Representing "Recursive" Default Logic in Modal Logic

The "recursive" definition of Default Logic is shown to be representable in a monotonic Modal Quantificational Logic whose modal laws are stronger than S5. Specifically, it is proven that a set of sentences of First Order Logic is a fixed-point of the "recursive" fixed-point equation of Default Logic with an initial set of axioms and defaults if and only if the meaning of the fixed-point is logically equivalent to a particular modal functor of the meanings of that initial set of sentences and of the sentences in those defaults. This is important because the modal representation allows the use of powerful automatic deduction systems for Modal Logic and because unlike the original "recursive" definition of Default Logic, it is easily generalized to the case where quantified variables may be shared across the scope of the components of the defaults.

On the Relationships Among Quantified Autoepistemic Logic, its Kernel, and Quantified Reflective Logic

A Quantified Autoepistemic Logic is axiomatized in a monotonic Modal Quantificational Logic whose modal laws are slightly stronger than S5. This Quantified Autoepistemic Logic obeys all the laws of First Order Logic and its L predicate obeys the laws of S5 Modal Logic in every fixed-point. It is proven that this Logic has a kernel not containing L such that L holds for a sentence if and only if that sentence is in the kernel. This result is important because it shows that L is superfluous thereby allowing the ori ginal equivalence to be simplified by eliminating L from it. It is also shown that the Kernel of Quantified Autoepistemic Logic is a generalization of Quantified Reflective Logic, which coincides with it in the propositional case.

Representing Reflective Logic in Modal Logic

The nonmonotonic logic called Reflective Logic is shown to be representable in a monotonic Modal Quantificational Logic whose modal laws are stronger than S5. Specifically, it is proven that a set of sentences of First Order Logic is a fixed-point of the fixed-point equation of Reflective Logic with an initial set of axioms and defaults if and only if the meaning of that set of sentences is logically equivalent to a particular modal functor of the meanings of that initial set of sentences and of the sentences in those defaults. This result is important because the modal representation allows the use of powerful automatic deduction systems for Modal Logic and because unlike the original Reflective Logic, it is easily generalized to the case where quantified variables may be shared across the scope of the components of the defaults thus allowing such defaults to produce quantified consequences. Furthermore, this generalization properly treats such quantifiers since all the laws of First Order Logic hold and since both the Barcan Formula and its converse hold.

Representing Default Logic in Modal Logic

The nonmonotonic logic called Default Logic is shown to be representable in a monotonic Modal Quantificational Logic whose modal laws are stronger than S5. Specifically, it is proven that a set of sentences of First Order Logic is a fixed-point of the fixed-point equation of Default Logic with an initial set of axioms and defaults if and only if the meaning or rather disquotation of that set of sentences is logically equivalent to a particular modal functor of the meanings of that initial set of sentences and of the sentences in those defaults. This result is important because the modal representation allows the use of powerful automatic deduction systems for Modal Logic and because unlike the original Default Logic, it is easily generalized to the case where quantified variables may be shared across the scope of the components of the defaults thus allowing such defaults to produce quantified consequences. Furthermore, this generalization properly treats such quantifiers since both the Barcan Formula and its converse hold.

On the Relationship between Quantified Reflective Logic and Quantified Default Logic

Reflective Logic and Default Logic are both generalized so as to allow universally quantified variables to cross modal scopes whereby the Barcan formula and its converse hold. This is done by representing both the fixed-point equation for Reflective Logic and the fixed-point equation for Default both as necessary equivalences in the Modal Quantificational Logic Z. and then inserting universal quantifiers before the defaults. The two resulting systems, called Quantified Reflective Logic and Quantified Default Logic, are then compared by deriving metatheorems of Z that express their relationships. The main result is to show that every solution to the equivalence for Quantified Default Logic is a strongly grounded solution to the equivalence for Quantified Reflective Logic. It is further shown that Quantified Reflective Logic and Quantified Default Logic have exactly the same solutions when no default has an entailment condition.

Representing Autoepistemic Logic in Modal Logic

The nonmonotonic logic called Autoepistemic Logic is shown to be representable in a monotonic Modal Quantificational Logic whose modal laws are stronger than S5. Specifically, it is proven that a set of sentences of First Order Logic is a fixed-point of the fixed-point equation of Autoepistemic Logic with an initial set of axioms if and only if the meaning or rather disquotation of that set of sentences is logically equivalent to a particular modal functor of the meaning of that initial set of sentences. This result is important because the modal representation allows the use of powerful automatic deduction systems for Modal Logic and unlike the original Autoepistemic Logic, it is easily generalized to the case where quantified variables may be shared across the scope of modal expressions thus allowing the derivation of quantified consequences. Furthermore, this generalization properly treats such quantifiers since both the Barcan formula and its converse hold.

Methods for Solving Necessary Equivalences

Nonmonotonic Logics such as Autoepistemic Logic, Reflective Logic, and Default Logic, are usually defined in terms of set-theoretic fixed-point equations defined over deductively closed sets of sentences of First Order Logic. Such systems may also be represented as necessary equivalences in a Modal Logic stronger than S5 with the added advantage that such representations may be generalized to allow quantified variables crossing modal scopes resulting in a Quantified Autoepistemic Logic, a Quantified Autoepistemic Kernel, a Quantified Reflective Logic, and a Quantified Default Logic. Quantifiers in all these generalizations obey all the normal laws of logic including both the Barcan formula and its converse. Herein, we address the problem of solving some necessary equivalences containing universal quantifiers over modal scopes. Solutions obtained by these methods are then compared to related results obtained in the literature by Circumscription in Second Order Logic since the disjunction of all the solutions of a necessary equivalence containing just normal defaults in these Quantified Logics, is equivalent to that system.

Embedding defeasible logic into logic programming

Defeasible reasoning is a simple but efficient approach to nonmonotonic reasoning that has recently attracted considerable interest and that has found various applications. Defeasible logic and its variants are an important family of defeasible reasoning methods. So far no relationship has been established between defeasible logic and mainstream nonmonotonic reasoning approaches. In this paper we establish close links to known semantics of logic programs. In particular, we give a translation of a defeasible theory D into a meta-program P(D). We show that under a condition of decisiveness, the defeasible consequences of D correspond exactly to the sceptical conclusions of P(D) under the stable model semantics. Without decisiveness, the result holds only in one direction (all defeasible consequences of D are included in all stable models of P(D)). If we wish a complete embedding for the general case, we need to use the Kunen semantics of P(D), instead.

The logic of ADHD : a brief review of fallacious reasoning

This paper has two central purposes: the first is to survey some of the more important examples of fallacious argument, and the second is to examine the frequent use of these fallacies in support of the psychological construct: Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). The paper divides 12 familiar fallacies into three different categories—material, psychological and logical—and contends that advocates of ADHD often seem to employ these fallacies to support their position. It is suggested that all researchers, whether into ADHD or otherwise, need to pay much closer attention to the construction of their arguments if they are not to make truth claims unsupported by satisfactory evidence, form or logic.