The impact of personal identity and intimacy on the use of social media

Personal identity and intimacy levels change over time and this can influence the way consumers buy and use goods and services. This thesis examined how levels of personal identity and intimacy influence the use of social media by consumers of different ages. A survey of 208 users of facebook demonstrated that consumers with weak levels of personal identity use social media to increase their identity and popularity, while consumers with strong levels of personal identity use social media for self-expression. Consumers with high intimacy levels use social media for socian connection and social investigation.

Personal identity. A theoretical and experimental analysis

Published as article in: Journal of Economic Methodology, 2010, vol. 17, issue 3, pages 261-275.

Is There Personal Identity in Economics?

John B. Davis explores the question of what the economic individual is. He bases his considerations of orthodox economics on the assumption that these theories implicitly rely on a conception of the individual that has its origin in Locke’s idea of the self as subjective inwardness. Economic history then is the attempt to deal with Locke’s inherent problems that this view involved. If neoclassical economics still has aspects of human psychology, mainstream economics dropped the subjective concept of the individual out of their considerations. However, Davis demonstrates that even the neoclassical concept of the individual fails to pass the existence test of individual identity. The latter is an idea developed in analogy to philosophers’ concern about personal identity and examines if the individual can be distinguished among different individuals and if he or she can be reidentified as the selfsame individual through time. The failure of the theory of the individual in orthodox economics led Davis to develop a concept of a socially embedded individual in accordance with heterodox accounts of economics. He submits this conception to the same test of individual identity. It appears that the socially embedded individual can be said to hold an identity in specific circumstances.

« Personal Identity Is What Matters » ou l'importance de l'identité personnelle dans les luttes pour la reconnaissance

Derek Parfit est célèbre pour avoir soutenu que l'identité personnelle ne comptait pas pour déterminer la survie d'une personne. Sa phrase « personal identity is not what matters » est inspirée d'une approche réductionniste de l'identité personnelle qui consiste à dire que la personne humaine se réduit à un corps, un cerveau et une série d'événements mentaux causalement liés. Dans cette optique, ce qui compte, c'est la continuité psychologique. Cet article vise à montrer que dans des dynamiques de reconnaissances (et de non-reconnaissances), l'identité personnelle peut compter dans la définition de l'identité personnelle à travers le temps ; en deux mots, que l'identité personnelle compte. Partant des conceptions narrativistes défendues par Paul Ricoeur et Charles Taylor, j'en viens à défendre une théorie constructiviste-institutionnaliste de l'identité personnelle qui prend en considération le caractère institué et construit de l'identité personnelle. Le but de cet article est donc de défendre la thèse selon laquelle l'identité personnelle compte pour dans les réflexions éthiques et politiques.

Perception of personal identity at home

Resumen tomado de la publicaci??n

Participation of future pharmacists in a professional development certificate scheme; the paradox of personal identity

The white paper ‘Pharmacy in England’ advocates establishing a new pharmacy regulator, building leadership and integrating undergraduate education.[1] Students must morph into competent pharmacists with the skills, expertise and confidence to lead the profession to 2020 and beyond.[2] One way individuals are encouraged to ‘professionalise’ is through participation in personal/professional development schemes. The British Pharmaceutical Students’ Association (BPSA) and the College of Pharmacy Practice have operated a professional development certificate (PDC) scheme since 2001. The scheme rewards students with a joint certificate for evidence of participation in five accredited activities in one academic year. Although the scheme is relevant to development of students, less than 2% of BPSA members take part annually. We wanted to understand the reasons for the low uptake. Our primary objectives were to examine the portrayal of the scheme and to investigate what it signifies to individuals. We describe our attempts to apply social marketing techniques[3] to the PDC, and we use ‘logical levels of change’[4] to highlight a paradox with personal identity.

Stranger in a Strange Land: The struggle for cultural and personal identity in Haruki Murakami's Hard-Boiled Wonderland and the End of the World

In order to explicate Murakami's version of the official culture, I have analyzed the novel with the works of several different theorists. Primarily, I drew my own understanding of the official culture from Raymond Williams's examination of culture in Marxism and Literature. His terminology became helpful in writing about the operation of the System and the Town, though it did not define that operation precisely. Williams's work also introduced me to the theory behind the official culture's manipulation and exclusion of historical aspects in order to create their "official" version of history, from which the official culture draws its identity. For further analysis of the treatment of history, I turned to Friedrich Nietzsche's On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life. Though it examines the official culture's manipulation of history in a much more in-depth manner, it seems to have influenced Murakami's treatment of individual memories and cultural histories. For instance, the herd ofunicoms in the End of the World resembles Nietzsche's description of the ''unhistorical herd," or has the potential to resemble it. With these theories I was able to access the mechanisms of cultural control that Murakami depicts in the form of the System and the Town, and from there I was able to develop a model for how the narrator struggles to subvert that control. Both sides of that struggle are depicted and re-imagined many times throughout Hard-Boiled Wonderland and the End of the World.

Personal identity : moving beyond essence

Education's ancient and profoundly important pursuit to 'know thyself', is often realised through engaging with the question 'who am I?' In order to the identify who in this search, it is argued in this paper that personal identity should be understood to be embedded in the purposes one has for one's life through how one relates, and is therefore spiritual. This spiritual quality of personal identity is therefore existential in character - not essential.

However, often when children respond to this question 'who am I?', they rely upon socially constructed categories and labels such as religious, feminine, cool, punk and the like. The application of such labelling assumes that meaningfulness lies in their essence; that is, they identify what is. This can become most problematic when individuals accept and apply such essentialist labelling to themselves, because such a process can only answer 'what am I?' and not the educationally more important question of 'who am I?' This paper therefore challenges the inadequacy of such an approach and offers a conceptualisation of personal identity which is spiritually embedded in a purpose for one's life.

Locke, Kierkegaard, and the phenomenology of personal identity

Personal Identity theorists as diverse as Derek Parfit, Marya Schechtman and Galen Strawson have noted that the experiencing subject (the locus of present psychological experience) and the person (a human being with a career/narrative extended across time) are not necessarily coextensive. Accordingly, we can become psychologically alienated from, and fail to experience a sense of identity with, the person we once were or will be. This presents serious problems for Locke’s original account of “sameness of consciousness” constituting personal identity, given the distinctly normative (and indeed eschatological) focus of his discussion. To succeed, the Lockean project needs to identify some phenomenal property of experience that can constitute a sense of identity with the self figured in all moments to which consciousness can be extended. I draw upon key themes in Kierkegaard’s phenomenology of moral imagination to show that Kierkegaard describes a phenomenal quality of experience that unites the experiencing subject with its past and future, regardless of facts about psychological change across time. Yet Kierkegaard’s account is fully normative, recasting affective identification with past/future selves as a moral task rather than something merely psychologically desirable (Schechtman) or utterly contingent (Parfit, Strawson).