Desert and Distributive Efficiency

It is highly desirable for an allocation of goods to be efficient. However, one might also deem it important that an allocation gives individuals what they deserve. This paper investigates whether it is possible for an allocation to be both efficient and give people what they deserve. It will first of all consider comparative desert, and conclude that it is possible to satisfy both desiderata. It will then consider absolute desert by integrating Shelly Kagan’s work on desert and economic theory. The conclusion will be that there are potential conflicts between absolute desert and efficiency. The paper will then examine how to select the best compromise between the two values, considering several different conceptions of absolute desert.

Learning to be different:heterogeneity and efficiency in distributed smart camera networks

In this paper we study the self-organising behaviour of smart camera networks which use market-based handover of object tracking responsibilities to achieve an efficient allocation of objects to cameras. Specifically, we compare previously known homogeneous configurations, when all cameras use the same marketing strategy, with heterogeneous configurations, when each camera makes use of its own, possibly different marketing strategy. Our first contribution is to establish that such heterogeneity of marketing strategies can lead to system wide outcomes which are Pareto superior when compared to those possible in homogeneous configurations. However, since the particular configuration required to lead to Pareto efficiency in a given scenario will not be known in advance, our second contribution is to show how online learning of marketing strategies at the individual camera level can lead to high performing heterogeneous configurations from the system point of view, extending the Pareto front when compared to the homogeneous case. Our third contribution is to show that in many cases, the dynamic behaviour resulting from online learning leads to global outcomes which extend the Pareto front even when compared to static heterogeneous configurations. Our evaluation considers results obtained from an open source simulation package as well as data from a network of real cameras. © 2013 IEEE.

Fairness under uncertainty with indivisibilities

I analyze an economy with uncertainty in which a set of indivisible objects and a certain amount of money is to be distributed among agents. The set of intertemporally fair social choice functions based on envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency is characterized. I give a necessary and sufficient condition for its non-emptiness and propose a mechanism that implements the set of intertemporally fair allocations in Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Implementation at the ex ante stage is considered, too. I also generalize the existence result obtained with envy-freeness using a broader fairness concept, introducing the aspiration function.

Political economics and normative analysis

The approaches and opinions of economists often dominate public policy discussion. Economists have gained this privileged position partly (or perhaps mainly) because of the obvious relevance of their subject matter, but also because of the unified methodology (neo-classical economics) that the vast majority of modern economists bring to their analysis of policy problems and proposed solutions. The idea of Pareto efficiency and its potential trade-off with equity is a central idea that is understood by all economists and this common language provides the economics profession with a powerful voice in public affairs. The purpose of this paper is to review and reflect upon the way in which economists find themselves analysing and providing suggestions for social improvements and how this role has changed over roughly the last 60 years. We focus on the fundamental split in the public economics tradition between those that adhere to public finance and those that adhere to public choice. A pure public finance perspective views failures in society as failures of the market. The solutions are technical, as might be enacted by a benevolent dictator. The pure public choice view accepts (sometimes grudgingly) that markets may fail, but so, it insists, does politics. This signals institutional reforms to constrain the potential for political failure. Certain policy recommendations may be viewed as compatible with both traditions, but other policy proposals will be the opposite of that proposed within the other tradition. In recent years a political economics synthesis emerged. This accepts that institutions are very important and governments require constraints, but that some degree of benevolence on the part of policy makers should not be assumed non-existent. The implications for public policy from this approach are, however, much less clear and perhaps more piecemeal. We also discuss analyses of systematic failure, not so much on the part of markets or politicians, but by voters. Most clearly this could lead to populism and relaxing the idea that voters necessarily choose their interests. The implications for public policy are addressed. Throughout the paper we will relate the discussion to the experience of UK government policy-making.

Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules.

We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning k indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences, we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic rules by Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy. We also show that in this characterization no-envy cannot be replaced by anonymity. When agents are strictly risk averse von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximizers, then we reduce the problem of assigning k identical objects to a problem of allocating the amount k of an infinitely divisible commodity.

Priorities in the Location of Multiple Public Facilities

A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number k of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not su¤er from congestion and are non-excludable. We provide a characterization of the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among interest groups. We characterize each of the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, hiding-proofness and strategy-proofness. In particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it partitions the set of agents into a fixed hierarchy. Alternatively, any such rule can be viewed as a collection of fixed-populations generalized peak-selection median rules (Moulin, 1980), that are linked across populations, in a way that we describe.

Squattage militant : entre efficience parétienne et principe de justice

Le squattage militant est étudié du point du vue du fonctionnement du marché immobilier et des principes de justice libérale. On montre que certains cas de vacance peuvent être considérés comme des défaillances du marché et que, sous certaines conditions, le squattage peut être pareto-améliorant. On examine ensuite le squattage du point de vue des principes de justice en considérant la question des goûts dispendieux, qui doit être relogé, l'éventualité du paiement d'un loyer et la base informationnelle requise pour le relogement.

Centralized allocation in multiple markets

We study the problem of centralized allocation of indivisible objects in multiple markets. We show that the set of allocation rules that are group strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient are sequential dictatorships. Therefore, the solution of the joint al-location in multiple markets is significantly narrower than in the single-market case. Our result also applies to dynamic allocation problems. Finally, we provide conditions under which the solution of the single-market allocation coincides with the multiple-market case, and we apply this result to the study of the school choice problem with sibling priorities.

The optimality of the Friedman rule when some distorting taxes are exogenous

This paper investigates the optimality of the Friedman rule in a two-sector small open economy. That policy prescription is found to be a necessary condition for Pareto efficiency. If a planner can select all conceivable distorting taxes, then, for some initial values of public debt, money balances and foreign assets, it is possible to decentralize a Pareto efficient allocation. If the planner can select only some of these tax rates, then second-best policies may also satisfy the Friedman rule. However, this last result depends on the set of tax instruments the planner can choose from.

Static, dynamic, and adaptive heterogeneity in distributed smart camera networks

We study heterogeneity among nodes in self-organizing smart camera networks, which use strategies based on social and economic knowledge to target communication activity efficiently. We compare homogeneous configurations, when cameras use the same strategy, with heterogeneous configurations, when cameras use different strategies. Our first contribution is to establish that static heterogeneity leads to new outcomes that are more efficient than those possible with homogeneity. Next, two forms of dynamic heterogeneity are investigated: nonadaptive mixed strategies and adaptive strategies, which learn online. Our second contribution is to show that mixed strategies offer Pareto efficiency consistently comparable with the most efficient static heterogeneous configurations. Since the particular configuration required for high Pareto efficiency in a scenario will not be known in advance, our third contribution is to show how decentralized online learning can lead to more efficient outcomes than the homogeneous case. In some cases, outcomes from online learning were more efficient than all other evaluated configuration types. Our fourth contribution is to show that online learning typically leads to outcomes more evenly spread over the objective space. Our results provide insight into the relationship between static, dynamic, and adaptive heterogeneity, suggesting that all have a key role in achieving efficient self-organization.

An Afriat theorem for the collective model of household consumption

We provide a nonparametric 'revealed preference’ characterization of rational household behavior in terms of the collective consumption model, while accounting for general (possibly non-convex) individual preferences. We establish a Collective Axiom of Revealed Preference (CARP), which provides a necessary and sufficient condition for data consistency with collective rationality. Our main result takes the form of a ‘collective’ version of the Afriat Theorem for rational behavior in terms of the unitary model. This theorem has some interesting implications. With only a finite set of observations, the nature of consumption externalities (positive or negative) in the intra-household allocation process is non-testable. The same non-testability conclusion holds for privateness (with or without externalities) or publicness of consumption. By contrast, concavity of individual utility functions (representing convex preferences) turns out to be testable. In addition, monotonicity is testable for the model that assumes all household consumption is public.

Efficience et normativité : examen de la légitimité de l'utilisation de la notion d’efficience économique pour l'évaluation de politiques publiques

Ce texte a pour but de monter que l’efficience telle qu’utilisée par les économistes dans le cadre de recommandations de politiques publiques suppose toujours l’adoption de certains critères moraux. Je voudrai d’abord montrer que les recommandations des économistes en matière de politiques publiques ont déjà été identifiées aux recommandations de l’utilitarisme. Plusieurs économistes ont voulu abstraire leur science de toute discussion morale au XXe siècle. Cette séparation entre faits et valeur s’est soldée par l’apparition de l’efficience de Pareto, grandement utilisée dans le cadre de l’économie du bien-être. Cependant, cette utilisation de l’efficience suppose à la fois qu’il est moralement désirable d’améliorer le bien-être des individus et que ce bien-être peut être évalué en termes de satisfaction des préférences, ce qui constitue un jugement de nature éthique et morale qui ne peut être fait seulement à partir de faits scientifiques. L’efficience ne peut plutôt être utilisée de manière non moralement discutable seulement si l’on examine au préalable les objectifs sociaux que l’utilisation de cette mesure présuppose. D’un point de vue scientifique, l’économiste qui veut utiliser une mesure d’efficience doit donc toujours prendre pour acquis les éléments normatifs qui sont intégrés aux calculs d’efficience. La discussion concernant la pertinence de ces objectifs sociaux ainsi que l’importance relative de chacun des objectifs sociaux est une discussion portant avant tout sur des questions morales qui ne sont pas du domaine des sciences économiques.

Efficience et normativité : examen de la légitimité de l'utilisation de la notion d’efficience économique pour l'évaluation de politiques publiques

Ce texte a pour but de monter que l’efficience telle qu’utilisée par les économistes dans le cadre de recommandations de politiques publiques suppose toujours l’adoption de certains critères moraux. Je voudrai d’abord montrer que les recommandations des économistes en matière de politiques publiques ont déjà été identifiées aux recommandations de l’utilitarisme. Plusieurs économistes ont voulu abstraire leur science de toute discussion morale au XXe siècle. Cette séparation entre faits et valeur s’est soldée par l’apparition de l’efficience de Pareto, grandement utilisée dans le cadre de l’économie du bien-être. Cependant, cette utilisation de l’efficience suppose à la fois qu’il est moralement désirable d’améliorer le bien-être des individus et que ce bien-être peut être évalué en termes de satisfaction des préférences, ce qui constitue un jugement de nature éthique et morale qui ne peut être fait seulement à partir de faits scientifiques. L’efficience ne peut plutôt être utilisée de manière non moralement discutable seulement si l’on examine au préalable les objectifs sociaux que l’utilisation de cette mesure présuppose. D’un point de vue scientifique, l’économiste qui veut utiliser une mesure d’efficience doit donc toujours prendre pour acquis les éléments normatifs qui sont intégrés aux calculs d’efficience. La discussion concernant la pertinence de ces objectifs sociaux ainsi que l’importance relative de chacun des objectifs sociaux est une discussion portant avant tout sur des questions morales qui ne sont pas du domaine des sciences économiques.

Using Pareto optimality to explore the topology and dynamics of the human connectome.

Graph theory has provided a key mathematical framework to analyse the architecture of human brain networks. This architecture embodies an inherently complex relationship between connection topology, the spatial arrangement of network elements, and the resulting network cost and functional performance. An exploration of these interacting factors and driving forces may reveal salient network features that are critically important for shaping and constraining the brain's topological organization and its evolvability. Several studies have pointed to an economic balance between network cost and network efficiency with networks organized in an 'economical' small-world favouring high communication efficiency at a low wiring cost. In this study, we define and explore a network morphospace in order to characterize different aspects of communication efficiency in human brain networks. Using a multi-objective evolutionary approach that approximates a Pareto-optimal set within the morphospace, we investigate the capacity of anatomical brain networks to evolve towards topologies that exhibit optimal information processing features while preserving network cost. This approach allows us to investigate network topologies that emerge under specific selection pressures, thus providing some insight into the selectional forces that may have shaped the network architecture of existing human brains.

Pareto- ja Kaldor-Hicks- tehokkuuden mahdollisuudet ja rajoitukset julkisen hankkeen vaikutusten arvioinnissa : esimerkkinä suunniteltu autoverotusuudistus

Abstract: The posssibilities and limitations of Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency for the evalaution of public project - reform of car taxation as an example