41 resultados para Orderings
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To date, inequality orderings for ordered response data are only suitable for comparing distributions that share a common median state. In this paper we propose a methodology for comparing distributions irrespective of their medians. We set out to do so by introducing a general pre-ordering and equivalence relation defined over distributions with different median responses, leading us naturally to derive a partial ordering over equivalence classes. We then discuss the implications of our results for the axiomatic derivation of inequality indices for ordered response data.
Flippable Pairs and Subset Comparisons in Comparative Probability Orderings and Related Simple Games
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We show that every additively representable comparative probability order on n atoms is determined by at least n - 1 binary subset comparisons. We show that there are many orders of this kind, not just the lexicographic order. These results provide answers to two questions of Fishburn et al (2002). We also study the flip relation on the class of all comparative probability orders introduced by Maclagan. We generalise an important theorem of Fishburn, Peke?c and Reeds, by showing that in any minimal set of comparisons that determine a comparative probability order, all comparisons are flippable. By calculating the characteristics of the flip relation for n = 6 we discover that the regions in the corresponding hyperplane arrangement can have no more than 13 faces and that there are 20 regions with 13 faces. All the neighbours of the 20 comparative probability orders which correspond to those regions are representable. Finally we define a class of simple games with complete desirability relation for which its strong desirability relation is acyclic, and show that the flip relation carries all the information about these games. We show that for n = 6 these games are weighted majority games.
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"April 1979."
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"Research supported in part under NSF grant MCS 77-22830."
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Bibliography: p. 34.
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Quantum Materials are many body systems displaying emergent phenomena caused by quantum collective behaviour, such as superconductivity, charge density wave, fractional hall effect, and exotic magnetism. Among quantum materials, two families have recently attracted attention: kagome metals and Kitaev materials. Kagome metals have a unique crystal structure made up of triangular lattice layers that are used to form the kagome layer. Due to superconductivity, magnetism, and charge ordering states such as the Charge Density Wave (CDW), unexpected physical phenomena such as the massive Anomalous Hall Effect (AHE) and possible Majorana fermions develop in these materials. Kitaev materials are a type of quantum material with a unique spin model named after Alexei Kitaev. They include fractional fluctuations of Majorana fermions and non-topological abelian anyons, both of which might be used in quantum computing. Furthermore, they provide a realistic framework for the development of quantum spin liquid (QSL), in which quantum fluctuations produce long-range entanglements between electronic states despite the lack of classical magnetic ordering. In my research, I performed several nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR), nuclear quadrupole resonance (NQR), and muon spin spectroscopy (µSR) experiments to explain and unravel novel phases of matter within these unusual families of materials. NMR has been found to be an excellent tool for studying these materials’ local electronic structures and magnetic properties. I could use NMR to determine, for the first time, the structure of a novel kagome superconductor, RbV3Sb5, below the CDW transition, and to highlight the role of chemical doping in the CDW phase of AV3Sb5 superconductors. µSR has been used to investigate the effect of doping on kagome material samples in order to study the presence and behaviour of an anomalous phase developing at low temperatures and possibly related to time-reversal symmetry breaking.
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Estudi realitzat a partir d’una estada a la University of Oxford, Gran Bretanya, entre 2010 i 2012. Durant l’estada postdoctoral a la University of Oxford s’han efectuat dos estudis relacionats amb l’onomàstica dels faraons d’Egipte i que constitueixen una continuació de l’anàlisi de la titulatura d’Alexandre el Gran realitzada prèviament per l’investigador en la seva recerca doctoral. El primer estudi examina la titulatura faraònica dels emperadors romans en comparació amb la d’Alexandre i, en especial, la significació ideològica i política dels paral•lelismes onomàstics existents entre elles, els quals han estat analitzats en el marc de la imitatio-aemulatio-comparatio Alexandri. Per al cas d’August, s’ha arribat a la conclusió que l’adopció de determinats apel•latius egipcis utilitzats anteriorment per Alexandre pot ser interpretada com un exemple local o estrictament egipci d’imitatio Alexandri, mentre que, en relació amb la resta d’emperadors, atès que les seves titulatures faraòniques es basen o imiten la del primer emperador, aquestes represes han de ser vistes més aviat com un exemple d’imitatio (o comparatio) Augusti. El segon estudi versa sobre la titulatura faraònica egípcia i la tradició annalística. A partir d’una anàlisi comparativa dels protocols onomàstics dels fundadores de cadascuna de les dinasties, s’ha intentat determinar si determinats noms o epítets s’empren de forma recurrent i d’una manera deliberada per tal de senyalar canvis dinàstics, és a dir, noves realitats polítiques. En concret, s’ha pretès establir fins a quin punt determinats recursos onomàstics tenen el seu reflex en la divisió en dinasties de Manetó i, alhora, determinar en quina mesura l’estudi de l’onomàstica faraònica pot contribuir al coneixement de com els egipcis conceptualitzaren i organitzaren el seu propi passat.
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[eng] In the context of cooperative TU-games, and given an order of players, we consider the problem of distributing the worth of the grand coalition as a sequentia decision problem. In each step of process, upper and lower bounds for the payoff of the players are required related to successive reduced games. Sequentially compatible payoffs are defined as those allocation vectors that meet these recursive bounds. The core of the game is reinterpreted as a set of sequentally compatible payoffs when the Davis-Maschler reduced game is considered (Th.1). Independently of the reduction, the core turns out to be the intersections of the family of the sets of sequentially compatible payoffs corresponding to the different possible orderings (Th.2), so it is in some sense order-independent. Finally, we analyze advantagenous properties for the first player
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Executive Summary The unifying theme of this thesis is the pursuit of a satisfactory ways to quantify the riskureward trade-off in financial economics. First in the context of a general asset pricing model, then across models and finally across country borders. The guiding principle in that pursuit was to seek innovative solutions by combining ideas from different fields in economics and broad scientific research. For example, in the first part of this thesis we sought a fruitful application of strong existence results in utility theory to topics in asset pricing. In the second part we implement an idea from the field of fuzzy set theory to the optimal portfolio selection problem, while the third part of this thesis is to the best of our knowledge, the first empirical application of some general results in asset pricing in incomplete markets to the important topic of measurement of financial integration. While the first two parts of this thesis effectively combine well-known ways to quantify the risk-reward trade-offs the third one can be viewed as an empirical verification of the usefulness of the so-called "good deal bounds" theory in designing risk-sensitive pricing bounds. Chapter 1 develops a discrete-time asset pricing model, based on a novel ordinally equivalent representation of recursive utility. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use a member of a novel class of recursive utility generators to construct a representative agent model to address some long-lasting issues in asset pricing. Applying strong representation results allows us to show that the model features countercyclical risk premia, for both consumption and financial risk, together with low and procyclical risk free rate. As the recursive utility used nests as a special case the well-known time-state separable utility, all results nest the corresponding ones from the standard model and thus shed light on its well-known shortcomings. The empirical investigation to support these theoretical results, however, showed that as long as one resorts to econometric methods based on approximating conditional moments with unconditional ones, it is not possible to distinguish the model we propose from the standard one. Chapter 2 is a join work with Sergei Sontchik. There we provide theoretical and empirical motivation for aggregation of performance measures. The main idea is that as it makes sense to apply several performance measures ex-post, it also makes sense to base optimal portfolio selection on ex-ante maximization of as many possible performance measures as desired. We thus offer a concrete algorithm for optimal portfolio selection via ex-ante optimization over different horizons of several risk-return trade-offs simultaneously. An empirical application of that algorithm, using seven popular performance measures, suggests that realized returns feature better distributional characteristics relative to those of realized returns from portfolio strategies optimal with respect to single performance measures. When comparing the distributions of realized returns we used two partial risk-reward orderings first and second order stochastic dominance. We first used the Kolmogorov Smirnov test to determine if the two distributions are indeed different, which combined with a visual inspection allowed us to demonstrate that the way we propose to aggregate performance measures leads to portfolio realized returns that first order stochastically dominate the ones that result from optimization only with respect to, for example, Treynor ratio and Jensen's alpha. We checked for second order stochastic dominance via point wise comparison of the so-called absolute Lorenz curve, or the sequence of expected shortfalls for a range of quantiles. As soon as the plot of the absolute Lorenz curve for the aggregated performance measures was above the one corresponding to each individual measure, we were tempted to conclude that the algorithm we propose leads to portfolio returns distribution that second order stochastically dominates virtually all performance measures considered. Chapter 3 proposes a measure of financial integration, based on recent advances in asset pricing in incomplete markets. Given a base market (a set of traded assets) and an index of another market, we propose to measure financial integration through time by the size of the spread between the pricing bounds of the market index, relative to the base market. The bigger the spread around country index A, viewed from market B, the less integrated markets A and B are. We investigate the presence of structural breaks in the size of the spread for EMU member country indices before and after the introduction of the Euro. We find evidence that both the level and the volatility of our financial integration measure increased after the introduction of the Euro. That counterintuitive result suggests the presence of an inherent weakness in the attempt to measure financial integration independently of economic fundamentals. Nevertheless, the results about the bounds on the risk free rate appear plausible from the view point of existing economic theory about the impact of integration on interest rates.
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[eng] In the context of cooperative TU-games, and given an order of players, we consider the problem of distributing the worth of the grand coalition as a sequentia decision problem. In each step of process, upper and lower bounds for the payoff of the players are required related to successive reduced games. Sequentially compatible payoffs are defined as those allocation vectors that meet these recursive bounds. The core of the game is reinterpreted as a set of sequentally compatible payoffs when the Davis-Maschler reduced game is considered (Th.1). Independently of the reduction, the core turns out to be the intersections of the family of the sets of sequentially compatible payoffs corresponding to the different possible orderings (Th.2), so it is in some sense order-independent. Finally, we analyze advantagenous properties for the first player
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We provide a characterization of selection correspondences in two-person exchange economies that can be core rationalized in the sense that there exists a preference profile with some standard properties that generates the observed choices as the set of core elements of the economy for any given initial endowment vector. The approach followed in this paper deviates from the standard rational choice model in that a rationalization in terms of a profile of individual orderings rather than in terms of a single individual or social preference relation is analyzed.
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This paper characterizes welfarist social evaluation in a multi-profile setting where, in addition to multiple utility profiles, it is assumed that there are several profiles of non-welfare information. We prove new versions of the welfarism theorems in this alternative framework, and we illustrate that a very plausible and weak anonymity property is sufficient to generate anonymous social-evaluation orderings.
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We study fairness in economies with one private good and one partially excludable nonrival good. A social ordering function determines for each profile of preferences an ordering of all conceivable allocations. We propose the following Free Lunch Aversion condition: if the private good contributions of two agents consuming the same quantity of the nonrival good have opposite signs, reducing that gap improves social welfare. This condition, combined with the more standard requirements of Unanimous Indifference and Responsiveness, delivers a form of welfare egalitarianism in which an agent's welfare at an allocation is measured by the quantity of the nonrival good that, consumed at no cost, would leave her indifferent to the bundle she is assigned.
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We analyze collective choice procedures with respect to their rationalizability by means of profiles of individual preference orderings. A selection function is a generalization of a choice function where selected alternatives may depend on a reference (or status quo) alternative in addition to the set of feasible options. Given the number of agents n, a selection function satisfies efficient and non-deteriorating n-rationalizability if there exists a profile of n orderings on the universal set of alternatives such that the selected alternatives are (i) efficient for that profile, and (ii) at least as good as the reference option according to each individual preference. We analyze efficient and non-deteriorating collective choice in a general abstract framework and provide a characterization result given a universal set domain.