The Chilean wheat market and its price support mechanism : a spatial market integration analysis

This research investigates the spatial market integration of the Chilean wheat market in relation with its most representative international markets by using a vector error correction model (VECM) and how a price support policy, as a price band, affect it. The international market was characterized by two relevant wheat prices: PAN from Argentina and Hard Red Winter from the United States. The spatial market integration level, expressed in the error correction term (ECT), allowed concluding that there is a high integration degree among these markets with a variable influence of the price band mechanism mainly related with its estimation methodology. Moreover, this paper showed that Chile can be seen as price taker as long as the speed of its adjustment to international shocks, being these reactions faster than in the United States and Argentina. Finally, the results validated the "Law of the One Price", which assumes price equalization across all local markets in the long run.

O Mecanismo de transmissão de preços do petróleo para a gasolina e para o diesel nos EUA nos anos 2000

Através de um Modelo de Correção de Erros este estudo explora possíveis assimetrias no passthrough dos preços de petróleos para os preços do diesel e da gasolina no mercado dos Estados Unidos, analisando, principalmente, se as inversões das tendências das demandas destes derivados afetaram o mecanismo de transmissão de preços. A partir de dados mensais de janeiro de 2001 a dezembro de 2012, para a gasolina foram encontrados indícios de que houve alterações do passthrough em decorrência da quebra da demanda. Porém, é válido destacar que tal resultado ocorreu concomitantemente ao período de recuperação de preços presenciada após a crise de 2008. Em relação ao diesel, não há indícios de que houve alterações no passthrough. Por fim, há evidências da redução do WTI como petróleo de referência em decorrência da sua desvalorização a partir de 2010.

Price discovery in dual-class shares across multiple markets

We extend the standard price discovery analysis to estimate the information share of dual-class shares across domestic and foreign markets. By examining both common and preferred shares, we aim to extract information not only about the fundamental value of the rm, but also about the dual-class premium. In particular, our interest lies on the price discovery mechanism regulating the prices of common and preferred shares in the BM&FBovespa as well as the prices of their ADR counterparts in the NYSE and in the Arca platform. However, in the presence of contemporaneous correlation between the innovations, the standard information share measure depends heavily on the ordering we attribute to prices in the system. To remain agnostic about which are the leading share class and market, one could for instance compute some weighted average information share across all possible orderings. This is extremely inconvenient given that we are dealing with 2 share prices in Brazil, 4 share prices in the US, plus the exchange rate (and hence over 5,000 permutations!). We thus develop a novel methodology to carry out price discovery analyses that does not impose any ex-ante assumption about which share class or trading platform conveys more information about shocks in the fundamental price. As such, our procedure yields a single measure of information share, which is invariant to the ordering of the variables in the system. Simulations of a simple market microstructure model show that our information share estimator works pretty well in practice. We then employ transactions data to study price discovery in two dual-class Brazilian stocks and their ADRs. We uncover two interesting ndings. First, the foreign market is at least as informative as the home market. Second, shocks in the dual-class premium entail a permanent e ect in normal times, but transitory in periods of nancial distress. We argue that the latter is consistent with the expropriation of preferred shareholders as a class.

Sequential screening

We present a model of price discrimination where a monopolistfaces a consumer who is privately informed about thedistribution of his valuation for an indivisible unit ofgood but has yet to learn privately the actual valuation.The monopolist sequentially screens the consumer with amenu of contracts:the consumer self-selects once by choosing a contract andthen self-selects again when he learns the actual valuation. A deterministic sequential mechanism is a menu of refundcontracts, each consisting of an advance payment and a refundamount in case of no consumption, but sequential mechanismsmay involve randomization.We characterize the optimal sequential mechanism when someconsumer types are more eager in the sense of first-orderstochastic dominance, and when some types face greatervaluation uncertainty in the sense of mean-preserving-spread.We show that it can be optimal to subsidize consumer typeswith smaller valuation uncertainty (through low refund, as inairplane ticket pricing) in order to reduce the rent to thosewith greater uncertainty. The size of distortion depends bothon the type distribution and on how informative the consumer'sinitial private knowledge is about his valuation, but noton how much he initially knows about the valuation per se.

Mecanismos de transmissão de preços e parcelas de mercado: uma análise sobre as exportações brasileiras de manga

Climate and environmental conditions allowed Brazil to become one of the largest producers of tropical fruits in the world. The São Francisco Valley, over the years, has emerged as the main fruit-producing region of the country, especially mangos and grapes. The mango, which is produced in this region, has reached a good international position, especially in European and American markets. However, the domestic price has absorbed more and more the impact of fluctuations in the international market expectations affecting the production and marketing of producers. The objective of the study is to analyze the transmission ratio of export prices of the mango, with the American market prices and the European Union in the period from 2003 to 2013. It is intended also to analyze the factors affecting the fluctuations of exports Brazilian mango for the main import markets. To achieve the proposed objectives, we used, in the methodology, the autoregressive vector model, in order to find the price transmission mechanism and the mechanisms of impacts through the impulse response function. We also used, the Constant Market Share model, in order to observe the importance of the effects competitiveness, destination, and growth in world trade on the changes of Brazilian mango exports in the period. The data used were obtained from the database of the Ministry of Development and Foreign Trade - MIDIC and FAOSTAT (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). Among the results, it was found that the Brazilian domestic prices are influenced by the US market price, and that price shocks promoted this market can impact on the growth of the internal prices for several months. It was noted also that the competitiveness effect accounted for the largest portion of the effective growth of Brazilian exports, in other word, the country has improved its competitiveness among the other exporting countries.

Efectos espaciales en la formación de precios de oferta en mercados spot de generación eléctrica

El mecanismo de fijación del precio de oferta en el mercado eléctrico colombiano exhibe comportamientos estratégicos inherente a la estructura oligopólica de este mercado, no solo por su alto porcentaje hidrológico, aproximadamente 80%, sino también debido a la localización geográfica de las plantas de generación eléctrica cercanas a la Región Andina. En esta investigación se diseña una matriz de pesos espaciales, que recoge características de la localización geográfica de las plantas de generación eléctrica, la cual se incorpora en un panel espacial de tipo Durbin para identificar dichos comportamientos de la geografía económica, además de las variables fundamentales que explican la formación del precio en este mercado.

Consistent solutions in exchange economies: A characterization of the price mechanism

We characterize the Walrasian allocations correspondence by means offour axioms: consistency, replica invariance, individual rationality andPareto optimality. It is shown that for any given class of exchange economiesany solution that satisfies the axioms is a selection from the Walrasianallocations with slack. Preferences are assumed to be smooth, but may besatiated and non--convex. A class of economies is defined as all economieswhose agents' preferences belong to an arbitrary family (finite or infinite)of types. The result can be modified to characterize equal budget Walrasianallocations with slack by replacing individual rationality with individualrationality from equal division. The results are valid also for classes ofeconomies in which core--Walras equivalence does not hold.

The empirical study of the price mechanism in the Chinese housing market

In China, the history of the establishment of the private housing market is pretty short. Actually in less then two decades, the market has grown from almost the scratch to playing an important role in the economy. A great achievement! But many problems also exist. They need to be properly addressed and solved. Price problem---simply put, housing price is too high--- is one of them, and this paper is focused on it. Three basic questions are posed, i.e. (1) how to judge the housing affordability? (2) why the housing price is so high? (3) how to solve the housing price problem. The paper pays particular attention to answering the second question. Except the numerous news reports and surveys show that most of the ordinary city dwellers complained about the high housing price, the mathematical means, the four ratios, are applied to judge the housing affordability in Shanghai and Shenzhen. The results are very clear that the price problem is severe. So why? Something is wrong with the price mechanism. This research shows that mainly these five factors contribute to the price problem: the housing reform, the housing development model, the unbalanced housing market, the housing project financing and the poor governmental management. Finally the paper puts forward five suggestions to solve the housing price problem in first-hand private Chinese housing market. They include: the establishment of real estate information system, the creation of specific price management department, the government price regulation, the property tax and the legalization of "cushion money".

Reserve price commitments in auctions

It is well known that the optimal auction-one that maximizes the seller's expected revenue-can be implemented using a standard auction format with a suitably chosen reserve price. This reserve price is above the seller's value of retaining the object and the mechanism requires a commitment not to sell the object below the reserve. This commitment is what makes the reserve valuable to the seller. However, in practice, a reserve price commits the seller to sell the object if the reserve is reached, but does not commit her to withhold the object from sale if bidding falls short of the reserve. In this note we investigate whether reserve prices remain valuable for the seller when she may negotiate with the highest bidder if the reserve is not met. We show that the value of the reserve price may be completely undermined if the seller is a sufficiently weak bargainer. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint

I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism will implement both in Nash and strong Nash the set of envy-free allocations. The distinguishing feature of the mechanism is that it treats the announced preferences as the true ones and selects an envy-free allocation with respect to the announced preferences.

The Complete Information First. Price Auction or the Importance of Being Indivisible

Abstract Despite the popularity of auction theoretical thinking, it appears that no one has presented an elementary equilibrium analysis of the first-price sealed-bid auction mechanism under complete information. This paper aims to remedy that omission. We show that the existence of pure strategy undominated Nash equilibria requires that the bidding space is not "too divisible" (that is, a continuum). In fact, when bids must form part of a finite grid there always exists a "high price equilibrium". However, there might also be "low price equilibria" and when the bidding space is very restrictive the revenue obtained in these "low price equilibria" might be very low. We discuss the properties of the equilibria and an application of auction theoretical thinking in which "low price equilibria" may be relevant. Keywords: First-price auctions, undominated Nash equilibria. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D44 (Auctions).

Self-Fulfilling Price Cycles

This paper presents a model of a self-fulfilling price cycle in an asset market. Price oscillates deterministically even though the underlying environment is stationary. The mechanism that we uncover is driven by endogenous variation in the investment horizons of the different market participants, informed and uninformed. On even days, the price is high; on odd days it is low. On even days, informed traders are willing to jettison their good assets, knowing that they can buy them back the next day, when the price is low. The anticipated drop in price more than offsets any potential loss in dividend. Because of these asset sales, the informed build up their cash holdings. Understanding that the market is flooded with good assets, the uninformed traders are willing to pay a high price. But their investment horizon is longer than that of the informed traders: their intention is to hold the assets they purchase, not to resell. On odd days, the price is low because the uninformed recognise that the informed are using their cash holdings to cherry-pick good assets from the market. Now the uninformed, like the informed, are investing short-term. Rather than buy-and-hold as they do with assets purchased on even days, on odd days the uninformed are buying to sell. Notice that, at the root of the model, there lies a credit constraint. Although the informed are flush with cash on odd days, they are not deep pockets. On each cherry that they pick out of the market, they earn a high return: buying cheap, selling dear. However they don't have enough cash to strip the market of cherries and thereby bid the price up.

Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement

In the presence of cost uncertainty, limited liability introduces the possibility of default in procurement with its associated bank-ruptcy costs. When financial soundness is not perfectly observable, we show that incentive compatibility implies that financially less sound contractors are selected with higher probability in any feasible mechanism. Informational rents are associated with unsound financial situations. By selecting the financially weakest contractor, stronger price competition (auctions) may not only increase the probability of default but also expected rents. Thus, weak conditions are suffcient for auctions to be suboptimal. In particular, we show that pooling firms with higher assets may reduce the cost of procurement even when default is costless for the sponsor.

Oil price shocks and labor market fluctuations

We examine the impact of real oil price shocks on labor market flows in the U.S. We first use smooth transition regression (STR) models to investigate to what extent oil prices can be considered as a driving force of labor market fluctuations. Then we develop and calibrate a modified version of Pissarides' (2000) model with energy costs, which we simulate in response to shocks mimicking the behavior of the actual oil price shocks. We find that (i) these shocks are an important driving force of job market flows; (ii) the job finding probability is the main transmission mechanism of such shocks; and (iii) they bring a new amplification mechanism for the volatility and should thus be seen as complementary of labor productivity shocks. Overall we conclude that shocks in oil prices cannot be neglected in explaining cyclical labor adjustments in the U.S.

The impact of the reference price system on the pharmaceutical market: A theoretical approach

This article analyses the impact of the reference pricesystem on the price-setting strategies of thepharmaceutical firms and on the level of generic usage.This model is the first to take explicitly into accountthe impact of the reference price mechanism on the levelof competition between brand-name and generic drugs andnational pharmaceutical spending. We consider aduopolistic model with one firm producing the brand-namedrug, whose patent has already expired, and the otherproducing the corresponding generic version. We work ina partial equilibrium framework where firms set pricessequentially and consumers face heterogeneous switchingcosts.We show that brand producers compensate thedecline of profits by selling greater quantities insteadof charging higher prices, thus fostering pricecompetition in the pharmaceutical market. This result isa consequence of both the assumption of a verticallydifferentiated model and the introduction of thereference price system.