'A responsible nuclear weapons power' : Nuclear Weapons and Indian Foreign Policy

This thesis examines the interrelationship and dynamics between the Indian United Progressive Alliance government’s foreign policy and its nuclear weapons policy. The purpose of the study is to situate nuclear policy within a foreign policy framework, and the fundamental research problem is thus how does the Indian nuclear policy reflect and respond to the Indian foreign policy? The study examines the intentions in the Indian foreign and nuclear policies, and asks whether these intentions are commensurable or incommensurable. Moreover, the thesis asks whether the UPA government differs from its predecessors, most notably the Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance government in its foreign and nuclear policies. Answers to these questions are based on the interpretation of political texts and speeches as suggested by Quentin Skinner’s notion of meaning3, what does a writer or speaker mean by what he or she says in a given text, and by J.L. Austin’s speech act theory. This linguistic perspective and the approach of intertextualizing, place the political acts within their contingent intellectual and political contexts. The notion of strategic culture is therefore introduced to provide context for these juxtapositions. The thesis firstly analyses the societal, historical and intellectual context of India’s foreign and nuclear policy. Following from this analysis the thesis then examines the foreign and nuclear policies of Prime Minister Manmo-han Singh’s UPA government. This analysis focuses on the texts, speeches and statements of Indian authorities between 2004 and 2008. This study forwards the following claims: firstly, the UPA Government conducts a foreign policy that is mainly and explicitly inclusive, open and enhancing, and it conducts a nuclear policy that is mainly and implicitly excluding, closed and protective. Secondly, despite the fact that the notion of military security is widely appreciated and does not, as such, necessarily collide with foreign policy, the UPA Government conducts a nuclear policy that is incommensurable with its foreign policy. Thirdly, the UPA Gov-ernment foreign and nuclear policies are, nevertheless, commensurable re-garding their internal intentions. Finally, the UPA Government is conduct-ing a nuclear policy that is gradually leading India towards having a triad of nuclear weapons with various platforms and device designs and a function-ing and robust command and control system encompassing political and military planning, decision-making and execution. Regarding the question of the possible differences between the UPA and NDA governments this thesis claims that, despite their different ideological roots and orientations in domestic affairs, the Indian National Congress Party conducts, perhaps surprisingly, quite a similar foreign and nuclear policy to the Bharatiya Janata Party.

Invention and uninvention in nuclear weapons politics

If there is one uncontroversial point in nuclear weapons politics it is that uninventing nuclear weapons is impossible. This article seeks to make this claim controversial by showing that it is premised on attenuated understandings of invention and the status of objects operative through familiar but problematic conceptual dualisms. The claimed impossibility of uninvention is an assertion that invention is irreversible. Drawing on “new materialism” this article produces a different understanding of invention, reinvention, and uninvention as ontologically similar practices of techno-political invention. On the basis of empirical material on the invention and re-invention of nuclear weapons, and an in-depth ethnography of laboratories inventing a portable radiation detector, both the process of invention and the “objects” themselves (weapons and detectors) are shown to be fragile and not wholly irreversible processes of assembling diverse actors (human and non-human) and provisionally stabilizing their relations. Nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented! Why not?

The Bomb: Nuclear Weapons in their Historical, Strategic and Ethical Context

This book examines to what extent the invention and first use of nuclear weapons was a turning point in the history of warfare and strategy(to what extent was it a mere continuation or perfection of air power strategy? Were the casualty numbers really unprecedented?), the ethics of war (was this form of war against civilians unprecedented?), and it asks whether it was an expression of total war or did it create total war

Beliefs, cultures, proliferation and use of nuclear weapons

This article demonstrates the centrality of mentality, culture, beliefs and historical lessons for nuclear prolifertion. Using the historical casestudies of Britain, France, and West Germany, it encourages researchers to look at the mentality/culture of potential proliferators rather than apply a culture-less "Realist" IR theory approach that assumes that desicion-makers the world over think like Bismarck.

Civilian casualties and nuclear weapons: the application of the rule of distinction

This chapter considers the possible use in armed conflict of low-yield (also known as tactical) nuclear weapons. The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion maintained that it is a cardinal principle that a State must never make civilians an object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets. As international humanitarian law applies equally to any use of nuclear weapons, it is argued that there is no use of nuclear weapons that could spare civilian casualties particularly if you view the long-term health and environmental effects of the use of such weaponry.

Nuclear weapons and deterrence

Discusses deterrence theory in relation to the nuclear armed nations. Suggests the world may turn from the deterrence of war using nuclear weapons to deterring countries and other oganisations from their acquisition.

Cleanup worker exposures to hazardous chemicals at a former nuclear weapons plant : piloting of an exposure surveillance system

Cleanup of former U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons production facilities involves potential exposures to various hazardous chemicals. We have collaboratively developed and piloted an exposure database and surveillance system for cleanup worker hazardous chemical exposure data with a cleanup contractor at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS). A unique system feature is the incorporation of a 34-category work task-coding scheme. This report presents an overview of the data captured by this system during development and piloting from March 1995 through August 1998. All air samples collected were entered into the system. Of the 859 breathing zone samples collected, 103 unique employees and 39 unique compounds were represented. Breathing zone exposure levels were usually low (86% of breathing zone samples were below analytical limits of detection). The use of respirators and other exposure controls was high (87 and 88%, respectively). Occasional high-level excursions did occur. Detailed quantitative summaries are provided for the six most monitored compounds: asbestos, beryllium, carbon tetrachloride, chromium, lead, and methylene chloride. Task and job title data were successfully collected for most samples, and showed specific cleanup activities by pipe fitters to be the most commonly represented in the database. Importantly, these results demonstrate the feasibility of the implementation of integrated exposure database and surveillance systems by practicing industrial hygienists employed in industry as well as the preventive potential and research uses of such systems. This exposure database and surveillance system--the central features of which are applicable in any industrial work setting--has enabled one of the first systematic quantitative characterizations of DOE cleanup worker exposures to hazardous chemicals.

Integrating workplace exposure databases for occupational medicine services and epidemiologic studies at a former nuclear weapons facility

We outline methods for integrating epidemiologic and industrial hygiene data systems for the purpose of exposure estimation, exposure surveillance, worker notification, and occupational medicine practice. We present examples of these methods from our work at the Rocky Flats Plant?a former nuclear weapons facility that fabricated plutonium triggers for nuclear weapons and is now being decontaminated and decommissioned. The weapons production processes exposed workers to plutonium, gamma photons, neutrons, beryllium, asbestos, and several hazardous chemical agents, including chlorinated hydrocarbons and heavy metals. We developed a job exposure matrix (JEM) for estimating exposures to 10 chemical agents in 20 buildings for 120 different job categories over a production history spanning 34 years. With the JEM, we estimated lifetime chemical exposures for about 12,000 of the 16,000 former production workers. We show how the JEM database is used to estimate cumulative exposures over different time periods for epidemiological studies and to provide notification and determine eligibility for a medical screening program developed for former workers. We designed an industrial hygiene data system for maintaining exposure data for current cleanup workers. We describe how this system can be used for exposure surveillance and linked with the JEM and databases on radiation doses to develop lifetime exposure histories and to determine appropriate medical monitoring tests for current cleanup workers. We also present time-line-based graphical methods for reviewing and correcting exposure estimates and reporting them to individual workers.

Contamination of Alpine snow and ice at Colle Gnifetti, Swiss/Italian Alps, from nuclear weapons tests

Plutonium is present in the environment as a consequence of atmospheric nuclear tests, nuclear weapons production and industrial releases over the past 50 years. To study temporal trends, a high resolution Pu record was obtained by analyzing 52 discrete samples of an alpine firn/ice core from Colle Gnifetti (Monte Rosa, 4450 m a.s.l.), dating from 1945 to 1990. The 239Pu signal was recorded directly, without decontamination or preconcentration steps, using an Inductively Coupled Plasma - Sector Field Mass Spectrometer (ICP-SFMS) equipped with an high efficiency sample introduction system, thus requiring much less sample preparation than previously reported methods. The 239Pu profile reflects the three main periods of atmospheric nuclear weapons testing: the earliest peak lasted from 1954/55 to 1958 and was caused by the first testing period reaching a maximum in 1958. Despite a temporary halt of testing in 1959/60, the Pu concentration decreased only by half with respect to the 1958 peak due to long atmospheric residence times. In 1961/62 Pu concentrations rapidly increased reaching a maximum in 1963, which was about 40% more intense than the 1958 peak. After the signing of the "Limited Test Ban Treaty" between USA and USSR in 1964, Pu deposition decreased very sharply reaching a minimum in 1967. The third period (1967-1975) is characterized by irregular Pu concentrations with smaller peaks (about 20-30% of the 1964 peak) which might be related to the deposition of Saharan dust contaminated by the French nuclear tests of the 1960s. The data presented are in very good agreement with Pu profiles previously obtained from the Col du Dome ice core (by multi-collector ICP-MS) and Belukha ice core (by Accelerator Mass Spectrometry, AMS). Although a semi-quantitative method was employed here, the results are quantitatively comparable to previously published results.