Regulatory and enabling approaches to corporate law enforcement : patterns of litigation 1986-2002 and the effect of recent reforms in New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom


Autoria(s): Berkahn, Matthew.
Data(s)

01/01/2003

Resumo

Enforcement of corporate rights and duties may follow either a ‘regulatory’ or ‘enabling’ model. If a regulatory approach is taken, enforcement action will generally be undertaken by regulatory agencies such as, in New Zealand, the Registrar of Companies and Securities Commission, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) or the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in the United Kingdom. If an enabling approach is chosen, enforcement action will more often be by private parties such as company shareholders, directors or creditors. When New Zealand's company law was reformed in 1993, a primarily private enforcement regime was adopted, consisting of a list of statutory directors' duties and an enhanced collection of shareholder remedies, based in part upon North American models and including a statutory derivative action. Public enforcement was largely confined to administrative matters and the enforcement of the disclosure requirements of New Zealand's securities law. While the previous enforcement regime was similarly reliant on private action, the law on directors' duties was less accessible, and shareholder action was hindered by the majority rule principle and the rule in Foss v Harbottle. This approach is in contrast with that used in Australia and the United Kingdom, where public agencies have a much more prominent enforcement role despite recent and proposed reforms to directors' duties and shareholder remedies. These reforms are designed to improve the ability of private parties to enforce corporate rights and duties. A survey of enforcement litigation in New Zealand since 1986 indicates that the object of a primarily enabling enforcement regime seems to have been achieved, and may well have been achieved even without the 1993 reform package. Private enforcement has, in fact, been much more prevalent than public enforcement since well before the enactment of the new legislation. Most enforcement action both before and after the reform was commenced by shareholders and shareholder/directors, and most involved closely held companies. Public enforcement was largely undertaken in areas such as securities law, where the wider public interest was affected. Similar surveys of Australian and United Kingdom enforcement litigation reveal a proportionally much greater reliance on public bodies to enforce corporate rights and duties, indicating a more regulatory approach. The ASIC and DTI enforced a wider range of provisions, affecting both closely and widely held companies, than those subject to public enforcement in New Zealand. Publicly enforced provisions in Australia and the United Kingdom include directors' duties and provisions dealing with disqualification from managing companies, as well as securities law requirements.

Identificador

http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30023196

Idioma(s)

eng

Publicador

Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Law

Relação

http://dro.deakin.edu.au/eserv/DU:30023196/berkahn-regulatoryandenabling-2003.pdf

http://dro.deakin.edu.au/eserv/DU:30023196/berkahn_matthew.pdf

Palavras-Chave #Corporation law - Australia #Corporation law - New Zealand #Corporation law - Great Britain #Law enforcement
Tipo

Thesis