Does China overinvest? Evidence from a panel of Chinese firms

This paper addresses the hotly-debated question: do Chinese firms overinvest? A firm-level dataset of 100,000 firms over the period of 2000-07 is employed for this purpose. We initially calculate measures of investment efficiency, which is typically negatively associated with overinvestment. Despite wide disparities across various ownership groups, industries and regions, we find that corporate investment in China has become increasingly efficient over time. However, based on direct measures of overinvestment that we subsequently calculate, we find evidence of overinvestment for all types of firms, even in the most efficient and most profitable private sector. We find that the free cash flow hypothesis provides a good explanation for China‟s overinvestment, especially for the private sector, while in the state sector, overinvestment is attributable to the poor screening and monitoring of enterprises by banks.

Dynamic Relational Contracts under Complete Information

This paper considers a long-term relationship between two agents who both undertake a costly action or investment that together produces a joint benefit. Agents have an opportunity to expropriate some of the joint benefit for their own use. Two cases are considered: (i) where agents are risk neutral and are subject to limited liability constraints and (ii) where agents are risk averse, have quasi-linear preferences in consumption and actions but where limited liability constraints do not bind. The question asked is how to structure the investments and division of the surplus over time so as to avoid expropriation. In the risk-neutral case, there may be an initial phase in which one agent overinvests and the other underinvests. However, both actions and surplus converge monotonically to a stationary state in which there is no overinvestment and surplus is at its maximum subject to the constraints. In the risk-averse case, there is no overinvestment. For this case, we establish that dynamics may or may not be monotonic depending on whether or not it is possible to sustain a first-best allocation. If the first-best allocation is not sustainable, then there is a trade-off between risk sharing and surplus maximization. In general, surplus will not be at its constrained maximum even in the long run.

An electrophysiological investigation into the influence of affect on the attentional blink

Accuracy at identifying or detecting a second-target (T2) is reduced if presented within approximately 500 ms of the first target (TI) - an attentional blink (AB). Affect has previously been shown to influence the magnitude of the AB such that positive affect (PA) is associated with smaller ABs. To account for these findings, Olivers and Nieuwenhuis (2005) proposed an overinvestment hypothesis where P A was said to reduce overinvestment of attentional resources in TI and distractors, leaving more resources for T2. In the present study, P3, CNV, and average activation on distracter-only trials were used to measure attentional investment. The goal was to investigate whether these electrophysiological measures mediated the relationship between self-reported affect and the AB. Results demonstrated that investment of attentional resources was not associated with self-reported affect, or AB magnitude. However, self-report measures of affect, personality and electrophysiological measures of investment did follow some predictions derived from the overinvestment hypothesis.

Análisis de la influencia del Modelo Socioeconómico Chaebol en la crisis financiera del sudeste asiático de 1997: Tailandia

A partir del fin de la Guerra de Corea los diferentes gobiernos que tomaron el poder permitieron la consolidación de las grandes empresas Chaebol. El análisis social se basa en rescatar principios del confucianismo que pueden verse representados en el sistema corporativo estudiado, entre ellos la piedad filial, la honestidad, la educación. Al analizar los factores confucianos se logra determinar ciertas dinámicas presentes en las empresas Chaebol que muestran similitud con las causas de la Crisis Financiera del Sudeste asiático en 1997 lo que permite crear una relación entre el modelo y la crisis. La sobreinversión, el sobreendeudamiento, la relación entre el gobierno y los Chaebol son un ejemplo de dinámicas resultantes. Al tener a Tailandia como segundo país de referencia fue necesario buscar la existencia de relaciones entre el sistema económico y social tailandés, además de encontrar dinámicas resultantes del modelo corporativo de Tailandia similares a las coreanas para finalizar relacionándolas con la crisis financiera.

State ownership, bank loans, and corporate investment

We study the effect of bank loans on Chinese publicly listed firms' investment decisions based on the underinvestment and overinvestment theories of leverage. Evidence from China is of particular importance because China is the world's largest emerging and transitional economy. At first we show that there is a negative relationship between bank loan ratios and investment for Chinese publicly listed firms. And this negative relationship is much stronger for firms with low growth than firms with high growth. Secondly, we find that both short-term and long-term loan ratios are negatively correlated with investment. However, the higher the long-term loan ratios are, the weaker the negative relationship between long-term loan ratios and investment is. Thirdly, firm ownership only matters to the effect of short-term bank loans on investment in our sample. That is, the negative relationship between short-term loan ratios and investment is weaker for SOEs than for non-SOEs. Lastly, we show that the reform of China's banking system in 2003 has not strengthened the negative relationship between bank loans and investment. Our findings suggest that although Chinese state-owned banks are severely intervened by government policies, they still have a disciplining role on firms' investment, especially in firms with low growth.

Essays in Industrial Organization and Information Technology

Chapter 1 studies how consumers’ switching costs affect the pricing and profits of firms competing in two-sided markets such as Apple and Google in the smartphone market. When two-sided markets are dynamic – rather than merely static – I show that switching costs lower the first-period price if network externalities are strong, which is in contrast to what has been found in one-sided markets. By contrast, switching costs soften price competition in the initial period if network externalities are weak and consumers are more patient than the platforms. Moreover, an increase in switching costs on one side decreases the first-period price on the other side. Chapter 2 examines firms’ incentives to invest in local and flexible resources when demand is uncertain and correlated. I find that market power of the monopolist providing flexible resources distorts investment incentives, while competition mitigates them. The extent of improvement depends critically on demand correlation and the cost of capacity: under social optimum and monopoly, if the flexible resource is cheap, the relationship between investment and correlation is positive, and if it is costly, the relationship becomes negative; under duopoly, the relationship is positive. The analysis also sheds light on some policy discussions in markets such as cloud computing. Chapter 3 develops a theory of sequential investments in cybersecurity. The regulator can use safety standards and liability rules to increase security. I show that the joint use of an optimal standard and a full liability rule leads to underinvestment ex ante and overinvestment ex post. Instead, switching to a partial liability rule can correct the inefficiencies. This suggests that to improve security, the regulator should encourage not only firms, but also consumers to invest in security.

A escarificação na adolescência : a problemática do eu-pele a partir do Rorschach

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Psicologia, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Psicologia Clínica e Cultura, 2015.