Design of an optimal auction for sponsored search auctions

In this paper we first describe a framework to model the sponsored search auction on the web as a mechanism design problem. Using this framework, we design a novel auction which we call the OPT (optimal) auction. The OPT mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue while achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the advertisers. We show that the OPT mechanism is superior to two of the most commonly used mechanisms for sponsored search namely (1) GSP (Generalized Second Price) and (2) VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves). We then show an important revenue equivalence result that the expected revenue earned by the search engine is the same for all the three mechanisms provided the advertisers are symmetric and the number of sponsored slots is strictly less than the number of advertisers.

Optimal auction with a general distribution: virtual valuation without densities

We characterize the optimal auction in an independent private values framework for a completely general distribution of valuations. We do this introducing a new concept: the generalized virtual valuation. To show the wider applicability of this concept we present two examples showing how to extend the classical models of Mussa and Rosen and Baron and Myerson for arbitrary distributions

Mechanism design for cost optimal PAC learning in the presence of strategic noisy annotators

We consider the problem of Probably Ap-proximate Correct (PAC) learning of a bi-nary classifier from noisy labeled exam-ples acquired from multiple annotators(each characterized by a respective clas-sification noise rate). First, we consider the complete information scenario, where the learner knows the noise rates of all the annotators. For this scenario, we derive sample complexity bound for the Mini-mum Disagreement Algorithm (MDA) on the number of labeled examples to be ob-tained from each annotator. Next, we consider the incomplete information sce-nario, where each annotator is strategic and holds the respective noise rate as a private information. For this scenario, we design a cost optimal procurement auc-tion mechanism along the lines of Myer-son’s optimal auction design framework in a non-trivial manner. This mechanism satisfies incentive compatibility property,thereby facilitating the learner to elicit true noise rates of all the annotators.

Optimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusion

Within the context of a single-unit, independent private values auction model, we show that if bidder types are multidimensional, then under the optimal auction exclusion of some bidder types will occur. A second contribution of the paper is methodological in nature. In particular, we identify conditions under which an auction model with multidimensional types can be reduced to a model with one dimensional types without loss of generality. Reduction results of this type have achieved the status of folklore in the mechanism design literature. Here, we provide a proof of the reduction result for auctions.

Abstract types and distributions in independent private value auctions

In this note, in an independent private values auction framework, I discuss the relationship between the set of types and the distribution of types. I show that any set of types, finite dimensional or not, can be extended to a larger set of types preserving incentive compatibility constraints, expected revenue and bidder’s expected utilities. Thus for example we may convexify a set of types making our model amenable to the large body of theory in economics and mathematics that relies on convexity assumptions. An interesting application of this extension procedure is to show that although revenue equivalence is not valid in general if the set of types is not convex these mechanism have underlying distinct allocation mechanism in the extension. Thus we recover in these situations the revenue equivalence.

Hybrid Auctions I: Theory

In this paper we examine the properties of a hybrid auction that combines a sealed bid and an ascending auction. In this auction, each bidder submits a sealed bid. Once the highest bid is known, the bidder who submitted it is declared the winner if her bid is higher than the second highest by more than a predetermined amount or percentage. If at least one more bidder submitted a bid su¢ciently close to the highest bid (that is, if the di¤erence between this bid and the highest bid is smaller than the predetermined amount or percentage) the quali…ed buyers compete in an open ascending auction that has the highest bid of the …rst stage as the reserve price. Quali…ed bidders include not only the highest bidder in the …rst stage but also those who bid close enough to her. We show that this auction generates more revenue than a standard auction. Although this hybrid auction does not generate as much revenue as the optimal auction, it is ex-post e¢cient.

Optimal Choice of a Firm in Conducting Auction

Силвия К. Баева, Цветана Хр. Недева - Важен аспект в системата на Министерството на регионалното развитие и благоустройство е работата по Оперативна програма “Регионално развитие” с приоритетна ос “Устойчиво и интегрирано градско развитие” по операция “Подобряване на физическата среда и превенция на риска”. По тази програма са включени 86 общини. Финансовият ресурс на тази операция е на стойност 238 589 939 евро, от които 202 801 448 евро са европейско финансиране [1]. Всяка от тези 86 общини трябва да реши задачата за възлагане на обществена поръчка на определена фирма по тази операция. Всъщност, тази задача е задача за провеждане на общински търг за избор на фирма-изпълнител. Оптималният избор на фирма-изпълнител е много важен. Задачата за провеждане на търг ще формулираме като задача на многокритериалното вземане на решения, като чрез подходящо изграждане на критерии и методи може да се трансформира до задача на еднокритериалната оптимизация.

Deriving optimal competition in infrastructure procurement

Typically only a limited number of consortiums are able to competitively bid for Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects. Consequently, this may lead to oligopoly pricing constraints and ineffective competition, thus engendering ex ante market failure. In addressing this issue, this paper aims to determine the optimal number of bidders required to ensure a healthy level of competition is available to procure major infrastructure projects. The theories of Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm; Game Theory and Auction Theory and Transaction Cost Economics are reviewed and discussed and used to produce an optimal level of competition for major infrastructure procurement, that prevents market failure ex ante (lack of competition) and market failure ex post (due to asymmetric lock-in).

An Optimal Mechanism for Sponsored Search Auctions on the Web and Comparison With Other Mechanisms

In this paper, we first describe a framework to model the sponsored search auction on the web as a mechanism design problem. Using this framework, we describe two well-known mechanisms for sponsored search auction-Generalized Second Price (GSP) and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG). We then derive a new mechanism for sponsored search auction which we call optimal (OPT) mechanism. The OPT mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue, while achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the advertisers. We then undertake a detailed comparative study of the mechanisms GSP, VCG, and OPT. We compute and compare the expected revenue earned by the search engine under the three mechanisms when the advertisers are symmetric and some special conditions are satisfied. We also compare the three mechanisms in terms of incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and computational complexity. Note to Practitioners-The advertiser-supported web site is one of the successful business models in the emerging web landscape. When an Internet user enters a keyword (i.e., a search phrase) into a search engine, the user gets back a page with results, containing the links most relevant to the query and also sponsored links, (also called paid advertisement links). When a sponsored link is clicked, the user is directed to the corresponding advertiser's web page. The advertiser pays the search engine in some appropriate manner for sending the user to its web page. Against every search performed by any user on any keyword, the search engine faces the problem of matching a set of advertisers to the sponsored slots. In addition, the search engine also needs to decide on a price to be charged to each advertiser. Due to increasing demands for Internet advertising space, most search engines currently use auction mechanisms for this purpose. These are called sponsored search auctions. A significant percentage of the revenue of Internet giants such as Google, Yahoo!, MSN, etc., comes from sponsored search auctions. In this paper, we study two auction mechanisms, GSP and VCG, which are quite popular in the sponsored auction context, and pursue the objective of designing a mechanism that is superior to these two mechanisms. In particular, we propose a new mechanism which we call the OPT mechanism. This mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue subject to achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality. Bayesian incentive compatibility guarantees that it is optimal for each advertiser to bid his/her true value provided that all other agents also bid their respective true values. Individual rationality ensures that the agents participate voluntarily in the auction since they are assured of gaining a non-negative payoff by doing so.

An auction algorithm for procuring wireless channel in a heterogenous wireless network

In this paper, we develop a novel auction algorithm for procuring wireless channel by a wireless node in a heterogeneous wireless network. We assume that the service providers of the heterogeneous wireless network are selfish and non-cooperative in the sense that they are only interested in maximizing their own utilities. The wireless user needs to procure wireless channels to execute multiple tasks. To solve the problem of the wireless user, we propose a reverse optimal (REVOPT) auction and derive an expression for the expected payment by the wireless user. The proposed auction mechanism REVOPT satisfies important game theoretic properties such as Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality.

Optimal allocation of carbon credits to emitting agents in a carbon economy

Reduction of carbon emissions is of paramount importance in the context of global warming. Countries and global companies are now engaged in understanding systematic ways of achieving well defined emission targets. In fact, carbon credits have become significant and strategic instruments of finance for countries and global companies. In this paper, we formulate and suggest a solution to the carbon allocation problem, which involves determining a cost minimizing allocation of carbon credits among different emitting agents. We address this challenge in the context of a global company which is faced with the challenge of determining an allocation of carbon credit caps among its divisions in a cost effective way. The problem is formulated as a reverse auction problem where the company plays the role of a buyer or carbon planning authority and the different divisions within the company are the emitting agents that specify cost curves for carbon credit reductions. Two natural variants of the problem: (a) with unlimited budget and (b) with limited budget are considered. Suitable assumptions are made on the cost curves and in each of the two cases we show that the resulting problem formulation is a knapsack problem that can be solved optimally using a greedy heuristic. The solution of the allocation problem provides critical decision support to global companies engaged seriously in green programs.

Optimal procurement and contracting with research and development

Government procurement of a new good or service is a process that usually includes basic research, development, and production. Empirical evidences indicate that investments in research and development (R and D) before production are significant in many defense procurements. Thus, optimal procurement policy should not be only to select the most efficient producer, but also to induce the contractors to design the best product and to develop the best technology. It is difficult to apply the current economic theory of optimal procurement and contracting, which has emphasized production, but ignored R and D, to many cases of procurement.

In this thesis, I provide basic models of both R and D and production in the procurement process where a number of firms invest in private R and D and compete for a government contract. R and D is modeled as a stochastic cost-reduction process. The government is considered both as a profit-maximizer and a procurement cost minimizer. In comparison to the literature, the following results derived from my models are significant. First, R and D matters in procurement contracting. When offering the optimal contract the government will be better off if it correctly takes into account costly private R and D investment. Second, competition matters. The optimal contract and the total equilibrium R and D expenditures vary with the number of firms. The government usually does not prefer infinite competition among firms. Instead, it prefers free entry of firms. Third, under a R and D technology with the constant marginal returns-to-scale, it is socially optimal to have only one firm to conduct all of the R and D and production. Fourth, in an independent private values environment with risk-neutral firms, an informed government should select one of four standard auction procedures with an appropriate announced reserve price, acting as if it does not have any private information.

Asynchronous Auction for Distributed Nonlinear Resource Allocation Problem

Resource Allocation Problems (RAPs) are concerned with the optimal allocation of resources to tasks. Problems in fields such as search theory, statistics, finance, economics, logistics, sensor & wireless networks fit this formulation. In literature, several centralized/synchronous algorithms have been proposed including recently proposed auction algorithm, RAP Auction. Here we present asynchronous implementation of RAP Auction for distributed RAPs.

An analytical model for optimal spectrum leasing under constraints of quality of service in CRNs

Cognitive radio improves spectrum efficiency and mitigates spectrum scarcity by allowing cognitive users to opportunistically access idle chunks of the spectrum owned by licensed users. In long-term spectrum leasing markets, secondary network operators make a decision about how much spectrum is optimal to fulfill their users' data transmission requirements. We study this optimization problem in multiple channel scenarios. Under the constrains of expected user admission rate and quality of service, we model the secondary network into a dynamic data transportation system. In this system, the spectrum accesses of both primary users and secondary users are in accordance with stochastic processes, respectively. The main metrics of quality of service we are concerned with include user admission rate, average transmission delay and stability of the delay. To quantify the relationship between spectrum provisioning and quality of service, we propose an approximate analytical model. We use the model to estimate the lower and upper bounds of the optimal amount of the spectrum. The distance between the bounds is relatively narrow. In addition, we design a simple algorithm to compute the optimum by using the bounds. We conduct numerical simulations on a slotted multiple channel dynamic spectrum access network model. Simulation results demonstrate the preciseness of the proposed model. Our work sheds light on the design of game and auction based dynamic spectrum sharing mechanisms in cognitive radio networks.