Boardroom identities: can independence by 'cued' in directors?

Director independence is a cornerstone of fiduciary responsibility and good corporate governance. However, most directors are recruited because of the roles and networks they hold, meaning that there is an expectation that identities held by a director outside the boardroom will be used to benefit the company. While this often works well, it is acknowledged that many directors, either consciously or subconsciously, will at times allow themselves to be influenced by their other roles to the detriment of the governance process. In this paper we argue that identity theory can be used to explore the impact of ‘identity’ on corporate governance and that practical tools can be developed to actively assist directors to maintain ‘independence’ in the boardroom.

The disclosure of directors' share option information in UK companies

This paper considers the empirical determinants of the quality of information disclosed about directors’ share options in a sample of large companies in 1994 and 1995. Policy recommendations, consolidated in the recommendations of the Greenbury report, argue for full and complete disclosure of director option information. In this paper two modest contributions to the UK empirical literature are made. First, the current degree of option information disclosure in the FTSE 350 companies is documented. Second, option information disclosure as a function of variables that are thought to in¯uence corporate costs of disclosure is modelled. The results have implications for corporate governance. Speci®cally, support is oVered for the monitoring function of nonexecutive directors. In addition, nondisclosure is found to be related to variables which proxy proprietary costs of revealing information (such as company size).

Frameworks in regulating company directors : rethinking the philosophical foundations to enhance accountability

Sets out a system of corporate governance regulation, aimed at combining legal and social methods of governing director behaviour and at creating a framework flexible enough to accommodate different business and ethical cultures. Outlines the theoretical basis of corporate governance and the broad responsibilities of directors, and discusses the extent to which they can and should be regulated. Discusses the constitution of a regulatory framework encompassing law, soft law and best practice, and ethics.

Do board contacts matter? : an analysis of the relationship between boards of directors’ ties and the performance of Australia’s largest companies.

Boards of directors are thought to provide access to a wealth of knowledge and resources for the companies they serve, and are considered important to corporate governance. Under the Resource Based View (RBV) of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984) boards are viewed as a strategic resource available to firms. As a consequence there has been a significant research effort aimed at establishing a link between board attributes and company performance. In this thesis I explore and extend the study of interlocking directorships (Mizruchi, 1996; Scott 1991a) by examining the links between directors’ opportunity networks and firm performance. Specifically, I use resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and social capital theory (Burt, 1980b; Coleman, 1988) as the basis for a new measure of a board’s opportunity network. I contend that both directors’ formal company ties and their social ties determine a director’s opportunity network through which they are able to access and mobilise resources for their firms. This approach is based on recent studies that suggest the measurement of interlocks at the director level, rather than at the firm level, may be a more reliable indicator of this phenomenon. This research uses publicly available data drawn from Australia’s top-105 listed companies and their directors in 1999. I employ Social Network Analysis (SNA) (Scott, 1991b) using the UCINET software to analyse the individual director’s formal and social networks. SNA is used to measure a the number of ties a director has to other directors in the top-105 company director network at both one and two degrees of separation, that is, direct ties and indirect (or ‘friend of a friend’) ties. These individual measures of director connectedness are aggregated to produce a board-level network metric for comparison with measures of a firm’s performance using multiple regression analysis. Performance is measured with accounting-based and market-based measures. Findings indicate that better-connected boards are associated with higher market-based company performance (measured by Tobin’s q). However, weaker and mostly unreliable associations were found for accounting-based performance measure ROA. Furthermore, formal (or corporate) network ties are a stronger predictor of market performance than total network ties (comprising social and corporate ties). Similarly, strong ties (connectedness at degree-1) are better predictors of performance than weak ties (connectedness at degree-2). My research makes four contributions to the literature on director interlocks. First, it extends a new way of measuring a board’s opportunity network based on the director rather than the company as the unit of interlock. Second, it establishes evidence of a relationship between market-based measures of firm performance and the connectedness of that firm’s board. Third, it establishes that director’s formal corporate ties matter more to market-based firm performance than their social ties. Fourth, it establishes that director’s strong direct ties are more important to market-based performance than weak ties. The thesis concludes with implications for research and practice, including a more speculative interpretation of these results. In particular, I raise the possibility of reverse causality – that is networked directors seek to join high-performing companies. Thus, the relationship may be a result of symbolic action by companies seeking to increase the legitimacy of their firms rather than a reflection of the social capital available to the companies. This is an important consideration worthy of future investigation.

Regulating non-executive directors in Australia : a socio-legal approach

Discusses the role of legislation and codes of conduct in influencing the behaviour of non-executive directors. Outlines the functions of a board of directors and considers the role on non-executive directors in particular. Traces the development of standards of skill required on non-executive directors both under the Australian Corporations Act 2001 and under common law. Questions whether these have brought about a real change in behaviour. Considers whether professionalisation of directorship could be more effective.

Does Chinese traditional values matter in regulating China's company directors? Preliminary findings from surveys in Hong Kong

Much has been said about Chinese corporate governance and the new laws on companies. While most literature focuses on either the political or the legal doctrinal issues, this paper argues that Chinese traditional values do matter in Chinese corporate governance. The object of this paper is to report on the preliminary findings of a project supported by the General Research Fund in Hong Kong (HK). Thus far the survey results from HK respondents support our hypothesis. As such, traditional Chinese values should be on the agenda of the next round of company law reforms in China.

The role of the board of directors : perceptions of managerial elites

We highlight how directors and senior managers perceive the roles of a board to involve overseeing risk and compliance, strategy, governance, developing the CEO and senior management and managing stakeholders. We find that managers and directors perceive board effectiveness as linked to different combinations of these roles and that there appear to be differences in perceptions between different types of firms. We conclude that clarity around the board’s role set is critical to furthering the corporate governance research agenda, and that the relationship between board roles and perceived board effectiveness differs between managers and directors.

Boards of directors' contribution to strategy : a literature review and research agenda

Research Question/Issue: Over the last four decades, research on the relationship between boards of directors and strategy has proliferated. Yet to date there is little theoretical and empirical agreement regarding the question of how boards of directors contribute to strategy. This review assesses the extant literature by highlighting emerging trends and identifying several avenues for future research. Research Findings/Results: Using a content-analysis of 150 articles published in 23 management journals up to 2007, we describe and analyze how research on boards of directors and strategy has evolved over time. We illustrate how topics, theories, settings, and sources of data interact and influence insights about board–strategy relationships during three specific periods. Theoretical Implications: Our study illustrates that research on boards of directors and strategy evolved from normative and structural approaches to behavioral and cognitive approaches. Our results encourage future studies to examine the impact of institutional and context-specific factors on the (expected) contribution of boards to strategy, and to apply alternative methods to fully capture the impact of board processes and dynamics on strategy making. Practical Implications: The increasing interest in boards of directors’ contribution to strategy echoes a movement towards more strategic involvement of boards of directors. However, best governance practices and the emphasis on board independence and control may hinder the board contribution to the strategic decision making. Our study invites investors and policy-makers to consider the requirements for an effective strategic task when they nominate board members and develop new regulations.