Optimal debt, endogenous fertility, and human capital externalities in a model with altruistic bequests

and human capital externalities. Because of such externalities, education investment is too low and fertility is too high. While education subsidies are the conventional means to deal with these problems, we show that the optimal policy also comprises debt even when distortionary taxes are used. The reason is that debt tips the usual trade-off between children's quantity and quality in favor of the latter by increasing the bequest cost of children. The optimal debt-output ratio exceeds 10% for plausible parameterization. (C) 2002 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Debt and default in a growth model

This paper presents a small open economy model with capital accumulation and without commitment to repay debt. The optimal debt contract specifies debt relief following bad shocks and debt increase following good shocks and brings first order benefits if the country's borrowing constraint is binding. Countries with less capital (with higher marginal productivity of capital) have a higher debt-GDP ratio, are more likely to default on uncontingent bonds, require higher debt relief after bad shocks and pay a higher spread over treasury. Debt relief prescribed by the optimal contract following the interest rate hikes of 1980-81 is more than half of the debt forgiveness obtained by the main Latin American countries through the Brady agreements.

Second-best public debt with human capital externalities

This paper studies optinnal public debt in a dynastic model with human capital externalities that cause human capital investment (fertility) to be below (above) its socially optimal level. By reducing fertility and raising human capital investment, the optimal debt can exceed 10% of output for plausible parameterizations.

Financial liberalization and dynamics of firm-level financing and investment decisions in the Southeast Asian countries

This thesis examines the dynamics of firm-level financing and investment decisions for six Southeast Asian countries. The study provides empirical evidence on the impacts of changes in the firm-level financing decisions during the period of financial liberalization by considering the debt and equity financing decisions of a set of non-financial firms. The empirical results show that firms in Indonesia, Pakistan, and South Korea have relatively faster speed of adjustment than other Southeast Asian countries to attain optimal debt and equity ratios in response to banking sector and stock market liberalization. In addition, contrary to widely held belief that firms adjust their financial ratios to industry levels, the results indicate that industry factors do not significantly impact on the speed of capital structure adjustments. This study also shows that non-linear estimation methods are more appropriate than linear estimation methods for capturing changes in capital structure. The empirical results also show that international stock market integration of these countries has significantly reduced the equity risk premium as well as the firm-level cost of equity capital. Thus stock market liberalization is associated with a decrease in the cost of equity capital of the firms. Developments in the securities markets infrastructure have also reduced the cost of equity capital. However, with increased integration there is the possibility of capital outflows from the emerging markets, which might reverse the pattern of decrease in cost of capital in these markets.

Információs paradoxon a vállalkozások hitelezésében nem fizető vevő esetén (An innovation paradox in enterprise financing where buyers fail to pay)

Cikkünkben a vállalkozók külső finanszírozásának modelljét terjesztjük ki arra az - irodalom által eddig nem tárgyalt - esetre, amikor a vállalkozónak van nem fizető vevője. Szerződéselméleti megközelítésünkben a vállalkozó hitelképességére vonatkozó információ aszimmetrikus a tranzakcióban részt vevő felek között, s ez morális kockázatnak ad teret. Megfigyelhető, hogy ilyenkor a pontosan fizető vevők számára is hitelszűke lép fel. A vállalkozó és a finanszírozó közötti optimális szerződés nem fizető vevő hatására további hitelszűkösséget generál. Két esetet vizsgálunk: az egyikben a vállalkozó információs előnyben van a vevő nemfizetésére vonatkozóan, a másikban nincs ilyen előny. A két modellváltozat alapján információs paradoxon jellemzi a kialakuló finanszírozási helyzetet: a vállalkozó kisebb összegű hitelhez jut az említett információs előnye esetén, mint amikor közte és a finanszírozó között szimmetrikus az információ. A modell azt a - magyar kis- és középvállalkozóknál látott - jelenséget írja le, amikor nem transzparens a szállító-vevő viszonya, és a finanszírozó bank e miatt az információs hátrány miatt kevesebb hitelt nyújt kis- és középvállalati ügyfeleinek. _____ The model of external financing of the firm is extended here to cases where there may be defaults on account receivables. Information asymmetry between entrepreneur and lender on a firm's creditworthiness leads to moral hazard and credit rationing, even in the absence of default risk. The authors show an optimal debt contract that formulates the situation, and focus on two cases: where the entrepreneur has an information advantage on defaults on receivables, and where the information is symmetric. A comparison of these cases revealed a paradoxical knowledge issue in external financing: a better informed entrepreneur may be able to afford a smaller financing ability. The model describes a frequent phenomenon in small businesses, when the relationship between buyer and seller lacks transparency, and lenders offer lower amount of lending to small and medium-sized enterprises.

The Optimal Capital Structure of Banks: Balancing Deposit Insurance, Capital Requirements and Tax-Advantaged Debt

The capital structure and regulation of financial intermediaries is an important topic for practitioners, regulators and academic researchers. In general, theory predicts that firms choose their capital structures by balancing the benefits of debt (e.g., tax and agency benefits) against its costs (e.g., bankruptcy costs). However, when traditional corporate finance models have been applied to insured financial institutions, the results have generally predicted corner solutions (all equity or all debt) to the capital structure problem. This paper studies the impact and interaction of deposit insurance, capital requirements and tax benefits on a bankÇs choice of optimal capital structure. Using a contingent claims model to value the firm and its associated claims, we find that there exists an interior optimal capital ratio in the presence of deposit insurance, taxes and a minimum fixed capital standard. Banks voluntarily choose to maintain capital in excess of the minimum required in order to balance the risks of insolvency (especially the loss of future tax benefits) against the benefits of additional debt. Because we derive a closed- form solution, our model provides useful insights on several current policy debates including revisions to the regulatory framework for GSEs, tax policy in general and the tax exemption for credit unions.

Államadósság, optimális politika, finanszírozás (State Debt, Optimal Policy, and Financing)

A fejlett ipari országoknak is az államadósság csökkentése vagy akár szinten tartása okozza az egyik legfontosabb gazdaságpolitikai dilemmát. Az euróövezet tagállamai esetében is ez a kritérium tűnik a legkevésbé teljesíthetőnek, de Japán és az Egyesült Államok is leküzdhetetlennek tűnő államadóssággal birkózik. A tanulmány rövid áttekintést ad néhány meghatározó közgazdasági megközelítésről, amelyek az államadósság szintjének hosszú távú alakulása mögött meghúzódó tényezőket, gazdaságpolitikai lépéseket magyarázzák. Végül az elméletek alapján tanulságokat fogalmaz meg a magyar államadósság kezelését illetően az 1990–2010 közötti folyamatok ismeretében. _____ The macroeconomic developments of the last decade have confirmed that one of the most important dilemmas that even developed economies have to face is the reduction or even sustaining of the state debt. In case of the eurozone member states this criterion is the most difficult to be accomplished, furthermore the United States and Japan are among the global powers that have to cope with state debts which seems to be insurmountable. The aim of this paper is to provide a brief overview of some decisive economic approaches (Barro [1979], Lucas and Stokey [1983], Marcet and Scott [2007], Martin [2009] etc.) that explain the factors behind the formation of long-run state debt level and economic policy measures accompanying state debt management. The paper also attempts to draw some lessons for the Hungarian state debt management in view of the 1990-2010 processes.

What if firms adjust their debt-equity ratios toward a target range?

We estimate optimal target-ranges of capital structure controlling for a series of firmspecific characteristics and accounting for the serial correlation that arises from the dynamic component of the leverage choice. Then, we empirically examine if firms adjust their leverages toward the estimated optimal ranges. Our analysis suggests that the observed behavior of firms is consistent with the notion of range-adjustment.

Rational expectations and the service of public debt: a recursive approach

This paper uses dynamic programming to study the time consistency of optimal macroeconomic policy in economies with recurring public deficits. To this end, a general equilibrium recursive model introduced in Chang (1998) is extended to include govemment bonds and production. The original mode! presents a Sidrauski economy with money and transfers only, implying that the need for govemment fmancing through the inflation tax is minimal. The extended model introduces govemment expenditures and a deficit-financing scheme, analyzing the SargentWallace (1981) problem: recurring deficits may lead the govemment to default on part of its public debt through inflation. The methodology allows for the computation of the set of alI sustainable stabilization plans even when the govemment cannot pre-commit to an optimal inflation path. This is done through value function iterations, which can be done on a computeI. The parameters of the extended model are calibrated with Brazilian data, using as case study three Brazilian stabilization attempts: the Cruzado (1986), Collor (1990) and the Real (1994) plans. The calibration of the parameters of the extended model is straightforward, but its numerical solution proves unfeasible due to a dimensionality problem in the algorithm arising from limitations of available computer technology. However, a numerical solution using the original algorithm and some calibrated parameters is obtained. Results indicate that in the absence of govemment bonds or production only the Real Plan is sustainable in the long run. The numerical solution of the extended algorithm is left for future research.

The Limits of political compromise: debt ceilings and political competition

We study the desirability of limits on the public debt and of political competition in an economy where political parties alternate in office. Due to rent-seeking motives, incumbents have an incentive to set public expenditures above the socially optimal level. Parties cannot commit to future policies, but they can forge a political compromise where each party curbs excessive spending when in office if it expects future governments to do the same. In contrast to the received literature, we find that strict limits on government borrowing can exacerbate political-economy distortions by rendering a political compromise unsustainable. This tends to happen when political competition is limited. Conversely, a tight limit on the public debt fosters a compromise that yields the efficient outcome when political competition is vigorous, saving the economy from immiseration. Our analysis thus suggests a legislative tradeoff between restricting political competition and constraining the ability of governments to issue debt.

A vállalati likviditáskezelés szerepe eszközfedezettel rendelkező hitelszerződésekben. Az alkun alapuló megközelítés eredményei (The role of corporate liquidity management under secured debt financing Results of the bargaining approach)

A szerző azt a kérdést vizsgálja, hogy a vállalat működése során a likvid eszközök mekkora arányát tartsa fenn. A kérdést a finanszírozás szemszögéből veti fel, mivel a hitelezés okozta korlátok jelentősen befolyásolják a likvid eszköz tartalékolásának motivációit. A cikk a vállalkozói-hitelezői információs kapcsolat háromféle esetében mutatja be az eszközfedezettel rendelkező hitelek adósságszolgálatát meghatározó tényezőket. Elsőként a teljes információs viszony melletti stratégiákkal meghatározott adósságszolgálatot vizsgálja, majd a második típusú információs kapcsolatban a nem megfigyelhető vállalkozói erőfeszítéseket feltételezve adja meg az adósságszolgálat fizetésének ex ante és ex post egyensúlyát. Harmadikként, a nem igazolható vállalati adatok feltevése mellett teljes és részleges eszközfedezetre is meghatározza az optimális vállalkozói likviditási politikát, és tárgyalja az itt fennálló ellentéteket. Megmutatja, hogy részleges eszközfedezet mellett 1. újratárgyalható a hitelszerződés, és a stratégiai adósságszolgálatot nem lehet elkerülni, 2. a likviditásoptimalizálásnak nincs ex post Pareto-egyensúlyi megoldása, ugyanis a hitelszerződésben részt vevő felek alkuereje határozza meg a vállalat likviditásának szintjét. / === / This paper investigates what the liquid asset ratio for firms should be. Financing constraints significantly influence motivations for liquidity hoarding. The article shows the determinants of secured debt services for three different information cases of a lender-borrower relationship. First, it examines the strategic debt service under full information, and then, assuming non-observable entrepreneurial efforts, it gives the ex ante and ex post equilibria of the strategic debt service. The third case supposes non-verifiable firm information; this provides the optimal corporate liquidity policy and explains the contrary propositions. It shows that under not fully secured collateral, 1. the debt contract is renegotiable; the lender cannot avoid the strategic debt service, 2. there is no ex post optimal Pareto efficient solution to liquidity policy, because the corporate liquidity ratio is determined by the bargaining power of the partners in the debt contract.

The political economy of sovereign debt

This dissertation examines international lending arrangements between a competitive foreign investor and a less-developed country. Given that the benefits and costs of borrowing are distributed unequally across society, it is of interest to examine the conditions under which borrowing occurs and how the borrowed funds are allocated. Three theoretical models are developed to consider optimal lending arrangements in the presence of sovereign risk. The models show how a society's level and distribution of wealth influences its access to loans and the terms of the loan agreements. Optimal loan contracts are established, which place either a debt ceiling or a debt floor on the amount of the loan that, will be offered. ^