Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative games

We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game. We analyze the subgame perfect equilibria of this supergame, and its implications on the original game. We discuss existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of the agreement reachable through this bargaining process. We illustrate the consequences of applying such a process to several common two-player non-cooperative games: the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Hawk-Dove Game, the Trust Game, and the Ultimatum Game. In each of them, the proposed bargaining process gives rise to Pareto-efficient agreements that are typically different from the Nash equilibrium of the original games.

Implementing with veto players: a simple non cooperative game

The paper adapts a non cooperative game presented by Dagan, Serrano and Volij (1997) for bankruptcy problems to the context of TU veto balanced games. We investigate the relationship between the Nash outcomes of a noncooperative game and solution concepts of cooperative games such as the nucleolus, kernel and the egalitarian core.

Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?

It is well-known that non-cooperative and cooperative game theory may yield different solutions to games. These differences are particularly dramatic in the case of truels, or three-person duels, in which the players may fire sequentially or simultaneously, and the games may be one-round or n-round. Thus, it is never a Nash equilibrium for all players to hold their fire in any of these games, whereas in simultaneous one-round and n-round truels such cooperation, wherein everybody survives, is in both the a -core and ß -core. On the other hand, both cores may be empty, indicating a lack of stability, when the unique Nash equilibrium is one survivor. Conditions under which each approach seems most applicable are discussed. Although it might be desirable to subsume the two approaches within a unified framework, such unification seems unlikely since the two approaches are grounded in fundamentally different notions of stability.

A spatial collision avoidance strategy for UAVs in a non-cooperative environment

This paper presents a feasible spatial collision avoidance approach for fixed-wing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The proposed strategy aims to achieve the desired relative bearing in the horizontal plane and relative elevation in the vertical plane so that the host aircraft is able to avoid collision with the intruder aircraft in 3D. The host aircraft will follow a desired trajectory in the collision avoidance course and resume the pre-arranged trajectory after collision is avoided. The approaching stopping condition is determined for the host aircraft to trigger an evasion maneuver to avoid collision in terms of measured heading. A switching controller is designed to achieve the spatial collision avoidance strategy. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed approach can effectively avoid spatial collision, making it suitable for integration into flight control systems of UAVs.

A 3D collision avoidance strategy for UAVs in a non-cooperative environment

This paper presents a feasible 3D collision avoidance approach for fixed-wing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The proposed strategy aims to achieve the desired relative bearing in the horizontal plane and relative elevation in the vertical plane so that the host aircraft is able to avoid collision with the intruder aircraft in 3D. The host aircraft will follow a desired trajectory in the collision avoidance course and resume the pre-arranged trajectory after collision is avoided. The approaching stopping condition is determined for the host aircraft to trigger an evasion maneuver to avoid collision in terms of measured heading. A switching controller is designed to achieve the spatial collision avoidance strategy. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed approach can effectively avoid spatial collision, making it suitable for integration into flight control systems of UAVs.

Comparing cooperative and non-cooperative crash risk assessment

Cooperative Systems provide, through the multiplication of information sources over the road, a lot of potential to improve the assessment of the road risk describing a particular driving situation. In this paper, we compare the performance of a cooperative risk assessment approach against a non-cooperative approach; we used an advanced simulation framework, allowing for accurate and detailed, close-to-reality simulations. Risk is estimated, in both cases, with combinations of indicators based on the TTC. For the non-cooperative approach, vehicles are equipped only with an AAC-like forward-facing ranging sensor. On the other hand, for the cooperative approach, vehicles share information through 802.11p IVC and create an augmented map representing their environment; risk indicators are then extracted from this map. Our system shows that the cooperative risk assessment provides a systematic increase of forward warning to most of the vehicles involved in a freeway emergency braking scenario, compared to a non-cooperative system.

A non-cooperative game-theoretic approach to channel assignment in multi-channel multi-radio wireless networks

Channel assignment in multi-channel multi-radio wireless networks poses a significant challenge due to scarcity of number of channels available in the wireless spectrum. Further, additional care has to be taken to consider the interference characteristics of the nodes in the network especially when nodes are in different collision domains. This work views the problem of channel assignment in multi-channel multi-radio networks with multiple collision domains as a non-cooperative game where the objective of the players is to maximize their individual utility by minimizing its interference. Necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for the channel assignment to be a Nash Equilibrium (NE) and efficiency of the NE is analyzed by deriving the lower bound of the price of anarchy of this game. A new fairness measure in multiple collision domain context is proposed and necessary and sufficient conditions for NE outcomes to be fair are derived. The equilibrium conditions are then applied to solve the channel assignment problem by proposing three algorithms, based on perfect/imperfect information, which rely on explicit communication between the players for arriving at an NE. A no-regret learning algorithm known as Freund and Schapire Informed algorithm, which has an additional advantage of low overhead in terms of information exchange, is proposed and its convergence to the stabilizing outcomes is studied. New performance metrics are proposed and extensive simulations are done using Matlab to obtain a thorough understanding of the performance of these algorithms on various topologies with respect to these metrics. It was observed that the algorithms proposed were able to achieve good convergence to NE resulting in efficient channel assignment strategies.

The Case for Non-Cooperative Multihoming of Users to Access Points in IEEE 802.11 WLANs

In many cases, a mobile user has the option of connecting to one of several IEEE 802.11 access points (APs),each using an independent channel. User throughput in each AP is determined by the number of other users as well as the frame size and physical rate being used. We consider the scenario where users could multihome, i.e., split their traffic amongst all the available APs, based on the throughput they obtain and the price charged. Thus, they are involved in a non-cooperative game with each other. We convert the problem into a fluid model and show that under a pricing scheme, which we call the cost price mechanism, the total system throughput is maximized,i.e., the system suffers no loss of efficiency due to selfish dynamics. We also study the case where the Internet Service Provider (ISP) could charge prices greater than that of the cost price mechanism. We show that even in this case multihoming outperforms unihoming, both in terms of throughput as well as profit to the ISP.

Linear quadratic game and non-cooperative predictive methods for potential application to modelling driver-AFS interactive steering control

This paper is concerned with the modelling of strategic interactions between the human driver and the vehicle active front steering (AFS) controller in a path-following task where the two controllers hold different target paths. The work is aimed at extending the use of mathematical models in representing driver steering behaviour in complicated driving situations. Two game theoretic approaches, namely linear quadratic game and non-cooperative model predictive control (non-cooperative MPC), are used for developing the driver-AFS interactive steering control model. For each approach, the open-loop Nash steering control solution is derived; the influences of the path-following weights, preview and control horizons, driver time delay and arm neuromuscular system (NMS) dynamics are investigated, and the CPU time consumed is recorded. It is found that the two approaches give identical time histories as well as control gains, while the non-cooperative MPC method uses much less CPU time. Specifically, it is observed that the introduction of weight on the integral of vehicle lateral displacement error helps to eliminate the steady-state path-following error; the increase in preview horizon and NMS natural frequency and the decline in time delay and NMS damping ratio improve the path-following accuracy. © 2013 Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.

Neural mechanisms of belief inference during cooperative games.

Humans have the arguably unique ability to understand the mental representations of others. For success in both competitive and cooperative interactions, however, this ability must be extended to include representations of others' belief about our intentions, their model about our belief about their intentions, and so on. We developed a "stag hunt" game in which human subjects interacted with a computerized agent using different degrees of sophistication (recursive inferences) and applied an ecologically valid computational model of dynamic belief inference. We show that rostral medial prefrontal (paracingulate) cortex, a brain region consistently identified in psychological tasks requiring mentalizing, has a specific role in encoding the uncertainty of inference about the other's strategy. In contrast, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex encodes the depth of recursion of the strategy being used, an index of executive sophistication. These findings reveal putative computational representations within prefrontal cortex regions, supporting the maintenance of cooperation in complex social decision making.

Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games

A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of efficient contracts. It is shown that they exist if and only if the set of possible coalitions contains a balanced subset. Moreover, a characterization of values that result in efficient contracts in the case of minimally balanced collections is provided.

Production externalities : cooperative and non-cooperative approaches

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Behavioral economics, wearable devices, and cooperative games: results from a population-based intervention to increase physical activity

Background: Health care literature supports the development of accessible interventions that integrate behavioral economics, wearable devices, principles of evidence-based behavior change, and community support. However, there are limited real-world examples of large scale, population-based, member-driven reward platforms. Subsequently, a paucity of outcome data exists and health economic effects remain largely theoretical. To complicate matters, an emerging area of research is defining the role of Superusers, the small percentage of unusually engaged digital health participants who may influence other members. Objective: The objective of this preliminary study is to analyze descriptive data from GOODcoins, a self-guided, free-to-consumer engagement and rewards platform incentivizing walking, running and cycling. Registered members accessed the GOODcoins platform through PCs, tablets or mobile devices, and had the opportunity to sync wearables to track activity. Following registration, members were encouraged to join gamified group challenges and compare their progress with that of others. As members met challenge targets, they were rewarded with GOODcoins, which could be redeemed for planet- or people-friendly products. Methods: Outcome data were obtained from the GOODcoins custom SQL database. The reporting period was December 1, 2014 to May 1, 2015. Descriptive self-report data were analyzed using MySQL and MS Excel. Results: The study period includes data from 1298 users who were connected to an exercise tracking device. Females consisted of 52.6% (n=683) of the study population, 33.7% (n=438) were between the ages of 20-29, and 24.8% (n=322) were between the ages of 30-39. 77.5% (n=1006) of connected and active members met daily-recommended physical activity guidelines of 30 minutes, with a total daily average activity of 107 minutes (95% CI 90, 124). Of all connected and active users, 96.1% (n=1248) listed walking as their primary activity. For members who exchanged GOODcoins, the mean balance was 4,000 (95% CI 3850, 4150) at time of redemption, and 50.4% (n=61) of exchanges were for fitness or outdoor products, while 4.1% (n=5) were for food-related items. Participants were most likely to complete challenges when rewards were between 201-300 GOODcoins. Conclusions: The purpose of this study is to form a baseline for future research. Overall, results indicate that challenges and incentives may be effective for connected and active members, and may play a role in achieving daily-recommended activity guidelines. Registrants were typically younger, walking was the primary activity, and rewards were mainly exchanged for fitness or outdoor products. Remaining to be determined is whether members were already physically active at time of registration and are representative of healthy adherers, or were previously inactive and were incentivized to change their behavior. As challenges are gamified, there is an opportunity to investigate the role of superusers and healthy adherers, impacts on behavioral norms, and how cooperative games and incentives can be leveraged across stratified populations. Study limitations and future research agendas are discussed.

The binding of synthetic triiodo L-thyronine analogs to human transthyretin: Molecular basis of cooperative and non-cooperative ligand recognition

Transthyretin (TTR) is a tetrameric beta-sheet-rich transporter protein directly involved in human amyloid diseases. Several classes of small molecules can bind to TTR delaying its amyloid fibril formation, thus being promising drug candidates to treat TTR amyloidoses. In the present study, we characterized the interactions of the synthetic triiodo L-thyronine analogs and thyroid hormone nuclear receptor TR beta-selecfive agonists GC-1 and GC-24 with the wild type and V30M variant of human transthyretin (TTR). To achieve this aim, we conducted in vitro TTR acid-mediated aggregation and isothermal titration calorimetry experiments and determined the TTR:GC-1 and TTR:GC-24 crystal structures. Our data indicate that both GC-1 and GC-24 bind to TTR in a non-cooperative manner and are good inhibitors of TTR aggregation, with dissociation constants for both hormone binding sites (HBS) in the low micromolar range. Analysis of the crystal structures of TTRwt:GC-1(24) complexes and their comparison with the TTRwt X-ray structure bound to its natural ligand thyroxine (T4) suggests, at the molecular level, the basis for the cooperative process displayed by T4 and the non-cooperative process provoked by both GC-1 and GC-24 during binding to TTR. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Lattices and discrete methods in cooperative games and decisions

Questa tesi si pone l'obiettivo di presentare la teoria dei giochi, in particolare di quelli cooperativi, insieme alla teoria delle decisioni, inquadrandole formalmente in termini di matematica discreta. Si tratta di due campi dove l'indagine si origina idealmente da questioni applicative, e dove tuttavia sono sorti e sorgono problemi più tipicamente teorici che hanno interessato e interessano gli ambienti matematico e informatico. Anche se i contributi iniziali sono stati spesso formulati in ambito continuo e utilizzando strumenti tipici di teoria della misura, tuttavia oggi la scelta di modelli e metodi discreti appare la più idonea. L'idea generale è quindi quella di guardare fin da subito al complesso dei modelli e dei risultati che si intendono presentare attraverso la lente della teoria dei reticoli. Ciò consente di avere una visione globale più nitida e di riuscire agilmente ad intrecciare il discorso considerando congiuntamente la teoria dei giochi e quella delle decisioni. Quindi, dopo avere introdotto gli strumenti necessari, si considerano modelli e problemi con il fine preciso di analizzare dapprima risultati storici e solidi, proseguendo poi verso situazioni più recenti, più complesse e nelle quali i risultati raggiunti possono suscitare perplessità. Da ultimo, vengono presentate alcune questioni aperte ed associati spunti per la ricerca.