On the endogeneity of the pay-performance relationship in professional soccer

In this reply we show that the Nüesch (2009) comment paper to our initial contribution (Torgler and Schmidt 2007) has several shortcomings. He suggests that professional soccer wages seem to buy talent rather than motivation. We therefore provide a larger set of talent proxies and estimations to check whether this assertion is correct. Our results indicate that his conclusion is problematic. We still observe a strong motivational effect, and in some cases the effect is even larger than the talent effect. A further key problem in Nüesch’s contribution is the fact that he neglects to consider the relevance of the relative salary situation.

Executive pay and performance: did bankers’ bonuses cause the crisis?

This paper examines the pay-performance relationship between executive cash compensation (including bonuses) and company performance for a sample of large UK companies, focusing particularly on the financial services industry, since incentive misalignment has been blamed as one of the factors causing the global financial crisis of 2007–2008. Although we find that pay in the financial services sector is high, the cash-plus-bonus pay-performance sensitivity of financial firms is not significantly higher than in other sectors. Consequently, we conclude that it unlikely that incentive structures could be held responsible for inducing bank executives to focus on short-term results.

What shapes player performance in soccer? Empirical findings from a panel analysis

In this article, we investigate the pay-performance relationship of soccer players using individual data from eight seasons of the German soccer league Bundesliga. We find a nonlinear pay-performance relationship, indicating that salary does indeed affect individual performance. The results further show that player performance is affected not only by absolute income level but also by relative income position. An additional analysis of the performance impact of team effects provides evidence of a direct impact of team-mate attributes on individual player performance.

Do employees care about their relative income position? Behavioral evidence focusing on performance in professional team sport

Objective Do employees care about their relative (economic) position in comparison to their co-workers in an organization? And if so, does it raise or lower their performance? While the topic is widely discussed in the literature, behavioral evidence on these important questions is relatively rare. Methods This article explores the pay-performance relationship using a sports data set. The strength of analyzing such data is that sports tournaments take place in a very controlled environment that helps to isolate a relative income effect. Results Using two large unique data sets that cover 26 seasons in basketball and eight seasons in soccer (Bundesliga), we find considerable support for the idea that a relative income disadvantage is correlated with a decrease in individual performance. In addition, there does not seem to be any tolerance for income disparity based on the hope that such differences may signal that better times are ahead. Conclusions This suggests the need to consider the impact of the relative income position when designing pay-for-performance mechanisms within firms and teams.

Integrating customer orientation, employee compensation and performance management: A conceptual framework

Compensation systems are an essential tool to link corporate goals such as customer orientation with individual and organisational performance. While some authors demonstrate the positive effects of incorporating nonfinancial measures into the compensation system empirically, companies have encountered problems after linking pay to customer satisfaction. We argue that reasons for this can be attributed to the measurement of customer satisfaction as well as to the missing link between customer satisfaction and customer retention and profitability in theses cases. Hence, there is a strong need for the development of an holistic reward and performance measurement model enabling an organisation to identify cause-and-effect relationships when linking rewards to nonfinancial performance measures. We present a conceptual framework of a success chain driven reward system that enables organisations to systematically derive a customer-oriented reward strategy. In the context of performance evaluation, we propose to rely on integrated and multidimensional measurement methods.

Effect of executive compensation on firm performance

The paper finds evidence that the equity-based CEO pay is positively related to firm performance and risk-taking. Both stock price and operating performance as well as firm's riskiness increase in the pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) provided by CEO stock options and stock holdings. PPS can explain stock returns better as an additional factor to the Fama-French 3-factor model. When CEOs are compensated with higher PPS, firms experience higher return on asset (ROA). The higher PPS also leads to the higher risk-taking. While CEO incentive compensation has been perceived mixed on its effectiveness, this study provides support to the equity-based CEO compensation in reducing agency conflicts between CEOs and shareholders.

A influência do volume na performance dos fundos de investimento em ações no Brasil

Tendo como base a literatura internacional sobre fundos mútuos, o presente estudo busca encontrar algumas características que influenciam a performance dos fundos de investimentos em ações no Brasil de janeiro de 1999 até abril de 2005. O objetivo principal do trabalho é perceber se os fundos de investimento em ações têm retorno decrescente de escala. Ao mesmo tempo, sabe-se que a persistência de uma boa rentabilidade depende do grau de profissionalismo dos gestores e também de uma boa relação entre o gestor responsável e o investidor e, um contrato ótimo entre ambos. Observou-se que o volume não tem influência negativa no retorno do fundo, pelo contrário, quanto maior o fundo melhor é a rentabilidade do mesmo. Os resultados também apresentaram que os fundos que cobram taxa de performance têm um desempenho melhor do que os que não cobram. Foi identificado também que os fundos que utilizam a marca d água como incentivo de remuneração aos gestores têm rentabilidade um pouco maior do que os fundos que pagam taxa de performance, mas não utilizam a marca d água no regulamento. Chegou-se a conclusão que há uma relação direta entre incentivo e desempenho. Os resultados aqui encontrados buscam facilitar o conhecimento e a tomada de decisão de pesquisadores, investidores, empresas gestoras, Corretoras e Distribuidoras, fundos de pensão e dos demais interessados na indústria de fundos de investimento em ações no Brasil.

Managerial Risk-Taking and CEO Excess Compensation

This paper examines risk taking and CEO excess compensation problems in U.S firms to determine their impact on shareholders wealth. Literature suggests a positive effect of CEO incentive risk and strong corporate governance on CEO risk taking. Furthermore, the strong governance mitigates excess compensation problem. Controlling for governance quality and incentive risk, I provide empirical evidence of a significant association between risk taking and CEO excess compensation. When I also control for pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and feedback effects of incentive compensation on CEO risk taking, I find that higher use of incentive pay encourages risk taking, and due to a high exposure to risk CEOs draws excess compensation. Furthermore, I find that the excess compensation problem is more serious with CEOs taking high risk than with those taking low risk. Finally, I find that CEO risk taking also has structural impacts on CEO compensation

Controle acionário, remuneração de executivos e desempenho empresarial : evidências para o mercado brasileiro

Esse artigo buscou examinar como o tipo de controlador afeta a relação remuneração e desempenho da diretoria nas empresas brasileiras no período de 2010 a 2013. Primeiramente, o controle no Brasil ainda é majoritariamente exercido por firmas familiares, e que o capital também é concentrado, sendo em média 65% do capital detido pelos 5 maiores acionistas. Quanto a análise econometrica os resultados indicaram que: As empresas de controle familiar e governamental remuneram seus gestores com um valor menor em relação os outros tipos de controle; Não foi possível fazer inferência acerca da influência do controlador nas empresas institucionais; As empresas sem controlador remuneram o seu gestor com um valor maior de remuneração. Por fim, quanto ao desempenho, em nenhuma das equações o ROA foi significativo, demonstrando fracos mecanismos de remuneração ou capacidade do gestor em determinar sua compensação

Corporate commitment to sustainability : is it all hot air? An Australian review of the linkage between executive pay and sustainable performance

Across time, companies have increasingly made public commitments to sustainable development and to reducing their impacts on climate change. Management remuneration plans (MRPs) are a key mechanism to motivate managers to achieve corporate goals. We review the MRPs negotiated with key management personnel in a sample of large Australian carbon-intensive companies. Our results show that, as in past decades, the companies in our sample have MRPs in place that continue to fixate on financial performance. We argue that this provides evidence of a disconnection, or ‘decoupling’, between the sustainability-related rhetoric of the sample companies, and their ‘real’ organisational practices and priorities.

Performance pay for Australian teachers: A critical policy historiography

In May 2011, the Australian Federal Education Minister announced there would be a unique, innovative and new policy of performance pay for teachers, Rewards for Great Teachers (Garrett, 2011a). In response, this paper uses critical policy historiography to argue that the unintended consequences of performance pay for teachers makes it unlikely it will deliver improved quality or efficiency in Australian schools. What is new, in the Australian context, is that performance pay is one of a raft of education policies being driven by the federal government within a system that constitutionally and historically has placed the responsibility for schooling with the states and territories. Since 2008, a key platform of the Australian federal Labor government has been a commitment to an Education Revolution that would promote quality, equity and accountability in Australian schools. This commitment has resulted in new national initiatives impacting on Australian schools including a high-stakes testing regime 14 National Assessment Program 13 Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN) 14a mandated national curriculum (the Australian Curriculum), professional standards for teachers and teacher accreditation 14Australian Institute for Teaching and School Leadership (AITSL) 14and the idea of rewarding excellent teachers through performance pay (Garrett, 2011b). These reforms demonstrate the increased influence of the federal government in education policy processes and the growth of a 1Ccoercive federalism 1D that pits the state and federal governments against each other (Harris-Hart, 2010). Central to these initiatives is the measuring, or auditing, of educational practices and relationships. While this shift in education policy hegemony from state to federal governments has been occurring in Australia at least since the 1970s, it has escalated and been transformed in more recent times with a greater emphasis on national human capital agendas which link education and training to Australia 19s international economic competitiveness (Lingard & Sellar, in press). This paper uses historically informed critical analysis to critique claims about the effects of such policies. We argue that performance pay has a detailed and complex historical trajectory both internationally and within Australian states. Using Gale 19s (2001) critical policy historiography, we illuminate some of the effects that performance pay policies have had on education internationally and in particular within Australia. This critical historical lens also provides opportunities to highlight how teachers have, in the past, tactically engaged with such policies.

Secondary prevention of cardiovascular disease in different primary healthcare systems with and without pay-for-performance

Objective: To compare baseline cardiovascular risk management between people recruited from two different healthcare systems, to a research trial of an intervention to optimize secondary prevention. Design: Cross-sectional study. Setting: General practices, randomly selected: 16 in Northern Ireland (NI) (UK NHS, ‘strong’ infrastructure); 32 in Republic of Ireland (RoI) (mixed healthcare economy, less infrastructure). Patients: 903 (mean age 67.5 years; 69.9% male); randomly selected, known coronary heart disease. Main outcome measures: Blood pressure, cholesterol, medications; validated questionnaires for diet (DINE), exercise (Godin), quality of life (SF12); healthcare usage. Results: More RoI than NI participants had systolic BP>140 mmHg (37% v 28%, p=0.01) and cholesterol >5mmol/l (24% v 17%, p=0.02): RoI mean systolic BP was higher (139 v 132 mm Hg). More RoI participants reported a high fibre intake (35% v 23%), higher levels of physical activity (62% v 44%), and better physical and mental health (SF12); they had more GP (5.6 v 4.4) and fewer nurse visits (1.6 v 2.1) in the previous year. Fewer in RoI (55% v 70%) were prescribed B blockers. Both groups’ ACE inhibitor (41%; 48%) prescribing was similar; high proportions were prescribed statins (84%; 85%) and aspirin (83%; 77%). Conclusions Blood pressure and cholesterol are better controlled among patients in a primary healthcare system with a ‘strong’ infrastructure supporting computerization and rewarding measured performance but this is not associated with healthier lifestyle or better quality of life. Further exploration of differences in professionals’ and patients’ engagement in secondary prevention in different healthcare systems is needed.

Increase in the pharmacological management of Type 2 diabetes with pay-for-performance in primary care in the UK

Aims To determine whether the financial incentives for tight glycaemic control, introduced in the UK as part of a pay-for-performance scheme in 2004, increased the rate at which people with newly diagnosed Type 2 diabetes were started on anti-diabetic medication.

Methods A secondary analysis of data from the General Practice Research Database for the years 1999-2008 was performed using an interrupted time series analysis of the treatment patterns for people newly diagnosed with Type 2 diabetes (n=21 197).

Results Overall, the proportion of people with newly diagnosed diabetes managed without medication 12months after diagnosis was 47% and after 24months it was 40%. The annual rate of initiation of pharmacological treatment within 12months of diagnosis was decreasing before the introduction of the pay-for-performance scheme by 1.2% per year (95% CI -2.0, -0.5%) and increased after the introduction of the scheme by 1.9% per year (95% CI 1.1, 2.7%). The equivalent figures for treatment within 24months of diagnosis were -1.4% (95% CI -2.1, -0.8%) before the scheme was introduced and 1.6% (95% CI 0.8, 2.3%) after the scheme was introduced.

Conclusion The present study suggests that the introduction of financial incentives in 2004 has effected a change in the management of people newly diagnosed with diabetes. We conclude that a greater proportion of people with newly diagnosed diabetes are being initiated on medication within 1 and 2years of diagnosis as a result of the introduction of financial incentives for tight glycaemic control.