Options for the development of the New Zealand Law of Charities

The Australian Centre for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies was briefed to advise the Charities Commission of New Zealand on ways in which the law of charity might be developed. The substantive issue underpinning the brief is a need to enable charity law in New Zealand to continue to develop in accordance with the societal values of New Zealand. This is an options paper and as such it does not explain the current law, but is intended to generate constructive discussion. Four options are sketched, with important issues and implications for each. No recommendation is made to adopt a particular option; there are strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats with each of the four approaches canvassed.

The New Zealand law reports.

Vols. for 1933-1936 include "The Law journal supplement to the New Zealand law reports."

Regulatory and enabling approaches to corporate law enforcement : patterns of litigation 1986-2002 and the effect of recent reforms in New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom

Enforcement of corporate rights and duties may follow either a ‘regulatory’ or ‘enabling’ model. If a regulatory approach is taken, enforcement action will generally be undertaken by regulatory agencies such as, in New Zealand, the Registrar of Companies and Securities Commission, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) or the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in the United Kingdom. If an enabling approach is chosen, enforcement action will more often be by private parties such as company shareholders, directors or creditors. When New Zealand's company law was reformed in 1993, a primarily private enforcement regime was adopted, consisting of a list of statutory directors' duties and an enhanced collection of shareholder remedies, based in part upon North American models and including a statutory derivative action. Public enforcement was largely confined to administrative matters and the enforcement of the disclosure requirements of New Zealand's securities law. While the previous enforcement regime was similarly reliant on private action, the law on directors' duties was less accessible, and shareholder action was hindered by the majority rule principle and the rule in Foss v Harbottle. This approach is in contrast with that used in Australia and the United Kingdom, where public agencies have a much more prominent enforcement role despite recent and proposed reforms to directors' duties and shareholder remedies. These reforms are designed to improve the ability of private parties to enforce corporate rights and duties. A survey of enforcement litigation in New Zealand since 1986 indicates that the object of a primarily enabling enforcement regime seems to have been achieved, and may well have been achieved even without the 1993 reform package. Private enforcement has, in fact, been much more prevalent than public enforcement since well before the enactment of the new legislation. Most enforcement action both before and after the reform was commenced by shareholders and shareholder/directors, and most involved closely held companies. Public enforcement was largely undertaken in areas such as securities law, where the wider public interest was affected. Similar surveys of Australian and United Kingdom enforcement litigation reveal a proportionally much greater reliance on public bodies to enforce corporate rights and duties, indicating a more regulatory approach. The ASIC and DTI enforced a wider range of provisions, affecting both closely and widely held companies, than those subject to public enforcement in New Zealand. Publicly enforced provisions in Australia and the United Kingdom include directors' duties and provisions dealing with disqualification from managing companies, as well as securities law requirements.

A summary view of government cost recovery policies in Australia and New Zealand relating to the supply of public sector information

Researching administrative history is problematical. A trail of authoritative documents is often hard to find; and useful summaries can be difficult to organise, especially if source material is in paper formats in geographically dispersed locations. In the absence of documents, the reasons for particular decisions and the rationale underpinning particular policies can be confounded as key personnel advance in their professions and retire. The rationale for past decisions may be lost for practical purposes; and if an organisation’s memory of events is diminished, its learning through experience is also diminished. Publishing this document tries to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort by other researchers that need to venture into how policies of charging for public sector information have been justified. The author compiled this work within a somewhat limited time period and the work does not pretend to be a complete or comprehensive analysis of the issues.----- A significant part of the role of government is to provide a framework of legally-enforceable rights and obligations that can support individuals and non-government organisations in their lawful activities. Accordingly, claims that governments should be more ‘business-like’ need careful scrutiny. A significant supply of goods and services occurs as non-market activity where neither benefits nor costs are quantified within conventional accounting systems or in terms of money. Where a government decides to provide information as a service; and information from land registries is archetypical, the transactions occur as a political decision made under a direct or a clearly delegated authority of a parliament with the requisite constitutional powers. This is not a market transaction and the language of the market confuses attempts to describe a number of aspects of how governments allocate resources.----- Cost recovery can be construed as an aspect of taxation that is a sole prerogative of a parliament. The issues are fundamental to political constitutions; but they become more complicated where states cede some taxing powers to a central government as part of a federal system. Nor should the absence of markets be construed necessarily as ‘market failure’ or even ‘government failure’. The absence is often attributable to particular technical, economic and political constraints that preclude the operation of markets. Arguably, greater care is needed in distinguishing between the polity and markets in raising revenues and allocating resources; and that needs to start by removing unhelpful references to ‘business’ in the context of government decision-making.