Nuclear rivalry in South Asia : an examination of post Cold War nuclear arms control initiatives

South Asia has emerged in the post-Cold War era as a region where ongoing nuclear rivalry has the potential to result in a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan. The United States, together with the global community, is devoting considerable effort to prevent the further development and deployment of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan. This thesis analyses the underlying reasons for the ongoing nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan, details post-Cold War initiatives to end the nuclear rivalry and examines the prospect of United States efforts to cap, reduce and eventually eliminate the nuclear arsenals of India and Pakistan. The thesis finds that historical factors form the basis of the continuing hostility and animosity between the two nations. The two nations have been bitter rivals since the time of partition in 1947 and the disputed territory of Kashmir continues to be the manifestation of deep seated antagonism and hostility. Pakistan's geography leaves it extremely vulnerable to conventional Indian attack and possession of nuclear weapons is seen as a means to redress the imbalance. Strong domestic support together with fervent nationalism and international prestige will continue to drive the nuclear programs of each nation. This thesis concludes that the nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan is regional in nature and the end of the Cold War has done little to improve the prospects for nuclear disarmament in the region. United States led efforts have failed to persuade India or Pakistan to either accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or dismantle their nuclear weapons. The thesis also notes that the United States has failed to take account of China as a significant regional power and it's impact on the nuclear programs of India and Pakistan. A fresh approach (to include China) with more emphasis on regional dialogue is suggested as a first step to ending the nuclear rivalry.

Overview of nuclear arms control and defense strategy in NATO : hearings before the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-seventh Congress, second session, February 23, March 18 and 22, 1982.

Mode of access: Internet.

Third Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [microform] : hearing before the subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security, and Science and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-ninth Congress, first session, August 1, 1985.

CIS Microfiche Accession Numbers: CIS 86 H381-49

The future of arms control : hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations, and Environment of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, second session, on the control of nuclear arms, January 20, 21 and 25, 1982.

Mode of access: Internet.

Essays on arms control and national security /

Mode of access: Internet.

New purposes and priorities for arms control : a report to Sherman M. Funk, Inspector General of ACDA.

Shipping list no.: 93-98-P.

The MX missle and the Strategic Defense Initiative-- their implications on arms control negotiations : hearings before the Defense Policy Panel of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-ninth Congress, first session, February 27, 28; March 12, 13, 14, and 20, 1985.

Mode of access: Internet.

Arms control : Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty implementation : report to the chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate /

"B-241519."

Guns don’t kill people, cyborgs do::a Latourian provocation for transformatory arms control and disarmament

This article seeks to provoke a deeper engagement of Critical Security Studies with security's relations to technology and weapons. It explores existing assumptions about these relations in mainstream arms control and disarmament theory, and the way such assumptions are deployed and distributed in the current settlement of arms control and disarmament practice. It then draws on recent social and philosophical discussions of materiality, particularly on the thought of Bruno Latour, to propose a different set of concepts for exploring the aims and limits of arms control and disarmament. These concepts emphasise the mediating roles of material things in social relations and they may offer a richer view of the object of arms control (weapons and violence) and of the practices of arms limitation and reduction; one that may ultimately gesture towards a different understanding of arms politics, and that may be used to explore the transformatory potentials of arms control and disarmament.

Equal Security: Europe and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 1968-1976

SALT threatened to institutionalize a bipolar world order. NWS and NNWS alike feared that the US and SU will prioritize global security principles such as systemic stability and conflict stability to Atlantic and European security. Endangered was Europe’s security and position in the future world order. Parity in strategic weapons invalidated the US nuclear umbrella. An ABM deployment and a non-transfer regime threatened Europe’s nuclear defence options. The danger of a Limited War or a denuclearization of Central Europe led to a European co-ordination on nuclear arms control to assure the preservation of the West and the future of Europe.