Évolution narrative du concept théologique de royauté dans les récits du livre canonique de Daniel

L’avènement récent des approches littéraires en études bibliques a suscité un regain d’intérêt pour le livre de Daniel, et attiré l’attention autant sur ses qualités littéraires que sur sa véritable fonction sociale. Le livre de Daniel comprend deux sections : six récits (Daniel 1-6) et quatre visions (Daniel 7-12). Les récits racontent la confrontation entre la royauté divine céleste et la royauté humaine terrestre, au travers l’histoire de Daniel et ses amis, jeunes israélites exilés à la cour babylonienne. La méthode narrative explore comment se concrétise la narrativité dans un texte en procédant à l’inventaire des caractéristiques fondamentales d’un récit : l’intrigue, les personnages, le cadre, la temporalité et la voix narrative. Ce mémoire propose une analyse narrative systématique des récits du livre canonique de Daniel afin d’examiner l’évolution narrative du concept théologique de royauté. Cette approche permet d’accéder à un niveau textuel où l’intertextualité, l’ironie, le symbolisme et la polysémie imprègnent fortement ces récits subversifs.

La caractérisation du personnage Jésus dans la narration des Actes des Apôtres

Si la théologie lucanienne de la résurrection a largement été étudiée dans le livre des Actes des Apôtres, Jésus n’a jamais été considéré comme personnage principal, à l’inverse des apôtres, de l’Esprit saint ou même de Dieu. Pourtant, le premier verset des Actes laisse entendre que Jésus va continuer de faire et d’enseigner ce qu’il avait commencé dans l’évangile, même si, peu de temps après l’ouverture du récit, il quitte la scène. Pour chercher à comprendre ce paradoxe, une analyse approfondie de la mise en récit du personnage Jésus dans les Actes était nécessaire. Le premier chapitre de cette thèse introduit le sujet, l’état de la question et deux approches méthodologiques empruntées aux experts de la caractérisation narrative. Au chapitre deux, après avoir introduit la difficulté d’identification du personnage qui se trouve derrière le titre Seigneur des Actes, le cadre épistémologique d’Elizabeth Struthers Malbon permet d’observer le comment en classant toutes les péricopes qui participent à la rhétorique de la caractérisation christologique en cinq catégories : (1) la christologie représentée qui montre ce que Jésus fait, (2) la christologie détournée qui permet d’entendre ce que Jésus dit en réponse aux autres personnages, (3) la christologie projetée qui laisse entendre ce que les autres personnages ou le narrateur disent à Jésus et à son sujet, (4) la christologie réfléchie qui montre ce que les autres personnages font en reflétant ce que Jésus a dit et (5) la christologie reflétée qui montre ce que les autres personnages font en reflétant ce que Jésus a fait. Ensuite, avec le chapitre trois, l’approche de John Darr donne à comprendre le pourquoi de la caractérisation par l’observation de quatre activités cognitives du lecteur : (1) l’anticipation et la rétrospection, (2) la recherche de cohérence, (3) l’identification et/ou l’implication et (4) la défamiliarisation. Enfin, au chapitre quatre, les résultats des deux méthodes sont comparés pour proposer une solution au cas de l’ouverture paradoxale des Actes. D’abord les différentes observations de la thèse montrent que le personnage Jésus n’est pas si absent du récit; puis la rhétorique narrative de la caractérisation conduit le lecteur à comprendre que c’est essentiellement au travers des personnages du récit que Jésus est présent en actes et en paroles.

La caractérisation du personnage Jésus dans la narration des Actes des Apôtres

Si la théologie lucanienne de la résurrection a largement été étudiée dans le livre des Actes des Apôtres, Jésus n’a jamais été considéré comme personnage principal, à l’inverse des apôtres, de l’Esprit saint ou même de Dieu. Pourtant, le premier verset des Actes laisse entendre que Jésus va continuer de faire et d’enseigner ce qu’il avait commencé dans l’évangile, même si, peu de temps après l’ouverture du récit, il quitte la scène. Pour chercher à comprendre ce paradoxe, une analyse approfondie de la mise en récit du personnage Jésus dans les Actes était nécessaire. Le premier chapitre de cette thèse introduit le sujet, l’état de la question et deux approches méthodologiques empruntées aux experts de la caractérisation narrative. Au chapitre deux, après avoir introduit la difficulté d’identification du personnage qui se trouve derrière le titre Seigneur des Actes, le cadre épistémologique d’Elizabeth Struthers Malbon permet d’observer le comment en classant toutes les péricopes qui participent à la rhétorique de la caractérisation christologique en cinq catégories : (1) la christologie représentée qui montre ce que Jésus fait, (2) la christologie détournée qui permet d’entendre ce que Jésus dit en réponse aux autres personnages, (3) la christologie projetée qui laisse entendre ce que les autres personnages ou le narrateur disent à Jésus et à son sujet, (4) la christologie réfléchie qui montre ce que les autres personnages font en reflétant ce que Jésus a dit et (5) la christologie reflétée qui montre ce que les autres personnages font en reflétant ce que Jésus a fait. Ensuite, avec le chapitre trois, l’approche de John Darr donne à comprendre le pourquoi de la caractérisation par l’observation de quatre activités cognitives du lecteur : (1) l’anticipation et la rétrospection, (2) la recherche de cohérence, (3) l’identification et/ou l’implication et (4) la défamiliarisation. Enfin, au chapitre quatre, les résultats des deux méthodes sont comparés pour proposer une solution au cas de l’ouverture paradoxale des Actes. D’abord les différentes observations de la thèse montrent que le personnage Jésus n’est pas si absent du récit; puis la rhétorique narrative de la caractérisation conduit le lecteur à comprendre que c’est essentiellement au travers des personnages du récit que Jésus est présent en actes et en paroles.

Second person : a point of view? The function of the second person pronoun in narrative prose fiction

This thesis looks at the functions and effects of the ‘second-person’ pronoun in narrative prose fiction, with particular focus on the fluidity and ambiguity of the mode that I will call Protean-'you.' It is a mode in which it is unclear whether the ‘you’ is a character, the narrator, a reader/narratee, or no-one in particular—or a combination of these—so that readers find ‘second-person’ utterances at once familiar and deeply strange. I regard the ‘second person’ as a special case of narrative ‘person’ that, at its most fluid, can produce an experience of reading quite unlike that of reading traditional ‘first-‘ and ‘third-person’ narrative. Essentially, this unique experience comes about because Protean-‘you’ neglects to constitute the stable modes of subjectivity that readers expect to find within narrative textuality. These stable modes of subjectivity, modelled on what I will refer to as Cartesianism’s hegemonic notion of the self, have been thoroughly formalised and naturalised within the practices of ‘first-‘ and ‘third-person’ narrative. The Protean-‘you’ form of ‘second-person’ narrative, conversely, is a mode of narrative discourse that puts readers in a place of doubt and uncertainty, its unsettling equivocations forcefully disrupting accustomed, mimetic explanations of narrative and denying us access to the foundational, authorising subject of classical Cartesian thought. Rather than founding a notion of ‘second-person’ narrative and narrative ‘person’ generally on Cartesianism's ‘self-ish’ logic of unified, privatised identity, I turn to C.S, Peirce's notion of the semiotic self and to developments in post-structuralist thought. Essentially, the conception of subjectivity underpinning my arguments is Peirce's proposition that the self is to be conceived of not as a cogito, but as a sign by which the conscious entity knows itself. It is a sign, moreover, that is constantly being re-read, reinterpreted, so that identity is never self-complete. This reconception of subjectivity is necessary because 1 will argue that the effects of Protean-‘you’ arise in some part from a tension between Cartesianism's hegemony and what philosophical pragmatism and post-structuralism glimpse as the actual condition of the human subject—the subject as dispersed and contingent rather than unified and authoritative. Most discussions of ‘second-person’ narrative conceive of the mode in terms of implicit communicative relations, in some measure instituting Cartesianism's notion of the intentionalist self at the centre of literary meaning. I contrast the paradigmatic address model that arises from this conception against a model that approaches the analysis of ‘second-person’ narrative modality in terms of a referential function, that is, in terms of the object or objects referred to deictically by the ‘second-person’ pronoun. Two principal functions of ‘second-person’ textuality are identified and discussed at length. The first is generalisation, which is rarely dissipated altogether, a situation that contributes to the ambiguities of the pronoun's reference in much ‘second-person’ fiction. The second principal function is that of address, that is, the allocutionary function. Clearly, although stories that continually refer to a ‘you’ can seem quite baffling and unnatural, not all ‘second-person’ narratives unsettle the reader. In order to make the ‘second person's’ outlandish narratives knowable and stable, we bring to bear on them in our habits of reading whatever hermeneutic frames, whatever interpretive keys, come to hand, including a large number of unexceptional forms of literary and ‘natural’ discourse that employ the ‘second-person’ pronoun. These forms include letter writing and internal dialogue (i.e., talking to one's self), the language of the courtroom, the travelogue, the maxim, and so on. In looking at the ways in which the radicalising potentials of ‘second-person’ discourse are contained or recuperated, I focus on issues of vraisemblance and mimesis. Vraisemblance can be described as the ‘system of conventions and expectations which rests on/reinforces that more general system of ‘mutual knowledge’ produced within a community for the realisation and maintenance of a whole social world’. All of the forms of the vraisemblable are already instituted within social, cultural relations, so that what vraisemblance describes is the way we fit the inscriptions we read-that is, the way in which we naturalise what we read-into those given cultural and social forms. I also look at the conventionalising and naturalising work done by notions of mimesis in explaining relations between the world, our being in it, and texts, proposing that mimesis provides a principle buttress by which the good standing of the metaphor of ‘person’ is preserved in traditional and pre-critical modes of analysis. Indeed, the critic’s recourse to ‘person’ is in some measure always an engagement with mimesis. Any discussion that maintains that mimesis is in some way productive of meaning-which this thesis in fact does-must identify mimesis as a merely conventional category within practices of reading and semiosis more generally, and at the very least remove that term from its traditional position of transparent primacy and authority. Some of the most interesting and insightful arguments about ‘second-person’ narrative propose that the ‘second person’s’ most striking effects derive from the constitution of an ‘intersubjective’ experience of reading in which the subject positions of the ‘you’-protagonist, reader-narratee and narrator are combined into a fluid and indeterminate multiple subjectivity. Notions of intersubjectivity frequently position themselves as liberating the reader from Cartesianism's fixed, authoritative modes of subjectivity, Frequently, however, they tend implicitly to reinstate Cartesianism's notion of the self at the centre of textual practice and subjectivity. I look at Daniel Gunn's novel ‘Almost You’, at length in this context, illustrating the constant overdetermination of the ‘you’ and the novel's narrating voice, and demonstrating that this overdetermination leaves the origin of the narrative discourse, the identity of the narrator, and the ontological nature of both principal protagonists utterly ambiguous. The fluidity and ambiguity of Protean-‘you’ in ‘Almost You’ is discussed in terms of ‘second-person’ intersubjectivity, but with a view to demonstrating the indebtedness by the notion of intersubjectivity to Cartesianism's hegemony of ‘person’. I then turn to a discussion of what might be a more ‘old fashioned’ if perhaps ultimately more far-reaching approach to the ‘second person’s’ often startling ambiguities. This is Keats's notion of negative capability, a capacity or quality in which a person ‘is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason.’ I suggest that Protean-‘you’ texts will license all of the readings of ambiguity and fluidity proposed in my discussion of ‘Almost You’, but conclude that the instances of indeterminacy illustrate no more than that: the fluidity and deep ambiguity, and thus, finally, the lack of coherence, of Protean-‘you’ discourse. This has particular implications for how we are to consider readers’ experiences of narrative texts. More fundamentally, it has implications for how we are to consider readers as subjects. I suggest that unstable, ambiguous instances of ‘second-person’ narrative can tear the complex and systematic embroidery of ideological suture that unifies Cretinism’s experience or sense of subjectivity, leaving the reader in a condition of epistemological and ontological havoc. I go on to argue that much of the deeply unsettling effect of Protean-‘you’ discourse anises because its utterances explicitly gesture towards Cretinism’s notion of self. Protean-‘you’ involves a sense of address that is much more pronounced than we are accustomed to facing when reading literary narrative, alerting us to the presence of inscribed anthropomorphic subjects. At the very same time, protean-‘you’ leaves its inscribed subjects indeterminate, ambiguous. This conflict generates a tension between the anticipation of the emergence of speaking and listening selves and our inability to find them. I go on to propose that Protean-‘you’ narrative's lack of coherence is also to be understood as the condition of narrative actuality generally, but a condition that is vigorously mediated against by dominant practices of reading and writing, hocusing my discussion in this respect on the issue of narrative ‘person,’ I argue that narrative ‘person’ is constituted within texts as an apparent unity, but that it is in fact, produced as unitary solely within the practice of making sense, that is, Within our habits of reading, and so is never finally unified. I propose that this is the case for ‘first-‘ and ‘third-person’ modes no less than for the ‘second.’ Where ‘second-person’ narrative at its most radical and Protean differs from conventional ‘first-‘ and ‘third-person’ narratives is the degree to which each has been circumscribed by practices of tantalization, containment and limit, and, in particular, Cretinism’s hegemony of ‘person.’ It may be that the most significant insights ‘second-person’ narrative has to offer are to be found within its capacity to reveal to the engaged reader the underlying condition of narrative discourse, and more generally, its capacity to reveal the actual condition of the human subject-a condition in which, exactly like its textual corollary of narrative ‘person,’ the self is glimpsed as thoroughly dispersed and contingent.

Inventing (a) life: deconstruction and the praxis and poiesis of narrative

Deconstruction often sits awkwardly between the realm of literary studies and criticism, and philosophy proper. This paper explores the contribution that a deconstructive literacy might have for those engaged in writing narrative, as a practice and a product. Taking up Kristeva's reading of Arendt, and the Aristotelian categories of praxis and poiesis, it will be argued that the act of narrating life amounts to both the actual generation of the life it purports to describe, while also being a praxis in itself, one that need not produce anything, since the very act of engaging in/with it, leaves atraceless trace that itself is 'full of meaning'. Narrative, however, will not rest in either pole of Aristotle's binary structure. For Arendt, Kristeva will remind us, narrative is an activity that is very 'human', where we engender not just zoe, mere physiological life, but bios, a living that is not colonised by ends alone, and instead finding in itself a value, a fulfilment in its own process. Applied to the activity of story-making (autobiographical or otherwise), and also to pedagogical practice in the academy, this dual potential of narrative (at once to produce and to be an end unto itself) reframes the Beruf (calling) of creative writing. Deconstruction, in other words, assists us in appreciating the very ethical consequences of the labour of deciding where and when the story begins and ends, and who the protagonist is. Recalling us to the ontological implications of the thought of différance, this paper will attempt to demonstrate how the action of articulating the edges of story can be read as akin to that which turns the
featureless flux of time into bios, or human life that, according to Arendt, is what goes missing under totalitarianism.

Narrative Deliberation? On Storytelling as a Necessary Component of Public Deliberation

This paper deals with the place of narrative, that is, storytelling, in public deliberation. A distinction is made between weak and strong conceptions of narrative. According to the weak one, storytelling is but one rhetorical device among others with which social actors produce and convey meaning. In contrast, the strong conception holds that narrative is necessary to communicate, and argue, about topics such as the human experience of time, collective identities and the moral and ethical validity of values. The upshot of this idea is that storytelling should be a necessary component of any ideal of public deliberation. Contrary to recent work by deliberative theorists, who tend to adopt the weak conception of narrative, the author argues for embracing the strong one. The main contention of this article is that stories not only have a legitimate place in deliberation, but are even necessary to formulate certain arguments in the fi rst place; for instance, arguments drawing on historical experience. This claim, namely that narrative is constitutive of certain arguments, in the sense that, without it, said reasons cannot be articulated, is illustrated by deliberative theory’s own narrative underpinnings. Finally, certain possible objections against the strong conception of narrative are dispelled.

Religion and narrative in the "Metamorphoses" of Apuleius

In this thesis I explore the narratological paradigm of conversion and its usefulness in interpreting the Metamorphoses of Apuleius. I believe that this paradigm is not useful in exploring the novel. However, a closely related paradigm - which I call a "narrative of metamorphosis" - can in fact help us interpret the novel and make sense of the final book of the novel known as the Isis book, which has generated much scholarly debate.