Mobile termination, network externalities, and consumer expectations

We re-examine the literature on mobile termination in the presence of network externalities. Externalities arise when firms discriminate between on- and off-net calls or when subscription demand is elastic. This literature predicts that profit decreases and consumer surplus increases in termination charge in a neighborhood of termination cost. This creates a puzzle since in reality we see regulators worldwide pushing termination rates down while being opposed by network operators. We show that this puzzle is resolved when consumers' expectations are assumed passive but required to be fulfilled in equilibrium (as defined by Katz and Shapiro, AER 1985), instead of being rationally responsive to non-equilibrium prices, as assumed until now.

The role of network externalities in value creating process of the commercial web service for two-sided international markets

Network externalities and two-sided markets in the context of web services and value creation is not very well discussed topic in academic literature. The explosive rise of the Internet users has created a strong base for many successful web services and pushed many firms towards e-business and online service based business models. Thus the subject of this thesis, the role of network externalities in value creating process of the commer-cial web service for two-sided international markets is very current and interesting topic to examine. The objective of this Master’s Thesis is to advance the study of network externalities from the viewpoint of two-sided markets and network effects as well as describe the value creation & value co-creation process in commercial web service business models. The main proposition suggests that the larger network of customers and the bigger number of users the web service is able to attract, the more value and stronger positive net-work externalities the service is able to create for each customer group. The empirical research of this study was implemented for commercial web service, targeted to Russian consumers and Finnish business users. The findings suggest that the size of the network is highly related to the experi-enced value of the customers and the whole value creation process of commercial web targeted for two-sided international markets varies from the value creation for one-sided or pure domestic markets.

Competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities

We study competition in two sided markets with common network externality rather than with the standard inter-group e¤ects. This type of externality occurs when both groups bene t, possibly with di¤erent intensities, from an increase in the size of one group and from a decrease in the size of the other. We explain why common externality is relevant for the health and education sectors. We focus on the symmetric equilibrium and show that when the externality itself satis es an homogeneity condition then platforms pro ts and price structure have some speci c properties. Our results reveal how the rents coming from network externalities are shifted by platforms from one side to other, according to the homogeneity degree. In the speci c but realistic case where the common network externality is homogeneous of degree zero, platform s pro t do not depend on the intensity of the (common) network externality. This is in sharp contrast to conventional results stating that the presence of network externalities in a two-sided market structure increases the intensity of competition when the externality is positive (and decreases it when the externality is negative). Prices are a¤ected but in such a way that platforms only transfer rents from consumers to providers.

Doctors´ remuneration schemes and hospital competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities

This paper uses a two-sided market model of hospital competition to study the implications of di§erent remunerations schemes on the physiciansí side. The two-sided market approach is characterized by the concept of common network externality (CNE) introduced by Bardey et al. (2010). This type of externality occurs when occurs when both sides value, possibly with di§erent intensities, the same network externality. We explicitly introduce e§ort exerted by doctors. By increasing the number of medical acts (which involves a costly e§ort) the doctor can increase the quality of service o§ered to patients (over and above the level implied by the CNE). We Örst consider pure salary, capitation or fee-for-service schemes. Then, we study schemes that mix fee-for-service with either salary or capitation payments. We show that salary schemes (either pure or in combination with fee-for-service) are more patient friendly than (pure or mixed) capitations schemes. This comparison is exactly reversed on the providersíside. Quite surprisingly, patients always loose when a fee-for-service scheme is introduced (pure of mixed). This is true even though the fee-for-service is the only way to induce the providers to exert e§ort and it holds whatever the patientsívaluation of this e§ort. In other words, the increase in quality brought about by the fee-for-service is more than compensated by the increase in fees faced by patients.

Network externalities across financial institutions

We propose and estimate a financial distress model that explicitly accounts for the interactions or spill-over effects between financial institutions, through the use of a spatial continuity matrix that is build from financial network data of inter bank transactions. Such setup of the financial distress model allows for the empirical validation of the importance of network externalities in determining financial distress, in addition to institution specific and macroeconomic covariates. The relevance of such specification is that it incorporates simultaneously micro-prudential factors (Basel 2) as well as macro-prudential and systemic factors (Basel 3) as determinants of financial distress. Results indicate network externalities are an important determinant of financial health of a financial institutions. The parameter that measures the effect of network externalities is both economically and statistical significant and its inclusion as a risk factor reduces the importance of the firm specific variables such as the size or degree of leverage of the financial institution. In addition we analyze the policy implications of the network factor model for capital requirements and deposit insurance pricing.

Network Externalities in Developing Economies

This thesis contains three essays on microeconometrics, networks and economic development. In the first two essays I focus on developing country settings (Tanzania and Nepal respectively) to study how rural villagers form their social networks, and how the existence of these informal links impacts their welfare. The third essay focuses on the international trade of arms to investigate whether the political orientation of government in power makes any difference to arms export policy.

The new economy: Essays in network economics and two-sided markets

Following the Introduction, which surveys existing literature on the technology advances and regulation in telecommunications and on two-sided markets, we address specific issues on the industries of the New Economy, featured by the existence of network effects. We seek to explore how each one of these industries work, identify potential market failures and find new solutions at the economic regulation level promoting social welfare. In Chapter 1 we analyze a regulatory issue on access prices and investments in the telecommunications market. The existing literature on access prices and investment has pointed out that networks underinvest under a regime of mandatory access provision with a fixed access price per end-user. We propose a new access pricing rule, the indexation approach, i.e., the access price, per end-user, that network i pays to network j is function of the investment levels set by both networks. We show that the indexation can enhance economic efficiency beyond what is achieved with a fixed access price. In particular, access price indexation can simultaneously induce lower retail prices and higher investment and social welfare as compared to a fixed access pricing or a regulatory holidays regime. Furthermore, we provide sufficient conditions under which the indexation can implement the socially optimal investment or the Ramsey solution, which would be impossible to obtain under fixed access pricing. Our results contradict the notion that investment efficiency must be sacrificed for gains in pricing efficiency. In Chapter 2 we investigate the effect of regulations that limit advertising airtime on advertising quality and on social welfare. We show, first, that advertising time regulation may reduce the average quality of advertising broadcast on TV networks. Second, an advertising cap may reduce media platforms and firms' profits, while the net effect on viewers (subscribers) welfare is ambiguous because the ad quality reduction resulting from a regulatory cap o¤sets the subscribers direct gain from watching fewer ads. We find that if subscribers are sufficiently sensitive to ad quality, i.e., the ad quality reduction outweighs the direct effect of the cap, a cap may reduce social welfare. The welfare results suggest that a regulatory authority that is trying to increase welfare via regulation of the volume of advertising on TV might necessitate to also regulate advertising quality or, if regulating quality proves impractical, take the effect of advertising quality into consideration. 3 In Chapter 3 we investigate the rules that govern Electronic Payment Networks (EPNs). In EPNs the No-Surcharge Rule (NSR) requires that merchants charge at most the same amount for a payment card transaction as for cash. In this chapter, we analyze a three- party model (consumers, merchants, and a proprietary EPN) with endogenous transaction volumes and heterogenous merchants' transactional benefits of accepting cards to assess the welfare impacts of the NSR. We show that, if merchants are local monopolists and the network externalities from merchants to cardholders are sufficiently strong, with the exception of the EPN, all agents will be worse o¤ with the NSR, and therefore the NSR is socially undesirable. The positive role of the NSR in terms of improvement of retail price efficiency for cardholders is also highlighted.

Knowledge, networks of cities and growth in regional urban systems

The objective of this paper is to measure the impact of different kinds of knowledge and external economies on urban growth in an intraregional context. The main hypothesis is that knowledge leads to growth, and that this knowledge is related to the existence of agglomeration and network externalities in cities. We develop a three-tage methodology: first, we measure the amount and growth of knowledge in cities using the OCDE (2003) classification and employment data; second, we identify the spatial structure of the area of analysis (networks of cities); third, we combine the Glaeser - Henderson - De Lucio models with spatial econometric specifications in order to contrast the existence of spatially static (agglomeration) and spatially dynamic (network) external economies in an urban growth model. Results suggest that higher growth rates are associated to higher levels of technology and knowledge. The growth of the different kinds of knowledge is related to local and spatial factors (agglomeration and network externalities) and each knowledge intensity shows a particular response to these factors. These results have implications for policy design, since we can forecast and intervene on local knowledge development paths.

A Framework for Analyzing Language and Welfare

The paper proposes a general model that will encompass trade and social benefits of a common language, a preference for a variety of languages, the fundamental role of translators, an emotional attachment to maternal language, and the threat that globalization poses to the vast majority of languages. With respect to people’s emotional attachment, the model considers minorities to suffer losses from the subordinate status of their language. In addition, the model treats the threat to minority language as coming from the failure of the parents in the minority to transmit their maternal language (durably) to their children. Some familiar results occur. In particular, we encounter the usual social inefficiencies of decentralized solutions to language learning when the sole benefits of the learning are communicative benefits (though translation intervenes). However, these social inefficiencies assume a totally different air when the con-sumer gains of variety are brought in. One fundamental aim of the paper is to bring together contributions to the economics of language from labor economics, network externalities and international trade that are typically treated separately.

A Framework for Analyzing Language and Welfare

The paper proposes a general model that will encompass trade and social benefits of a common language, a preference for a variety of languages, the fundamental role of translators, an emo-tional attachment to maternal language, and the threat that globalization poses to the vast ma-jority of languages. With respect to people’s emotional attachment, the model considers minor-ities to suffer losses from the subordinate status of their language. In addition, the model treats the threat to minority language as coming from the failure of the parents in the minority to transmit their maternal language (durably) to their children. Some familiar results occur. In particular, we encounter the usual social inefficiencies of decentralized solutions to language learning when the sole benefits of the learning are communicative benefits (though translation intervenes). However, these social inefficiencies assume a totally different air when the con-sumer gains of variety are brought in. One fundamental aim of the paper is to bring together contributions to the economics of language from labor economics, network externalities and international trade that are typically treated separately.

Mobile termination and mobile penetration

In this paper, we study how access pricing affects network competition when subscription demand is elastic and each network uses non-linear prices and can apply termination-based price discrimination. In the case of a fixed per minute termination charge, we find that a reduction of the termination charge below cost has two opposing effects: it softens competition but helps to internalize network externalities. The former reduces mobile penetration while the latter boosts it. We find that firms always prefer termination charge below cost for either motive while the regulator prefers termination below cost only when this boosts penetration. Next, we consider the retail benchmarking approach (Jeon and Hurkens, 2008) that determines termination charges as a function of retail prices and show that this approach allows the regulator to increase penetration without distorting call volumes.

Mobile termination and mobile penetration

In this paper, we study how access pricing affects network competition when subscription demand is elastic and each network uses non-linear prices and can applytermination-based price discrimination. In the case of a fixed per minute terminationcharge, we find that a reduction of the termination charge below cost has two opposing effects: it softens competition but helps to internalize network externalities. Theformer reduces mobile penetration while the latter boosts it. We find that firms always prefer termination charge below cost for either motive while the regulator preferstermination below cost only when this boosts penetration.Next, we consider the retail benchmarking approach (Jeon and Hurkens, 2008)that determines termination charges as a function of retail prices and show that thisapproach allows the regulator to increase penetration without distorting call volumes.

Verkostovaikutteisen tuotteen lanseerauksen erityispiirteet business to business-markkinoilla

Tutkielman empiriaosuus kerättiin teemahaastatteluin. Case yrityksenä oli Osuma Finland Oy, jonka kehittämä kanta-asiakasjärjestelmä omasi verkostovaikutuksia. Yrityksen tekemää lanseerausstrategiaa peilataan teoriaan ja näin sekä teorian että empirian kautta löydetään vastaus siihen, kuinka verkostovaikutteisen tuotteen erityispiirteet vaikuttavat tuotteen lanseeraukseen. Johtopäätöksistä tärkeimmät ovat verkostovaikutteisen tuotteen ja tavallisen tuotteen erityispiirteiden erottamisen tärkeys ja niiden huomioon ottaminen lanseerausstrategiaa suunniteltaessa. Verkostovaikutteisen tuotteen lanseerauksessa tärkein tavoite on kasvattaa mahdollisimman nopeasti mahdollisimman suuri käyttäjämäärä. Lanseerausstrategiaa suunniteltaessa on tärkeää ottaa huomioon sekä tuotteen endogeeniset että eksogeeniset arvot. Tutkielman satona löytyneet eksogeeniset arvot, joita voidaan kuvata lanseerausstrategian kulmakiviksi, voidaan kiteyttää neljään tärkeään elementtiin, jotka ovat: hinnoittelu, sitominen eli kytkykauppa, segmentointi ja ennakkomarkkinointi. Verkostovaikutteisen tuotteen omaksuminen markkinoilla ei välttämättä perustu tuotteen tekniseen paremmuuteen, vaan oleellisinta on ymmärtää, ettätällaisen tuotteen arvo kasvaa, mitä suuremmaksi sen käyttäjien muodostama verkosto kasvaa. Lanseerausstrategiaa suunniteltaessa on tärkeää tunnistaa ja huomioida nämä erityispiirteet.

The economic value of reciprocal bilingualism

Some bilingual societies exhibit a distribution of language skills that can- not be explained by economic theories that portray languages as pure commu- nication devices. Such distribution of skills are typically the result of public policies that promote bilingualism among members of both speech commu- nities (reciprocal bilingualism). In this paper I argue that these policies are likely to increase social welfare by diminishing economic and social segmenta- tion between the two communities. However, these gains tend to be unequally distributed over the two communities. As a result, in a large range of circum- stances these policies might not draw su¢ cient support. The model is built upon the communicative value of languages, but also emphasizes the role of linguistic preferences in the behavior of bilingual individuals.