Electoral rules, political competition and fiscal spending: regression discontinuity evidence from brazilian municipalities

We exploit a discontinuity in Brazilian municipal election rules to investigate whether political competition has a causal impact on policy choices. In municipalities with less than 200,000 voters mayors are elected with a plurality of the vote. In municipalities with more than 200,000 voters a run-off election takes place among the top two candidates if neither achieves a majority of the votes. At a first stage, we show that the possibility of runoff increases political competition. At a second stage, we use the discontinuity as a source of exogenous variation to infer causality from political competition to fiscal policy. Our second stage results suggest that political competition induces more investment and less current spending, particularly personnel expenses. Furthermore, the impact of political competition is larger when incumbents can run for reelection, suggesting incentives matter insofar as incumbents can themselves remain in office.

The Limits of political compromise: debt ceilings and political competition

We study the desirability of limits on the public debt and of political competition in an economy where political parties alternate in office. Due to rent-seeking motives, incumbents have an incentive to set public expenditures above the socially optimal level. Parties cannot commit to future policies, but they can forge a political compromise where each party curbs excessive spending when in office if it expects future governments to do the same. In contrast to the received literature, we find that strict limits on government borrowing can exacerbate political-economy distortions by rendering a political compromise unsustainable. This tends to happen when political competition is limited. Conversely, a tight limit on the public debt fosters a compromise that yields the efficient outcome when political competition is vigorous, saving the economy from immiseration. Our analysis thus suggests a legislative tradeoff between restricting political competition and constraining the ability of governments to issue debt.

Protocol, image, and discourse in political leadership competition:the case of Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, 1997-2002

This article examines the relationship between Prime Minister Jospin and President Chirac in the period 1997 to 2002. It is concerned in particular with symbolism, discourse and protocol, and how these have mediated the political competition between Chirac and Jospin. We develop a framework of analysis with several main strands. We consider the effects of the institutions of the Fifth Republic upon the political conduct of Prime Minister and President. We observe the perceived character traits of the individuals concerned, as well as the character traits expected of the offices of President and Prime Minister. We investigate the influence of the past upon the behaviour of Chirac and Jospin in the present, both in terms of notions of regime crisis which configured the institutions in the first place, and in relation to the image of previous holders of the offices (especially Charles de Gaulle and Franois Mitterrand).

Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: with Applicatioon to the United States, 1973 and 1983

A full understanding of public affairs requires the ability to distinguish between the policies that voters would like the government to adopt, and the influence that different voters or group of voters actually exert in the democratic process. We consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model of a competitive political economy in which the economic interests of groups of voters and their effective influence on equilibrium policy outcomes can be explicitly distinguished and computed. The model incorporates an amended version of the GEMTAP tax model, and is calibrated to data for the United States for 1973 and 1983. Emphasis is placed on how the aggregation of GEMTAP households into groups within which economic and political behaviour is assumed homogeneous affects the numerical representation of interests and influence for representative members of each group. Experiments with the model suggest that the changes in both interests and influence are important parts of the story behind the evolution of U.S. tax policy in the decade after 1973.

Reelection incentives and political corruption : evidence from Brazil’s municipal audit reports

This paper uses a unique dataset of political corruption, constructed from municipal audit reports obtained from Brazil’s randomized anti-corruption program, to test whether reelection incentives affect the level of rent extraction of incumbent politicians. In order to identify reelection incentives, we use the existence of a term limit in Brazil’s municipal elections. We find that in municipalities where mayors are in their second and final term, there is significantly more corruption compared to similar municipalities where mayors are in their first-term. In particular, in municipalities with second-term mayors there is, on average, R$188,431 more diversion of resources and the incidence of irregularities is 23% higher. We also find more pronounced effects where the costs of rent-extraction are lower (municipalities without media and judicial presence), and the density of pivotal voters is higher (more political competition). Finally, we show that first-term mayors, while less corrupt, have a larger incidence of poor administration suggesting that there may exist a trade-off between corruption and quality in public good provision.

Political conditions for fair elections

Democracy is not necessarily consolidated simply by the introduction of formal democratic institutions. It is often observed in new democracies that democratic institutions are neglected and eroded in actual practice. Particularly, electoral fraud committed by a ruler is one of the main problems in this regard. This paper deals with two questions, (1) under what conditions does a ruler have an incentive to hold fair elections (or to rig elections), and (2) what makes a ruler prefer to establish an independent election governing institution? Assuming that a ruler prefers to maintain her power, basically she has an incentive to rig elections in order to be victorious in the political competition. A ruler, however, faces the risk of losing power if the opposition stages successful protests on a sufficiently large scale. If opponents are able to pose a credible threat to a ruler, she will have an incentive to hold fair elections. The problem is that information on electoral fraud is not shared by every player in the game. For the opposition, imperfect information deepens their coordination problems. Imperfect information, on the other hand, in some cases causes a problem for a ruler. If the opposition is sufficiently cohesive and have little tolerance of cheating, even unverified suspicions of fraud may trigger menacing protests. In such a case, a ruler has an incentive to establish an independent election commission to avoid unnecessary collisions by revealing the nature of the elections.

Evidence of Partisan Emphasis on EMU during 1994–1999 : Comparing Finnish Parties

This study explores the EMU stand taken by the major Finnish political parties from 1994 to 1999. The starting point is the empirical evidence showing that party responses to European integration are shaped by a mix of national and cross-national factors, with national factors having more explanatory value. The study is the first to produce evidence that classified party documents such as protocols, manifestos and authoritative policy summaries may describe the EMU policy emphasis. In fact, as the literature review demonstrates, it has been unclear so far what kind of stand the three major Finnish political parties took during 1994–1999. Consequently, this study makes a substantive contribution to understanding the factors that shaped EMU party policies, and eventually, the national EMU policy during the 1990s. The research questions addressed are the following: What are the main factors that shaped partisan standpoints on EMU during 1994–1999? To what extent did the policy debate and themes change in the political parties? How far were the policies of the Social Democratic Party, the Centre Party and the National Coalition Party shaped by factors unique to their own national contexts? Furthermore, to what extent were they determined by cross-national influences from abroad, and especially from countries with which Finland has a special relationship, such as Sweden? The theoretical background of the study is in the area of party politics and approaches to EU policies, and party change, developed mainly by Kevin Featherstone, Peter Mair and Richard Katz. At the same time, it puts forward generic hypotheses that help to explain party standpoints on EMU. It incorporates a large quantity of classified new material based on primary research through content analysis and interviews. Quantitative and qualitative methods are used sequentially in order to overcome possible limitations. Established content-analysis techniques improve the reliability of the data. The coding frame is based on the salience theory of party competition. Interviews with eight party leaders and one independent expert civil servant provided additional insights and improve the validity of the data. Public-opinion surveys and media coverage are also used to complete the research path. Four major conclusions are drawn from the research findings. First, the quantitative and the interview data reveal the importance of the internal influences within the parties that most noticeably shaped their EMU policies during the 1990s. In contrast, international events play a minor role. The most striking feature turned out to be the strong emphasis by all of the parties on economic goals. However, it is important to note that the factors manifest differences between economic, democratic and international issues across the three major parties. Secondly, it seems that the parties have transformed into centralised and professional organisations in terms of their EMU policy-making. The weight and direction of party EMU strategy rests within the leadership and a few administrative elites. This could imply changes in their institutional environment. Eventually, parties may appear generally less differentiated and more standardised in their policy-making. Thirdly, the case of the Social Democratic Party shows that traditional organisational links continue to exist between the left and the trade unions in terms of their EMU policy-making. Hence, it could be that the parties have not yet moved beyond their conventional affiliate organisations. Fourthly, parties tend to neglect citizen opinion and demands with regard to EMU, which could imply conflict between the changes in their strategic environment. They seem to give more attention to the demands of political competition (party-party relationships) than to public attitudes (party-voter relationships), which would imply that they have had to learn to be more flexible and responsive. Finally, three suggestions for institutional reform are offered, which could contribute to the emergence of legitimised policy-making: measures to bring more party members and voter groups into the policy-making process; measures to adopt new technologies in order to open up the policy-formation process in the early phase; and measures to involve all interest groups in the policy-making process.

Property rights and competing for the affections of Demos: The Impact of the 1867 Reform Act on stock prices

The 1867 Reform Act in Britain extended the electoral franchise to the skilled but propertyless urban working classes. Using stock market data and exploiting the fact that foreign and domestic equities traded simultaneously on the London market, this paper finds that investors in British firms reacted negatively to the passage of this Act. We suggest that this finding is consistent with investors foreseeing future alterations of property rights arising from the pressure that the large newly enfranchised group would bring to bear on government policy. We also suggest that our findings appear to be more consistent with the Tory political competition explanation for the Act rather than the Whig threat-of-revolution explanation.

Consociationalism, regional integration and vote choice

Consociational institutional arrangements in deeply divided societies are often criticised for cementing the underlying conflict cleavage, encouraging the continued dominance of conflict-based party competition and voter behaviour and prohibiting the emergence of 'normal' (that is, non-conflict-based) dimensions of political competition. However, drawing on evidence from a post-election survey at the 2009 Northern Ireland election to the European Parliament, I find that EU issues determined intra-bloc vote choice (at least in the nationalist community). This suggests that there is potential for regional integration projects, such as the EU, to contribute to the normalisation of politics in a consociational system by acting as the source of an externally generated dimension of political competition. © 2012 Macmillan Publishers Ltd.

Dimensionality of Policy Space in Consociational Northern Ireland

A criticism of consociational power sharing as an institutional response to violent conflict is that it buttresses rather than ameliorates the underlying (linguistic, religious or ethno-national) divide, hence prohibiting the emergence of new dimensions of political competition (such as economic left-right or moral liberal-conservative dimensions) that are characteristic of 'normal' societies. We test this argument in the context of the illustrative Northern Ireland case, using data from expert coding of party policy documents and opinion data derived from two Voter Advice Applications (VAAs). We find evidence for a moral liberal-conservative dimension of politics in addition to the ethno-national dimension. Hence, we caution against assuming that consociational polities are uni-dimensional.

La subpoliarquía colombiana. Deficiencias estatales, democracia deficitaria

El artículo analiza la democracia colombiana en la década 2002-2011. El argumento central es que Colombia representa un caso de una democracia con déficits, que no alcanza a cubrir las condiciones mínimas de las democracias políticas y se constituye en una subpoliarquía. En esta condición incide de forma  directa las deficiencias estatales, en sus dimensiones de coacción y cohesión social. Los déficits democráticos se presentan en las condiciones básicas de la competencia  política, con elecciones periódicas, pero no libres ni competitivas ni limpias; en la presencia continuada de fraude y manipulación de los resultados electorales y en la  ausencia de garantías para las libertades civiles y políticas. Estas características justifican los diversos adjetivos aplicados a la democracia colombiana, siempre  en clave negativa.

Don't make war, make elections : Franchise extension and violence in XIXth-century Colombia

This paper studies the effect of strengthening democracy, as captured by an increase in voting rights, on the incidence of violent civil conflict in nineteenth-century Colombia. Empirically studying the relationship between democracy and conflict is challenging, not only because of conceptual problems in defining and measuring democracy, but also because political institutions and violence are jointly determined. We take advantage of an experiment of history to examine the impact of one simple, measurable dimension of democracy (the size of the franchise) on con- flict, while at the same time attempting to overcome the identification problem. In 1853, Colombia established universal male suffrage. Using a simple difference-indifferences specification at the municipal level, we find that municipalities where more voters were enfranchised relative to their population experienced fewer violent political battles while the reform was in effect. The results are robust to including a number of additional controls. Moreover, we investigate the potential mechanisms driving the results. In particular, we look at which components of the proportion of new voters in 1853 explain the results, and we examine if results are stronger in places with more political competition and state capacity. We interpret our findings as suggesting that violence in nineteenth-century Colombia was a technology for political elites to compete for the rents from power, and that democracy constituted an alternative way to compete which substituted violence.