Changing the guard? China and the nuclear nonproliferation regime

China's profile in the nuclear nonproliferation regime is changing at a crucial time. The regime is under considerable internal and external strain as a result of eroding international support and trends in vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation. While China's nonproliferation agenda and approach differ in some respects from those of other key actors, the gap separating China from the established drivers of efforts to address horizontal nuclear proliferation in terms of the objectives, institutions, and approach of the nonproliferation regime is diminishing, and there is considerable potential for China to contribute to the capacity of the regime to adapt to changing requirements. The Asia-Pacific region features both as the area of greatest nonproliferation concern to China and as the area where proliferation concerns are most likely to spur the further qualitative development of Chinese nonproliferation policy.

Nuclear nonproliferation : DOE needs better controls to identify contractors having foreign interests : report to the Chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate /

"B-221179.10"--p.1

Reviewing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) /

"As currently interpreted, it is difficult to see why the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) warrants much support as a nonproliferation convention. Most foreign ministries, including that of Iran and the United States, insist that Article IV of the NPT recognizes all states' "inalienable right" of all states to develop "peaceful nuclear energy". This includes money-losing activities, such as nuclear fuel reprocessing, which can bring countries to the very brink of acquiring nuclear weapons. If the NPT is intended to ensure that states share peaceful "benefits" of nuclear energy and to prevent the spread of nuclear bomb making technologies, it is difficult to see how it can accomplish either if the interpretation identified above is correct."--P. 3

U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy : hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, second session, September 29, 1982.

Mode of access: Internet.

The Second Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference : implications of recent nuclear developments : hearing before the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, first session, July 16, 1979.

Mode of access: Internet.

Nuclear rivalry in South Asia : an examination of post Cold War nuclear arms control initiatives

South Asia has emerged in the post-Cold War era as a region where ongoing nuclear rivalry has the potential to result in a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan. The United States, together with the global community, is devoting considerable effort to prevent the further development and deployment of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan. This thesis analyses the underlying reasons for the ongoing nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan, details post-Cold War initiatives to end the nuclear rivalry and examines the prospect of United States efforts to cap, reduce and eventually eliminate the nuclear arsenals of India and Pakistan. The thesis finds that historical factors form the basis of the continuing hostility and animosity between the two nations. The two nations have been bitter rivals since the time of partition in 1947 and the disputed territory of Kashmir continues to be the manifestation of deep seated antagonism and hostility. Pakistan's geography leaves it extremely vulnerable to conventional Indian attack and possession of nuclear weapons is seen as a means to redress the imbalance. Strong domestic support together with fervent nationalism and international prestige will continue to drive the nuclear programs of each nation. This thesis concludes that the nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan is regional in nature and the end of the Cold War has done little to improve the prospects for nuclear disarmament in the region. United States led efforts have failed to persuade India or Pakistan to either accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or dismantle their nuclear weapons. The thesis also notes that the United States has failed to take account of China as a significant regional power and it's impact on the nuclear programs of India and Pakistan. A fresh approach (to include China) with more emphasis on regional dialogue is suggested as a first step to ending the nuclear rivalry.

Nuclear weapons and deterrence

Discusses deterrence theory in relation to the nuclear armed nations. Suggests the world may turn from the deterrence of war using nuclear weapons to deterring countries and other oganisations from their acquisition.

Nuclear reactor options to reduce the risk of proliferation and to succeed current light water reactor technology : report to the Congress /

"B-164105."

Third Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [microform] : hearing before the subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security, and Science and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-ninth Congress, first session, August 1, 1985.

CIS Microfiche Accession Numbers: CIS 86 H381-49

The dicey impact of a "nuclear freeze" on the defense posture of the free world : report together with dissenting view of the Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-eighth Congress, first session, March 11, 1983.

Mode of access: Internet.

Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013 : report (to accompany H.R. 850) (Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office).

Mode of access: Internet.

Política externa brasileira e o Tratado de Não-Proliferação de Armas Nucleares (TNP): da resistência à adesão

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

China's Strategic Choices towards North Korea and Iran

This study tests two hypotheses. First, China cooperates with the United States only when it is able to obtain material rewards. Second, without material incentives from the United States, China straddles between the United States on one hand and Iran and North Korea on the other. My findings show that neither Structural Realism, which holds anti-hegemonism alliance, nor Constructivism, which holds positive assimilation of the nuclear nonproliferation norm explains Chinese international behavior comprehensively. My balance of interest model explains Chinese foreign policy on the noncompliant states better. The cases cover the Sino-North Korean and Sino-Iranian diplomatic histories from 1990 to 2013 vis-à-vis the United States. The study is both a within-case comparison—that is, changes of China’s stance across time—and a cross-case comparison in China’s position regarding Iran and North Korea. My comparisons contribute to theoretical and empirical analyses in international relations literature. Theoretically, the research creates different options for the third party between the two antagonistic actors. China will have seven different types of reaction: balancing, bandwagoning, mediating, and abetting that foster strategic clarity versus hiding, delaying, and straddling which are symptomatic of strategic ambiguity. I argue that there is a gradation between pure balancing and pure supporting. Empirically, the test results show that Chinese leaders have tried to find a balance between its material interests and international reputation by engaging in straddling and delaying inconsistently. There are two major findings. First, China’s foreign policy has been reactive. Whereas prior to 2006, balancing against the U.S. had been a dominant strategy, since 2006, China has shown strategic ambiguity. Second, Chinese leaders believe that the preservation of stability in the region outweighs denuclearization of the noncompliant states, because it is in China’s interest to maintain a manageable tension between the U.S. and the noncompliant states. The balance of interest model suggests that the best way to understand China’s preferences is to consider them as products of rough calculation of risks and rewards on both the U.S. and the noncompliant states.

Combating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction : annex : annex to report of the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, pursuant to Public Law 293, 104th Congress.

"Staff prepared."--T.p.