A note on bargaining power and managerial delegation in multimarket oligopolies

In a two-stage delegation game model with Nash bargaining between a manager and an owner, an equivalence result is found between this game and Fershtman and Judd's strategic delegation game (Fershtman and Judd, 1987). Interestingly, although both games are equivalent in terms of profits under certain conditions, managers obtain greater rewards in the bargaining game. This results in a redistribution of profits between owners and managers.

A Note on Networks of Collaboration in Multimarket Oligopolies

In this note, we extend the Goyal and Joshi’s model of collaboration networks in oligopoly to multi-market situations. We examine the incentive of firms to form links and the architectures of the resulting equilibrium networks in this setting. We then present some results on efficient networks.

Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies when rivals' costs are unknown

We study Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly models with incomplete information about rivals’ costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian- Nash equilibrium of both games, the ex-ante expected profits and the ex-post profits of each firm. We see that, in the price competition, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.

Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopolies

This article is searching for necessary and sufficient conditions which are to be imposed on the demand curve to guarantee the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a Bertrand-Edgeworth game with capacity constraints.

A Bertrand-Edgeworth-oligopóliumok (Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopolies – a survey of the literature)

Az irodalomban az olyan oligopolmodellek, amelyekben mind az ár, mind a mennyiség döntési változó, Bertrand-Edgeworth-oligopóliumok néven ismertek. E tanulmányban a Bertrand-Edgeworth-oligopóliumokkal kapcsolatos érdekesebb eredményeket tekintjük át. Tárgyaljuk a Bertrand-Edgeworth-típusú oligopolmodellek specifikációját, a Nash-egyensúly létezését, a Nash-egyensúly meghatározását és a Bertrand-Edgeworth-oligopóliumok alkalmazásait. / === / Oligopoly models in which both price and quantity are decisive variables are known in the literature as Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopolies, the most interesting results with which are surveyed in this paper. The author assumes the existence of the Nash equilibrium, as the specification of Bertrand-Edgeworth-type oligopoly models, the determination of the Nash equilibrium, and the application of Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopolies.

Exclusive contracts with private information in successive differentiated oligopolies

The purpose of this article is to analyze the incentives of manufacturers to deal exclusively with retailers in bilaterally duopolistic industries with brand differentiation by manufacturers. In contrast with the previous literature, exclusive contracts are shown to generate higher profits for manufacturers and retailers selling highly differentiated products, who thus have an incentive to insist on exclusive contracting. However, if the products are close substitutes no exclusivity will emerge in equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that exclusive contracts decrease both consumer and social welfare.

Business Intelligence and Multi-market Competition

We consider a multi-market framework where a set of firms compete on two oligopolistic markets. The cost of production of each firm allows for spillovers across markets, ensuring that output decisions for both markets have to be made jointly. Prior to competing in these markets, firms can establish links gathering business intelligence about other firms. A link formed by a firm generates two types of externalities for competitors and consumers. We characterize the business intelligence equilibrium networks and networks that maximize social welfare. By contrast with single market competition, we show that in multi-market competition there exist situations where intelligence gathering activities are underdeveloped with regard to social welfare and should be tolerated, if not encouraged, by public authorities.

Partial Cooperation in Strategic Decision Situations

We consider a normal form game in which there is a single exogenously given coalition of cooperating players that can write a binding agreement on pre-selected actions. These collective actions typically represent a certain number of dimensions in the players’ strategy space. The actions represented by the other dimensions of the strategy space remain under the complete, individual control of the players.
We consider a standard extension of the Nash equilibrium concept denoted as a partial cooperative equilibrium as well as an equilibrium concept in which the coalition of cooperators has a leadership position. Existence results are developed for these new equilibrium concepts. We identify conditions on these partial cooperative games under which the various equilibrium concepts are equivalent.
We apply this game theoretic framework to existing models of multi-market oligopolies and international pollution abatement. In a multi-market oligopoly typically a merger paradox emerges in the partial cooperative equilibrium, which vanishes if the cartel of collaborators exploits its leadership position. Our application to international pollution abatement treaties shows that cooperation by a sufficiently large group of countries results in a Pareto improvement over the standard tragedy of the commons outcome described by the Nash equilibrium.

Los efectos de la participación política ciudadana en Colombia: la revocatoria de mandato en Boyacá

La revocatoria de mandato es una herramienta de participación política ciudadana en Colombia establecida hace ya más de veinte años. Sin embargo, y a pesar de que ha sido implementada en 146 casos, ningún gobernante ha sido revocado o ratificado por este medio en el país. Este hecho ha motivado varias investigaciones que se han centrado en los problemas operativos, normativos y las dificultades en la implementación de la herramienta. Este trabajo busca ir más allá y centrarse en los efectos políticos y sociales que afectan, de manera positiva o negativa, esta herramienta de participación política ciudadana. Siendo una herramienta que involucra directamente a los ciudadanos con la política local, las acciones que se lleven a cabo durante todo el proceso pueden afectar a la población. Esto se puede afirmar si se tiene en cuenta que la historia política colombiana ha estado permeada por el autoritarismo y el clientelismo, donde actores poderosos a nivel local, pertenecientes a oligopolios políticos, se encuentran legitimados por características históricas para adelantar acciones que afectan la seguridad, tranquilidad e integridad de la población. El análisis involucra tres procesos de revocatoria de mandato en el departamento de Boyacá durante el periodo 2008-2011: Tunja, Samacá y Somondoco; resaltando el papel que cada actor juega en el respectivo proceso de revocatoria, así como sus motivaciones para ser parte de él y las acciones que adelanten para asegurar el éxito o fracaso de esta herramienta. Para ello se utilizó una metodología cualitativa, consistente en monitoreo de medios y entrevistas semiestructuradas a los diferentes actores de los procesos, lo cual permite reconstruir los casos de estudio.

An experiment on energy-saving competition with socially responsible consumers: opening the black box

We present results from experimental price-setting oligopolies in which green firms undertake different levels of energy-saving investments motivated by public subsidies and demand-side advantages. We find that consumers reveal higher willingness to pay for greener sellers’ products. This observation in conjunction to the fact that greener sellers set higher prices is compatible with the use and interpretation of energy-saving behaviour as a differentiation strategy. However, sellers do not exploit the resulting advantage through sufficiently high price-cost margins, because they seem trapped into “run to stay still” competition. Regarding the use of public subsidies to energy-saving sellers we uncover an undesirable crowding-out effect of consumers’ intrinsic tendency to support green manufacturers. Namely, consumers may be less willing to support a green seller whose energy-saving strategy yields a direct financial benefit. Finally, we disentangle two alternative motivations for consumer’s attractions to pro-social firms; first, the self-interested recognition of the firm’s contribution to the public and private welfare and, second, the need to compensate a firm for the cost entailed in each pro-social action. Our results show the prevalence of the former over the latter.

Inimigos públicos: crimes corporativos e necrocorporações

As corporações estão presentes em todos os lugares e em quase todos os aspectos de nossas vidas, porém, elas podem ser perigosas para a sociedade, protagonizando ações com impactos negativos para consumidores, trabalhadores, meio ambiente e comunidades. Nesta tese, lançamos nosso olhar sobre o lado sombrio das corporações, explorando dois crimes corporativos cometidos no Brasil por duas corporações transnacionais da indústria química, uma indústria predominada por grandes corporações operando em forma de oligopólios, dentro de um setor altamente estratégico por produzir insumos para a produção da maioria dos bens de consumo. Nosso objetivo é compreender os crimes corporativos para além da perspectiva funcionalista predominante na literatura sobre o tema. Para tanto, realizamos uma pesquisa qualitativa, com base na perspectiva crítica, focalizando dois casos ocorridos há mais de quatro décadas, no Brasil. Para reunir material empírico, entrevistamos ex-trabalhadores e trabalhadores das corporações protagonistas dos crimes, ex-moradores da comunidade atingida pelos crimes e especialistas, como advogados e profissionais da saúde, que se envolveram nos casos. As entrevistas foram do tipo narrativa, tendo sido gravadas e, posteriormente, transcritas para análise. Além das entrevistas, reunimos diversos documentos sobre os casos, como a cobertura jornalística, relatórios técnicos, sentenças e acórdãos. Analisamos o material empírico buscando reconhecer que os crimes corporativos ocorreram como uma extensão das organizações e de seu modo de organizar, e não como infortúnio ou efeitos colaterais não intencionais. Como principais resultados, desenvolvemos os conceitos de necrocorporação e crimes corporativos contra a vida. Nossa análise estendeu-se sobre as articulações engendradas pelas corporações; a produção da morte; e o poder, o consentimento e a resistência. Em ambos os casos analisados, os crimes foram cometidos na busca pelos objetivos corporativos, provocando a morte e doenças, bem como outros danos irreversíveis ao meio ambiente e à comunidade. Nossos resultados apontam para a necessidade de uma mudança no modo de pensar quanto às relações entre governos, sociedade e corporações, iniciando-se pela dissolução desse modelo de organização de negócios.

Expansão da privatização/mercantilização do ensino superior Brasileiro: a formação dos oligopólios

O objetivo principal deste artigo é apresentar uma análise crítica das políticas de expansão da educação superior, no Brasil, instituídas pós-LDB/1996, com a finalidade de identificar e discutir as novas configurações dessa expansão, em especial a que vem sendo efetivada, a partir de 2007, com a criação de redes de empresas por meio da compra e (ou) fusão de instituições de ensino superior privadas do país, por empresas nacionais e internacionais de ensino superior e pela abertura de capitais destas nas bolsas de valores, configurando a formação de oligopólios. Para tanto, utilizamos como recurso metodológico a pesquisa bibliográfica, especificamente a consulta em fontes documentais diversas, em especial, web sites de empresas educacionais, bem como de órgãos da imprensa tradicional e da mídia eletrônica nacionais. Nas considerações finais, apontamos algumas tendências da mercantilização do ensino superior, no Brasil.

A agenda da regulação da comunicação social no Brasil: da constituinte aos impasses contemporâneos

The paper analyzes the regulatory framework for the Media in Brazil in the Federal Constitution and the nexus between democratization and constitutional process, interpreting relevant actors (government, political parties, civil society) and figured as the themes of communication and institutional political agenda. The obstacles to the regulation of many of the statements remain constitutional (right of communication; seal monopolies / oligopolies; regionalization of cultural production; nationalist character in control of broadcasting; compatibility between segments state, public and commercial; Social Communication Council), that replaces debate on the very principle of the right to communication regulation by analyzing the corresponding decisionmaking processes. This conflictual agenda-setting involves multiple interests, from strictly commercial aspirations of companies operating in this market, going by the increasing share of religious institutions who also want to expand upon practices of proselytizing until the interests of policy makers who also have control over a slice of that business.

Política y comunicación : el impacto de la Ley de Servicios de Comunicación Audiovisual en el escenario mediático

El año 2009 significó para Argentina un momento de discusiones que provocaron interpelaciones al sistema democrático. Después 26 años de recuperada la democracia, el Estado modificó la dictatorial legislación que regula los servicios de comunicación audiovisuales. Esto implica una ampliación de la democratización del sistema de medios, tanto en las voces presentes, como en los autorizados para su uso y explotación. Esta nueva legislación permite que más y diversos sujetos puedan hacer uso de su derecho a comunicar y obliga a los oligopolios de la comunicación a ceder parte de sus licencias, de ahí las presiones económicas para frenar la nueva norma.