obstacle for the transformation of the current electricity system into a smarter one. Regulation can have an important role in setting up a favorable framework that fosters investments. However, the novelty with SG is the disembodied character of the technology, which may change the incentives of the regulated network companies to invest, affecting the effectiveness of the regulatory instruments (“cost plus” or “price cap”). This paper demonstrates that the solution to this “Smart” paradox requires strong incentive regulation mechanisms able to stimulate the adoption of SG technologies. Moreover, the regulation should not jeopardize conventional investments that are unable to be substituted by SG. Thus, a combination of performance regulation and efficiency obligations may be necessary.
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On efficiency grounds, the economics community has to date tended to emphasize price-based policies to address climate change - such as taxes or a "safety-valve" price ceiling for cap-and-trade - while environmental advocates have sought a more clear quantitative limit on emissions. This paper presents a simple modification to the idea of a safety valve - a quantitative limit that we call the allowance reserve. Importantly, this idea may bridge the gap between competing interests and potentially improve efficiency relative to tax or other price-based policies. The last point highlights the deficiencies in several previous studies of price and quantity controls for climate change that do not adequately capture the dynamic opportunities within a cap-and-trade system for allowance banking, borrowing, and intertemporal arbitrage in response to unfolding information.