An Economic Analysis of the Legal Concept of Trustees' Power of Investment

Authorised trustee status is a legal concept which has economic implications; one of the major implications is that it assists in the direction of investment funds into particular securities and areas of the economy. The concept of authorised trustee status, while attempting to achieve specific outcomes for the beneficiaries of trusts cannot be relied upon to secure these results. Economic analysis of the role of the trustee maintains that this role is one of portfolio manager; a role which is complex but which is explicable in terms of definable procedures and practices. The role of trustee as portfolio manager is one which requires greater financial knowledge than can be assumed is possessed by all trustees. The trustee as portfolio manager is required to maintain a review of decisions make under powers to invest trust assets. A solution to the problem of authorised trustee status is proposed. The solution takes two parts: the first is the adoption of the prudent person approach but with the codification of duties of the trustee and the explicit listing of the factors that a trustee should consider in using the investment powers. The second part of the proposed solution is to link the investment powers of trustees to the best practice features of securities advisers who are now licensed by a regulatory body, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission.

Behavioral aspects of investment fund's markets: are good managers lucky or skilled?

It is generally accepted that financial markets are efficient in the long run a lthough there may be some deviations in the short run. It is also accepted that a good portfolio manager is the one who beats the market persistently along time, this type of manager could not exist if markets were perfectly efficient According to this in a pure efficient market we should find that managers know that they can not beat the market so they would undertake only pure passive management strategies. Assuming a certain degree of inefficiency in the short run, a market may show some managers who tr y to beat the market by undertaking active strategies. From Fama’s efficient markets theory we can state that these active managers may beat the market occasionally although they will not be able to enhance significantly their performance in the long run. On the other hand, in an inefficient market it would be expected to find a higher level of activity related with the higher probability of beating the market. In this paper we follow two objectives: first, we set a basis to analyse the level of efficiency in an asset invest- ment funds market by measuring performance, strategies activity and it’s persistence for a certain group of funds during the period of study. Second, we analyse individual performance persistence in order to determine the existence of skilled managers. The CAPM model is taken as theoretical background and the use of the Sharpe’s ratio as a suitable performance measure in a limited information environment leads to a group performance measurement proposal. The empiri- cal study takes quarterly data from 1999-2007 period, for the whole population of the Spanish asset investment funds market, provided by the CNMV (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores). This period of study has been chosen to ensure a wide enough range of efficient market observation so it would allow us to set a proper basis to compare with the following period. As a result we develop a model that allows us to measure efficiency in a given asset mutual funds market, based on the level of strategy’s activity undertaken by managers. We also observe persistence in individual performance for a certain group of funds

La probabilidad de supervivencia en un modelo con reaseguro proporcional de umbral

[spa] En este artículo presentamos una nueva estrategia de reaseguro, a la que denominamos estrategia de reaseguro umbral, que actúa de forma diferente en función del nivel de las reservas. Así, para unos niveles de las reservas inferiores a un determinado nivel, el gestor decide aplicar un reaseguro proporcional, y para niveles superiores, al considerar que se ha alcanzado cierta solvencia en la cartera, opta por no ceder ningún porcentaje del riesgo. El análisis del efecto de la introducción del reaseguro umbral sobre la probabilidad de supervivencia, y su comparación con el reaseguro proporcional y la opción de no reasegurar, nos permite hallar estrategias de reaseguro equivalentes desde el punto de vista de la solvencia. Palabras clave: teoría del riesgo, reaseguro de umbral, reaseguro proporcional, probabilidad de supervivencia.

La probabilidad de supervivencia en un modelo con reaseguro proporcional de umbral

[spa] En este artículo presentamos una nueva estrategia de reaseguro, a la que denominamos estrategia de reaseguro umbral, que actúa de forma diferente en función del nivel de las reservas. Así, para unos niveles de las reservas inferiores a un determinado nivel, el gestor decide aplicar un reaseguro proporcional, y para niveles superiores, al considerar que se ha alcanzado cierta solvencia en la cartera, opta por no ceder ningún porcentaje del riesgo. El análisis del efecto de la introducción del reaseguro umbral sobre la probabilidad de supervivencia, y su comparación con el reaseguro proporcional y la opción de no reasegurar, nos permite hallar estrategias de reaseguro equivalentes desde el punto de vista de la solvencia. Palabras clave: teoría del riesgo, reaseguro de umbral, reaseguro proporcional, probabilidad de supervivencia.

Sähkösalkun tuotteistaminen ja salkunhallinnan menestyksen seuranta

Sähkömarkkinoiden vapautumisen ja pörssimuotoisen kaupankäynnin myötäyhä useampi toimija on siirtynyt perinteisistä kiinteähintaisista sopimuksista salkkumuotoiseen sähkönhankintaan. Aktiivisen salkunhallinnan myötä kanava markkinoille pysyy jatkuvasti avoimena ja ostopäätös voidaan jakaa pidemmälle ajanjaksolle, jolloin riippuvaisuus vain yhden hetken hintatasosta pienenee. Sähkön hankintahinnan suojaamiseen käytettävien finanssituotteiden määrä pörssissä ja OTC-markkinalla on kasvanut viime vuosina merkittävästi. Tämän seurauksena myös käytettävien instrumenttien valinta ja perustelu asiakkaalle vaatii entistä tarkempaa huomiota. Työssä käsiteltävän tuotteistuksen tavoitteena oli luoda salkunhallinnan perustapauksille yksinkertaiset rungot, joita voidaan täydentää erilaisillalisäominaisuuksilla. Tuotteistuksella pyritään myös selkeyttämään asiakkaalle muodostuvaa mielikuvaa tarjolla olevista vaihtoehdoista sekä edesauttamaan markkinointia. Diplomityön toisena tavoitteena oli kehittää salkunhallinnan menestyksen seurantaa varten mittarit, joiden avulla sekä asiakas että salkunhoitaja pystyvät seuraamaan salkunhallinnan onnistumista. Mittarit toteutettiin Excel-ympäristössä ja testattavat salkut koostuivat pääasiassa lopullisista tuotteistettaviksi valituista salkuista. Työn pohjalta on määrä toteuttaa olemassa olevan internet-pohjaisen salkunhallintapalvelun osaksi sovellus, joka mahdollistaa salkunhallinnan menestyksen jatkuvan seurannan.

La responsabilité de l'intermédiaire de marché et la protection du petit investisseur : à la recherche d'un certain équilibre

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de maîtrise, option droit des affaires"

La réglementation des risques associés à la gouvernance des régimes complémentaires de retraite.

Dans un univers financier en turbulence, les régimes de retraite privés gèrent une part importante de l’épargne-retraite des Québécois en conciliant les intérêts divergents de différents acteurs : employeurs, participants actifs, retraités, autres intervenants à la gestion. Considérant la complexité des techniques et des instruments financiers, la gestion des régimes de retraite est devenue, pour les administrateurs de régime, un exercice périlleux. Dans ce contexte, la réglementation des risques associés à la gouvernance des régimes de retraite constitue aujourd’hui un enjeu socio-économique important pour assurer leur pérennité dans notre système de retraite. Le cadre légal et réglementaire applicables aux régimes de retraite découle essentiellement de la Loi sur les régimes complémentaires de retraite et ses règlements ainsi que du Code civil du Québec. En s’appuyant sur des études économiques et financières, cette étude analyse le régime juridique du fonctionnement et de la gouvernance des régimes de retraite par les comités de retraite et propose des améliorations en utilisant une approche fondée sur le risque. À titre préliminaire, pour situer dans le temps la problématique actuelle, cette étude présente l’évolution des régimes de retraite privés de l’origine à nos jours en se concentrant sur les règles affectant leur administration. Ensuite, dans une première partie, le cadre théorique sur lequel s’appuie notre étude est exposé. Les régimes de retraite privés y sont présentés comme un intermédiaire opérant sur les marchés financiers par le biais d’autres intermédiaires : les gestionnaires de portefeuilles, les courtiers en valeurs et les gardiens de valeurs. Il s’applique aux régimes de retraite des principes de gouvernance d’entreprise particuliers fondés sur les risques encourus par l’organisation. Cette partie conduit au développement d’une théorie de l’agence des régimes de retraite privés impliquant notamment des relations fondamentales entre l’employeur, les participants et bénéficiaires et le(s) gestionnaire(s) de portefeuille. Dans la seconde partie, l’environnement légal et réglementaire de la gouvernance applicable des régimes de retraite privés est présenté et la structure incitative des règles analysée à la lumière de travaux économiques théoriques et empiriques. Après avoir expliqué les principaux contrats du régime de retraite, un examen de certains mécanismes légaux est effectué : les devoirs généraux des administrateurs, les règles de composition, le fonctionnement interne et l’obligation de rendre compte. Cette étude permet de proposer une série de recommandations visant à améliorer la gouvernance et le fonctionnement des régimes de retraite privés.

Performance das melhores ideias dos gestores de fundos de ações brasileiros

Nesta tese é construído um portfolio com as melhores ideias dos gestores de fundos de ações brasileiro. Este portfolio apresenta um retorno acima do mercado de 1,8% ao mês. As melhores ideias dos gestores são definidas como as ideias que os gestores têm a maior convicção ex ante e são identificadas como a maior posição de cada gestor relativa a um benchmark. Os retornos em excesso encontrados são estatisticamente e economicamente significantes e utilizam como base de dados a carteira mensal de fundos de ações brasileiros no período de janeiro 2006 a agosto 2011.

Optimal provision of implicit and explicit incentives in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of the fiow of funds as an implicit incetive provided by investors to portfolio managers in a two-period relationship. We show that the fiow of funds is a powerful incentive in an asset management contract. We build a binomial moral hazard model to explain the main trade-ofIs in the relationship between fiow, fees and performance. The main assumption is that efIort depend" on the combination of implicit and explicit incentives while the probability distrioutioll function of returns depends on efIort. In the case of full commitment, the investor's relevant trade-ofI is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce efIort in the first período The more concerned the investor is with today's payoff. the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the following periods. That is. in the second period, the investor penalizes observed low returns by withdrawing resources from non-performing portfolio managers. Besides, he pays performance fee when the observed excess return is positive. When commitment is not a plausible hypothesis, we consider that the investor also learns some symmetríc and imperfect information about the ability of the manager to generate positive excess returno In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as efIort choices exerted by the portfolio manager. We show that implicit incentives can explain the fiow-performance relationship and, conversely, endogenous expected return determines incentives provision and define their optimal leveIs. We provide a numerical solution in Matlab that characterize these results.

Asset-backed securities: The key to unlocking Europe's credit markets? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2014/07, 24 July 2014

The European market for asset-backed securities (ABS) has all but closed for business since the start of the economic and financial crisis. ABS (see Box 1) were in fact the first financial assets hit at the onset of the crisis in 2008. The subprime mortgage meltdown caused a deterioration in the quality of collateral in the ABS market in the United States, which in turn dried up overall liquidity because ABS AAA notes were popular collateral for inter-bank lending. The lack of demand for these products, together with the Great Recession in 2009, had a considerable negative impact on the European ABS market. The post-crisis regulatory environment has further undermined the market. The practice of slicing and dicing of loans into ABS packages was blamed for starting and spreading the crisis through the global financial system. Regulation in the post-crisis context has thus been relatively unfavourable to these types of instruments, with heightened capital requirements now necessary for the issuance of new ABS products. And yet policymakers have recently underlined the need to revitalise the ABS market as a tool to improve credit market conditions in the euro area and to enhance transmission of monetary policy. In particular, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England have jointly emphasised that: “a market for prudently designed ABS has the potential to improve the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy and to allow for better risk sharing... by transforming relatively illiquid assets into more liquid securities. These can then be sold to investors thereby allowing originators to obtain funding and, potentially, transfer part of the underlying risk, while investors in such securities can diversify their portfolios... . This can lead to lower costs of capital, higher economic growth and a broader distribution of risk” (ECB and Bank of England, 2014a). In addition, consideration has started to be given to the extent to which ABS products could become the target of explicit monetary policy operations, a line of action proposed by Claeys et al (2014). The ECB has officially announced the start of preparatory work related to possible outright purchases of selected ABS1. In this paper we discuss how a revamped market for corporate loans securitised via ABS products, and how use of ABS as a monetary policy instrument, can indeed play a role in revitalising Europe’s credit market. However, before using this instrument a number of issues should be addressed: First, the European ABS market has significantly contracted since the crisis. Hence it needs to be revamped through appropriate regulation if securitisation is to play a role in improving the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy. Second, even assuming that this market can expand again, the European ABS market is heterogeneous: lending criteria are different in different countries and banking institutions and the rating methodologies to assess the quality of the borrowers have to take these differences into account. One further element of differentiation is default law, which is specific to national jurisdictions in the euro area. Therefore, the pool of loans will not only be different in terms of the macro risks related to each country of origination (which is a ‘positive’ idiosyncratic risk, because it enables a portfolio manager to differentiate), but also in terms of the normative side, in case of default. The latter introduces uncertainties and inefficiencies in the ABS market that could create arbitrage opportunities. It is also unclear to what extent a direct purchase of these securities by the ECB might have an impact on the credit market. This will depend on, for example, the type of securities targeted in terms of the underlying assets that would be considered as eligible for inclusion (such as loans to small and medium-sized companies, car loans, leases, residential and commercial mortgages). The timing of a possible move by the ECB is also an issue; immediate action would take place in the context of relatively limited market volumes, while if the ECB waits, it might have access to a larger market, provided steps are taken in the next few months to revamp the market. We start by discussing the first of these issues – the size of the EU ABS market. We estimate how much this market could be worth if some specific measures are implemented. We then discuss the different options available to the ECB should they decide to intervene in the EU ABS market. We include a preliminary list of regulatory steps that could be taken to homogenise asset-backed securities in the euro area. We conclude with our recommended course of action.

The European challenge of KMN and innovation: a skills and competence portfolio for knowledge worker in SME's

Versão editor: http://www.isegi.unl.pt/docentes/acorreia/documentos/European_Challenge_KM_Innovation_2004.pdf

The European challenge of KM and innovation: a skills and competence portfolio for the knowledge worker in SME's

This chapter appears in Innovations of Knowledge Management edited by Montano, D. Copyright 2004, IGI Global, www.igi-global.com. Posted by permission of the publisher.

Portfolio delegation under short-selling constraints

In this paper we study delegated portfolio management when themanager's ability to short-sell is restricted. Contrary to previousresults, we show that under moral hazard, linear performance-adjustedcontracts do provide portfolio managers with incentives to gatherinformation. The risk-averse manager's optimal effort is an increasingfunction of her share in the portfolio's return. This result affectsthe risk-averse investor's optimal contract decision. The first best,purely risk-sharing contract is proved to be suboptimal. Usingnumerical methods we show that the manager's share in the portfolioreturn is higher than the rst best share. Additionally, this deviationis shown to be: (i) increasing in the manager's risk aversion and (ii)larger for tighter short-selling restrictions. When the constraint isrelaxed the optimal contract converges towards the first best risksharing contract.

Different risk measures: different portfolio compositions?

Traditionally, the measure of risk used in portfolio optimisation models is the variance. However, alternative measures of risk have many theoretical and practical advantages and it is peculiar therefore that they are not used more frequently. This may be because of the difficulty in deciding which measure of risk is best and any attempt to compare different risk measures may be a futile exercise until a common risk measure can be identified. To overcome this, another approach is considered, comparing the portfolio holdings produced by different risk measures, rather than the risk return trade-off. In this way we can see whether the risk measures used produce asset allocations that are essentially the same or very different. The results indicate that the portfolio compositions produced by different risk measures vary quite markedly from measure to measure. These findings have a practical consequence for the investor or fund manager because they suggest that the choice of model depends very much on the individual’s attitude to risk rather than any theoretical and/or practical advantages of one model over another.

Integrating technology roadmapping and portfolio management at the front-end of new product development

Many authors point out that the front-end of new product development (NPD) is a critical success factor in the NPD process and that numerous companies face difficulties in carrying it out appropriately. Therefore, it is important to develop new theories and proposals that support the effective implementation of this earliest phase of NPD. This paper presents a new method to support the development of front-end activities based on integrating technology roadmapping (TRM) and project portfolio management (PPM). This new method, called the ITP Method, was implemented at a small Brazilian high-tech company in the nanotechnology industry to explore the integration proposal. The case study demonstrated that the ITP Method provides a systematic procedure for the fuzzy front-end and integrates innovation perspectives into a single roadmap, which allows for a better alignment of business efforts and communication of product innovation goals. Furthermore, the results indicated that the method may also improve quality, functional integration and strategy alignment. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.