Resale price maintenance - in need of further reform

The Competition Policy Reform Act extended the resale price maintenance provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974 to include services and provide for authorisation where the conduct can be shown to benefit the public such that it should be allowed. This article explores the scope of these changes and their shortcomings. It also seeks to provide some guidance as to their likely application and makes recommendations for further reform.

Resale price maintenance : economic theories and empirical evidence /

Mode of access: Internet.

Resale price maintenance. Hearing before a subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Seventy-fourth Congress, second sesion, on S. 3822, to amend the act entitled "An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies", approved July 2, 1890. March 13, 1936.

Carl A. Hatch, Chairman of Subcommittee.

An evaluation of the impact upon productivity of ending resale price maintenance on books

Report prepared for the OFT by the Centre for Competition Policy at University of East Anglia. An examination of the ending of RPM aims to improve understanding of how competition interventions affect productivity, provide a methodological framework that could inform future evaluations and provide inputs to the ongoing debate about the effects of RPM.

Community pharmacist perceptions of the loss of resale price maintenance

Focal points: This study was designed to elicit the views of community pharmacists on any perceived business and professional changes following the loss of resale price maintenance (RPM)A piloted, 22-point self-completion questionnaire containing open, closed and scaled response questions was distributed to 35 independent (<10 stores), 13 multiple group and three supermarket-based pharmacies, and 40 responses were obtained (29 independent, eight multiple and three supermarket)Theme analysis indicated that 20 respondents felt that an increased range of services was now provided, 27 reported a decreased sales potential and 25 thought that patients now purchased more medicinesThe average price at which eight common over-the-counter medicines were offered was found to be £4.34 in independents, £4.37 in multiples and £4.22 in the supermarket pharmacies, compared with an average standard list price of £4.32There are indications that removal of RPM may have instigated changes in community pharmacy

A kiskereskedelmi árrögzítés versenyfokozó hatása (The competition-enhancing effect of retail price maintenance)

A kiskereskedelmi árrögzítés évtizedek óta vitatott kérdés a közgazdasági elméletben. Az Egyesült Államok legfelsőbb bíróságának közelmúltbeli döntése - megszüntetve az ilyen típusú árkorlátozások önmagában törvénytelennek ítélését - ismételten felhívta a figyelmet az adott problémakörre. Cikkünkben az árrögzítés eddig mellőzött versenyfokozó hatásával foglalkozunk. A megszokott statikus modellek helyett dinamikus környezetet feltételezve, arra a következtetésre jutunk, hogy egy profitmaximalizáló termelőnek számos esetben célszerű kiskereskedelmi árrögzítést alkalmazni egy esetlegesen kialakuló forgalmazói kartell megelőzésére, amelynek egyértelműen pozitív hatása van nemcsak a termelő profitjára, hanem a kialakuló fogyasztói többletre nézve is. Amellett érvelünk, hogy indokolatlan a még mindig uralkodó, a legtöbb ország versenyszabályozásában tetten érhető, önmagában törvénytelennek minősített megítélés a vertikális árkorlátozásokkal kapcsolatban. / === / Retail price fixing has been a disputed issue in theoretical economics for decades, to which attention was drawn again by a recent decision by the US Supreme Court ending the illegality of such price restrictions as such. Assuming a dynamic environment instead of the customary static model leads to the conclusion that it is frequently advantageous to a profit-maximizing producer to use retail price maintenance to avert the possible appearance of a reseller cartel. This will have a clearly positive effect on producer profits, and also in terms of increasing consumption. It is also argued in the study that it is unjustified to qualify such vertical pricing restrictions as essentially illegal, after the manner of the competition rules in most countries.

Trade practice and price law, federal,

Includes index.

The Role of Price Floor in a Differentiated Product Retail Market

The ability of a manufacturer to enhance competition among its retailers by imposing a price floor was recently introduced in the literature. The purpose of this article is to revisit this anti-collusive explanation of the retail price maintenance in a more general model in which we introduce asymmetric retailers. We find that a manufacturer can amplify the retail market’s competition by imposing a price foor when retailers sell differentiated products. This result contradicts the prevailing concept of retail price maintenance.

A criação de valor no mercado da saúde enquanto fator diferenciador para a negociação de preços e competitividade em contexto de crise mundial

Numa altura em que o setor da saúde é apontado como uma área crítica de gastos, nunca foi tão pertinente, pela falta de verbas, refletir e discutir o formato de contratação e de gestão dos cuidados de saúde. A sua fundamentação em custo, volume ou diferenciação, bem como, os indicadores que refletem o investimento, a eficiência e eficácia dos cuidados. Pretendeu-se como objetivo principal estudar a criação de valor no mercado da saúde enquanto fator diferenciador para a negociação de preços e competitividade em contexto de crise económica. Com vista a alcançar este objetivo, procedeu-se à revisão dos modelos teóricos, recorrendo a pesquisa bibliográfica. Procedeu-se também à comparação dos resultados operacionais de uma empresa enquanto prestadora de serviços de oxigenoterapia ao domicílio, tendo por base duas estratégias diferentes: redução direta de preços ou manutenção de preços com criação de valor para o cliente. Tendo em vista as duas estratégias, foram elaboradas duas propostas e posteriormente apresentadas para avaliação e votação on-line por um grupo oito gestores hospitalares. O valor em cuidados de saúde é visível nos benefícios clínicos alcançados pelo dinheiro investido. A estrutura dos atuais sistemas de saúde apenas reconhece redução de gastos, fontes de receita, volume de cuidados, sem orientação para a valorização dos resultados clínicos. Os prestadores deviam competir pela focalização na obtenção de melhores resultados clínicos, pois deve ser a essa a preocupação central dos serviços médicos. Uma boa gestão pode levar a que numa negociação de contratos, uma proposta baseada em valor possa garantir a manutenção dos preços.

Impact evaluations of Federal Trade Commission vertical restraints cases /

Item 535

The stability of prices;

Mode of access: Internet.

Capper-Kelly fair-trade bill. Hearings, Seventy-second Congress, first session.

Mode of access: Internet.

Incentive compatible mechanisms for group ticket allocation in software maintenance services

A customer reported problem (or Trouble Ticket) in software maintenance is typically solved by one or more maintenance engineers. The decision of allocating the ticket to one or more engineers is generally taken by the lead, based on customer delivery deadlines and a guided complexity assessment from each maintenance engineer. The key challenge in such a scenario is two folds, un-truthful (hiked up) elicitation of ticket complexity by each engineer to the lead and the decision of allocating the ticket to a group of engineers who will solve the ticket with in customer deadline. The decision of allocation should ensure Individual and Coalitional Rationality along with Coalitional Stability. In this paper we use game theory to examine the issue of truthful elicitation of ticket complexities by engineers for solving ticket as a group given a specific customer delivery deadline. We formulate this problem as strategic form game and propose two mechanisms, (1) Division of Labor (DOL) and (2) Extended Second Price (ESP). In the proposed mechanisms we show that truth telling by each engineer constitutes a Dominant Strategy Nash Equilibrium of the underlying game. Also we analyze the existence of Individual Rationality (IR) and Coalitional Rationality (CR) properties to motivate voluntary and group participation. We use Core, solution concept from co-operative game theory to analyze the stability of the proposed group based on the allocation and payments.