Personal indebtedness, community characteristics and theft crimes

Becker (1968) and Stigler (1970) provide the germinal works for an economic analysis of crime, and their approach has been utilised to consider the response of crime rates to a range of economic, criminal and socioeconomic factors. Until recently however this did not extend to a consideration of the role of personal indebtedness in explaining the observed pattern of crime. This paper uses the Becker (1968) and Stigler (1970) framework, and extends to a fuller consideration of the relationship between economic hardship and theft crimes in an urban setting. The increase in personal debt in the past decade has been significant, which combined with the recent global recession, has led to a spike in personal insolvencies. In the context of the recent recession it is important to understand how increases in personal indebtedness may spillover into increases in social problems like crime. This paper uses data available at the neighbourhood level for London, UK on county court judgments (CCJ's) granted against residents in that neighbourhood, this is our measure of personal indebtedness, and examines the relationship between a range of community characteristics (economic, socio-economic, etc), including the number of CCJ's granted against residents, and the observed pattern of theft crimes for three successive years using spatial econometric methods. Our results confirm that theft crimes in London follow a spatial process, that personal indebtedness is positively associated with theft crimes in London, and that the covariates we have chosen are important in explaining the spatial variation in theft crimes. We identify a number of interesting results, for instance that there is variation in the impact of covariates across crime types, and that the covariates which are important in explaining the pattern of each crime type are largely stable across the three periods considered in this analysis.

Debt and default in a growth model

This paper presents a small open economy model with capital accumulation and without commitment to repay debt. The optimal debt contract specifies debt relief following bad shocks and debt increase following good shocks and brings first order benefits if the country's borrowing constraint is binding. Countries with less capital (with higher marginal productivity of capital) have a higher debt-GDP ratio, are more likely to default on uncontingent bonds, require higher debt relief after bad shocks and pay a higher spread over treasury. Debt relief prescribed by the optimal contract following the interest rate hikes of 1980-81 is more than half of the debt forgiveness obtained by the main Latin American countries through the Brady agreements.

Optimal reserve management and sovereign debt

Most models currently used to determine optimal foreign reserve holdings take the level of international debt as given. However, given the sovereign`s willingness-to-pay incentive problems, reserve accumulation may reduce sustainable debt levels. In addition, assuming constant debt levels does not allow addressing one of the puzzles behind using reserves as a means to avoid the negative effects of crisis: why do not sovereign countries reduce their sovereign debt instead? To study the joint decision of holding sovereign debt and reserves, we construct a stochastic dynamic equilibrium model calibrated to a sample of emerging markets. We obtain that the reserve accumulation does not play a quantitatively important role in this model. In fact, we find the optimal policy is not to hold reserves at all. This finding is robust to considering interest rate shocks, sudden stops, contingent reserves and reserve dependent output costs. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Nominal versus indexed debt: A quantitative horse race

The main arguments in favor and against nominal and indexed debts are the incentive to default through inflation versus hedging against unforeseen shocks. We model and calibrate these arguments to assess their quantitative importance. We use a dynamic equilibrium model with tax distortion, government outlays uncertainty, and contingent-debt service. Our framework also recognizes that contingent debt can be associated with incentive problems and lack of commitment. Thus, the benefits of unexpected inflation are tempered by higher interest rates. We obtain that costs from inflation more than offset the benefits from reducing tax distortions. We further discuss sustainability of nominal debt in developing (volatile) countries. (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Personal Indebtedness, Spatial Effects and Crime

There is a long and detailed history of attempts to understand what causes crime. One of the most prominent strands of this literature has sought to better understand the relationship between economic conditions and crime. Following Becker (1968), the economic argument is that in an attempt to maintain consumption in the face of unemployment, people may resort to sources of illicit income. In a similar manner, we might expect ex–ante, that increases in the level of personal indebtedness would be likely to provide similar incentives to engage in criminality. In this paper we seek to understand the spatial pattern of property and theft crimes using a range of socioeconomic variables, including data on the level of personal indebtedness.

Personal Indebtedness, Spatial Effects and Crime

There is a long and detailed history of attempts to understand what causes crime. One of the most prominent strands of this literature has sought to better understand the relationship between economic conditions and crime. Following Becker (1968), the economic argument is that in an attempt to maintain consumption in the face of unemployment, people may resort to sources of illicit income. In a similar manner, we might expect ex–ante, that increases in the level of personal indebtedness would be likely to provide similar incentives to engage in criminality. In this paper we seek to understand the spatial pattern of property and theft crimes using a range of socioeconomic variables, including data on the level of personal indebtedness.

Sovereign debt with adverse selection : a quantitative approach

We construct a dynamic equilibrium model to quantitatively study sovereign debt with contingent services and country risk spreads such that the benefits of defaulting are tempered by higher interest rates in the future. For a wide range of parameters, the only equilibrium of the model is one in which the sovereign defaults in all states, unless defaulting incurs additional costs. Due to the adverse selection problem, some countries choose to delay default in order to reduce reputation loss. Although equilibria with no default imply in greater welfare levels, they are not sustainable in the highly indebted and volatile countries.

Speculative attacks, openness and crises

In this paper we propose a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to evaluate financial adjustments that some emerging market economies went through to overcome external crises during the latest decades, such as default and local currency devaluation. We assume that real devaluation can be used to avoid external debt default, to improve trade balance and to reduce the real public debt level denominated in local currency. Such effects increase the government ability to deal with external crisis, but also have costs in terms of welfare, related to expected inflation, reductions in private investments and higher interest to be paid over the public debt. We conclude that openness improves expected welfare as it allows for a better devaluation-response technology against crises. We also present results for 32 middle-income countries, verifying that the proposed model can indicate, in a stylized way, the preferences for default-devaluation options and the magnitude of the currency depreciation required to overcome 48 external crises occurred as from 1971. Finally, as we construct our model based on the Cole-Kehoe self-fulfilling debt crisis model ([7]), adding local debt and trade, it is important to say that their policy alternatives to leave the crisis zone remains in our extended model, namely, to reduce the external debt level and to lengthen its maturity.

Capital flows to Latin America: first quarter 2003

Includes bibliography

Argentina’s quarter century experiment with neoliberalism: from dictatorship to depression

Em 2002, a Argentina atingiu um novo marco histórico, ao experimentar o maior default da dívida externa, não somente pela sua própria história, mas também do mundo. Para compreender como a Argentina deixou de ser um país mais desenvolvido de terceiro mundo até experimentar a crise de 2001, entrando depois numa depressão em 2002, com mais da metade da população abaixo da linha de pobreza, precisamos fazer uma avaliação das políticas econômicas durante o último quarto de século na Argentina. A virada ao neoliberalismo começou durante a ditadura no ano 1976, tendo se aprofundado no governo Menem e sempre apoiada pelo FMI. Este trabalho tentará identificar porque a crise ocorreu naquele momento, e também, compreender as mudanças subjacentes na economia política durante duas décadas na Argentina, as quais que desencadearam duas ondas de desindustrialização, uma explosão da dívida externa e uma deterioração bem marcante no padrão de vida para a maioria dos argentinos.

Lending to the borrower from hell: Debt and default in the age of Philip II, 1556-1598

What sustained borrowing without third-party enforcement, in the early days of sovereignlending? Philip II of Spain accumulated towering debts while stopping all payments tohis lenders four times. How could the sovereign borrow much and default often? Weargue that bankers ability to cut off Philip II s access to smoothing services was key. Aform of syndicated lending created cohesion among his Genoese bankers. As a result,lending moratoria were sustained through a cheat the cheater mechanism (Kletzer andWright, 2000). Our paper thus lends empirical support to a recent literature emphasizingthe role of bankers incentives for continued sovereign borrowing.

National exchange rate policies and international debt crises: how Brazil did not follow Argentina into a default in 2001-2002

This paper examines how exchange rate policies and IMF Stand-By Arrangements affect debt crises using econometrics and a comparison between Argentina and Brazil. It refines an existing diagram outlining crisis development to propose crisis prevention strategies. Flexible exchange rate policies reduce a country's probability of default by over 4%, but Stand-By Arrangements increase it by an inconsequential percentage. Unlike Argentina, Brazil avoided a default via a freely-floating exchange rate system, fiscal deficit reduction, and a cooperative and coordinated relationship with the IMF. The results provide policymakers from developing countries with lessons to manage their countries' default risks more effectively.

Valuing Sovereign Default Risk - A Pricing Formula and its Empirical Results for the Mexican External Debt.

Rapport de recherche

Credit Default Swaps (CDS) y Collateral Debt Obligation (CDO) derivados financieros responsables de la crisis sub-prime de 2008 en Estados Unidos y una guía para el desarrollo del mercado de derivados exóticos en Colombia

La crisis financiera hipotecaria de 2008 en la que se declaró en quiebra el banco de inversión Lehman Brothers, se desarrolló en un ambiente que contemplaba apalancamientos financieros excesivos y el uso de derivados financieros de crédito innovadores. Razón por la cual, a partir del estudio de caso de quiebra de este banco de inversión y el análisis de las causas y consecuencias del ambiente desregulatorio que surgió en Estados Unidos desde la década de los 30 hasta el 2000, se orienta la investigación a indagar sobre lo que sucede en términos regulatorios y empresariales en el mercado de valores colombiano y así lograr definir objetivos que permitan el crecimiento del mercado de derivados exóticos en Colombia bajo un marco de responsabilidad financiera y ética empresarial.