Temporary Natural Resource Cartels

We analyze the behavior of a nonrenewable resource cartel that anticipates being forced, at some date in the future, to break-up into an oligopolistic market in which its members will then have to compete as rivals. Under reasonable assumptions about the value function of the individual firms in the oligopolistic equilibrium that follows the break-up, we show that the cartel will then produce more over the same interval of time than it would if there were no threat of dissolution, and that its rate of extraction is a decreasing function of the cartel's life; that there are circumstances under which the cartel will attach a negative marginal value to the resource stocks, in which case the rate of depletion will be increasing over time during the cartel phase; that, for a given date of dissolution, the equilibrium stocks allocated to the post-cartel phase will increase as a function of the total initial stocks, whereas those allocated to the cartel phase will increase at first, but begin decreasing beyond some level of the total initial stocks.

On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games

We derive conditions that must be satisfied by the primitives of the problem in order for an equilibrium in linear Markov strategies to exist in some common property natural resource differential games. These conditions impose restrictions on the admissible form of the natural growth function, given a benefit function, or on the admissible form of the benefit function, given a natural growth function.

On the Optimal Order of Natural Resource Use When the Capacity of the Inexhaustible Substitute is Limited.

Consider a general equilibrium framework where the marginal cost of extraction from several deposits of an exhaustible resource is constant in terms of an inexhaustible perfect substitute and differs between deposits. the instantaneous rate of production form the inexhaustible resource is subject to a capacity constraint.

Natural-Resource Exploitation with Costly Enforcement of Property Rights

This paper proposes a model of natural-resource exploitation when private ownership requires costly enforcement activities. For a given wage rate, it is shown how enforcement costs can increase with labor's average productivity on a resource site. As a result, it is never optimal for the site owner to produce at the point where marginal productivity equals the wage rate. It may even be optimal to exploit at a point exhibiting negative marginal returns. An important parameter in the analysis is the prevailing wage rate. When wages are low, further decreases in the wage rates can reduce the returns from resource exploitation. At sufficiently low wages, positive returns can be rendered impossible to achieve and the site is abandoned to a free-access exploitation. The analysis provides some clues as to why property rights may be more difficult to delineate in less developed countries. It proposes a different framework from which to address normative issues such as the desirability of free trade with endogenous enforcement costs, the optimality of private decisions to enforce property rights, the effect of income distribution on property rights enforceability, etc.

Essays in resource economics

Cette thèse comporte trois essais en économie des ressources naturelles. Le Chapitre 2 analyse les effets du stockage d’une ressource naturelle sur le bien-être et sur le stock de celle-ci, dans le contexte de la rizipisciculture. La rizipisciculture consiste à élever des poissons dans une rizière en même temps que la culture du riz. Je développe un modèle d’équilibre général, qui contient trois composantes principales : une ressource renouvelable à accès libre, deux secteurs de production et le stockage du bien produit à partir de la ressource. Les consommateurs stockent la ressource lorsqu’ils spéculent que le prix de cette ressource sera plus élevé dans le futur. Le stockage a un effet ambigu sur le bien-être, négatif sur le stock de ressource au moment où le stockage a lieu et positive sur le stock de ressource dans le futur. Le Chapitre 3 étudie les effects de la migration de travailleurs qualifiés dans un modèle de commerce international lorsqu’il y a présence de pollution. Je développe un modèle de commerce à deux secteurs dans lequel j’introduis les questions de pollution et de migration dans l’objectif de montrer que le commerce interrégional peut affecter le niveau de pollution dans un pays composé de régions qui ont des structures industrielles différentes. La mobilité des travailleurs amplifie les effets du commerce sur le capital environnemental. Le capital environnemental de la région qui a la technologie la moins (plus) polluante est positivement (négativement) affecté par le commerce. De plus, je montre que le commerce interrégional est toujours bénéfique pour la région avec la technologie la moins polluante, ce qui n’est pas toujours le cas pour la région qui a la technologie la plus polluante. Finalement, le Chapitre 4 est coécrit avec Yves Richelle. Dans ce chapitre, nous étudions l’allocation efficace de l’eau d’un lac entre différents utilisateurs. Nous considérons dans le modèle deux types d’irréversibilités : l’irréversibilité d’un investissement qui crée un dommage à l’écosystème et l’irréversibilité dans l’allocation des droits d’usage de l’eau qui provient de la loi sur l’eau (irréversibilité légale). Nous déterminons d’abord la valeur de l’eau pour chacun des utilisateurs. Par la suite, nous caractérisons l’allocation optimale de l’eau entre les utilisateurs. Nous montrons que l’irréversibilité légale entraîne qu’il est parfois optimal de réduire la quantité d’eau allouée à la firme, même s’il n’y a pas de rivalité d’usage. De plus, nous montrons qu’il n’est pas toujours optimal de prévenir le dommage créé par un investissement. Dans l’ensemble, nous prouvons que les irréversibilités entraînent que l’égalité de la valeur entre les utilisateurs ne tient plus à l’allocation optimale. Nous montrons que lorsqu’il n’y a pas de rivalité d’usage, l’eau non utilisée ne doit pas être considérée comme une ressource sans limite qui doit être utilisée de n’importe quelle façon.

Natural resource windfalls and efficiency of local government expenditures: evidence from Peru

We study the role of natural resource windfalls in explaining the efficiency of public expenditures. Using a rich dataset of expenditures and public good provision for 1,836 municipalities in Peru for period 2001-2010, we estimate a non-monotonic relationship between the efficiency of public good provision and the level of natural resource transfers. Local governments that were extremely favored by the boom of mineral prices were more efficient in using fiscal windfalls whereas those benefited with modest transfers were more inefficient. These results can be explained by the increase in political competition associated with the boom. However, the fact that increases in efficiency were related to reductions in public good provision casts doubts about the beneficial effects of political competition in promoting efficiency.

Resource-dependent livelihoods and the natural resource base

The natural resource base, terrestrial and marine, provides rural households in lower-income countries with income, food, shelter, and medicines, which are variously gathered and hunted in common lands and waters. These resources may be actively managed, whether by the government or local community; or may be de facto open access, with little effort by governments to prevent what may be de jure illegal extraction. This paper provides an appraisal of the literature that encompasses the direct value of wild resources to rural households; the extent to which these resources mitigate poverty and inequality; and the importance of the institutional context. The literature is increasingly addressing competing demands on the resource base both to support nearby livelihoods, and to enhance ecosystem services such as biodiversity; and how initiatives such as community-based payments for ecosystem services are changing how people interact with the resource base.

Capacity building in the use of geospatial tools for natural resource management in Tajikistan: Final Report

The Swiss Swiss Consultant Trust Fund (CTF) support covered the period from July to December 2007 and comprised four main tasks: (1) Analysis of historic land degradation trends in the four watersheds of Zerafshan, Surkhob, Toirsu, and Vanj; (2) Translation of standard CDE GIS training materials into Russian and Tajik to enable local government staff and other specialists to use geospatial data and tools; (3) Demonstration of geospatial tools that show land degradation trends associated with land use and vegetative cover data in the project areas, (4) Preliminary training of government staff in using appropriate data, including existing information, global datasets, inexpensive satellite imagery and other datasets and webbased visualization tools like spatial data viewers, etc. The project allowed building of local awareness of, and skills in, up-to-date, inexpensive, easy-to-use GIS technologies, data sources, and applications relevant to natural resource management and especially to sustainable land management. In addition to supporting the implementation of the World Bank technical assistance activity to build capacity in the use of geospatial tools for natural resource management, the Swiss CTF support also aimed at complementing the Bank supervision work on the ongoing Community Agriculture and Watershed Management Project (CAWMP).

Capacity building in the use of geospatial tools for natural resource management in Tajikistan: Inception report BNWPP project

The Centre for Development and Environment (CDE) has been contracted by the World Bank Group to conduct a program on capacity development in use of geospatial tools for natural resource management in Tajikistan. The program aimed to help improving natural resource management by fostering the use of geospatial tools among governmental and non-governmental institutions in Tajikistan. For this purpose a database including a Geographic Information System (GIS) has been prepared, which combines spatial data on various sectors for case study analysis related to the Community Agriculture and Watershed Management Project (CAWMP). The inception report is based on the findings resulting from the Swiss Consultant Trust Fund (CTF) financed project, specifically on the experiences from the awareness creation and training workshop conducted in Dushanbe in November 2007 and the analysis of historical land degradation trends carried out for the four CAWMP watersheds. Furthermore, also recommendations from the inception mission of CDE to Tajikistan (5-20 August 2007) and the inception report for the Swiss CTF support were considered. The inception report for the BNWPP project (The Bank-Netherlands Water Partnership Program) discusses the following project relevant issues: (1) Preliminary list of additional data layers, types of data analysis, and audiences to be covered by BNWPP grant (2) Assessing skills and equipment already available within Tajikistan, and implications for training program and specific equipment procurement plans (3) Updated detailed schedule and plans for all activities to be financed by BNWPP grant, and (4) Proposed list of contents for the final report and web-based presentations.

Shaping Institutions for Natural Resource Management

This InfoResources Focus tries to clarify challenges people face when shaping institutions for sustainable NRM and discusses key elements for implementing processes of institutional change. Emphasis is put on local institutions embedded in national, regional and global institutional schemes.